A domestic policy-making approach to world market integration strategies in developing nations : Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia in comparision [i.e. comparison] by Robin, Christian
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2008
A domestic policy-making approach to world market integration strategies in
developing nations : Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia in comparision [i.e.
comparison]
Robin, Christian
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-163724
Dissertation
Published Version
Originally published at:
Robin, Christian. A domestic policy-making approach to world market integration strategies in developing
nations : Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia in comparision [i.e. comparison]. 2008, University of Zurich,
Faculty of Arts.
A DOMESTIC POLICY-MAKING APPROACH 
TO WORLD MARKET INTEGRATION 
STRATEGIES IN DEVELOPING NATIONS 
 
CHILE, ARGENTINA, PERU, AND BOLIVIA IN 
COMPARISION 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis  
presented to the Faculty of Arts  
of the University of Zurich  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
by 
 
Christian Robin 
of Uznach (SG) 
 
 
Accepted on the recommendation of 
Professor Dr. Thomas Bernauer and Professor Dr. Dieter Ruloff 
Zurich, 2008 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
A DOMESTIC POLICY-MAKING APPROACH TO WORLD 
MARKET INTEGRATION STRATEGIES IN DEVELOPING 
NATIONS 
 
CHILE, ARGENTINA, PERU, AND BOLIVIA IN 
COMPARISION 
 
 
Christian Robin 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
A Domestic Policy-Making Approach to World Market Integration Strategies in Developing 
Nations: The Case of Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia in Comparison. 
 
Christian Robin 
 
Abstract 
How, and to what extent, does the success of world market integration strategies in 
developing countries depend on the institutional strength of state bureaucracies and business 
associations? Guided by this research question, this study examines in four South America 
countries the system of interest intermediation in the trade area and therefore responds from a 
political scientist view to the increasingly complex nature of international trade policy. 
Particularly since the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the emergence of 
a new bustling Regionalism in the 1990s, strongly influencing the South American region, 
trade policy no longer primarily refers to the level of national tariffs, but implies the close 
coordination among a broad set of policy areas, covering both border and behind-the-border 
measures, and parallel negotiations on different bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. 
The study demonstrates, in the case of Chile, that the successful world market integration of 
the southern Andean State was strongly influenced by the institutional properties of the 
General Directorate of International Economic Relations (DIRECON) inside the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the associative capacities of the export oriented private sector. On the 
other hand, the study shows that world market integration strategies in Argentina, Peru and 
particularly Bolivia were not as successful, mainly due the observed absence of solid 
institutions inside the state and business sectors. Data collection relied on an extensive set of 
guided and informal interviews with case-involved actors and outside experts collected from 
September 2003 to March 2005. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wie und bis zu welchem Grad steht der Erfolg wirtschaftlicher Öffnungsprozesse in 
Entwicklungsländern im Zusammenhang mit der institutionellen Kapazität staatlicher 
Bürokratien und von Unternehmerverbänden? Geleitet von dieser Fragestellung untersucht die 
Studie in vier südamerikanischen Staaten das System der Interessensvermittlung im 
Handelsbereich und geht damit aus einer politikwissenschaftlichen Perspektive auf das 
Phänomen der zunehmenden Komplexität der internationalen Handelspolitik ein. Spätestens 
mit der Schaffung der Welthandelsorganisation und der raschen Expansion thematisch 
weitreichender bilateraler und regionaler Handelsabkommen in den 1990er Jahren entspricht 
Handelspolitik nicht mehr primär der Festlegung von Zolltarifen, sondern sie impliziert eine 
enge Koordination zwischen einer Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Politikbereiche und die parallele 
Durchführung von Verhandlungen auf bilateraler, regionaler und multilateraler Ebene. 
Das Beispiel von Chile zeigt, dass die erfolgreiche Weltmarktintegration des südlichen 
Andenstaates seit Mitte der 1980er massgeblich durch die institutionelle Kapazität der 
Generaldirektion für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (DIRECON) innerhalb des 
Aussenministeriums und einer kohärenten Verbandsstruktur innerhalb des exportorientierten 
Privatsektors erklärt werden kann. Im Gegensatz dazu wird in der Studie dargelegt, dass der 
wirtschaftliche Integrationserfolg in Ländern wie Argentinien, Peru, und insbesondere 
Bolivien aufgrund defizitärer institutioneller Rahmenbedingungen weitgehend ausblieb. Die 
Datenerhebung beruht auf einer umfassenden Reihe offener und geleiteter Interviews, welche 
zwischen September 2003 und März 2005 durchgeführt wurden. 
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CENI   Study Centre of International Negotiations (Centro de Estudios para las Negociaciones 
Internacionales) 
CERA  Arg. Export Chamber (Cámara Argentina de Exportadores) 
CET  Common External Tariff 
CIAI  Arg. Chamber of Clothing Industry (Camara Industrial Argentina de la Indumentaria) 
CIARA-CEC Arg. Chamber of Vegetable Oils Industry-Centre of Cereals Exporters (Cámara de la 
Industria Aceitera de la República Argentina- Centro de Exportadores de Cereales) 
CICA  Arg. Chamber of Footwear Industry (Cámara de la Industria de Calzado Argentina) 
CIL  Centre of Dairy Industry (Centro de la Industria Lechera) 
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CILFA  Chamber of Argentinean Pharmaceutical Laboratories (Cámara Industrial de Laboratorios 
Farmaceuticos Argentinos) 
CIPA  Chamber of Foodstuffs Industry (Cámara de Industriales de Productos Alimenticios) 
CIQIP  Chamber of Chemical and Petrochemical Industry (Cámara de la Industria Química y 
Petroquímica) 
CIS  Centre of Steel Industry (Centro de Industriales Siderúrgicos)  
CGE  General Confederation of Economy (Confederación General Económica) 
CGT  General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General del Trabajo) 
CNCE  National Foreign Trade Commission (Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior) 
CONIAGRO Confederation of Rural Cooperatives (Confederación Intercooperativa Agropecuaria) 
COOPERALA Enterpreneurial Chamber of Pharmaceutical Laboratories (Cámara Empresaria de 
Laboratorios Farmacéuticos) 
COPAL Coordinator for Food and Beverage Industry (Coordinadora de las Industrias de  
  Productos Alimenticios) 
CORFO  Chilean Development Corporation (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción) 
CRA  Arg. Rural Confederations ( Confederación Rural Argentina) 
FAA  Arg. Agrarian Federation (Federación Agraria Argentina) 
FAIGA Arg. Federation of Grafic Industry (Federación Argentina de la Industria Gráfica y Afines) 
FCES  MERCOSUR Economic and Social Consultative Forum (Foro Económico y Social del 
MERCOSUR) 
FITA  Arg. Federation of Textiles Industries (Federación Argentina de Industrias Textiles) 
FTA  Free Trade Area 
FTAA  Free Trade Area of the America 
GMC Common Market Group (Grupo del Mercado Común) 
IDI                   Institute for Industrial Development (Instituto para el Desarrollo Industrial) 
INAI Institute of International Agriculture Negotiations (Instituto de Negociaciones Agrícolas 
Internacionales) 
INDEC National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos) 
INTI  National Institute of Industrial Technology (Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial) 
ISEN National Foreign Service Institute (Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación) 
MENA  National Entrepreneurial Round Table (Mesa Empresarial Nacional) 
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur) 
MEP  Ministry of Economy and Production (Ministerio de Economía y Producción) 
MIA  Argentinean Industrial Movement (Movimento Industrial Argentino) 
MIN  National Industrial Movement (Movimiento Industrial Nacional) 
MRECIC Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade and Worship (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto)  
MOI  Manufactures of Industrial Origin (Manufacturas de Origen Industrial) 
PICE  Argentinean-Brazilian Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation (Programa de 
 Integración y Cooperación Económica) 
SEBRAE Brazilian Service for Micro y Small Firm Support (Servicio Brasilero de Apoyo de Micro 
y Pequeñas Empresas) 
SICE  Secretariat of Industry and Foreign Trade (Secretaría de Industria y Comercio Exterior) 
SINAPA National System of Administrative Profession (Sistema Nacional de la Profesión  
  Administrativa) 
SRA  Argentinean Rural Society (Sociedad Rural Argentina) 
UIA  Argentinean Industrialists Union (Unión Industrial Argentina) 
UGT  General Union of Milk Producers (Unión General de Tamberos) 
YPF  State Petroleum Company (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) 
 
 
Peru 
 
ACE  Economic Complementary Agreement (Acuerdo de Complementación Económica) 
ADEX  Exporters Association (Asociación de Exportadores) 
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ADIFAN  Association of Pharmaceutical Industries of National Origin (Asociación de Industrias 
Farmacéuticas de Origen y Capital Nacionales) 
AGAP  Association of Agro Exporter Entities (Asociación de Gremios Productores 
Agroexportadores) 
ALADI Latin American Integration Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración) 
ALAFARPE  National Association of Pharmaceutical Laboratories of Peru (Asociación Nacional de 
Laboratorios Farmaceúticos de Perú 
APEC   Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APESEG Peruvian Association of Assurance Companies (Asociación Peruana de Empresas de 
Seguros)  
ATPA  Andean Trade Promotion Act 
ATPDEA Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act  
CADE   Annual Business Executives Conferences (Conferencia Anual de Ejecutivos) 
CAF  Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento) 
CAN  Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones) 
CCL  Lima Chamber of Commerce (Cámara de Comercio de Lima)  
CENI  Entrepreneurial Council of International Negotiations (Consejo Empresarial de  
  Negociones Internaciones) 
CEPES  Peruvian Centre of Social Studies (Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales) 
CERTEX Certificate of Tax Return on Non-Traditional Exports (Certificado de Reintegro a la 
Exportación No Tradicional) 
CET  Common External Tariff 
CNC  National Council for Competitiveness  
COMEXPERU Foreign Trade Society of Peru 
COMPYMEP Peruvian Council of Micro, Small, Medium Scale Firms Organizations (Consejo de 
Organizaciones de la Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa del Perú) 
CONFIEP National Confederation of Private Entrepreneurship Institutions (Confederación Nacional 
de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas) 
CONVEAGRO National Agrarian Convention (Convención Nacional Del Agro) 
COPEI  Committee of Small Industry (Comité de la Pequeña Industria) 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
FONGAL  National Fund of Dairy Livestock (Fondo Nacional de Ganadería Lechera) 
FOPEX Fund for Non-Traditional Export Promotion 
FTA  Free Trade Area 
GSP  General System of Preferences 
ICE  Foreign Trade Institute (Instituto de Comercio Exterior)  
IDB Inter-American Development Bank 
INDECOPI National Institute of Intellectual Property and Competition Defense (Instituto Nacional de 
Defensa del Consumidor) 
IPAE  Peruvian Institute of Business Administration (IPAE) 
IPE  National Planning Institute  
IPR  Intellectual Properties Rights 
MICITI Ministry of Industry, Domestic Trade, Tourism and Integration (Ministerio de Industria, 
Comercio Interno, Turismo e Integración) 
MINAG Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) 
MITI Ministry of Industry, Tourism, Integration (Ministerio de Industria, Turismo, Integración) 
MITINCI Ministry of Industry, Tourism, Integration and International Trade Negotiations 
(Ministerio de Industria, Turismo, Integración y Negociaciones Comerciales 
Internacionales) 
MEF  Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas) 
MINCETUR Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo) 
ONIT  National Integration Office (Oficina Nacional de Integración) 
PBS  Price Band System 
PENX   National Export Plan (Plan Nacional de Exportación) 
PeruCámeras National Chamber of Commerce, Production & Services (Cámara Nacional de 
Commercio, Producción y Servicios)  
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PROMPEX Export Promotion Commission (Comisión para la Promoción de Exportaciones) 
SADA  Arequipa Rural Society (Sociedad Agrícola de Arequipa) 
SENASA National Servico of Agrarian Sanity (Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agraria) 
SNMPE  National Society of Mining, Petroleum & Energy (Sociedad Nacional de Minería, 
Petroleo y Energía) 
SNI  National Industry Society (Sociedad Nacional de Industrias) 
SNP  National Fishery Society (Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería) 
UP  Pacific University (Universidad del Pacífico) 
US-AFTA United States-Andean Free Trade Agreement 
USTR  United States Trade Representative 
VMCE  Vice-Ministry of Foreign Trade (Vice-Ministerio de Comercio Exterior) 
 
 
Bolivia 
 
ABA  Bolivian Association of Insurances (Asociación Boliviana de Aseguradoras) 
ACE  Economic Complementary Agreement (Acuerdo de Complementación Económica) 
ACAP  Central Storehouse of Farming Equipments (Almacen Central Agricola y Pecuario) 
ADN  Democratic Nationalist Action (Acción Democrática Nacionalista) 
ALADI Latin American Integration Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración) 
ALALC Latin American Association for Free Trade (Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre 
Comercio) 
ANAPO National Association of Oleaginous and Wheat Producers (Asociación de Productores de 
Oleaginosas y Trigo) 
ATPA  Andean Trade Preference Act 
ATPDEA Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
ASOBAN Bolivian Association of Private Banks (Asociación de Bancos Privados de Bolivia) 
CABOFACE National Brewery Chamber (Cámara Boliviana de Fabricantes de Cerveza) 
CADEPIA Departamental Chamber of Small Scale Industry (Cámara Departamental de la Pequeña 
Industria y Artesanía) 
CADEX Santa Cruz Export Chamber (Cámara de Exportadores de Santa Cruz) 
CAF  Andean Development Coporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento) 
CAINCO Santa Cruz Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Services and Tourism (Cámara de Industria, 
Comercio, Servicios y Turismo de Santa Cruz) 
CAMEX La Paz Chamber of Exporters (Cámara de Exportadores de La Paz) 
CAN  Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones)  
CANEB National Chamber of Exporters (Cámara Nacional de Exportadores) 
CAO  Eastern Chamber of Agriculture (Cámara Oriental de Agricultura)  
CBC  National Chamber Construction (Cámara Nacional de la Construcción) 
CBF  Bolivian Development Corporation (Corporación Boliviana de Fomento)  
CEDEIM Tax Refund Certificates (Certificados de Devolución Impositiva) 
CEDLA Study Centre of Labor and Rural Development (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo 
Laboral y Agrario) 
CEPB  Bolivian Confederation of Private Entrepreneurship (CEPB) 
CEPROBOL Promotion Centre of Bolivia (Centro de Promoción Bolivia) 
CERTEX Certificates of Tax Reimbursments (Certificados de Reintegro Tributarios) 
CIFABOL Bolivian Chamber of Pharmaceutical Industry (Cámara de la Industria Farmacéutica de 
Bolivia) 
CIOEC Coordinator of Small Scale Farming Unit Organizations of Bolivia (Comité Integrador de 
Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas) 
CNC  National Chamber of Commerce (Cámara Nacional de Comercio) 
CNI  National Chamber of Industry (Cámara Nacional de Industria) 
COB  Central Workers Union (Central Obrera Boliviana) 
CODEPLAN National Council of Economy and Planning (Consejo Nacional de Economía y 
Planificación) 
COMIBOL Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia) 
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CONAPE National Council of Economic Policy (Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica) 
CONEX National Export Council (Consejo Nacional de Exportaciones) 
CORDECRUZ Santa Cruz Development Corporation (Corporación de Desarrollo de Santa Cruz) 
ENEX  National Export Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Exportaciones)  
FEBOPI Bolivian Federation of Small Industry (Federación Boliviana de la Pequeña Industria) 
FEGASACRUZSanta Cruz Federation of Livestock Farming (Federación de Ganaderos de Santa Cruz) 
GSP  Generalised System of Preferences 
IBCE  Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade (Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior) 
INE  National Institute for Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) 
ITC  International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO 
INPEX  National Institute of Export Promotion (Instituto Nacional de Promoción de 
Exportaciones) 
LOPE  Ministerial Law of the Executive Power (Ley de Organización del Poder Ejecutivo) 
MAS  Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo) 
MBL  Free Bolivian Movement (Moviemiento Bolivia Libre) 
MDE  Ministry of Economic Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico) 
MCEI  Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior e 
Inversiones) 
MECE  Ministry of Exports and Economic Competitiveness  (Ministerio de Exportaciones y 
Competitividad Económica) 
MIR  Leftist Revolution Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) 
MNR  Nationalist Revolution Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) 
RITEX Temporary Import Regime for Export Promotion (Régimen de Internación Temporal para 
Perfeccionamiento Activo). 
SAFCO System of Financial Administration and Governmental Control (Sistema de 
Administración Financiera y Control Gubernamental) 
SAT  Technical Assistance Service (Servicio de Asistencia Técnica) 
SBPC  Bolivian System of Productivity and Competitiveness (Sistema Boliviano de 
Productividad  y Competitividad) 
SEGIN  General Secretariat of Integration (Secretaría General de Integración) 
SENASA National Service of Agriculture Sanity (Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agroalimentaria) 
SENAPI National Service of Intelectual Property (Servicio Nacional de Propiedad Intelectual) 
SICOMEX Service of Foreign Trade Information (Servicio de Información para Comercio Exterior) 
SLDC  Small and Less Developed Country 
UDAPE Analyzing Unit for Economic and Social Policy (Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales 
y Económicas) 
UMSA  Mayor University of San Andrés (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés) 
UNCI  Unit for International Trade Negotiation (Unidad de Negociaciones Comerciales  
  Internacionales) 
UPC  Productivity and Competitiveness Unit (Unidad de Productividad y Competitividad) 
US-AFTA United States - Andean Free Trade Talks  
USAID United States Development Agency 
USTR  United States Trade Representative  
VAT  Value Added Tax  
VICE  Vice-Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Exports (Vice-Ministerio de Industria,  
  Comercio y Exportaciones) 
VREI  Vice-Ministry of International Economic Relations (Vice-Ministerio de Relaciones 
Economicas Internacionales) 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
If we are to understand the modern challenges of world market integration, there are few better 
examples than those found in South America. More than in any other region, countries in this 
region have experienced drastic changes during the last two decades concerning the way their 
economies are integrated into global markets. In the 1980s, these changes were mainly a result of 
external shocks, in terms of debt crises and the consequent balance of payment problems which 
forced governments to abandon the remaining features of the state-led import substitution 
industrialisation strategies practiced since the 1930s. Consequently, these countries began shifting 
towards a widespread disengagement of the State in national economies, and the liberalisation of 
trade regimes in particular (Edwards 1995). These initial reform steps, aimed at further economic 
openness, were largely based on unilateral measures and, in the case of trade reforms, implied a 
substantial reduction of external tariffs – from a annual regional average of over 40 percent to just 
12 percent (Devlin/Estevadeordal 2001: 1). 
On more stable macroeconomic grounds, trade policy took on a new meaning during the 
1990s. The adjustment approach (Williamson 1990), with the principal goal of correcting relative 
prices, was no longer the central pillar, instead, national governments set forth active world 
market integration plans, and fostered the development of exports as a means to lower their 
dependency on a narrow range of mostly unprocessed commodities; which until this point had 
been one of the main causes of the balance of payment problems experienced by most countries in 
the region (Loser/Guerguil 1999).  
A strategic and indispensable policy tool in this process constituted the search for market 
access and foreign investments, by means of reciprocal forms of liberalisation. On the multilateral 
level, the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) was South America’s first significant experience within 
the multilateral trading system. While almost entirely absent within the former system of the 
General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT), from 1995 the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) evolved into a vital reference framework for policy-makers in the region, i.e. South 
American countries not only incorporated the WTO agreements into national law, but undertook 
far-reaching commitments in most areas involved. On the regional and extra-regional level, the 
countries’ involvement became even more widespread than with multilateral initiatives. In this 
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respect, the customs union agreements of the Common Market of the South, or “MERCOSUR” 
(Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and the Andean Group (Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador) stand out, as do numerous bilateral preferential trade agreements, both 
between Latin American countries, and with trading partners in Europe, North America, and Asia. 
With this agenda, Latin America became a paradigmatic case of modern trade policies. 
Rather than being based merely on unilateral measures, trade policy has increasingly been 
implemented by reciprocal forms of liberalisation on the multilateral and (extra-) regional level. 
Furthermore, the notion of “trade” has become much broader. Rather than the traditional focus on 
abolishing tariff and non-tariff barriers, the WTO, MERCOSUR and North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) all moved towards a wide set of “behind-the-border-measures” affecting 
foreign business transactions, such as regulating services, investment, state procurement, 
intellectual property rights and subsidies. 
This shift in the trade policy agenda was accompanied by changing views on what 
constitutes a successful strategy for world market integration. Discussions no longer focussed 
only on whether or not openness to trade – low tariffs, absent non-tariff barriers (NTB’s) and 
export taxes – proves beneficial to developing countries, but on how, when and under what rules 
and background conditions trade liberalisation is to be carried out. For example, Dani Rodrik, a 
prominent critic of the WTO, does not question the positive effects of free trade on economic 
growth, productivity and poverty reduction in the long-term, but suggests that WTO institutions – 
being, to a wide extent, the reference schemes for regional initiatives – do not adequately meet the 
necessities of developing nations, and argues in favour of a more gradualist approach based on 
“local experimentation” (Rodrik 1999; 2000b). 
On the other hand, in recent years the World Bank – often criticised for its “one-size-fits-
all” approach to trade reform when advising bank clients – has been urged to expand its focus. 
According to “Assessing WB support for trade 1987-2004” by the World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG 2006), the Bank traditionally placed too much emphasis on import 
liberalisation, especially during the initial period of reform, having been overly optimistic for 
growth in the short run. Accordingly (IEG 2006: xvi), “it underestimated the complexity and 
sequencing of complementary policies (e.g. competition, labour, fiscal policies); the role of the 
external environment (investment climate), the interaction among trade, growth, and 
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distributional outcomes; and the country-specific context (such as initial conditions and 
institutions) in which these policies interacted”. 
Studying experiences in South America, we find strong empirical arguments that suggest 
that “trade openness” plays a secondary role when explaining the success of world market 
integration processes. For instance, in 1985 Bolivia opted for a liberal, outward-oriented model, 
abandoning tariff ceilings, NTBs and other regulations that distorted domestic prices, and in the 
process becoming one of the earliest reformers in Latin America. Moreover, in the 1990s the 
country signed a broad range of multilateral and regional trade agreements to consolidate and 
enhance the “modern economy” image. However, after twenty years, tangible benefits for the 
Bolivian people were negligible, and the once visionary New Economic Policy turned into a 
symbol of social exclusion that, for many sectors of Bolivian society, embodied the “disruptive 
forces” of globalisation.1 Therefore, in this case low tariffs and a high number of trade agreements 
can be viewed as a failure, rather than a policy success, thus favouring the arguments put forward 
by free trade critics convinced that protectionist, state-led development strategies offer the best 
chances for developing countries. 
Nevertheless, explanations must not be over simplified. For instance, Chile, with currently 
the lowest tariff levels in the region, can indeed be seen as a successful case, as this thesis will 
show in Chapter Three. But in Chile, the application of low uniformed, or “flat rate”, tariffs was 
just one of several features crucial to the country’s policy success.2 Contrary to experiences in 
other South American countries over the last 20 years, Chile has managed to implement a 
coherent mixture of unilateral, regional and extra-regional trade policy measures, underlining its 
capacity to make simultaneous use of each level in favour of national export development. The 
cornerstone of the applied Multipolar Model embraced, aside from the flat rate concept, active 
trade policy on the regional and extra-regional level, and wide-reaching export promotion 
schemes for non-traditional exports. Finally, “heterodox”, state-led policies were employed to 
accompany and prepare the relatively threatened segments of the local agriculture and small 
business sectors for the impacts of liberalised trade. 
                                                 
1 In January 2006, a socialist government was elected with Evo Morales, the first State President with indigenous 
origins, at the helm. Consequently, the new Government Development Plan put in force has sought so far to rid itself 
of every element that composed the former NEP approach. 
2 In the following chapter, “Analytical Framework”, I divide “policy success” into three possible categories; policy 
outcome (trade performance), policy impact (economic growth/poverty reduction) and policy output (the result of 
policy-making processes, e.g. trade reforms). For the purpose of this thesis, the policy success is output oriented.   
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Thus, it is natural to ask ourselves whether Chile’s strategy could be implemented by any 
other country. Indeed, given the widespread problems regarding the development of national 
world market integration strategies, reliable policy advice in this area is strongly needed. 
However, attempts to transfer successful “blueprints” from one economy to another commonly 
fail, due to domestic background conditions that widely differ from those of model cases. Peru 
and Bolivia, and later also Argentina, faced harsh difficulties in adopting Chile’s approach to 
integration, as this thesis exposes in chapters four, five and six. Thus, the key objective of this 
thesis is not primarily to question “what” strategy is required for successful world market 
integration, but to “how” and “under what background conditions” such strategies are acquired 
and maintained over time. 
In Peru, for example, when far-reaching economic reforms were implemented in 1991, key 
economic policy-makers decided to undergo a world market integration strategy very similar in 
design to the Chilean example. But in the aftermath, major incoherencies were identified both 
regarding time inconsistency and contradictions between unilateral trade liberalisation, regional 
integration initiatives and export promotion schemes. Thus, Peru’s example highlights the essence 
of today’s trade policy-making, which particularly stresses the capabilities of developing 
countries: Trade policy is not about singular reform steps concerning the level of national tariffs, 
but rather is a set of policy areas, covering both border and behind-the-border-measures, parallel 
negotiations on different international levels, and the complex incorporation of trade agreements 
into national laws.  
Nevertheless, existing theories on trade policy mainly focus on the preferences of domestic 
actors, and refer to the redistributive character of trade policies that are manifested at given 
moments. Literature on International Political Economy conceives trade decisions as conflict 
management among economic sectors that face dramatic changes in the rules and institutions that 
govern their markets (Milner 1988; Hillman 1989; Frieden 1991; Rodrik 1995; Hiscox 2002). 
Based on a sectoral approach, whereby production factors are understood to be immobile between 
industries, the outcome of such processes can be explained by analysing the political behaviour of 
export-oriented industries that favour liberalisation, and respectively, the import-competing sector 
being affected by reform steps. But this traditional view on the “politics of trade reforms” must be 
complemented in light of the current challenges of world market integration. For example, the 
analysis of actor preferences might explain why Chile adopted more outward-oriented policies 
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than Brazil, where influential domestic market-oriented industrialists effectively inhibit far-
reaching trade liberalisations. But it is harder to explain why Peru, which likewise undertook far-
reaching trade reforms, failed to implement integration policies with the same success as Chile. 
Therefore, to fill this explanatory gap, in this thesis I examine the effects of institutions 
involved in domestic policy-making processes, that is, formal and informal rules which shape the 
behaviour of collective actors, analysing to what extent these factors favour, or hinder, the 
success of world market integration strategies. The relevance of institutional variables, ranging 
from coordination among public and private actors, parliament procedures, state bureaucracy 
structures, and forms of business participation, to the resources and analytical capacities of civil 
society actors, has been highlighted by several working papers published by international 
organisations concerned with positive economic integration scenarios for Latin American States, 
such as the Inter-American Development Bank (Jordana/Ramió 2002; Ostry 2002) and the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Porras 2003; Sáez 2005). These 
papers provide a good overview of the institutional topics involved in the process of trade policy-
making. But in order to reveal the causal relationship between particular institutional features 
and the success of world market integrations strategies, the work to be undertaken requires a 
stronger delimitation of key variables, the systematisation of empirical data, and the analysis of 
cause-effects links within determined time periods. 
Drawing on neo-institutionalism literature by Schmitter and Streeck (1999) and Peter 
Evans (1995), in this thesis I thus systematise the analysis of the institutional factors of state 
bureaucracies and business associations, enlightening the cause-effects links between them and 
the success of world market integrations strategies. The analysis of the complex internal structures 
of state bureaucracy - defined as the executive branch in charge of trade policy - becomes 
particularly revealing due to its central position in the conduction of international trade policy 
affairs, considering that in developing countries the involvement of the legislative branch is often 
very limited. Indeed, although practically all South American countries have returned to 
democracy since the 1980s, democratic achievements to date appear to have been limited only to 
the right to vote and to express opinions freely.  
On the other hand, business associations, i.e. trade and industrial chambers, and peak and 
sectoral organisations, are not only expected to assume the task of intermediating among the 
economic sectors affected by trade policy rules, but should also have key trade data at their 
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disposal, such as growth perspectives, consumer trends, technological innovations, fiscal and 
labour regulations, sanitary rules and technical obstacles. In the light of these institutional 
imperatives, this book has sought to find answers to the following research question:  
How, and to what extent, does the success of world market integration strategies 
in developing countries depend on the institutional strength of state 
bureaucracies and business associations? 
This research question is relevant for both practical and theoretical reasons. As noted, the 
challenge faced by developing nations to integrate into world markets has changed in such a way 
that it has become necessary to highlight the close relationship between national and international 
trade policies. But while the participation of developing countries within the world trading system 
has widely been discussed, little systematised work has been done on the domestic perspectives in 
developing countries, that is, how domestic actors are facing the challenges of international trade 
policy tendencies. A better understanding of domestic policy-making processes is crucial if we are 
to understand results achieved at the international level, and draw insights on how to take best 
advantage of opportunities provided by the current system, and how to change international trade 
rules to favour developing states. 
Therefore, this study will analyse the success of world market integration strategies, 
whereby such strategies are conceptualised as a particular set of trade related policies that 
developing countries adopt within the context of a gradual liberalisation of the global economy, 
and a shift of trade policy-making towards regional and multilateral levels.3 For the purpose of 
this study, success is defined as a high degree of coherence by implementing a world market 
integration strategy, considering to what extent essential principals, policies, and objectives of the 
selected strategy have been put into practice and maintained over the period of analysis. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that coherently implemented, or “successful”, world market 
integration strategies will contribute to a successful trade performance, such as high export 
growth and export diversification, and finally, to achieve the goal of poverty reduction in two 
ways - by contributing to economic growth, and by creating jobs. Chapter two, the analytical 
framework, will deepen the discussion on key concepts, and also shed light on the control 
                                                 
3 As the analytical framework exposes in detail, the world market integration strategies pursued thus far by South 
American countries have ranged between: The Multipolar Model based on the creation of a dense network of 
bilateral free trade agreements in- and outside the region; and the Springboard Model, which focuses on deeper 
forms of regional integration by establishing a common regional market and a customs union. 
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variables used in this thesis, i.e. the factors with possible influences on the success/failure of 
world market integration strategies, which must be observed during the empirical research. 
 
Methodology and Case Studies 
For the empirical examination of the theoretical propositions developed in the theory framework, I 
adhere to a research strategy that focuses on qualitative case studies. According to Robert Yin 
(1998: 233) the more that research questions seek to explain how, and why, something occurs – as 
in this study – the more relevant the case study method will be, mainly due to a profound 
examination of causal chains, which is considered to be more important than a broad analytical 
focus. Furthermore, the case study method is more adequate than quantitative research when the 
number of potential cases is limited, and aggregate data absent. Even when including the smallest 
independent country in the region, there are no more than ten adequate cases available in South 
America; which is too limited a basis for a larger analysis. Furthermore, with respect to the data 
structure, it is clear that very little aggregate information and/or empirical studies exist. 
Particularly, with respect to the independent variables – “institutional strength of state 
bureaucracies” and “business associations” – it was unrealistic to expect well prepared data-sets. 
Instead, I was compelled to search for primary information in an individual, explorative way, as I 
show later in this chapter. 
In this study a “case” is conceptualised as the process of domestic trade policy-making 
from 1985 to 2004. Each case firstly involves the examination of the country’s world market 
integration strategy (section one), encompassing unilateral trade policies, (extra) integration 
endeavours, and sector- and export-oriented promotion schemes. In sections two and three, the 
independent variables – the institutional strength of state bureaucracy and business associations, 
respectively – are separately analysed. Finally, an assessment, in section four, discusses the causal 
pathways between independent and dependent variables, i.e. when, and how, the two selected 
explanatory variables caused the success/failure of world market integration strategies, and to 
what extent other (control) variables disturbed the effects on the dependent variable. Therein, I 
adhere to the “process tracing” method, whereby the researcher examines the chain of events 
through which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes. In this manner: “the 
cause-effect link that connects independent variables and outcomes is disentangled and divided 
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into smaller steps; then the researcher looks for observable evidence in each step” (Van Evera 
1997: 64). 
The propositions of the analytical framework are investigated by means of four country 
studies, considering different experiences in South America. As indicated at the outset of this 
paper, South American countries have become excellent examples of the changed pattern of world 
market integration. Moreover, I narrowed down the focus of the study to just one developing 
region in order to have similar background conditions between the cases, thus avoiding the impact 
of possible varying influences such as economy, culture, geography and politics (Van Evera 1997: 
52). For instance, even by selecting culturally proximate countries in Central America or Mexico, 
one faces the problem of adequately assessing the enormous influence of the US market on trade 
policy related decisions. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to expect general background conditions to be 
identical amongst any group of countries. Therefore, with respect to the countries selected – 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru – there are irrefutable differences concerning geographic 
extension, size and structure of the population, industrial development, GDP size, etc. However, 
several important similarities among the four countries over the last two decades provide a 
comparable playing field for the study of world market integration strategies. 
First, in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the 1980s, each country moved towards far-
reaching market reforms in order to counter inflationary pressures and balance of payment 
deficits. Although Bolivian and Peruvian trade reforms took place from 1985 and 1990 
respectively, in Chile and Argentina the first reform wave took place in the 1970s.  However, the 
debt crisis of the 1980s led to a serious economic backlash, explaining why the world market 
integration strategies currently in force did not emerge before 1985 in Chile and 1990 in 
Argentina. 
Second, prior to 1985, traditional exports depended, without exceptions, on a narrow range 
of industrial and agricultural commodities: cereals and meat (Argentina), mining (Peru, Chile, and 
Bolivia), fish and fish meal (Peru, Chile) and hydrocarbons (Bolivia, Argentina). Given their 
oscillating world market prices, and mainly limited labour demand, the four countries thus had 
clear incentives to foster the diversification of national exports.  
Third, it was during the 1980s that Latin American countries made the transition from 
authoritarian to democratic regimes; Argentina in 1983, Bolivia in 1982, Chile in 1989, and Peru 
in 1980. Aside from free elections, democratic rule implied more checks and balances, and more 
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transparency and openness towards society. It should be noted, however, that these new 
democracies are still marked by widespread presidentialism, as well as distinctive forms of 
populism, both considered serious obstacles to the consolidation of democratic regimes 
(Diamond/ Hartlyn/Linz/Lipset 1997; Mainwaring/Shugart/Soberg 1997; Merkel/Puhle 1999). 
As well as similar background conditions, Van Evera (1997: 77-88) recommends the 
selection of cases with extreme (high or low) variable values, and the existence of strong 
variances on the study variable (both between and within cases) in order to control the effect of 
disturbing third variables, and to facilitate the isolation of causal relations between the 
independent and dependent variable. Therefore, in the following section I briefly summarise the 
extremes and variances identified in each case with respect to the study variable (the dependent 
variable). 
Case Study 1: Chile passed through different stages during the process of adopting an 
exemplary Multipolar Model. The Southern cone state maintained an authoritarian regime from 
1973 to 1989, and it is these military leaders who can take credit for putting in practice the so-
called “flat rate” regime and the wide-reaching export promotion schemes, which were initiated 
as of 1985. Nevertheless the cornerstone of the current trade policy was launched under 
democratic ruling, and it was in the 1990s that Chile evolved into a world-wide pioneer of New 
Regionalism. Inside Latin America, Chile’s world market integration advanced further than in 
any other country, by consolidating bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with practically 
every Latin American State. Later, from 1996 emphasis was placed on strengthening extra-
regional ties. Through so-called “latest generation” FTAs - involving a broad range of new trade 
topics - with North American, European and Asian countries, the small emerging economy 
became an attractive partner in trade and investments for the big players of the world economy. 
As a result of these combined efforts, Chile registered impressive export growth rates and a 
significant export diversification based on non-traditional export champions, such as lumber, 
cellulose products, fruits, vegetables, salmon, wines and various manufactured goods. 
Case Study 2: Argentina’s strategy for world market integration was far less successful 
than that of its neighbouring country, although it was initially responsible for an innovative, 
proactive approach to integration; the Integration Programme for Economic Cooperation (PICE) 
with Brazil. From 1986, the PICE aimed at searching for industrial complementarities between 
the leading South American economies, and combined trade issues with other areas such as 
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defence, research and development, culture, and industrial promotion. The underlying principle 
was gradualism and experimentation, wherein small liberalisation steps in specific sectors would 
allow sensible industrial sectors to prepare themselves before foreign competitors. However, this 
“springboard logic” received major revision from 1990 onwards. Aside from far-reaching 
unilateral trade reforms, the MERCOSUR, founded in March 1991, took on a universal and 
automatic liberalisation approach (rather than a gradual, sector-specific one), aiming to reach full 
liberalisation within four years. This new initiative thus favoured the fast expansion of intra-zone 
trade in sectors where Argentina enjoyed comparative advantages, such as petrochemicals and 
food processing. In the aftermath, nevertheless, a coherent implementation of this strategy 
became undermined by several factors. 
First, the goal of establishing a common regional market and customs union, which 
demanded common external trade policies and the harmonisation of behind-the-border measures 
(in line with the Springboard Model), stood in contradiction to Argentina’s economic policy. 
Hence, the implementation of the regional integration objectives stagnated, as member states did 
not view the MERCOSUR as a reference scheme for unilateral policy-making. In general, the 
observable lack of intra-MERCOSUR cohesion, and a loss of international credibility, hindered 
the group’s ability to act as a powerful trading block both inside, and outside, Latin America. For 
example, virtually all external negotiations launched became deadlocked. Second, several 
permanent and temporary exceptions from the liberal trade regime persisted. But the fact that 
these protectionist measures were applied in an uncoordinated, ad-hoc manner, underlined the 
high unpredictability of domestic trade policies, and the lack of clarity related to the strategy for 
each sectors’ world market integration. Third, while sector-specific policies were absent (except 
for the automotive regime), official export promotion facilities suffered from the combination of 
frequent modifications, modest resources and a high degree of institutional fragmentation. 
Case Study 3: In 1991, Peru implemented far-reaching market reforms, in which trade 
liberalisation was a cornerstone. In a strategy that reflected the Chilean example, the country 
sought to adopt a “modern” flat rate tariff, and to define individual forms of world market 
integration by leaving the Andean Group (later Andean Community of Nations-CAN) where 
members pursued a Common External Tariff (CET) based on a four-tier structure. Nevertheless, 
the original policy goals failed to appear. Instead of setting forth vigorous bilateral trade 
diplomacy, in 1997 Peru returned to the CAN without a clear commitment to the ongoing Andean 
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integration process. In fact, the controversies of the Common External Tariff (CET) could not be 
resolved within the period of analysis. However, the flat rate model originally sought has yet to 
be reached, and from 2002 Peru has been applying seven different tariff lines. 
In the ongoing decade, Peru attained certain policy success nonetheless, discerning 
significant progress in assuming a Multipolar Model. By this point, the country had set forth a 
rather active trade policy, involving the strengthening of trade relations with the US, the Pacific 
Area, and MERCOSUR, and the implementation of the National Export Strategy 2003-2013. 
Though the pursued model had yet to be consolidated at the time of writing, the trade policy 
applied in the last years notably differed from the passive and incoherent trade policy sustained 
throughout the 1990s. 
Case Study 4: The Bolivian experience can be considered an outright failure. The poor, 
landlocked Andean country opened up its economy in 1985, abandoning such policies as tariff 
ceilings, price regulations and subsidies, and became one of the earliest reformers in Latin 
America. Later, during the 1990s, Bolivia signed several far-reaching trade arrangements in the 
multilateral, and above all regional, spheres. The FTAs signed with the CAN (itself being a CAN 
member), MERCOSUR, and Mexico particularly stand out.  
But since no significant support schemes for exporters were put into practice, such as 
market assistance, fiscal incentives or sector-specific measures, the enhanced market access 
opportunities were poorly exploited. In light of the massive structural shortcomings faced by the 
local entrepreneurship (market size, infrastructure, technology, etc.), the distinctive liberal trade 
regime primarily caused large trade deficits. As a result, the market-led, outward-looking strategy 
has, in recent years, become heavily opposed to by civil society actors, such as indigenous 
groups, workers, NGO’s and state universities. Above all, the government’s intention to 
strengthen trade relations with the US caused major social unrest domestically. In this way, the 
blind search for “trade openness” was responsible, among others factors, for the increasing 
destabilisation of the political system observed in the ongoing decade. 
 
Data Collection 
A simple, but important, case selection criterion has been data richness and data access, since 
the “process tracing” procedure requires a great deal of data to detangle policy-making chains. 
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Thus, privileged access to public and private sector organisations was essential, given that the 
required data was disperse and often rather confidential. Moreover, the availability of written data 
was often hindered by poor documentation and a widespread reluctance among state and business 
entities to disseminate information. Therefore, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile and Peru provided good 
opportunities for field research. In Argentina and Chile, I had already gathered vast information, 
case knowledge, and contacts during the field research for my MA Thesis (Robin 2001). 
Moreover, in Chile several working papers, related to the topics involved, provided a useful 
analytical background. Argentina had the additional benefit of being my country of residence in 
2003-2004. In the case of Bolivia and Peru, contacts were facilitated as a result of collaboration 
in the 2003-2006 Trade Cooperation Project conducted by the State Secretary of Economic 
Affairs (SECO). 
Principally, field research focused on the conduction of interviews with people who 
possessed first-hand knowledge on topics of interest. Thus, interviewing key actors or experts 
became the centre piece of empirical research, with a total of 311 interviews eventually 
conducted with state officials, special advisers, employees of business associations, university 
professors, entrepreneurs, etc. I carried out two types of interview techniques during this process, 
dividing them into semi-structured and open-end expert interviews (Atteslander 1995; Flick 
1999). 
Open-end expert interviews were minimally structured, explorative talks, aimed at the 
collection of factual information and the interpretation of different variables involved in the 
analysis, and often sought to gather this information in an historical perspective, i.e. how the 
variable evolved within the period of analysis. In total, 109 interviews of this type were carried 
out, involving state officials (39), business representatives (33) and outside experts (37) (category 
definitions follow later). Considering their practical use, nonetheless, most of these conversations 
were used to provide a better understanding of the case, helping to corroborate opinions and to 
narrow down topics and events involved in each case. In the end only a limited number of verbal 
reports, approximately five to six in each case, were utilised to explain key facts. 
To ensure the high validity of these reports, the risk of biased or incomplete information 
was mitigated by considering the following criteria when defining “selected interview partners”: 
(1) university graduate; (2) More than 10 years of professional experience in the trade policy 
fields; and (3) open minded and helpful behaviour (evaluated by my subjective impression and 
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the time of the interview - i.e. more than one hour). Naturally, objective case facts could not be 
guaranteed merely by these criteria, therefore, it was necessary to examine the independence of 
assessments (considering past and present professional obligations, for example), and to confirm 
the statements made through other expert interviews, and with existing written information. 
Semi-structured interviews, or “Leitfadengespräche”, are widely used by social scientists, 
since they offer something in between open, explorative talks and standardised surveys. Such 
interviews usually consist of previously determined “core questions,” linked to defined variable 
(dimensions), and flexible “detailed questions”, wherein the interviewer gathers additional case 
facts, exploring new ground and exchanging ideas. In this study, semi-structured interviews were 
applied to combine both the standardisation of data collection and to explore the research field 
through an open-end interview style. 
In summary, three questionnaires composed of “core questions” were employed to gather 
perceptions, according to three categories of interview partners; (1) business representatives, (2) 
state officials, and (3) outside experts. The survey carried out among business representatives 
(BR) was the most exhaustive (123 interviews), principally addressing management staff or trade 
policy advisors. To a lesser extent, board of directors and external consultants were consulted. 
The survey did not rely on a strict sample, but rather the selection of entities was adapted to each 
country’s characteristics. A core group was maintained, however, over the four cases, embracing 
multisectoral, or “umbrella”, organisations, and the sector peak entities of agriculture, industry, 
commerce, and exports (for a detailed selection, see Appendix 1). 
Surveys with state officials (41 interviews) and outside experts (38) were considerably 
more limited than the business surveys, for the following reasons: In the case of state officials, 
functionaries generally focus on just a few agencies such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Trade, Economy, Industry and Agriculture. Thus, it often appeared far more valuable to 
hold in-depth discussions on specific topics and to explore their career paths, rather than to pose 
questions on a broad range of rather superficial questions, especially when taking into account 
difficulties in obtaining an interview with accomplished senior officials (deputies, special 
advisors, and heads of areas). The conversations with outside experts (academics, former state 
officials and consultants) similarly had a rather open-end character (nevertheless, approximately 
50% were held in a semi-structured way). In particular, academics were often reluctant to give 
structured answers to a broad range of topics, and instead, tended to provide interpretations on 
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specific issues of interest. For these reasons, on several occasions it was not possible to cover all 
the core questions, causing missing data as a consequence. 
The questionnaires were structured in the following way: Depending on the category, the 
questionnaires were composed of 14 to 18 questions, using an ordinal scale with four possible 
answers (e.g. very close coordination, rather close coordination, rather sporadic, very sporadic or 
absent coordination). The survey with business associations was the most exhaustive, as detailed 
organisational data on business associations had to be collected (staff size, revenues, membership 
data, etc). Otherwise, the questionnaires were rather similar along the three categories, and 
referred to the division of responsibilities and inter-ministerial coordination in trade policy 
formulations, especially regarding the conduction of international trade negotiations, the size and 
technical capacities of the trade policy staff, transparency maintained during the conduction of 
international negotiations, state-business coordination and the intermediation of business 
interests. 
With regards to the period of field research, interviews were conducted between 
September 2003 and March 2005. Wherever possible, semi-structured interviews were set forth 
within a shorter timeframe, i.e. between February and October 2004, in order to avoid strong time 
distortions that could potentially weaken comparison between cases. As is shown in Table 1, the 
duration, and number, of interviews varied notably between countries, especially between 
Argentina and Chile. In this regard, it is necessary to emphasise that Argentina was my country 
of residence during the time when field activities took place. Therefore, during my stay in 
Argentina I worked on document analysis, the preparation of field visits, transcription of 
interviews, data searches on the Internet, the methodological development in general and the 
attendance of post-graduate courses on the topic of research. In Chile, conversely, data collection 
was based heavily on secondary literature and a limited number of interviews, taking into account 
that existing studies on research related topics provided a solid base, allowing for only selected 
primary data collection. 
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Table 1.1: Interviews 
 Open-End Expert Interviews Semi-Structured Interviews 
Business Representatives 
Argentina 
Chile 
Bolivia 
Peru 
33 
14
4
5
10
123 
58
-
36
29
State Officials 
Argentina 
Chile 
Bolivia 
Peru 
39 
12
6
12
9
41 
12
-
14
15
Outside Experts 
Argentina 
Chile 
Bolivia 
Peru 
37 
10
2
15
10
38 
12
-
15
11
Total 
Argentina 
Chile 
Bolivia 
Peru 
109 
36
12
32
29
202 
82
-
65
55
Time 
Argentina 
Chile 
Bolivia 
Peru 
September 2003 - March 2005 
30 weeks 
2 weeks (2 stays) 
3 weeks (2 stays) 
3 weeks (2 stays) 
February 2004 – October 2004
20 weeks 
- 
5 weeks (2 stays) 
5 weeks (3 stays) 
 
 
The methodological strength of case study interviews, according to Robert Yin (1998: 
231-232), is that these interviews are “targeted”, in the sense that they focus directly on topics of 
interest for the interviewer; furthermore, they are “insightful”, considering that causal inter-
ferences perceived by the key informant can be provided. Weak aspects of this data collection 
method are related, nevertheless, to poorly constructed, or suggestive, questions that lead to 
misguided answers. Moreover, in most cases responses are strongly subjective, representing only 
one particular point of view in relation to the case. Conversely, outside experts have a broader 
focus, but often do not know the contextual details of the case. Finally, the supply of faulty 
information is rather common, since interviewees often feel the need to transmit merely half 
truths, do not remember the case well (but do not admit or recognise that fact), and/or answers 
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tend to be too reflexive, in the sense that interviewees usually say what the interviewer wants to 
hear. 
Hence, to corroborate verbal reports with other types of evidence, so as to determine 
robust “case facts”, I conducted not only a high number of interviews, but also made extensive 
use of written data whenever reliable information was available, and data analysis could be 
carried out within a reasonable time. In this sense, working papers, text of laws, resolutions, 
meeting minutes, newspaper articles, annual reports of business associations, trade statistics, 
budget data, organisational charts and other official data were incorporated. Nonetheless, apart 
from the Chilean case, where secondary literature provided useful empirical data and 
interpretation, the conduction of interviews became the key method for data collection. 
Moreover, it should be noted that field visits in Bolivia, Peru and Chile were far too short to 
prepare a comprehensive research of archives, and the widespread problems of secrecy, 
overbearing administrative procedures and a lack of documentation of local organisations further 
limited research. 
This book is structured along the following lines. Chapter 2 develops the analytical 
framework that is designed to evaluate the success of world market integration strategies in 
developing countries. Chapters 3 to 6 form the core of the book: They contain detailed case 
studies on the world market integration steps underwent by the four selected countries. Finally, 
the results of the four in-depth case studies are summarised and compared in chapter 7. 
2 Analytical Framework 
 
 
The analytical framework that guides the empirical research conducted in this study is 
structured as follows. In the first section I define the key concepts used in this thesis, discuss 
the theoretical and practical relevance of the research question, and review the state of art on 
world market integration and domestic trade policy-making in developing countries. In the 
second section, I explore the evolution of the international trade system, as seem from a 
development perspective, placing particular emphasis on the dynamic interrelation between 
unilateralism, multilateralism, and regionalism, accentuated since the mid-1980s by the 
initiation of the Uruguay Round. It is from this standpoint that the two most common modes of 
world market integration in South America have been conceptualised: the Multipolar and 
Springboard Models. In the third section, I enlighten, from a theoretical perspective, the 
process of trade policy-making on the domestic level, and develop the two explanatory 
variables used in this study: the institutional strength of state bureaucracies and business 
associations. In the forth and final section of this chapter, the test hypothesis is exposed and its 
logical structure discussed in detail. 
 
2.1 Key Concepts, Relevance of the Research Question and State of the Art 
 
Research Question and Key Concepts 
This study aims to enhance our theoretical and practical knowledge of the causal relationship 
between the institutions involved in domestic policy-making, and the way developing 
countries achieve the integration of their economies into world markets. Specifically, I 
address the following research question: How, and to what extent, does the success of world 
market integration strategies in developing countries depend on the institutional strength of 
state bureaucracies and business associations? The research question contains several key 
concepts that are outlined below. 
From the 1950s to 1980s, the concept of developing countries’ world market 
integration strategies was commonly associated with a set of unilateral trade and economic 
policies, including tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and subsidies for exports and industrial 
transformation. As a result, distinctive approaches to world market integration emerged. On 
the one hand, Import-Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) strategies, widely applied in Latin 
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America, and on the other hand, Export-Led Growth (ELG) strategies, implemented by 
several states in East Asia. In both approaches the widespread state support granted to local 
industries was a common factor. But ISI experiences were more protectionist in nature than 
their ELG counterparts, as industries were permanently shielded from international 
competition through high tariff and non-tariff barriers, and a monetary policy that kept the 
domestic currency overvalued (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: 276-323). Conversely, ELG strategies, 
in line with the infant industry concept developed in the 19th century by Friedrich List (1856), 
consisted of selective protection and support schemes in order to enhance the international 
competitiveness of domestic manufactures within a determined time frame (Amsden 1989). 
From the 1980s, the connotation of world market integration strategies adapted to the 
changing international context, assimilating with the general tendency towards trade 
liberalisation, and the inclusion of developing nations into the world trading system. In 
particular, discussion on adequate world market integration strategies began to consider the 
adoption of “market-led” institutions in the scope of GATT, and from 1995, within the WTO 
framework. The debate on China is paradigmatic here. While scholars in favour of gradualism 
and local experimentation (Rodrik 1999) put emphasis on the evolutionary, experimental, and 
incremental nature of the successful reforms in China, and thus the need to combine non-
capitalist institutions with market-led institutions, the convergence school (Sachs/ Woo 2000) 
urges China towards institutional harmonisation with the WTO, rather than institutional 
innovation, suggesting that the ingredients for a dynamic market economy are already well-
known. 
In Latin America, the trend towards institutional harmonisation in general advanced 
more rapidly than in Asia, since local experimentation with ISI was drastically abolished as a 
consequence of the balance of payments crisis in the 1980s. Originally based on unilateral 
reforms to control inflationary pressure, since the 1990s the adoption of market-led 
institutions has taken place increasingly within the WTO scope, and by means of regional 
integration endeavours, as the next section of this chapter outlines in detail.  
For the purpose of this study, the notion of world market integration strategies adopts 
this altered international context. It is thus conceptualised as: a particular set of trade related 
policies that developing countries adopt within a context of gradual liberalisation of the 
global economy and a shift of trade policy-making towards regional and multilateral levels. 
With respect to the success of world market integration strategies, definitions are 
generally related to the policy outcome (trade performance), policy impact (economic growth 
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and/or poverty reduction) or policy output (such as trade reforms). In general, economic 
assessments consider the first two definitions. While policy outcome usually refers to 
improvements in a country’s trade performance - for instance export growth, greater export 
diversification, higher firm-level productivity or increased marked shares - most economic 
studies seek to measure broader economic and social impacts, and assess the benefits of trade 
in fostering economic growth (Sachs/Warner 1995), productivity (Edwards 1998), and 
reducing poverty (Wood 1997; Dollar/Kray 2003). 
From a political science perspective, success is often associated with policy outputs, 
that is, particular policy reforms originating from the policy-making processes. In this regard, 
“success” can be taken to be WTO adherence, implemented trade liberalisations or signed 
regional trade agreements. In this study, conversely, success does not refer to a single policy 
event or action, but considers the evolution of a set of trade related policies over a certain time 
period. Specifically, successful world market strategies are defined as a high degree of 
coherence by implementing a world market integration strategy, considering to what extent 
essential principals, policies, and objectives of the selected strategy have been put into 
practice and maintained over the period of analysis (1985 to 2004). The measurement of the 
degree of coherence is herein related to two idealistic modes of world market integration, 
which have been pursued within the revised international context: the Multipolar and 
Springboard Models (further explained in section 2.2). 
It is further assumed – but not analysed in this study – that coherently implemented, or 
“successful”, world market integration strategies will help to improve the trade performance 
of a country, and finally, to achieve the goals of economic growth, job creation and poverty 
reduction. 
 
Box 2.1: The Success of World Market Integration Strategies 
Policy 
Output 
Coherent implementation of the world market integration strategy 
over the period of analysis (1985 to 2004). 
Policy 
Outcome 
Improved trade performance (increase in exports, greater export 
diversification, increased market shares, higher firm-level productivity) 
Policy Impact Economic growth, job creation and poverty reduction 
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As is often indicated, the broad adoption of market institutions in Latin America from 
the 1980s onwards did not meet most of the initially set expectations. In particular, the limited 
“trickle down” effects of economic growth received broad criticism towards the end of the 
1990s, an aspect used by globalisation adversaries as evidence of the disruptive forces of trade 
liberalisations and other adjustment policies that made up the so called ‘Washington 
Consensus’. To counter these critical voices, arguments have since been put forward stressing 
the necessity of strong development institutions as a precondition for successful market 
reforms (Burki/Perry 1998; Graham/Naím 1998, World Bank Development Report 2002). In 
essence, the herein demanded second generation reforms particularly embrace the judiciary 
system, public administration and legislative powers, and thus aim to provide answers to 
problems of widespread corruption, legal certainty and overbearing bureaucratic procedures 
affecting business transactions. 
These insights often rely upon a rational choice approach, conceptualising institutions 
in accordance to North (1990: 3) as “the rules of the game of society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human integration.” Accordingly, the strength of 
institutions becomes an equivalent to high social acceptance of societal norms and regulatory 
systems among individuals in a particular community. The more that rules, both informal and 
formal, affecting business operations are broadly accepted and openly transparent, the more 
transactions take place within a predictable, trustful environment, thus allowing an efficient 
pursuit of economic interests (see also Arrow 1974; Putnam 1993b; Fukuyama 1995). 
Institutional strength applied to state bureaucracies and business associations also 
draws on stable and predictable rules and norms which govern interactions among actors. But 
unlike individuals acting in particular social contexts, the behaviour of collective actors is 
determined further by the internal structural constraints of organisations. Hence, the outcome 
of collective action cannot be seen as the simple aggregate of individual preferences, but 
instead as a result of several factors influencing, or filtering, collective actors’ interests, such 
as internal decision making procedures, the number of involved actors, common resources 
and principals. 
Regarding the collective action of entrepreneurs, the institutional strength of business 
associations is related to the complicated, intermediary, position between two independent 
and resourceful actors – firms on one side, and state authorities on the other. If a business 
association is to be taken into account, it is obliged to insert itself into the direct exchange of 
market actors and state authorities, by offering a service at a beneficial price or quality, 
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according to the neocorporatist logic sustained by Schmitter and Streeck (1999: 19). 
Therefore, the institutional strength of business associations is defined as the capacity of 
organisations representing private sectors interests – i.e. trade and industrial chambers, 
business councils, peak entities, farmers’ organisations, entities representing specific sectors 
or branches – to effectively intermediate the often opposing preferences within the private 
sector, and simultaneously, to maintain close relations with state authorities. Section 2.3 
further enlightens the complexity of associative business action by placing emphasis on four 
different, and often opposing, logics affecting business associations in their search to become 
strong interlocutors (or intermediary agents) of private sector interests. 
In the case of state bureaucracies, institutional strength concerns the structures and 
norms determining the work inside the executive branch, and the way in which other non-state 
actors, especially business agents, are incorporated into the development of trade policy. In 
this way, it is understood that the behaviour of bureaucrats is not simply guided by an 
obvious, clearly defined “public interest”, but by the outcome of multifaceted interaction 
patterns with other state and non-state actors.  
Bearing in mind the rampant corruption and rent-seeking behaviour common to 
developing countries, Peter Evans’ concept of Embedded Autonomy (1995) combines the 
strength of bureaucratic structures with two seemingly opposing features: First, a high degree 
of autonomy, or insulation, of policy-makers from societal pressure, in order to reduce rent-
seeking opportunities. Second, bureaucrats require the capacity to maintain fluent relations 
with the business sector, through channels which allow the permanent negotiation and 
monitoring of economic goals and policies, in order to fine-tune and adapt public policies to 
the possibilities of economic sectors responsible for efficient strategy/policy implementation.  
In this study, the notion of Embedded Autonomy was adapted to the underlying 
context and objectives of the research conducted. Hence, the institutional strength of state 
bureaucracy has been conceptualised as an executive branch wherein the responsibilities for 
the conduction of international trade policy affairs are clearly perceived, the trade policy staff 
are adequately doted, and finally, a degree of openness is sustained towards business and non-
business regarding their incorporation into the trade policy-making process. 
 
Relevance of Research Questions and State of the Art 
Analysing the influence of business and state related institutions on the success of world 
market integration strategies is relevant both from a practical and theoretical point of view. 
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On the practical side, the need for institutional reforms as a quasi precondition for successful 
economic policy reforms has been increasingly recognised by both local governments and 
international organisations that support such reform steps. As is briefly described in the 
following paragraphs, initial analysis has been conducted by organisations, such as the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), concerned with sound economic integration scenarios in Latin 
America, indicating the weight of institutional factors in successful trade policy-making. 
Consequently, in most countries in the region, IDB loans have been aimed at the “Institutional 
Strengthening of Foreign Trade”. However, support is often rather unspecific, ranging from 
facilitating trade policy advisors, to impact assessments, IT solutions, and the organisation of 
seminars and workshops on trade related topics. To date, these support schemes have 
generally been insufficient to foster the institutional framework necessary to adequately face 
the challenges of current world market integration forces. Thus, it is of no surprise that debate 
has arisen on whether the rules of the world trading system are really beneficial for 
developing countries, or conversely, whether they simply overstrain local capacities within 
these countries. 
Although any “cookbook-style” advice can be provided, this study aims to generate to 
practical solutions, as it discusses and systematises institutional factors weighing on the 
domestic level, where the essential problems of world market integration often arise. Being 
very rich in empirical details, I explore the effects of these institutional features on the way a 
country integrates into world markets by means of four country studies. As a consequence, 
useful guidelines can be offered as regards how, and under what conditions, countries and 
donor agencies should work on the institutional strengthening of national trade policy-
making. 
This study is also relevant from a theoretical point of view, since the existing literature 
on trade policy and world market integration generally fails to systematically explore the 
conditions under which institutional factors on the domestic level determine the success of 
such policy endeavours over a long period of time, taking into account the changing pattern of 
world market integration which has taken place in the last two decades. 
Focussing on the explanatory variables set forth in this study, nevertheless, much 
valuable theoretical and practical work has already been carried out. Numerous studies have 
indicated that trade policy is the substance of domestic politics. Tariffs, non-tariff barriers and 
quotas are common issues for a broad range of interest groups, from farmers and retailers to 
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manufacturers and trade unions. Dani Rodrik aptly describes the perspective of policy-makers 
when pursuing trade policy reforms (2000b: 1-2): 
“For them, the changes in tariff schedules are typically only a small part of the 
process. What is at stake is a deeper transformation of the patterns of behaviour 
within the public sector, and of the government’s relationship with the private 
sector and the rest of the world. The reform goes beyond particular levels of 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions; it sets new rules and expectations regarding 
how these policy choices are made and implemented, establishes new 
constraints and opportunities for economic policy more broadly, creates a new 
set of stakeholders while disenfranchising the previous ones, and gives rise to a 
new philosophy on what development policy is all about. Hence, trade reform 
ends up being much more than a change in relative prices; it becomes an 
institutional reform of a major kind.” 
Frequently, the United States has served as a paradigmatic case to illustrate the 
importance of domestic politics, where internal political conflicts are accentuated by the 
Congress’ power to levy tariffs and regulate foreign trade, strongly restricting the President’s 
international trade policy actions. For example, Milner (1997: 135-158) and Jackson (1997: 
31-44) show how protectionist voices within the US Congress were responsible for the failure 
of establishing the International Trade Organisation in the post war period. Rather than a 
powerful supranational institution fostering and enforcing free trade, the contracting parties 
agreed upon the GATT Secretariat, which was allotted scarce legal and economic resources, 
thus demonstrating the unwillingness to guarantee free trade. 
Inspired by the “two-level games” notion (Evans/Jacobson/Putnam 1993) and worried 
about the lack of knowledge regarding “level one” in those games, the domestic trade policy-
making level in Latin America has been enlightened by several studies and working papers 
published in recent years. Directed by Sylvia Ostry (2002), a project on trade policy-making 
in eight Western Hemisphere nations focused on the question of how best to accommodate the 
participation on non-state actors in the formulation of national trade policies and negotiations 
strategies.1 This Occasional Paper provides an overview of the considerable diversity in the 
policy-making process among these countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
United States, Mexico, and Uruguay) regarding, among other aspects, the procedures for 
consultations, the actors involved, scheduling, and institutional arrangements.  
                                                 
1 The project was jointly conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank and the University of Toronto’s 
Munk Centre for International Studies. 
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Although the country studies were not structured along identical lines, two important 
findings can be mentioned: First, there is a clear dividing line between the two North 
American countries, representing the industrialised world, and the six Latin American 
countries. While in the former countries the participation of legislators and other non-business 
actors is strongly anchored, in Latin America only business actors are actively involved in 
these processes. Second, two strategic resources for participating in trade policy are identified: 
money and analytical knowledge. Thus, Ostry infers that the superior financial and technical 
capabilities of business actors explain their leading role in consultation procedures, while non-
business actors are generally short of such means. 
Other works draw similarly structured conclusions. For both Lengyel and Ventura-
Dias in Trade Policy Reforms in Latin America - Multilateral Rules and Domestic Institutions 
and Sáez (2005) in Trade Policy-making in Latin America – A Compared Analysis, the 
participation of civil society and congress is described as incipient in Latin America compared 
to the consolidated role of business representatives.2 Together with the widespread absence of 
formal and transparent forms of consultation, the authors observe that this limited 
participation hinders the construction of a firm consensus, thus undermining the legitimacy of 
trade policy initiatives. Above all, the findings of Lengyel and Ventura-Dias sustain a very 
critical tone, stating that: 
“well-entrenched habits and rules of the game in the domestic political-
institutional context have conspired against the emergence of more open and 
transparent patterns of participation in that they only tend to integrate that part 
of society structured along corporatist lines or patronage webs, condemning the 
rest to exclusion” (2004: 203; see also Prats 2000). 
Likewise, the two previously mentioned studies make useful observations about the central 
position of the state’s executive powers. As involvement of the legislative is limited and the 
approval of international trade agreements often a mere formality, international trade policy 
actions depend on the internal features of the executive branch. Therefore, so called 
“institutional deficits”, such as the high rotation of state officials, untrained staff, 
jurisdictional struggles, and the failure to establish stable consultation with non-state actors all 
impact negatively on the development of trade policy. The most noteworthy efforts that stress 
the institutional aspects of the executive branch have been made by Jordana and Ramió in 
Institutional Design and Foreign Trade Policy Management in Latin America (2002). The 
                                                 
2 Lengyel and Ventura-Dias compare eight Latin American countries, Sáez collects data from nine. 
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paper examines the most common organisational models for trade policy-making, 
underscoring the fact that different institutional arrangements generally reflect variations in 
how the political systems are structured, what role the State assumes in the economy, and how 
government bodies engage in consultations with interest groups. Each of the four models 
developed (for instance the Foreign Affairs Model, where international trade policy is 
centralised inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), possesses its pros and cons with respect to 
the way trade policy is developed, as section 2.3 explains in detail. 
In general, most of the institutional factors involved in trade policy-making have been 
considered in the aforementioned papers. Nevertheless, three factors particular to this study 
differentiate it from the rest: First, the contributions made so far have brought together 
different country experiences in a rather flexible, unstructured way. Rather than defining 
variables and methodologies in a systematic manner, country studies have relied mostly on 
the impressions and data collection of the authors in charge, being, in general, economists 
rather than political scientists. 
Second, no empirical puzzle is explained in the corresponding works, that is, no causal 
pathways are developed in order to explain a defined outcome (e.g. number of agreements 
signed) by a specific explanatory variable (e.g. formality of consultation channels). Therefore, 
only a sketchy idea is transmitted to the reader of the true importance of institutions. 
Third, discussions on the role of business are still weakly developed. The papers give 
the impression, especially Ostry (2002) and Lengyel and Ventura-Dias (2004), that 
institutional deficits in Latin America basically concern the common exclusion of non-
business actors from policy-making, while the participation of business agents is guaranteed 
by their superior financial and technical capabilities. But this view would appear to be overly 
simplified. Although I fully agree with the need for a strong, formal inclusion of broad parts 
of the society in order to obtain a higher legitimacy and stability of policy reforms, I argue 
against a dichotomic view on business and non-business actors. Numerous works on the 
collective action of entrepreneurs have shown that business is by no means a homogenous 
actor. Different firm sizes, opposing sectoral interests, intra-sectoral competition, political 
allies, idiosyncrasy, short-term thinking, and lack of information, are all factors which 
underline the difficulty of bringing capitalists together (Offe/ Wiesenthal 1980; Maxfield/ 
Schneider 1997). Therefore, this thesis will shed further light on how institutional features of 
collective business actions, further developed in section 2.3, can become determining factors 
in explaining the outcome of policy reforms. 
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2.2 The International Trade System from a Development Perspective 
 
The following section is structured as follows. In the first part, I stress the shift of trade 
policy, on both multilateral and regional levels, that has taken place since the mid-1980s, 
when the Uruguay Round was initiated, particularly discussing its relevance for developing 
countries. On these grounds, in the second part I develop two idealistic modes of world 
market integration which have been pursued in Latin America within the international context 
outlined in the previous section: the Multipolar and Springboard Models. 
 
The Uruguay Round - the Watershed for the Multilateral Trading System 
Although the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 
supported international trade as a means to decrease reliance on unilateral measures, the 
reciprocal tariff concessions made in the scope of GATT were only gradual, and became 
widely criticised by domestic lobbyist. Additionally, numerous institutional provisions 
beyond trade served as “safety valves” in terms of protectionist measures adapted to domestic 
needs, i.e. Article XIX (general safeguard), Article XX (safeguard human, animal and live 
plants), Article XI (a safeguard for security purposes), Article XVIII (safeguard the protection 
of the balance of payments and infant industries), Article XI (quantitative controls on exports 
and imports of agricultural products and fisheries). Also, the GATT’s basic principle of 
fostering trade liberalisation became undermined by the failure to establish the International 
Trade Organisation (ITO). With the GATT Secretariat, conversely, the contracting parties 
agreed upon an institution with modest legal and economic resources, implying limits to the 
enforcement of the free trade rules embodied in GATT norms.  
On these grounds, the advances made since the 1980s are rather noteworthy. It was 
with the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979 that the administration of multilateral trade 
began to receive increasing criticism, leading industrial nations to begin pushing forward new 
trade issues. Therefore, the eighth negotiation round of GATT, launched in 1986 in Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, began with ambitious goals that went well beyond the traditional focus on 
border issues. After this round ended eight years later in Marrakech, Morocco, John Jackson 
expressed his surprise (1997: 46) about how much of the original agenda had been completed. 
In fact, even though only half this agenda had been fulfilled, the Uruguay Round would 
become the largest ever. 
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The introduction of new complex regulatory issues such as trade in services, 
intellectual property rights and trade related investment measures, represented a turning point 
in the nature of trade policy, considering the broadened focus on behind-the-border policies. 
These “new” trade topics arose as a result of new claims, mainly originating from 
multinational companies which had changed their patterns of production and trade in light of 
technical innovations, mostly in areas such as telecommunications and transportation.  
Beyond these new areas, other innovations agreed upon concerned comprehensive 
agreements on agricultural trade, subsidies and textiles. Finally, the strengthening of the 
institutional framework for international trade through the creation of the World Trade 
Organization, and the permanent dispute settlement system, in force since 1995, enabled an 
enhanced monitoring and enforcement of the multilateral rules agreed upon by the member 
states. 
Uruguay came to be a watershed for all WTO members, above all for developing 
nations. In the 1980s, the participation of third world countries was marginal, with discussions 
focusing merely on the definition of provisions for Special and Differential Treatment for 
developing countries.3 Effective participation, in terms of comprehensively falling under 
GATT norms, and the ability to influence on the negotiations’ outcome, did not take place 
before the Uruguay Round (Srinivasan 1999). Therefore, and as a result of the following three 
factors, the Marrakech agreements changed the developing nations’ modus vivendi within the 
multilateral trading system.  
1) Single Undertaking: Eventually introduced, the “single undertaking” mechanism 
implied that all countries had to adhere to the major agreements concerning the WTO. 
Therefore, new areas embodied in the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
                                                 
3 Of note here is the Enabling Clause enacted by the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, entitling the “Differential 
and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries.” Thereafter, the 
practice of extending preferential tariffs by developed to developing countries in the scope of the General 
System of Preferences (GSP) and the implementation of preferential agreements among developing contracting 
parties, obtained legal status. Today, special treatment provisions can be classified in five main groups: 
provisions aimed at increasing trade opportunities through market access; norms requiring WTO members to 
safeguard the interest of developing countries; norms allowing flexibility to developing countries on rules and 
disciplines governing trade measures; norms allowing longer transitional periods to developing countries; and 
provisions for technical assistance; see WTO 1999. 
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(TRIPS), as well as former plurilateral agreements concerning trade in goods, had to 
be adopted in a comprehensive manner.4 
2) Depth of Commitments: In light of the unilateral economic liberalisation undertaken 
since the 1980s, developing States (and South American States in particular) 
undertook important specific commitments. While in the areas of goods, many 
countries bound almost all agricultural and industrial tariffs, as regards trade in 
services, the main commitments focused on sectors such as financial services, 
telecommunications, tourism and professional services.5 
3) Agriculture: An area that had been practically excluded in previous decades, specific 
commitments by developed countries were included, by means of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, to improve market access and reduce market distorting subsidies. 
Member states, moreover, agreed to initiate talks to continue the reform process one 
year before the end of the implementation period, i.e. by the end of 1999. 
In assessing the benefits of this increased involvement, being moreover manifested by the 
large number of developing nations adhering to the WTO, standpoints are ambiguous. On the 
one hand, it seems unclear whether the agreement on agriculture, which for many developing 
countries represented the principal “offensive interest”, implied a milestone for liberalisation 
or not. The mandate agreed upon in Marrakech to deepen liberalisation in agricultural trade is, 
in any case, a pending issue thus far.  
Furthermore, in light of the many new topics such as intellectual property rights and 
trade-related investment measures that emerged in multilateral trade discussions, developing 
countries have, to date, largely remained “rule takers”. This adoption of rules made in 
industrialised countries can be assessed from two perspectives. The first rationale deals with 
the fact that “importing” new rules or regulatory systems might often be easier than building 
them on their own, as those systems have already been tested at the international level 
(Lawrence 1996: 17). Also Rodrik, generally critical of WTO institutions, (1999, 2000b: 12) 
underlines the fact that disciplines imposed by the WTO in the areas of tariff binding, 
quantitative restrictions, subsidies, services, trade-related investment measures and property 
                                                 
4 For example, the plurilateral agreement on non-tariff measures negotiated in the Tokyo Round, where 
developing countries originally stayed out, are now part of single undertaking, and are thus applicable to all 
members. Currently, only two existing agreements in the area of goods - the Agreement on Trade in Civil 
Aircraft and the Agreement on Government Procurement - remain plurilateral. 
5 In the range of services, the overwhelming majority of commitments made by developing countries (and also 
developed countries) were actually binding existing situations rather than undertaking new liberalisation efforts.  
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rights can provide predictability, transparency, rule bound behaviour, and non-discrimination 
in areas often subject to discretion and rent-seeking. 
A second perspective, which has been prominently put forward by Rodrik, considers 
that such gains from institutional harmonisation cannot substitute each country’s efforts to 
build its own institutions based on local experimentation, given that imported rules often do 
not precisely match local conditions. With striking empirical evidence, Rodrik, and other 
voices critical of rigid multilateral rules, argue that industrialised countries likewise 
implemented far-reaching industrial subsidy schemes and selective forms of protection in 
order to reach the required levels of competitiveness. Therefore, successful institutional 
reforms typically combine imported blueprints with a set of country-specific, heterodox-style 
policies aimed at the gradual integration of domestic industries into world markets. 
 
The Rise of (New-) Regionalism 
Trade policies that were influenced by the trend towards internationalisation were not limited 
to strengthening multilateral rules, but also strongly encompassed the rise of regional 
integration forces. Heated debates took place regarding whether such regional cooperation 
would favour or hinder the development of the multilateral trading system; i.e. if they were 
“building on stumbling blocks” (Bhagwati 1992; Lawrence 1996; Winters 1996) 6. However, 
challenging the multilateral system or not, preferential trade agreements among two or more 
countries have evolved into extremely popular policy choices; indeed, by July 2003, only 
three member countries – Macau China, Mongolia and Chinese Taipei – were not party to a 
regional trade agreement. Hence, over 265 of these agreements have been registered by the 
WTO with respect to the GATT Article 24, which allows regional trade arrangements to be 
established if certain criteria are met.7 
Although the most prominent regional economic agreements were realised by the 
leading GATT members – CUSFTA in 1988 between Canada and the US, EU-Maastricht 
                                                 
6 To this discussion, the WTO points out that in case a member enters into a regional trade arrangement by which 
it allows more favourable conditions to its trade with other parties in that arrangement, than to other WTO 
members’ trade, it departs from the guiding principle of non-discrimination defined in Article I of the GATT, 
and Article I of GATS, among others. On the other hand, the WTO (WTO 2004; Regionalism - Friends or 
Rivals?) considers regional integration as a possible complementary force because agreements between 
neighbouring countries contemplate free trade among them with no need to increase barriers on trade with the 
outside world. When profound commitments were made in new topics, moreover, such as competition policies, 
investment and trade facilitation measures, state procurement and environmental rules (issues launched at the 
first ministerial meeting in Singapore in December 1996) regional agreements became the cutting edge of trade 
policy development paving the way for further arrangement inside the WTO. 
7 According to GATT Article 24: “If a free trade area or customs union is created, duties and other trade barriers 
should be reduced or removed on virtually all sectors of trade in the group. Non-members should not find trade 
with the group any more restrictive than before the group was established.”  
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Treaty in 1992, and NAFTA between the US, Mexico and Canada in 1994 – the involvement 
of developing nations in regional endeavours was also widespread; especially when 
considering the regional integration treaties launched in South America in the 1990s. The 
principal endeavours were the creation of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) in 
1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, and from 1989, the “re-launching” 
of the Andean Group, created twenty years previously by Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, 
Ecuador and Bolivia. These countries set high targets as they strove for common regional 
markets that included the establishment of customs unions. Furthermore, the so far quasi 
dormant Latin American Integration Association (ALADI as it is known by its Spanish 
acronym) created in 1980, became, in the 1990s, a functional framework for numerous 
bilateral Economic Complementary Agreements (or ACEs), providing reciprocal trade 
preferences among the twelve member states.8 
Beyond the regional level, the trade policy agenda of the 1990s became increasingly 
influenced by the United States, which began to seek furthering trade relations with Latin 
America. During the first Presidential Summit Meeting of the Americas in 1995, four years 
after the US administration announced the Initiative for the Enterprise of the Americas, 34 
Heads of State from the Western Hemisphere set the goal of establishing a Free Trade Area for 
the Americas (FTAA). Nonetheless, the far-reaching, NAFTA inspired, project became more 
and more controversial and had finally stalled by the end of 2003. As a consequence, the US 
government began emphasising bilateral strategies as a means to achieve Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs); for example, it negotiated such strategies with Chile, Central American 
countries, Colombia, and Peru. As well as deepening relations with the US, most States set 
forth attempts to integrate their economies with Asian and European partners. 
Against this background of bustling regionalism, debates emerged concerning the 
question of whether (extra-) regional endeavours left more room for local experimentation 
and heterodox policies, in the sense developed by Rodrik. For Devlin and Estevadeordal 
(2001) the conclusions are clear. Comparing the “New Regionalism” in the scope of ALADI, 
MERCOSUR, CAN and FTAA, with the “Old Regionalism” embodied by the inward-
looking, “protectionist” integration schemes pursued in Latin America during the 1960s and 
1970s, they conclude that current regional developments should, by no means, be qualified as 
                                                 
8 Through the Montevideo treaty, ALADI became in 1980 the successor of the Latin American Free Trade Area 
(ALALC) founded in 1960. Even though ALADI did not stand up to very many immediate substantial 
concessions, its open nature vis-à-vis the rigid ALALC scheme enabled the signing of agreements between a 
small group of members, with no obligation to reach multilateral scope at the regional level. To date, most of the 
approximately 60 agreements encompass a bilateral trade exchange of preferences for specific products. 
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opposing forces to Multilateralism, but instead as, generally, complementary. Compared to 
the Old Regionalism, three evidently contrasting properties of the New Regionalism stand 
out: 
1) Lock-In Effect: The agreements signed in the last two decades have become integral 
parts of the economic reforms underway since the 1980s. Consequently, governments 
fostered regional integration to underline their commitment to further liberalisation in 
times of arduous multilateral talks and difficult political conditions for unilateral 
opening. 
2) Scope and Modalities: Although the earliest ALADI agreements were simply 
structured and based on a limited exchange of only temporary preferences on trade for 
specific products, more recent regional trade agreements have defined comprehensive 
liberalisation schemes, become broader in scope and set forth detailed enforcement 
mechanism. 
3) Attraction of FDIs: Given the global competition for FDIs, the creation of regional 
consumer markets such as MERCOSUR became strongly associated to the attraction 
of foreign capital, abolishing entry restrictions applied in previous decades. 
 
Therefore, a significant portion of local trade policy-making has been transferred to levels 
where rule making responds to the trend for institutional harmonisation, largely driven by the 
NAFTA and EU experience. In this scenario, developing nations have been moving within a 
rather small room for autonomous unilateral policy development, being challenged to use this 
remaining space in order to bring international market trends best in line with the realities of 
domestic economic sectors. 
 
Springboard versus Multipolar Model 
Up until the mid-1990s, economic integration within South America took place as a strong 
reaction to the rise of regionalism in Europe and North America. Understood as a “pragmatic 
intermediate step to world market integration” (Sangmeister 1999: 78-92), the Springboard 
Model, based on distinct regional coordination on trade and economic policies, can be seen as 
an expression of this regional response. The main projects in this regard have become the 
MERCOSUR and the lesser known Andean Community of Nations (CAN). 
Both integration projects place emphasis on the establishment of common regional 
markets and customs unions. As stated by Devlin and Estevadeordal, the leitmotifs of these 
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in-depth modes of economic integration, which go beyond the removal of border barriers by 
requiring the intra-regional harmonisation of economic policies, did not concern the insulation 
from international markets but rather the attraction of foreign investors. Beyond this, the 
Springboard Model is aimed at the expansion of limited domestic markets.9 Hence, local 
manufacturers can adapt their production schemes to the requirements of world markets 
within a “familiar” market space, reflecting more symmetric competition than that found on 
the international level. The application of an escalated tariff structure provides certain 
protection to local industries, while it reduces import costs for required inputs. Furthermore, 
productive complementarities and increased economies of scale on the regional level are 
likely to prosper due to enhanced intra-industrial trade and business alliances between 
neighbouring countries.  
Based on common external tariffs, a final but crucial element of the Springboard 
Model is the implementation of common trade policies, which implies the conduction of 
international negotiations as a trading block. The main idea behind such a policy is that the 
bargaining power of developing countries could potentially increase, through south-south 
cooperation schemes, in the scope of regional and multilateral trade negotiations, such as the 
WTO Development Round of Doha, the FTAA talks encompassing the Western Hemisphere 
and the bi-regional trade negotiations between MERCOSUR and the European Union. 
Nonetheless, the Multipolar Model, paradigmatically pursued by Chile since the 1990s 
(Silva 2001; ECLAC 2002) has turned into a powerful alternative to the Springboard Model.10  
Contrary to the building of regional trading blocks, the Multipolar Model foresees the 
application of a very open, non-discriminatory regionalism, involving the country in a dense 
network of regional, extra-regional and multilateral free trade arrangements.  
Essential to this strategy is the definition of “non-traditional export champions”, such 
as processed goods, which differ from traditional commodity exports, for which local 
diplomacy negotiates preferential market access all over the globe. To take advantage of the 
broad external market options, export industries receive active state support through 
                                                 
9 Lawrence (1996: 7-8) has drawn a distinction between deeper integration, that is, integration that moves 
beyond the removal of border barriers, and shallow integration, which is trade liberalisation. Regarding this 
approach, in-depth integration does not mean better or more efficient integration. For instance, the adoption of a 
common standard might discriminate against external imports and increase internal costs. Alternatively, in-depth 
integration could put in place measures that enhance efficiency such as the international enforcement of 
competitive policies or the international implementation of policies to deal with global greenhouse gases. 
10 The denomination “Multipolar” strategy has been used previously by Martin Redrado, former chief negotiator 
of Argentina; see Redrado 2003; Redrado/ Lacunza 2004. 
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marketing assistance, fiscal incentives, and other promotion schemes, sometimes exceeding 
the margins of the WTO regulatory framework.  
Furthermore, through the adoption of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) of the “latest 
generation” that cover new trade disciplines such as intellectual property, services, investment 
rules, competitive policies, state procurement, and labour and environmental protection, the 
country opts for institutional harmonisation with developed nations rather than local 
experimentation, promoting the image of a reliable, modern economy that is thus attractive to 
foreign investors. The adoption of a low and uniform tariff structure, or “flat rate”, can be 
considered similar, as it manifests the openness, predictability, and neutrality of the trade 
regime. In Table 2.1 the crucial features of both models are shown for comparative purposes. 
 
Table 2.1: Springboard versus Multipolar Model 
 Springboard Model Multipolar Model 
Geographic 
Orientation 
World market integration based 
on previous regional integration 
Open regionalism simultaneously using 
all possible venues in (extra) regional 
and multilateral spheres 
 
Negotiation 
Strategy 
Increasing international leverage 
by conducting negotiations as 
country blocks based on the 
customs union concept 
Flexible for bilateral negotiations; 
pursuing FTA of the latest generation 
to underline the reliability of market 
oriented policies (lock-in effect) 
 
Tariff Policy Multiple or “escalated” tariff 
structure promoting 
manufacturing sectors by 
providing cheaper inputs and 
higher protection for value added 
products 
 
Low uniform tariff or “flat rate” 
emphasising the predictability, 
transparency and neutrality of the trade 
regime 
Industrial 
policy 
Focus on value added chains and 
intra-industrial cooperation 
schemes on the regional level 
 
Selective policies favouring a small 
range of non-traditional export 
champions 
Trade 
Promotion 
Important, but less explicit than in 
the Multipolar Model  
Essential to take advantage of market 
access opportunities 
Source: own elaboration based on Sangmeister (1999); Devlin and Estevadeordal (2001); Redrado/Lacunza 2004 
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2.3 World Market Integration – A Domestic Policy-Making Approach 
 
In this third section, I start by discussing the development of world market integration 
strategies from a domestic policy-making perspective. Next, the two explanatory variables 
used in this study are explored in detail: the institutional strength of state bureaucracies and 
business associations. 
 
World Market Integration - A Domestic Policy-Making Approach 
As conceptualised in the previous section, today’s world market integration strategies can be 
seen as a broad set of trade related policies that countries adopt within the context of the 
gradual liberalisation of the global economy, and a general shift of trade policy-making 
towards regional and multilateral levels. Hence, exogenous factors clearly influence strategic 
trade policy decisions; indeed, both the Springboard and Multipolar Models represent the 
prevailing policy options in South America that adapt regional economies to the current 
challenges of global markets. 
Despite the driving forces of Multilateralism and, particularly, of Regionalism (being 
exogenous factors), the analysis of domestic politics (endogenous factor) remains crucial to 
explain why, how, when, and to what extent countries integrate their economies into world 
markets. In general, trade policy outputs can be analysed as domestic responses to a particular 
international setting, such as high commodity prices, debt crisis, recession or world war. For 
example, important works by Peter Gourevitch in Politics in Hard Times (1986) and Ronald 
Rogowski in Commerce and Coalition (1989) expose, from a historical perspective, the close 
relationship between the evolution of international trade and domestic politics.  
Aside from the historical context, all works dealing with trade policy reforms consider, 
at least implicitly, the “firmness of domestic coalitions” as a key factor if reforms are to be 
successful, considering the necessity to respond to the strongly unequal impacts on domestic 
sectors usually caused by trade reforms. From a two-level game perspective, linking 
international and national politics, high-ranking officials are urged to take into account 
domestic concerns. According to Putnam (1993a), interaction patterns between domestic and 
international policies are divided into a first phase of negotiations among state officials (Level 
I) and a second phase in which international agreements must be ratified by domestic actors 
(Level II).  
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As this separation is rather vague in practice, the definition of negotiation strategies on 
Level I requires prior consultation at the domestic Level II, and moreover, before any 
agreement is signed negotiators must try out preliminary versions to test the views of 
constituents. Therefore, the process of ratification goes well beyond formal institutions, i.e. 
the voting procedure within the legislative power, and refers to any domestic policy-making 
characteristic required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or 
informally (1993a: 438).11 
 
Table 2.2: Two-Level Game according to Putnam 
 Level Function  Win-Set Determinants Actors 
Negotiation 
Phase 
I  Bargaining 
between States, 
leading to an 
agreement 
Negotiators’ strategies State officials 
Ratification 
Phase 
 
II 
 
Bargaining among 
domestic 
constituents on 
whether to ratify 
the agreement 
Preferences and 
coalitions 
 
Institutions 
Organised business, 
state agencies, trade 
unions, parties, 
“public opinion,” 
civil society, etc. 
Source: Putnam 1993a: 438. 
In describing this two-level game, Putnam (1993: 439) uses the notion of “win-sets”, 
defined as: “the set of all possible international agreements (Level I) that would “win” (that 
is, gain the necessary support among the domestic constituents) when simply voted up or 
down.” For Putnam, both the size and certainty of win-sets must be taken into account. While 
the size depends on the configuration of domestic preferences at a specific time, defining the 
negotiation room for state officials involved at Level I (larger win-sets make agreements more 
likely), certainty goes beyond the preferences of actors and concerns the credibility of the 
proposals submitted (1993a: 441). With respect to the latter, Putnam argues (1993a: 453) that 
a high degree of uncertainty regarding the win-set presented by the opponent increases the 
risk of involuntary defection, in terms of the inability to deliver what was previously agreed, 
                                                 
11 Although the ratification of international agreements is commonly linked to formal mechanisms inside 
Parliament, in this study informal means are considered, bearing in mind that legislative powers had become 
rather irrelevant in the trade policy-making examined. Therefore, it seems useful to work with a broad 
ratification model that consists of informal and formal actions of interests groups inclined to support the official 
trade integration strategy. For example, indicative behaviour can be publications, favourable media or active 
participation in the scope of formal and non-formal consultation channels. Besides, ratification goes beyond 
(pre-) negotiation phases and also embraces post-negotiation phases where agreements are embodied in national 
laws and procedures, and thus, guarantee their effective implementation. In this phase, affected interest groups 
can avoid forms of defection (voluntary or involuntary) through the sound application of norms and through 
helping the executive to perfect the correspondence between negotiated content and domestic regulation. 
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and, hence, causes the failure of negotiations or the necessity to compensate “wobbly win-
sets” through more generous side-payments than would be needed under conditions of 
certainty. 
Although this study is not based on the analysis of international negotiations leading to 
specific trade agreements, Putnam’s notion of “win-sets” points at the determinants and actors 
which affect the domestic policy-making processes. Regarding the determinants of “win-sets” 
that define their size and certainty, literature on trade politics mainly focuses on preferences, 
rather than institutions. Specifically, there is a wide range of Political Economy literature that 
focusses on sectorally determined interests, leading to coalition formation, conflict, and 
influence over policy-making outcomes. 
For example, Gourevitch (1986) outlines different production profiles – determined by 
international competitiveness, labour intensity, etc. – which are responsible for particular 
sectoral coalitions that influence the development model adopted by a country at any given 
moment, ranging from classical liberalism to neo-mercantilism. Sectoral interests are at stake 
also in Rogowski’s Commerce and Coalition (1989). Drawing on the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, which states that abundant factors in an economy gain from trade, whilst scarce 
factors loose out, Rogowski argues that the dominant cleavages defining the degree of trade 
openness are determined by a country’s endowment with capital, land, and labour. 
Accordingly, “capital” is assumed as a homogenous unit which compete – depending on the 
specific circumstances within international trade - with the labour class and land owners.  
For many, Stolper-Samuelson’s assumptions fail to analyse intra-class conflicts, and 
are seen as unrealistic because factor mobility is taken for granted (Frieden 1991; Hillman 
1982, 1989; Rodrik 1995; Milner 1988). Conversely, many authors stress the high adjustment 
costs involved in shifting assets (machinery, skilled labour, etc.) between industries. While 
labour or tax regulation normally implies classical class conflicts between the united labour 
and capital, trade policy options can provoke internal divisions inside the business sector. 
Specifically, according to the Ricardo-Viner model that assumes the immobility of production 
factors, business consensus is often hindered by the division among import-competing 
industries lobbying for the preservation of their domestic market, and export industries 
seeking improved access to overseas markets. Whether exporting or not, further conflicts arise 
from different demands regarding imported inputs and external service suppliers (e.g. 
distributors, banks, courier companies, etc.) that lower production costs, and hence, raise 
competitiveness. 
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Nevertheless, such sectoral approaches, whether general or specific, normally discount 
the key role of institutions in forming and transmitting interests. Indeed, common interests 
within determined sectors do not necessarily lead to collective actions, and as a further 
consequence, into policy outcomes. As a result, for this study, which is not concerned with 
single reform steps, but rather with the level of coherence achieved by implementing a 
country’s world market integration strategy over the period of analysis, it does not suffice to 
rely on a simple pluralism in which policy favours are exchanged on the political market for 
various forms of support. Instead, it is necessary to analyse the institutional mechanisms 
inside the state and business sectors that are responsible for filtering, preparing and analysing 
trade policy options available within the increasingly complex pattern of world market 
integration. 
 
The State Bureaucracy 
Defining “national interests” is not only a process challenged by competing interests among 
economic sectors, but also by state officials representing their countries at the international 
level. More so than in industrialised countries, “bureaucratic politics” in developing nations 
are associated with weak state structures that permit rent-seeking behaviour and overbearing 
“hyper-legalism”. These weak, inefficient forms of state organisation have been outlined in 
detail by public choice theorists since the 1970s (Krueger 1974, Buchanan/ Tollison/ Tullock 
1980), who began to systematise the widespread common suspicions with regard to the unfair 
distribution of public rents, such as import licences, soft loans and industrial subsidies. In this 
way, business factions tend to form “distributional coalitions” that put pressure on state 
officials to divert resources – or rents – towards them, and away from their most efficient and 
collectively optimal uses. For this reason, the management of state-led development strategies 
in Latin America have been condemned to failure, as is highlighted in a wide range of 
literature (e.g. Hirschmann 1971; O’Donnell 1973; Bulmer-Thomas 1994). The rampant rent-
seeking responsible for fiscal debts lead to unambiguous policy prescriptions in the 1980s: 
thus, only through a wide-ranging economic disengagement of the State, can rents be reduced 
and entrepreneurs compelled to respond to market forces. 
However, a different perspective has been put forward by neo-institutionalists 
(Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989, 2001; Wade 1990; Evans 1995; Fields 1995). Since the 1980s, 
these scholars identified, mainly in Japan, Taiwan and Korea, an efficient development State 
in charge of planning, coordinating and monitoring the process of industrial transformation. 
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Accordingly, theorists argued that the genesis of internationally competitive industries such as 
electronics, steel, shipbuilding, automotive, textiles and clothing, had not been carried out by 
individual firms but grew out of joint projects which the State shared with business groups. 
Based on this theory, Peter Evans’ notion of Embedded Autonomy (1995) identified a 
combination of three elements: 
1) Embeddedness: One of the factors crucial to any transformation project that demands 
policy planning is a close interaction pattern between state and business that provides 
channels for the permanent negotiation, renegotiation, and monitoring of economic 
goals and policies. Relations can be formal, in the scope of advisory bodies, as well as 
informal, in societal networking spheres. While the State plans, coordinates, and 
monitors, the private sector implements strategies and contributes with its 
“decentralised intelligence” from markets. 
2) State Autonomy: So as not to convert embedded state-business relations into 
squandering rent seeking networks, state bureaucracies need to be organised along the 
lines laid out by Max Weber.12 In this way, bureaucracy is not associated with hyper-
legalism, paternalism or bribery, but with loyal public servants who recognise the 
pursuit of collective objectives as the best way to maximise individual interests. As a 
precondition, Evans names (1) the implementation of meritocratic systems of 
recruitment, (2) the promotion of public careers as a reliable career path, (3) 
competitive remuneration compared to the private sector; and finally, (4) high social 
prestige for public servants. 
3) Pilot Agency: Coherent economic policy demands an “institutionalised brain” in 
charge of policy planning and overall coordination, that is, intra-governmental 
                                                 
12 The role of bureaucratic authority structures in facilitating economic growth has been a sociological concern 
since Max Weber’s classic contributions almost 100 years ago. Recently, Evans and Rauch (1999) used original 
data sets to examine the characteristics of core state economic agencies and the growth records of a sample of 35 
developing countries between 1970 and 1990. They found that Weberian characteristics significantly enhance 
prospects for economic growth, even when they initially controlled levels of GDP per capita and human capital. 
Considering their results, Evans and Rauch suggest that Weberianness should be included as a factor in general 
models for economic growth. However, they highlight the need for more attention by policymakers to build 
better bureaucracies and more research by social scientists on variations in how state bureaucracies are 
organised; see Evans/ Rauch 1999. However, the difference among the concepts of Weber and Evans is related 
to the fact that Weber saw the state bureaucracy as an insulated institution from the private sector, while for 
Evans the government needs the business sector as a source of decentralised intelligence which provides 
information on possibilities and limitations. 
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leadership is to be assumed by one clearly identifiable economic department instead of 
dividing responsibilities among a large number of state departments.13 
The notion of embedded autonomy offers rich theoretical insights, even though this study 
does  not focussed on explaining the success of industrial transformation in authoritarian 
development States in East Asia during the 1960s and 1970s, but rather analyses state 
structures in South America from the 1980s, when democracy and market reforms emerged as 
prevailing policy options. 
When analysing trade policy-making, several institutional features need to be 
considered, however. The concentration of resources and responsibilities inside the executive 
branch is often hindered, as trade policy comprises a vast ensemble of ministries and agencies 
in charge of defining, setting, and implementing policies. The agencies frequently involved 
here are the Ministries of Trade, Foreign Affairs, Economy and Industry. Moreover, 
international trade policy has become very broad in scope, thus requiring specialised agencies 
dealing with agriculture, technical standards, intellectual property, telecommunications, 
transportation, construction, labour, justice, education, and others. 
Coordination problems between various state departments are therefore common, 
bearing in mind their varying functional logics. For example, the finance department might 
oppose liberalisation, or a particular tariff structure, in light of falling, or less predictable, 
revenues. In part, this conservative fiscal perspective is often sustained by sectoral ministries 
such as those involved with agriculture and industry, which seek to protect import-competing 
branches. Conversely, these ministries can be in conflict with the Finance Ministry, seeking 
lower tariffs for inputs. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might support the outward-
oriented strategy developed inside the Ministry of Economy, yet set other geographical 
priorities due to political reasons. 
                                                 
13 Obviously, Evans behaved inductively here by analysing, for example, the centric role of the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) in Korea, where responsibilities and the most talented officials were concentrated inside a 
single department (1995: 51–55). 
 
Jordana and Ramió (2002: 5) examined the most common models for trade policy-
making, underlining the fact that different institutional arrangements generally reflect 
variations in how the political systems are structured, what role the State assumes in the 
economy, and how government bodies engage in consultations with interest groups. Therein, 
each model possesses its pros and cons concerning the aim of conducting trade policy 
efficiently, and adequately linked to economic policy-making in general. 
 
Table 2.3: Organisational Models in International Trade Policy 
Foreign Affairs Model Economy/Industry Model Foreign Trade Model 
Frequent Pros 
o Coherence of foreign 
policies by having only 
one interlocutor abroad 
o Institutional link with 
foreign networks 
(market information, 
trade promotion) 
o Maintains traditional 
governance style; and 
low risk related to 
business capture 
o Coherence between 
economic/industrial 
policies and trade polices 
o Maintains traditional 
governance style 
 
o Autonomous trade 
policy 
o Prominent presidential 
incidence 
 
Frequent Cons 
o Mixed policy 
objectives 
o Political motivations 
often prevail 
o Weak presidential 
incidence 
 
o Duality regarding trade 
and foreign policies 
o Diversified policy goals 
(subordinating trade) 
o High risk related to 
business capture 
o Weak presidential 
incidence 
o Strong need for 
coordination 
o Weak linkages with 
long-term economic 
policies 
o Weakly enrooted style 
of governance 
o Inter-ministerial 
struggles 
 
With respect to the notion of embedded autonomy, each institutional arrangement includes 
elements that might resemble the idealistic construction, and others that appear to be 
dysfunctional. In the Foreign Affairs Model, for example, the organisational deficit is 
supposed to lie in its separation from the economic policy planning, and the tendency for 
outward-oriented diplomacy to be somewhat “detached” from the realities of domestic 
economic sectors. Thus, embeddedness in terms of efficient interaction patterns with business 
is somewhat unlikely. Conversely, in most foreign affairs ministries, civil service is 
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institutionalised, contrasting remarkably with other public agencies. This is so because the 
recruitment systems are more sophisticated and career perspectives are more stable. 
The Economy or Industry Model has been assessed rather negatively, although the 
unified handling of domestic and foreign economic policies greatly resembles the pilot agency 
concept. The critical aspects mentioned by Jordana and Ramió, such as the subordination of 
trade policies, risks related to business capture, and the duality of trade and foreign policies, 
are not necessarily given, and depend very much on the prevailing policy orientation and the 
coordination pattern upheld inside the executive branch, and with the private sector. 
Moreover, the traditional ties between Ministries of Economy and business factions can be 
crucial in precisely matching the realities of the domestic sector with the available policy 
options within international trade policy spheres. 
Finally, the Foreign Trade Model is a relatively new institutional phenomenon in 
Latin America, strongly inspired by the US Trade Representative. In obtaining ministerial 
rank, such a “pilot agency” in trade policy affairs receives special political attention. Yet, 
concerning the concept established by Evans, a specific Foreign Trade Ministry does not work 
as an economic policy core agency, but is focused on coordinating trade policy concerns 
among the different economic policy related ministries. In any case, the implementation of 
such a model seems a challenging task, given that this style of governance is still weakly 
enrooted, and often causes inter-ministerial struggles. 
Adapted to the purpose of this study, it should be considered the often widespread 
limitations public administrations suffer from in developing countries in general, and in Latin 
America in particular (Mendez 1999; Nef 2003). Therefore, the bureaucracy ideal, in a 
Weberian sense, cannot be taken as an absolute reference, as first approximations might entail 
positive effects already. Furthermore, the discussion on the adequacy of each of the models 
outlined also encounters empirical constraints. For example, while in Australia the Foreign 
Trade Model has worked very effectively to date; in Malaysia the Industry Model has become 
a broadly acknowledged solution, and in Chile, the Foreign Affairs approach has converted 
into a model case inside South America, as I shall elucidate in Chapter Three.  
Despite such variances, for the purpose of this study I identified three general aspects, 
which have been used as variable dimensions for the purpose of empirical research, related to 
the institutional strength of state bureaucracies, all of which are also greatly foreseen in the 
embedded autonomy concept. Box 2.2 provides an overview: 
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Box 2.2: Institutional Strength of State Bureaucracies 
Responsibilities  
 
o Clear division of labour in the conduction of international trade policy 
affairs. 
o Close inter-ministerial coordination among the different sectoral 
departments involved in international trade policy affairs. 
Resources o Organisational strength of the trade policy team with respect to staff 
size, technical expertise, and the application of civil service models 
inclined to meritocracy and continuity. 
Openness o Transparent conduction of international trade policy affairs. 
o Permanent consultation mechanism aimed at domestic businesses, 
enabling close coordination of sectoral interests and related technical 
concerns. 
 
The Organisation of Business Interests 
Following the trade liberalisation of the 1980s, the newly outward-oriented South American 
nations began to emphasise the virtue of entrepreneurship. Thus, governments became more 
prone to accept private business inputs on trade policy-making. Martin Redrado, Argentina’s 
chief negotiator from 2002 to 2004, points out (Redrado 2003: 66-67): “If we make 
concessions in order to “unblock” external markets and carry out export promotion 
activities, the idea is for firms to take advantage of these market opportunities. Otherwise our 
market access strategy will be incoherent; spending thereby scarce public resources.” 
Notwithstanding the foregoing statement, the participation of business in policy-making 
still faces many negative connotations. In public spheres, local entrepreneurs are often seen as 
risk adverse, preferring personal channels to state officials in order to avoid public scrutiny, 
and as a result, causing subornment and discretional decisions. Likewise, literature on rent-
seeking points exclusively at negative aspects, without stressing the useful contributions of 
sound business advocacy behaviour. For Schmitter and Streeck (1999: 9), the dilemma of the 
limited amount of attention paid to political business actions is wide-reaching, and can be 
explained, at least in part, by the absence of systematised data, thus leaving space to 
impressionist judgments of this issue. They advert (ibid.) that “reliable information on, not to 
speak of analysis of, the resources, organizational characteristics, activities, and strategies of 
formal associations specialized in the promotion and protectionism of trade or employer 
interests is rare.” Furthermore, they conclude (ibid.) “some of the lack of attention may be 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 43
attributed to the secrecy and confidentiality which tends to surround the operation of business 
associations and, hence, to greater problems of accessibility by scholars to the data necessary 
to evaluate the role of such associations in political lives.” 
The empirical analysis of formal business organisations in developing countries is also 
limited, and generally depicts a certain institutional fragility (Merkel/Sandschneider 1999). 
From a more practical view, Kostecki (2002: 2) identified a range of advocacy problems in 
the WTO scope, adverting that “business advocacy is a reality of the trading system and there 
is no reason why managers and the business community in developing countries should 
remain inactive when needs arise.” As principal activities, he mentioned the monitoring of 
trade talks by a certain interest group, building a case in favour of that interest, presenting it to 
policy-makers for their acceptance and support, assisting the authorities in negotiations 
abroad and controlling the advocacy process, evaluating the benefits obtained and 
communicating the results to associated sectors. For Kostecki (2002: 9), past experience 
clearly suggests that lobbyists from the developing world spend a relatively smaller share of 
their resources on advocacy than their developed country counterparts, outlining the following 
six aspects as causes: 
1) Lack of Awareness. Industry leaders in developing countries are often unaware of the 
potential benefits of advocacy. 
2) Short-Sightedness. Returns on business advocacy in trade policy have to be considered 
in a long-term perspective, whereas industry leaders in the developing world have a 
shorter decision horizon. 
3) High Cost/Benefit Ratio. The relative costs of business advocacy for many newcomers 
may be higher in developing countries, due to the modus operandi of the local 
administration, such as a lack of transparency or accountability, higher information 
costs, and the economic distance from the negotiation forum (Geneva in the WTO case). 
4) High Risk. Returns on business advocacy are more risky in developing countries, due to 
political instability and the unpredictability of trade policy-making. 
5) Resistance to Change. Related to cost/benefit issues is the resistance to change. 
Resistance to change in the trade policy of developing countries is partly due to the 
feeling of insecurity and threat, encouraged in many quarters by the process of 
globalisation in low-income countries. 
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6) Lack of Economies of Scale. Given the lack of economies of scale, the potential benefits 
of lobbying in trade policy tend to be lower for the developing country industries, 
especially for Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SME). 
 
From a political science perspective, it was Maxfield and Schneider et al. (1997) who 
highlighted that in several countries, any efforts towards encompassing business organisation, 
i.e. the capacity of multisectoral associations to control and monitor each other’s performance 
and assure compliance to collectively agreed strategies, entailed growth enhancing effects. 
Also Mancur Olson (1982) acknowledged that multisectoral organisations tend to assume a 
state like perspective due to their broad functional scope, and thus, support policies favourable 
to economy wide efficiency.  
In Colombia, for example, Thorp and Durand underlined (1997: 216-237) that the 
valuable encompassing properties of the National Coffee Federation facilitated not only 
efficient collaboration with the government in designing and administrating efficient export 
promotion schemes, but also provided outstanding collective goods in the range of 
warehousing, quality controls, marketing, and technical innovation. In the Mexican case, Ben 
Ross Schneider (1997: 191-216) showed that the presence of the Entrepreneurial Coordinator 
of Foreign Trade (COECE), created in 1990 by the national business council CCE, was 
crucial for a sound integration into the NAFTA, since it allowed the official negotiators to 
interact permanently with a technically competent and encompassing interlocutor within the 
(pre-) negotiation periods. In so doing, the concentration in multiple topic forums contributed 
to the consolidation of trade reform, by building support in the private sector, increasing the 
flow of information between business and government, and allowing business to propose 
complementary and compensatory policies. 
Identifying major organisational requirements for sound business associations, 
Schmitter and Streeck (1999) draw from the neocorporatistic premise that interest groups do 
not only pressure governments in order to influence policy outcome, but are also interested in 
engaging in a stable and cooperative exchange with state authorities (see also Czada 1994; 
Schubert 1995). In this manner, Schmitter and Streeck (1999: 19) point to the complicated, 
intermediary, position between two independent and resourceful actors – firms on the one 
hand, and state agencies on the other. Accordingly, in order not to be overlooked within the 
intermediation of interests, a business association is obliged to insert itself into the direct 
exchange of market actors and state authorities, by offering a service at a beneficial price or 
quality. In Figure 2.1, Schmitter and Streeck (1999: 20) illustrate the complexity of 
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associative business action, by emphasising four different, and often opposing, logics 
affecting the organisational properties of any voluntaristic, free association that aims to be a 
strong interlocutor of business interests. 
 
? Figure 2.1: The Competing Logics of Associative Business Action 
 
 
 
For a better understanding of these four logics, Figure 2.1 outlines four types of activities that 
each refers to two different logics, due to the fact that the logics are mutually linked. In order 
to achieve the essence of the neocorporatistic approach, I first stress the required capacities of 
business associations to align the Logic of Membership with the Logic of Influence. 
The Logic of Membership makes reference to the demanding task of defining common 
positions and providing useful services to (potential) members. The more an association 
knows how to deal with diverse member profiles, the larger the membership, and 
consequently the more resources can be extracted. As regards the creation of consensus 
around trade policy affairs, however, any coordination by associations representing a broad 
array of products and branches can become problematic, since factions pursue opposing 
interests, as was indicated in the previous section. 
Services to    Control 
Members              over Members
 
Participation   Representation
for members    of Members 
Logic of 
Influence 
Logic of 
Membership 
Logic of Effective 
Implementation  
Logic of goal 
Formation 
Assurance of members’ 
compliance with internal 
and external norms 
Provision of services 
through selective 
goods 
Exertion of pressure for 
member interests  
Creation of 
consensus around 
common goals 
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The Logic of Influence is orientated towards the imperative to interact steadily with 
policy-makers, influencing policy outputs, and consolidating the association’s institutional 
status. In this instance, associations search for public resources such as concessions, subsidies 
and official recognition. To achieve these goals, two apparently contradictory activities are 
required. In “control over members” the compliance of both internal and external obligations 
stands out, such as the sound payment of affiliation rates, and the fulfilment of agreements 
signed with the government, respectively (e.g. price controls, investment goals or distribution 
of export quotas). Under “representation of members” a wide range of lobbying activities 
could be enlisted, e.g. fiscal incentives for exports or lower tariffs for inputs. 
Therefore, the main difficulty of interest intermediation consists in respecting both 
logics simultaneously.14 The government has obvious interests in maintaining a permanent 
dialogue with associations that exhibit a degree of representation. However, it is also logical 
that the creation of internal consensus and the assurance of members’ behaviour are more 
demanding among a broad membership than a narrow group of capitalists. On the other hand, 
entrepreneurs will only bet their resources on their sectoral representative if, and when, 
privileged access to decision making is guaranteed, otherwise they will choose another, more 
informal option. Beyond the Logics of Membership and Influence, Schmitter and Streeck also 
stress two other sets of challenging imperatives that have to be considered by business 
organisations; the Logic of Effective Implementation and the Logic of Goal Formation. 
The Logic of Effective Implementation refers, in general terms, to the way in which 
(1999: 19) “specified tasks or outcomes are attained with certainty and efficiency”, and is 
focussed on features such as the “routinization of operation, specializations of functions, 
directness of communication and speed in decision making.” In other words, the authors are 
concerned with the quality of administrative structures, as well as the usefulness of the 
services provided to members (such as technical advisory, market surveys, trade data, custom 
procedures, business rounds and trade missions). According to Figure 1, this logic also 
discerns the ability to assure member compliance in internal and external affairs. 
The Logic of Goal Formation, finally, points to the democratic characteristics of 
internal decision making and questions whether associational goals are formed by inclusive, 
deliberative member participation rather than by oligarchic domination “from above” (1999: 
20). Thus, democratically inclined modes require the provision of checks and balances, 
deliberative institutions, and in general, active member participation. Even though such 
                                                 
14 Schmitter and Streeck apply this notion particularly in the context of labour relations, and for compliance with 
collective labour agreements. 
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“democratisation of business representation” might hamper external negotiations, since 
opposing views need to be taken into account, in the end, the broad and active participation of 
entrepreneurs increases the pressure of collective concerns with regard to the involvement in 
official policy-making. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the notion of the institutional strength of business 
associations draws on Schmitter and Streeck’s insights, being defined as the capacity of 
private sector organisations to effectively intermediate the often opposing trade policy 
preferences within the private sector, and simultaneously, to maintain close relations with 
state authorities. The variable dimension relevant to the empirical research has been divided 
into two areas – leadership and organisational strength - as Box 2.3 exposes in detail. 
 
Box 2.3: Institutional Strength of Business Associations 
Leadership  
 
 
o Existence of widely recognised peak, or “umbrella”, associations, capable 
of coordinating economic policies between the leading sectoral and 
regional representatives 
o Existence of widely recognised institutional mechanisms (e.g. commission, 
council) ensuring an effective intermediation of trade interests between 
sectoral and regional representatives. 
Organi-
sational 
Strength  
 
o Regular payment of the membership dues 
o High diversification of the entity’s revenues 
o Active participation by entrepreneurs in the scope of internal (business) and 
external (government) coordination channels on international trade policy 
affairs 
o Large size of permanent staff 
o High in-house expertise, i.e. professionals monitoring and analysing 
international trade policy affairs 
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2.4 The Hypothesis and its Logical Structure 
 
In light of the theoretical assumptions and concepts presented in sections 2.1 to 2.3, in this 
section I define the hypothesis, and later discuss its logical structure. The success of world 
market integration strategies in developing countries (Dependent Variable B) depends on the 
institutional strength of state bureaucracies (Independent Variable A1) and business 
associations (Independent Variable A2). 
 
? Figure 2.2: Arrow Diagram 
 
As shown in section 2.1., a successful world market integration strategy is 
conceptualised as a “high degree of coherence reached by implementing a particular set of 
trade related policies that developing countries adopt within a context of gradual liberalisation 
of the global economy and a shift of trade policy-making towards regional and multilateral 
levels, considering to what extent essential principals, policies, and objectives of the selected 
strategy have been put into practice and maintained over the period of analysis (1985 to 
2004).” The measurement of the degree of coherence is, herein, related to two idealistic 
modes of world market integration, which have been pursued within the enlightened 
international context: the Multipolar and Springboard Models. These are further outlined in 
section 2.2. It is further assumed – but not analysed in this study – that coherently 
implemented world market integration strategies will contribute to the improvement of a 
country’s trade performance, and finally, to the achievement of economic growth and poverty 
reduction. 
Success of 
World Market 
Integration 
Strategy (B) 
Institutional 
Strength of State 
Bureaucracy (A1) 
Institutional 
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Business 
Associations (A2) 
+
 
 
Domestic 
Trade 
Policy-
making 
(Level II)  
 
Trade 
Performance,
Economic 
Growth, 
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Regarding the explanatory part of the hypothesis, the institutional strength of state 
bureaucracy has been defined as an executive branch, wherein the responsibilities as regards 
the conduction of international trade policy affairs are clearly perceived, the trade policy staff 
is adequately doted, and finally, a degree of openness is sustained towards business and non-
business as regards their incorporation into the trade policy-making process. On the other 
hand, the institutional strength of business associations is defined as the capacity of 
organisations representing private sectors interests – i.e. trade and industrial chambers, 
business councils, peak associations, farmers organisations, and entities representing specific 
sectors or branches – to effectively intermediate the often opposing trade policy preferences 
within the private sector, and simultaneously, to maintain close relations with state authorities. 
When discussing the logical structure of the hypothesis, I use Zetterberg’s theory to 
distinguish five potential relationships between the independent and dependent variables: 
1. Reversible or irreversible (if A1+2, then B and if B then A1+2/ if A1+2 then B, but if 
B not A1+2): The hypothesis is reversible because it is conceivable that the success of 
a world market integration strategy (high value of B) strengthens the country’s state 
bureaucracy and business associations (high value of A1+2), rather than vice versa. 
For example, an important trade agreement, which might be an integral part of the 
country’s policy success, can spur domestic actors to prepare themselves for upcoming 
trade policy challenges, through the creation of an inter-sectoral coordination pattern 
or the strengthening of trade policy advisory units inside the state and business sector. 
2. Deterministic or probabilistic (if A1+2, then always B/ if A1+2, then probably B): The 
hypothesis is probabilistic because whilst it is likely that A1+2 cause B, it is by no 
means certain, i.e. several disturbing effects might hinder the influence from A1+2 on 
B (see point 5). 
3. Successive or coexistent (if A1+2, then later B/ if A1+2, then at the same time B): The 
hypothesis is successive because A1+2 must operate for a certain period of time 
before strong effects on the B-value can be observed. Therefore, strengthening 
domestic institutions, both inside the state and business sector, can be conceived as an 
investment that at a given moment causes a cohesive whole of trade policies, spurring 
economic growth and reducing poverty.  
4. Sufficient or conditional (if A1+2, then B, without considering other influences/ if 
A1+2, then B, but only if D is present): The hypothesis is sufficient because no 
condition variable is required. 
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5. Necessary or subsidiary (if A1+2, then and only then B/ if A1+2, then B, but also if C 
then B): The hypothesis is subsidiary because it is possible that other variables may 
influence the value of B. 
Point five indicates that the value of B cannot be attributed to A1+2 without first analysing 
other potential influences on the dependent variable. To mitigate the disturbing influences of 
economy, culture, geography and politics, among others, I narrowed down the focus of this 
study to South American countries, thus ensuring similar background conditions between the 
cases (Van Evera 1997: 52). Nevertheless, it was unlikely to expect general background 
conditions to be identical among the countries selected. With respect to these countries – 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru – there are irrefutable differences concerning geographic 
extension, size and structure of the population, industrial development, GDP size, etc. 
Conversely, several important similarities among the four countries provided, in the last two 
decades, a comparable playing field for trade integration strategies. 
First, in the aftermath of the debt crisis at the outset of the 1980s, the countries moved 
towards far-reaching market reforms so as to encounter inflationary pressures, and balance of 
payment deficits. While the Bolivian and Peruvian trade reforms took place from 1985 to 
1990, respectively, in Chile and Argentina the first reform wave had already taken place by the 
end of the 1970s. However, the debt crisis in the 1980s led to a serious backlash, thus 
accounting for the fact that the world market integration strategies currently in force were not 
implemented before 1985 in Chile and 1989 in Argentina. 
Second, before 1985, traditional exports depended, without exception, on a narrow 
range of industrial and agricultural commodities, like cereals and meat (Argentina), mining 
(Peru, Chile, and Bolivia), fish and fish meal (Peru, Chile) and hydrocarbons (Bolivia, 
Argentina). Due to their oscillating world market prices, and mainly limited demand for 
labour, the four countries had clear incentives to foster the diversification of national exports. 
Third, it was in the 1980s when, in Latin America, countries made the transition from 
authoritarian to democratic regimes; Argentina in 1983, Bolivia in 1982, Chile in 1989, and 
Peru in 1980. Apart from free elections, democratic rule implied more checks and balances, 
and more transparency and openness towards society. It should be noted, however, that these 
new democracies in Latin America are still marked by widespread presidentialism and 
distinctive forms of populism, which are serious obstacles to the consolidation of democratic 
regimes (Diamond/Hartlyn/Linz/Lipset 1997; Mainwaring/Shugart/Soberg 1997; Merkel/ 
Puhle 1999). 
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Despite this, to ensure that the value of B does not result from a factor other than A1+2, I 
defined four so called control variables: 
C1 - Heterogeneity of Sectoral Preferences: As outlined in section 2.3, heterogeneous 
interests have often been used to explain the outcome of trade policy, considering the 
distributive implications of trade reforms. Accordingly, the institutional requirements to filter 
and coordinate diverging sectoral interests might be lower in countries with a homogenous 
business sector, than in countries where there is strong competition between the views of 
farmers, industrialists and traders. For example, in Brazil, the coherent implementation of a 
world market integration strategy over a certain period, where regional, rural and industrial 
factions often maintain opposing interests, demands a higher value of A1+2 than in small and 
medium sized countries where business interest are generally more homogenous. 
C2 - Heterogeneity of Foreign Preferences: As indicated in section 2.1, a domestic 
policy-making approach to world market integration strategies encounters limits when 
exogenous factors determine policy options. Particularly, the preferences of other countries 
must be taken into account as integration steps necessarily depend on the policy coordination 
of two or more countries. For example, the coherent implementation of the Springboard 
Model, requiring a far-reaching south-south coordination of economic policies, can be 
inhibited by the absent will of neighbour countries to liberalise their home market and to 
harmonise technical and sanitarian measures. In this study, Argentina’s trade policy was 
affected by strong heterogeneous foreign preferences, which required adequate assessement. 
For example, the protectionist behaviour of the US and European governments regarding the 
further liberalising of agriculture trade stands out, being a major obstacle to the conclusion of 
the FTAA and MERCOSUR-EU free trade talks. 
C3 - Political Instability (C3): A general interference on policy-making processes 
which affects, among others, the development of trade policy, concerns political crisis 
features, such as the compulsory resignation of the head or chief, mass riots, corruption 
scandals, or other governance crisis. Such incidences, rather common in developing countries, 
often entail negative impacts on long-term oriented policies. Therefore, the strong populist 
attitudes of political leaders in responding exclusively to specific popular demands to increase 
governmental legitimacy in the short-term, can undermine prior achievements, or accentuate 
failures in other policy areas. For instance, analysing the Bolivian case, I faced the problem of 
assessing the effects of political crisis features such as mass riots and compulsory resignations 
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of state presidents, observed from 2000 to 2004, strongly interfering in the causal relationship 
I sought to elucidate. 
C4 – Macroeconomic Instability: As well as high political instability, another general 
interference on long-term oriented policy-making is macroeconomic turmoil. Indeed, 
inflationary pressure, balance of payments problems, fiscal deficits and volatile exchange 
rates, have often hindered, especially in Latin America countries, the maintenance of 
development policies over a longer period of time. Even though the economic instability 
registered during the 1980s was considerably decreased in the 1990s throughout the region, 
the potential impacts of exceptional macroeconomic features ought to be discussed. 
Specifically, Argentina during 2001-02 (debt crisis, volatile exchange rates, fiscal deficits), 
and Bolivia from 1998 to 2004 (fiscal deficits), required detailed analyses regarding the 
corresponding impacts on the B value. Finally, I illustrate below a variety of case scenarios 
which confirm or falsify the hypothesis. 
 
Table 2.4: Falsification and Confirmation of Hypothesis 
 Falsification of Hypothesis Confirmation of Hypothesis 
Success of World 
Market Integration 
Strategies 
Low A1+A2  
Low influence of C1-C4 
High A1+A2 
Low influence of C1-C4 
 
Failure of World Market 
Integration Strategies 
High A1+A2 
Low influence of C1-C4 
Low A1+A2 
Low influence of C1-C4 
 
It is important to note, however, that in practice the values of variables change over the period 
of analysis, and often range somewhere between high and low. For example in Chile, the most 
successful case in this study, a very high B value was not reached before 1995. Before this, 
the Multipolar Model had yet to be consolidated. In Argentina, the B value had been rather 
high in the second half of the 1980s, when the country was pursuing innovative integration 
initiatives with Brazil, but came down in the course of the 1990s, when incoherencies 
between unilateral and regional policies became increasingly apparent. A1 or A2 often 
behaved unequally, moreover, entailing different impacts on the value of B. For example, 
Peru’s trade policy expertise inside the public sector was strengthened from 2002, while 
responses inside the private sector turned out to be rather more modest. Hence, trade policy 
endeavours initiated at this time can be traced back more to the newly created Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Tourism rather than to the leading trade and industrial chambers. 
3 Chile 
 
 
The world market integration strategy pursued by Chile from 1985 appears comprehensible to 
any observer. As the domestic market is small, with just 15 million inhabitants and a per capita 
income of about US$4,500, local policy makers opted for an export-led growth strategy rather 
than an inward-looking solution. Moreover, considering the fact that ongoing South American 
integration endeavors provided few predictable options, Chile set forth an exhaustive worldwide 
search so as to further market access. As a result of the undertaken efforts, the country registered, 
in the last two decades, an impressive quantitative export growth coupled with almost constant 
trade surpluses. Furthermore, local exports attained a steady process of sectoral diversification, 
involving clearly outward oriented industries from the forestry (pulp, timber), fishery (salmon, 
fish meal) and agriculture (vines, vegetables, fresh fruits) and various manufactures. 
With this record, Chile became a model case for policy makers both inside and out with the 
region, even though critics claim that the export structure is still overly dependent on minimally 
processed natural resources. But perhaps the most remarkable feature is not primarily referred to 
the countries export figures – which are more impressive in East Asian countries – but concerns 
the high degree of coherence reached in implementing trade policies over the last 20 years. 
Instead of altering principals and objectives, as usually occurred in neighbouring countries, in 
Chile the export-oriented model developed gradually, constantly improving and enhancing 
previous efforts, rather than abolishing them. In this regard, the democratic government that took 
office in 1990 did not aim to rupture the trade policy of its authoritarian predecessor (e.g. in 
maintaining the “flat rate regime”) but to complement efforts in extending market access 
opportunities through preferential trade agreements. 
Therefore, this chapter describes the outstanding properties of the outward oriented 
Multipolar Model pursued from 1985 and 2004, and provides explanations for its success. 
Accordingly, this chapter is structured along the following lines. The first section outlines the 
different policy areas that make up the world market integration strategy (Dependent Variable 
B), i.e. unilateral trade regime, regional and extra-regional integration, sectoral and trade 
promotion policies. Section two enlightens the organisation of Chile’s public sector in the trade 
policy area (Independent Variable A1), thus showing how the local bureaucracies responded to 
the emerging challenges of the international trading system. Then, section three outlines the 
institutional responses of the business sector on the same issue (Independent Variable A2). 
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Based on section one to three, section four provides an assessment of the case by means of 
exploring the links between the independent and dependent variables during the period of 
analysis, and controls the possible influences of other variables (C1-4) on the B value. 
 
3.1 The Successful Development of the Multipolar Model 
 
This first section is structured in accordance with the different policy areas that make up the 
world market integration strategy (Dependent Variable B), i.e. unilateral trade regime, regional 
and extra-regional integration, and sectoral and trade promotion policies. The final subsection 
summarises the results and provides an overview of the trade performance from 1985 to 2004. 
 
Unilateral Trade Regime 
Placing trust on the forces of liberal trade, one of the first steps towards reform announced by the 
military government after the coup-d’état in September 1973 was the reduction of border tariffs 
and the unification of the exchange rate (French-Davis 2002). The most radical liberalisation 
concerning the nominal protection of local industry took place in April 1975, however, when the 
military government declared the aim to remove all non-tariff barriers and to abolish tariff walls 
of up to 120 percent (220 percent before 1973), progressively establishing a new tariff range of 
10 to 35 percent by 1978. In 1979, the government finally decided to reach a flat rate structure of 
10 percent for all imports. Furthermore, international competition for domestic industries was 
further accentuated by the decrease of the exchange rate from 34 to 17.8 percent between 1975 
and 1982 (French-Davis et al 2000: 137). As a consequence, at the outset of the 1980s the 
country suffered from devastating trade deficits which forced the government to raise the flat 
rate to 35 percent in September 1984. From 1985, on more stable economic grounds, the uniform 
tariff was gradually reduced once more, reaching 15 percent in 1988. 
The process of unilateral liberalisation was not altered when the democratic centre-left 
government Concertación took office in 1990. Indeed, the uniform tariff rate was further 
lowered in 1991 to 11 percent by the new economic team in the Ministry of Finance. In this 
regard, Sebastian Sáez remarks (2002: 37) that this: “reflects the philosophical legacy of those 
economists who where responsible for the country’s commercial strategy during the military 
regime, in the sense that trade opening and economic deregulation in general would provide 
welfare benefits for the whole of society irrespective of what happened in the rest of the world.” 
Seven years later, in 1998, the Ministry of Finance once again proposed a uniform cut from 11 to 
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6 percent. Additionally, in the context of the Asian financial crisis that negatively affected the 
trade balance as well as the exchange rate, the new tariff reduction became more politically 
sensible, given that it was linked to policies to offset any predictable increase in imports that 
might be detrimental to domestic production, i.e. small annual tariff reductions reaching 6 
percent in 2003 and a legislation on safeguard measures (Sáez 2002: 38). In any case, the 
unilateral trade reforms implemented as of 1985, outlined below, can be seen as the most 
ambitious within the region. 
 
Table 3.1: Unilateral Tariff Reforms from 1985 
1985 1988 1991 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
20 (from 35) 15 11 10 9 8 7 6 
 
On these grounds, the WTO considers Chile’s trade policy an exemplary model. The 
Secretariat Report states that (Trade Policy Review 2003: vii): “since its last review in 1997, 
Chile has continued to reform and liberalize its already open trade and investment regimes. It has 
thus unilaterally reduced tariffs, streamlined customs procedures, ceased to apply capital 
controls, and floated the exchange rate. Inter-sectoral neutrality has remained a key feature of 
Chile’s policies, as witnessed by an almost uniform applied MFN tariff, the absence of 
significant programmes to assist specific activities, and the granting of national treatment in 
government procurement and to foreign investors, in all but a few cases.” 
Nevertheless, Trade Policy Reviews from 1997 and 2003 objected to several policies, 
even though efforts made in between were recognised. The major distortions probably arose as a 
result of the use of the Price Band System (PBS), maintained since 1985, for various edible 
vegetable oils, sugar, wheat, and wheat flour. Comparable to the Andean Price Band System, the 
PBS was intended to reduce the impact of international price fluctuations on the domestic prices 
of these goods, i.e. specific duties based on previously calculated reference prices were added to 
the ad valorem rate to bring the import price up to the reference price.1 However, this system 
stands in contrast with the recent gradual reduction of Chile’s tariffs, since specific obligations 
can effectively maintain tariffs on these agricultural products quite high, as pointed out by the 
WTO (2003: 35). For example, the effective tariff rates applied for sugar moved in 1999 and 
2000 between 60-70 percent in the context of low world market prices, well above the country’s 
                                                 
1 If the import price exceeds the reference price, rebates lead to a reduction of the tariffs applied.  Price bands are 
established once a year, through Presidential Decree, taking into account average international prices of the 
respective goods at major commodity marketplaces; for more details, see Law No. 18.525. 
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WTO bound rate of 31.5 percent. In 2003, Chile was finally obliged to revise the system due to 
Argentina’s successful intervention in the WTO scope.2 
Other concerns mentioned by the WTO are related to the export support schemes kept in 
place. In total, Chile notified six support schemes involving subsidies. While three were related 
to regional measures focusing on the extreme northern and southern provinces (generally 
accepted by the WTO), since 1997 Chile has modified the simplified drawback system, the 
deferred payment of customs duties and tax benefits, and the Motor Vehicle Statute in order to 
bring them in line with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (2.1.4). 
Lastly, with certain suspicion, the WTO noted Chile’s vigorous involvement in preferential trade 
agreements. As observed in the latest review (2003: vii), the increasing number of such 
agreements “has reduced the share of Chilean trade conducted under MFN conditions, is 
injecting complexity into its trade regime, may undermine the neutrality of economic policies, 
and may result in trade and investment diversion.” 
 
Regional Integration 
Chile’s trade diplomacy has been clearly seen as a pragmatic instrument to extend market access 
in times of sluggish multilateral liberalisation. Accordingly, by 2004 over 70 percent of national 
exports took place in the scope of preferential trade agreements signed since 1990. But beyond 
the multilateral scope, the options for advanced trade integration in Latin America also became 
overly pretentious for the southern Andean state, even though the region political and economic 
situation had clearly been altered. While Chile’s abrupt withdrawal from the Andean Group in 
1976 was compliant with clear doctrinaire reasons in a protectionist environment, in contrast 
MERCOSUR, launched in 1991, seemed to be a natural partner, due to both physical and 
conceptual reasons, bearing in mind the neoliberal scenario visualised by the dynamic reform 
administrations of Carlos Menem (Argentina) and Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil). 
In the end, though, Chile sustained different preferences as the country was reluctant to 
fully integrate into the emerging trading block. The sudden decision of the Chilean government 
in November 2000 to initiate talks on free trade with the United States interrupted the previous 
                                                 
2 In October 2000, Argentina requested consultations with Chile regarding the PBS; these were held with no 
success. Mutually satisfactory solutions were not achieved, thus, giving headway to a WTO dispute settlement 
panel; the panel concluded that the PBS was inconsistent with Chile’s obligations under Article II of GATT 1994 
(on import tax limits; yet later reversed by the Appellate Body) and with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture (on market access). In November 2001, Chile amended Article 12 of Law No. 18.525 to prevent those 
rates resulting from the application of the PBS from exceeding Chile’s bound rates; see WTO documents 
WT/DS207/R, 3 May 2002 and WT/DS207/AB/R 23 September 2002. Notwithstanding, the solution found by Chile 
was not recognised as satisfactory by Argentina, leading to other still ongoing consultations by 2004. 
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discussions held with MERCOSUR countries which sought to define the modalities of Chile’s 
full admission into the Southern Cone block. To understand Chile’s conduct (which jeopardised 
a full MERCOSUR commitment) a summary is provided in the article “MERCOSUR: Problems 
and Interrogation Marks,” published in August 2000 by the conservative think-tank Liberty and 
Development: 
¾ The Common External Tariff (CET): Chile refused to reverse the successive reduction of 
its flat rate, sustaining its orientation to the EU and NAFTA with average tariffs of 
roughly 3 percent rather than MERCOSUR with 14 percent. Moreover, the CET was 
considered as functional only for Brazil’s industrial policy. 
¾ Common Distrust: Among local entrepreneurs widespread distrust prevailed regarding 
Brazil’s commitment toward trade openness. Hence, the country had no interest in tying 
its booming economy too closely to that of its neighbour’s, who had just started the long 
and painful process of economic restructuring; Chile had taken the lead as a pioneer in 
the region in previous decades. 
¾ United States: From the outset of the 1990s, Chile was highly tempted to become a full 
NAFTA member, and therefore rejected invitations to enter into a regional customs 
union, considering that it would hinder its bilateral discussions on free trade with the US. 
¾ Agriculture: Local farmers, above all wheat, sugar, beef, and oleaginous crops producers, 
strongly opposed full integration as a result of the threatening competing sectors in 
Argentina and Brazil. 
Nonetheless, the refusal to become a full MERCOSUR member was by no means a signal of 
disregard to trade relations with other Latin American countries. In June 1996, Chile was the first 
non-member signatory state of a comprehensive agreement with the newly created trading block, 
including full reciprocal liberalisation for the trading of goods until 2014, participation in 
common MERCOSUR bodies as an Associate Member, and substantial commitments related to 
transport means towards the Pacific.3 In addition, as shown in Table 3.2, during the 1990s Chile 
intensified its reciprocal liberalisations in the region more than any other country. While the 
main focus was based on the fostering of intra-regional trade in goods, applying ALADI-based 
norms in connection with rules of origin, safeguard measures, customs valuation, dispute 
settlement, SPS measures, etc., in recent years Chile pursued the application of Free Trade 
                                                 
3 Other provisions covered unfair business practices, safeguard measures, dispute settlement, customs valuation, 
technical regulations, SPS measures, export promotion measures, investment and intellectual property rights. 
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Agreements (FTAs) of the “latest generation” which set forth detailed norms and included new 
disciplines, such as services, competition policy and state procurement. 
 
Table 3.2: Preferential Trade Agreements in Latin America 
Agreement Tariff Reduction Program Coverage and Status 
Mexico  
01/01/1992 
FTA since 01/08/1999 
2 tariff reduction programs in 
4 and 6 years, respectively 
Latest generation FTAs including 
services, state procurement, 
competition policy and intellectual 
property rights 
Venezuela  
01/07/1993 
2 tariff reduction programs in 
4 and 6 years, respectively 
Trade in goods, investment, transport 
Foreseen: Services 
Bolivia  
06/04/1993 
Partial Scope Agreement 
covering a limited number of 
products 
Trade in goods 
Failed attempt in 2003 to negotiate a 
latest generation FTA 
Colombia  
01/01/1994 
2 tariff reduction programs in 
4 and 5 years, respectively 
Trade in goods, investment, transport 
Foreseen: services, state procurement 
Ecuador  
01/01/1994 
2 tariff reduction programs in 
3 and 5 years, respectively 
Trade in goods, investment, transport 
Foreseen: services 
MERCOSUR 
10/09/1996 
2 tariff reduction programs 
started in 1997 will expire in 
2014 
Trade in goods, investment, physical 
infrastructure, energy; 
Planning: services and state 
procurement 
Peru  
01/07/1998 
4 tariff reduction programs 
with a term of 5, 10, 15, and 
18 years; 5 special tariff 
reduction programs for the 
textile sector with a term of 3, 
6 and 8 years. 
Trade in goods, investment, transport; 
Foreseen: Latest generation FTA 
Cuba 
01/12/1999 
Partial Scope Agreement 
covering a limited number of 
products 
Trade in goods 
Central America 
14/02/2002 Costa 
Rica 
06/03/2002 El 
Salvador 
Gradual elimination of 
bilateral tariffs until 2015 
using different phase-out 
schemes. 
Latest generation FTA 
Source: own elaboration, based on ECLAC 2002: 16. 
 
Even though Chile distrusted the regional integration forces in Latin America, it held 
strong reasons for furthering regional trade relations. From a foreign policy perspective, the trade 
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area appeared to be a sound tool for good neighbour policies after often hostile relations during 
the military regime (1973-1989). Besides, compared to other destinations, exports going to Latin 
American markets have generally consisted of manufactured goods such as lumber, processed 
foods, paper, textiles, metal mechanics, software, etc. Last but not least, since the 1990s Chile 
has evolved into a salient investor in South America, and hence, has become interested in stable 
economic relations. For example, in 2004, Chile was the second largest foreign direct investor in 
Argentina (after Spain) holding major assets in forestry, energy, and shopping malls (ADI 2005). 
  
Extra-Regional Integration 
With the onset of the 1990s, Chile began to show signs of its ambition to go beyond the regional 
scope. In this regard, the general incentives related to the diversified structure of exports, where 
roughly 80 percent of foreign sales used to go beyond Latin American markets, and the fact that 
the private sector was searching for foreign investments and low-price capital goods from 
industrialised countries. Therefore, I will briefly present the most significant endeavours which 
targeted North American, European, and Asian markets. 
 United States: The Initiative for the Enterprise of the Americas launched in 1991 by the 
Bush administration and the later US attempts to expand the NAFTA model steadily southward 
was received with unparalleled enthusiasm in Chile,  due to two fundamental reasons. First, the 
increase in agricultural exports (mainly fruit) towards the US market (since the mid-1980s) 
encountered numerous market entry barriers which demanded appropriate solutions. Second, the 
government was convinced that through trade agreements with the United States, Chile could 
best “cement” the unilateral reforms previously implemented, thus becoming more attractive for 
foreign investors. 
Therefore, Chile quickly began to put in place wide-reaching measures to demonstrate the 
country’s high degree of “preparedness” to sign a broad FTA that consisted, among others, in 
assessing topics decisive to the US government such as the protection of investments, intellectual 
property rights and environmental standards. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of a formal invitation 
in 1994 to join the NAFTA, the process of deepening economic relations was suspended in the 
light of the Clinton administration’s inability to obtain the fast-track authority from Congress, 
and an antidumping and countervailing duty petition filed in 1997 in the United States which 
affected the imports of Chilean salmon. Notwithstanding, after 12 years of persevered lobbying, 
in June 2003 Chile was able to reach its objective and become the first South American country 
to sign a FTA of this magnitude with the US, embodied in 24 chapters, covering 19 negotiation 
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issues.4 In the traditional area of trade, the duty-free bilateral trade of goods and products was 
established until 2016; hence, a 12-year liberalisation period for the most sensitive agricultural 
products, such as wheat on the part of Chile, was granted. 
 Canada: The US’s tardiness had the effect that the FTA signed in 2003 became a sort of 
climax after intense, previously conducted negotiations. The FTA signed with Canada in 
November 1996 proved to be the first technical test for Chile’s negotiators, coming on the back 
of the recently concluded and politically demanding MERCOSUR negotiations. For the first 
time, the agreement based on NAFTA principles included provisions for trade in services, 
competition, labour and environmental issues, and efficient dispute settlement mechanisms. 
However, contrary to the NAFTA treaty, the agreement foresaw reciprocal exemption from anti-
dumping measures, set forth less restrictive rules of origin in general, and identified exemptions 
or included longer phasing-out terms for sensitive products.5 Chile’s principal interests involved 
an improved legal framework for Canada’s investment in the mining sector and enhanced market 
access for non-traditional exports like fruits, salmon, and wines.  
 Europe: A comprehensive package was further signed in November 2002 with the 
European Union. Although similar in technical aspects, the additional provisions on political, 
scientific, and cultural cooperation stand out, underlining the wide-ranging “association” 
approach put forward by the EU.6  Furthermore, the Europeans placed emphasis on two side-
agreements on trade in wines and on alcoholic and flavoured beverages, including provisions on 
the protection of geographical indications and denominations, traditional expressions, and 
complementary quality indications, trade marks, and labels.  
Moreover, the fact that the EU signed a trade agreement with a relatively small South 
American country can be considered as a “coup” for local diplomacy, since the EU initially 
sought a broad, strategic partnership with the MERCOSUR. Chile had essential interests in the 
                                                 
4 Chapters in the US-Chile FTA: I. Initial Provisions, II. General Definitions, III. National Treatment and Market 
Access for Goods, IV. Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures, V. Customs Administration, VI. Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, VII. Technical Barriers to Trade, VIII. Trade Remedies, IX. Government Procurement, X. 
Investment, XI. Cross-Border Trade in Services, XII. Financial Services, XIII. Telecommunications, XIV. 
Temporary Entry for Business Persons, XV. Electronic Commerce, XVI. Competition Policy, Designated 
Monopolies, and State Enterprises, XVII. Intellectual Property Rights, XVIII. Labor, XIX. Environment, XX. 
Transparency, XXI. Administration of the Agreement, XXII. Dispute Settlement XXIII. Exceptions, XXIV. Final 
Provisions. 
5 Most tariff lines were phased-out by January 2003. Special phasing-out terms (up to 17 years) were set for pork 
and beef meat, vegetable oils, potato products, corn and wheat flour, sugar products and milling wheat. Chile 
retained its duties on dairy, poultry, and egg products, and Canada retained its out-of quota tariffs on the same 
products. Rules of origin were based mainly on the principle of substantial transformation. Since the agreement 
entered into force, its dispute settlement mechanism was used on two occasions: concerning the imports of Chilean 
salmon into Canada, and Chile's safeguard measures on wheat and wheat flour, sugar, and edible vegetable oils. 
6 For more details, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/chile/assoc_agr/. 
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agreement since Europe has traditionally been its biggest trading partner, main source of FDI’s, 
and finally, principal donor for technical cooperation projects. The accord established a FTA 
covering the reciprocal liberalisation of trade in goods that entered into effect in March 2003, 
offered a maximum transitional period of 10 years, and aimed to reach a full liberalisation for 
97.1 percent of bilateral trade, per sector, with 100 percent full liberalisation of industrial trade, 
81 percent of agricultural trade and 91 percent of trade in fisheries. Furthermore, with the 
remaining Western European partners organised under the Free Trade Association EFTA a 
similarly structured agreement was signed in March 2003.  
 Asia: Since the 1980s, exports towards the Asian Pacific have continually increased, 
accounting for 30 percent of national overseas sales by 2004. On these dynamic grounds, the 
distinctive trade diplomacy efforts regarding both negotiations and promotion were 
unquestionable at the domestic level. Therefore, in 1994 Chile was the first Latin American 
country to become a full member of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC); furthermore, 
Chile hosted two APEC summits in 1997 and 2004, consolidating its role as the “gateway” to 
South America, based on its reliability, flexibility, and commitment as a negotiation partner. 
Additionally, in February 2003 Chile and South Korea reached the conclusion of the first 
transpacific FTA. Apart from the exempted rules on labour and environmental standards, the 
coverage of the agreement and its modalities resemble a latest generation treaty based on 
NAFTA principles.7 Moreover, pioneer negotiations with China, India, New Zealand, Singapore 
and Brunei Darussalam were launched in 2003 and completed during 2005. By the time all these 
agreements have entered into force, more than 90 percent of Chile’s exports will operate under 
reciprocal preference regimes. 
 
Export and Sector Promotion 
Concerning the promotion of exports, state support schemes are more widespread compared to 
those of other countries in the region (Alvarez 1993; Pietrobelli 1998; Macario 1998; 2000), 
though Chile is often said to be an example of a marked driven economy. Since 1985, a series of 
initiatives have been undertaken to stimulate non-traditional exports, i.e. fruits, vegetables, 
timber, salmon, wines and other manufactured products. Thus, I briefly present the official 
export promotion instruments that have been applied. 
                                                 
7 Chile granted immediate tariff-free access to 67 percent of its tariff lines, while South Korea introduced immediate 
duty-free treatment on 87 percent of its tariff lines. The other goods obtained tariff-free access within five, seven, 
ten, or thirteen years. Chile was allowed to permanently exclude refrigerators, washing machines, sugar, wheat, and 
oilseeds and Korea reserved rice, apples and pears. 
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 Fiscal Incentives: To “offset” the harm to exports created by tariffs on imported inputs 
and other taxes, both a general and a specific drawback system were introduced in 1988 and 
1985, respectively. While the former is still available for all exporters, refunding the import 
duties paid on goods incorporated into the production process, the specific refund regime came to 
be perceived as a clear export subsidy for non-traditional exports, since it provided new export 
firms a simplified refund of up to 10 percent on the FOB value (WTO 1997). Thus, by 1998 the 
original law had to be modified in-keeping with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, reducing refunds progressively to a single rate of 3 percent. Therefore, 
the total amount of costs refunded decreased from US$210 million in 1996 to US$86 million in 
2002 (WTO 2003).8 Moreover, the WTO considered the deferred payment of tariffs on imported 
capital goods enacted in 1987 as an export subsidy. In order to encourage investments in 
productive capacity, the payment of duties on imported capital goods could be deferred for seven 
years and exempted altogether if a firm’s exports exceed 60 percent of sales. Whilst this was also 
modified in 1998, the amount paid by this instrument was still US$178 million by 2000.9 
 Marketing Assistance: The promotion agency Prochile created in 1974 has gained an 
outstanding reputation. Both state officials and entrepreneurs from neighbouring countries are 
usually fascinated by the high budget and the market studies available on the agency’s functional 
web page; www.prochile.cl (For example, to obtain data Argentinean exporters often seek 
R.U.T. figures from Chilean firms that allow free access). Since 1979, the agency depends on the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has a dense global network of about 60 commercial offices and 
trade representations. Focusing on non-traditional exports, Prochile provides data on foreign 
markets, country image promotion by generic publicity and targeted missions, marketing 
strategies support and the identification of administrative problems encountered by exporters. 
Furthermore, the promotion agency has been aimed at stimulating coordination between SME’s 
in their production, design, marketing and promotion activities, together with private sector 
institutions, such as the Association of Exporters of Manufactured Goods (ASEXMA). 
Although local promotion resources have generally been higher than in neighbouring 
countries, from 2000 annual budgets have decreased remarkably compared to the 1990s, when 
                                                 
8 In the case of the general drawback system, above all large firms in the chemical and mining industry benefited 
from the annual refunds of US$30-45 million; see Boston Consulting Group 2004 and WTO 2003. 
9 Law No. 19.589 of November 1998 gradually eliminated the debt reductions for deferred payments initially 
granted. However, under a transitional article the law withheld the possibility of debt reductions for companies that 
requested deferred payment of tariffs and taxes before November 1998. Further transitional provisions allowed 
companies to take advantage of deferred payment of tariffs or tax credits until December 2002. Under this regime, 
only instalments with expiration dates up to December 2005 are eligible for debt reduction; see WTO 2003.  
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the budget was well above US$20 million.10 To a certain extent, the gradual decline can be seen 
as a result of the increasingly critical voices regarding Prochile’s management style. A 
benchmark assessment by the Boston Consulting Group (2004; see also Macario 2000) 
concluded that since the agency’s climax in the 1980s, no additional promotional services have 
been developed, and current services do not surpass the basic programs provided by other export 
promotion agencies. As the principal reasons for the standstill, the analysis mentioned the 
omission of management reforms, low operational autonomy inside the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, absent independent revenues, and constraints on how to allocate resources; for example 
75 percent of the budget is linked to the promotion of agricultural exports.  
In addition to Prochile, a very successful account in the promotion of non-traditional 
exports has been ascribed to Fundación Chile, a joint venture between the government and the 
US multinational ITT which has been in force since 1976 (Cordua 1994). Particularly in the 
1980s, the organisation was responsible for a flourishing development of exports with added 
value towards the US market. In this regard, the principal idea has been the introduction of 
innovative new technologies from abroad and then selling those businesses based on these new 
technologies, thus, becoming the main catalyst for new export trade in gourmet mini-vegetables, 
prestige brand timber products, and salmon. 
 Enhancing Competitiveness of SME’s: During the 1990s, Chile strengthened its 
framework dedicated to improve the competitiveness of SME’s, increasing expenditures from 
0.34 to 0.93 percent of the GDP between 1990 and 1999 (Ministry of Economy 2000). In so 
doing, the democratic government sought to overcome the strong dependence on a limited 
number of large-scale companies exporting minimally processed natural resources. Above all, 
towards the end of the decade, resources became increasingly earmarked for horizontal 
promotion instruments, without contravening WTO norms. Hence, practically all resources were 
channelled and coordinated through the Chilean Development Corporation (CORFO) aimed at 
promoting economic development by encouraging investment and competitiveness (Esser 1999: 
33-46). Founded in 1939, CORFO operated until the 1970s as a holding company for state 
owned firms, assuming the responsibility for the creation of the vast majority of large industrial 
firms from the 1940s. Furthermore, a study carried out by Alvarez (1993) revealed that of the 20 
top private export companies, at least thirteen had been created by CORFO, including prominent 
companies from the mining and forestry sectors. Nonetheless, after being downgraded by the 
                                                 
10 The budget of Prochile is integrated by different sources such as international donor programs, agriculture export 
funds and direct resources from the national treasury; see the Boston Consulting Group 2004 for further information. 
In 2005 the resources were increased again from US$15.4 to US$17.4 million according to the newspaper Diario 
PyMEs dated 17/11/04. 
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military regime, CORFO was reborn in the 1990s and currently acts as a second-tier bank, 
managing credit programs in the area of technology transfer, investments for SME’s, technical 
assistance, vocational training and the development of supply chains.11 
 
Summary Dependent Variable B 
During the study period, Chile attained a successful trade integration strategy. Contrary to 
occurrences in other South American countries over the last 20 years, Chile managed to 
implement a coherent blend of unilateral, regional and extra regional trade policy measures, and 
hence, underlined its capacity to make simultaneous use of each level in favour of national 
export development. Resuming this section, the following box highlights the cornerstones of the 
local Multipolar Model: the application of the flat rate concept, active trade policy on the 
regional and extra-regional level and wide-reaching export promotion schemes for non-
traditional exports. Furthermore, “heterodox”, state-led policies were employed to accompany 
and prepare the relatively threatened segments of the local agriculture and small scales firms 
from the impacts of liberalised trade. 
 
Box 3.1: Summary Dependent Variable B 
Unilateral 
Trade Regime 
Regional 
Integration 
Extra-Regional 
Integration 
Export 
Promotion 
Sector 
Promotion 
1985-2003: 
gradual 
reduction of 
“flat rate” tariff 
from 35 to 6 
percent 
Exceptions: 
Price Band 
System 
maintained for 
wheat, sugar 
and vegetable 
oils 
 
Since 1990, 
active trade 
policy in the 
regional sphere 
by means of 
reciprocal trade 
liberalisations 
favouring exports 
of manufactures; 
Full MERCOSUR 
membership was 
refused due to 
disagreements on 
the customs union.
From 1996, 
pioneer in the 
signing of 
bilateral FTAs of 
the “latest 
generation” with 
North American, 
European and 
Asian partners. 
 
Until recently, 
Chile maintained 
substantial fiscal 
incentives that 
supported 
exports beyond 
the WTO 
margin. Strong 
foreign presence 
of the export 
promotion 
agency Prochile. 
Agriculture and 
SME benefited 
from a broad 
range of 
technical 
assistance and 
credit facilities to 
enhance 
productivity and 
economy of 
scale. 
                                                 
11 Regarding the promotion of exports, two CORFO credit lines were related to export finance; WTO 2003. While 
the B.21 line allowed Chilean producers of capital goods, durable consumer goods, and engineering, consulting, and 
other services to provide foreign buyers long-term financing, the B.22 line allowed non-traditional Chilean exporters 
with annual sales of less than US$30 million long-term financing for the purchase of production supplies, as well as 
investments necessary for the installation of commercialisation infrastructure facilities in foreign countries. In 2002, 
disbursements under these credit lines amounted to US$5.9 million and US$2.4 million, respectively.  
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The coherent pursuit of the Multipolar Model contributed to the impressive quantitative export 
increases of roughly 840 percent and the practically constant trade surpluses between 1985 and 
2004. From a qualitative perspective, improvements can be noted with regard to the steady 
expansion of outward oriented industries from the forestry (pulp, lumber), fishery (salmon, fish 
meal) and agriculture (vines, fresh fruits, vegetables) and diverse manufactures, therefore 
reducing the share of mining exports from 62 to 44 percent. Objections are made regarding the 
remaining dependence on natural resources and natural resourced-based manufactures which still 
account for roughly 90 percent of current exports. Although some added value could be 
incorporated into commodities from mining, forestry, fishery and agriculture, the major 
challenge for future policy making concerns is to enhance the sustainability of world market 
integration by making local exports more “brain oriented,” and thus, lowering the dependence on 
volatile commodity prices and increasing the potential of generating jobs. 
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3.2. State Bureaucracy: Towards the Foreign Affairs Model 
 
This section is structured along the following lines. The first subsection, responsibilities, exposes 
the division of labour in the conduction of international trade policy affairs, involving the inter-
ministerial coordination among the different sectoral departments involved. Subsequently, in 
resources, there is a description of how the trade policy team evolved in the last two decades 
with respect to staff size, technical expertise, and the application of civil service models. Finally, 
the subsection openness discusses the consultation mechanism towards the business and civil 
society.  
 
Responsibilities 
For a greater understanding of local policy making, the extraordinary powers of the President of 
the Republic that date back to 1980 when the military leaders defined the constitutional norms 
must be mentioned. As regards the area of foreign affairs, the President’s office used to have the 
responsibility of negotiating, concluding, signing and ratifying international agreements; 
therefore, the role of Congress was limited to granting approval (article 50; 1). If the President 
demanded, the discussions of international matters were highly confidential (article 32; 17). 
Lastly, the President held the exclusive initiative to propose bills on matters concerning changes 
in the country’s political or administrative organisation, annual budgets, taxes, and tariffs, 
leaving hardly any space for parliamentarian initiatives. 
As regards the executive branch, since 1979 the international trade policy area depends 
on the General Directorate of Foreign Economic Affairs (DIRECON) in the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry (Decree Law 53/1979). Given that none of the state officials, outside experts and 
business representatives consulted in 2004 questioned the DIRECON’s competencies in 
directing the negotiations and representation in international economic forums, the promotion of 
exports and the proposal for regulatory measures, a continuance of this subsection seems 
unnecessary. Moreover, its institutional stability is underscored by its organisational chart that 
remained unaltered over the last two decades; disregarding some functional amendments. 
Although the predominant agency in this crucial policy area had, surprisingly, not even been 
granted the rank of Undersecretariat, DIRECON’s officials convincingly highlighted the wide-
reaching autonomy regarding the appointment of officials and the use of budgetary resources, 
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indicating thus their merely formal dependence on the widely unknown Undersecretariat of 
International Affairs.12 
Nonetheless, the outstanding status that DIRECON currently enjoys appears to be 
anything but natural if its historical roots are examined. In 1979, when DIRECON was created, it 
could have been considered the pragmatic merger of three weak entities, composed of the 
independent Chilean Institute of Export Promotion (Prochile), the Executive Secretariat for the 
Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC), and the General Directorate of Economic 
Affairs; the latter two areas depended on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (State Officials (SO) 
Buvinic and Campos 17/02/05). In any event, the institutional strength of DIRECON was limited 
through the 1980s due mainly to three reasons,: 
1) Regional Integration: In 1976, Chile decided to withdraw its membership from the 
Andean Group. Therefore, the military regime underlined its ideological differences from 
the inward oriented integration endeavours in Latin America, which have been 
demonstrated by its widespread absence in the scope of the ALALC (1960-1980) and 
ALADI since 1980. 
2) Discarded Diplomacy: Not only had the regional integration been considered of little 
importance, the diplomatic cadre was also perceived as an inefficient, conservative ambit 
spoiled by party politics, and hence, incapable of managing foreign affairs with serious 
economic implications. In this context, the status of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
government was quite low (Fernandois/Wilhelmy 1989). 
3) “Chicago Boys”: Conversely, the Ministry of Finance assumed the protagonist role in the 
principal areas of the country’s economy which involved trade policies. The best example  
of the Ministry’s central role was the incorporation of roughly 25 young economists in 
1975 to accelerate the structural adjustment reforms. In the following years, this group of 
orthodox-liberal technocrats became commonly known as the Chicago Boys, as they had 
been largely educated in the University of Chicago by scholars such as Milton Friedman 
and Arnold Harberger.13 Under the direction of Sergio de Castro (1974 – 1982), the 
                                                 
12 See interview with the Chief of the Legal Department, Alejandro Buvinic (17/02/05). At that time, Mr. Buvinic 
presented the guidelines for the current reform project, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century,” 
whereby the trade policy area was supposed to be institutionally upgraded to the level of Undersecretariat.  
13 The Chicago Boys were graduates of the Catholic University of Chile. After their graduation, they went to the 
Economics Departments of the University of Chicago through a scholarship program for Chilean post-graduates in 
the late 1950s. The influence of the Chicago Boys was very strong indeed; roughly 100 students attended the 
University of Chicago between 1957 and 1970. These graduates achieved positions of great prominence in large 
scale companies and/or in heading the Ministries of Finance (Sergio de Castro, Hernán Búchi), Economy (Jorge 
Cauas, Rolf Lauders, and Pablo Baraona), Labor (Jose Pinker), the Central Bank (Miguel Kast, Sergio de Castro) 
and the Ministries of Planning, among others; see Valdes/ Goodwin 1995. 
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Ministry of Finance became the ruling government agency in charge of the economic 
reforms designed to disengage the State from the economy. Concurrently, the Finance 
Department absorbed (from the Ministry of Economy) attributions in crucial areas, such 
as public investment and tax policies (including tariffs). 
Within this institutional context, regional integration, as well as multilateral discussions in the 
scope of the Uruguay Round negotiations, were barely monitored by anybody, considering that 
the economic branch inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suffered from serious weaknesses 
(the Mission to Geneva continued to be a part of this Ministry), and the powerful Ministry of 
Finance perceived trade policies as mere unilateral instruments for structural adjustments, 
neglecting the participation in international trade policy forums (Outside Expert (OE) Sáez 
27/09/04). 
At the outset of the 1990s, during the first democratic government of Patricio Aylwin 
(1990-1994), the state executive began responding to the forces of regional and multilateral trade 
policy. However, the main factors for this change had not been released by the Uruguay Round, 
but were related to the emerging New Regionalism embodied in the US Initiative for the 
Enterprise for the Americas (1991), the creation of MERCOSUR (1991), and the entering into 
force of NAFTA (1994). Despite an increasing domestic interest, reports pointed to a 
disorganised and conflictive environment inside the state bureaucracy (SO Buvinic 17/02/05; 
Silva 2000; Porras 2003). Table 3.3 provides an overview of the main objectives and rationale 
put forward in the different governmental departments. 
 
Table 3.3: Trade Integration Priorities inside the Government from 1990 to 1994 
 Ministries of Finance Ministry of Economy Foreign Affairs 
Ministry 
Priority NAFTA Latin America; Asian-
Pacific; Europe 
MERCOSUR; Andean 
Group (later CAN) 
Rationale Lock-In Effect Second Stage of Exports “Good Neighbourhood” 
 
The Ministry of Finance responded most enthusiastically to the Initiative for the 
Enterprise for the Americas and the possible adherence to the NAFTA. The team that surrounded 
Alejandro Foxley, whose policy orientation strongly resembled that of its authoritarian 
predecessor, perceived the possible US expansion towards the south as an historical chance to 
cement the unilateral economic reforms implemented since the mid-1970s. Consequently, the 
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Ministry took up the initiative to prepare Chile’s trade policy assimilation toward North America 
by making comprehensive assessments related to the preparedness of the economic sectors and 
the domestic legal framework. In addition, the Ministry could rely upon a business sector that 
showed clear signs of support for a possible hemispheric integration (3.3). 
The staff inside the Ministry of Economy held clear interests (after being in the “shadow” 
of the Chicago Boys for 15 years) to be in charge of the promotion and regulation of economic 
sectors. After the fast expansion of the commodity sector in the 1980s, the “Second Stage of 
Exports” had to set forth the guidelines for the incorporation of higher added value in the 
products being sold abroad (Diaz/Ramos 1998; Silva 2000). In light of this perspective, the 
Ministry of Economy argued in favour of the disregarded regional markets and the steady 
expansion of promotion facilities in the scope of the Chilean Development Corporation 
(CORFO). This belief led to the creation of negotiation expertise and the assumption of 
leadership in the trade discussions with Venezuela and Colombia that took place in 1992-93. 
Simultaneously, the department began absorbing responsibility for the European and Asian-
Pacific negotiations, though without immediate results. 
The principal reason for the fairly uncontrolled regional division of trade responsibilities 
was evidently associated with the still weak position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
concerning economic affairs. In any case, in this first stage of trade integration, the local 
diplomacy argued in favour of furthering economic links within Latin America, this being the 
Ministry’s main area of influence. The prevailing policy rationale among the leading diplomats 
perceived the MERCOSUR and the revival of the Andean Group as excellent opportunities to re-
establish the strained relations during the military regime (see Insulza 1998). Moreover, during 
the first half of the 1990s, the role of DIRECON in international trade policy affairs remained 
modest, considering the key position of the Finance Ministry in trade related aspects. Indeed, it 
wasn’t until the presidency of Eduardo Frey (1994-2000), the second term of the centre-left 
coalition Concertación, that an institutional strengthening of DIRECON took place, due to the 
following factors: 
 1) Increasing Pragmatism: By the end of the Aylwin administration, there was a growing 
consensus among key officials that the “institutional disorder” previously notable could no 
longer be maintained in light of the international challenges to be faced. Sebastian Sáez, by that 
time trade policy advisor in the Ministry of Finance, stated (OE 27/09/04): “For a small 
developing country like Chile there is not much sense interfering in discussions related to global 
warming or arms proliferation issues; what is really at stake, is to make use of international 
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affairs as a tool for its economic development.” To some extent, the increasing pragmatism in the 
domestic deliberations was related to the decision adopted by the US Congress in October 1994 
to postpone the fast-track authority for an indefinite time. Though a backlash, this exogenous 
factor allowed other integration options to receive more attention. As a result, the Ministry of 
Finance (heading the North America area) initiated permanent coordination activities with 
DIRECON during and after the free trade talks with Canada in 1995-96. 
 2) MERCOSUR: The Chile-MERCOSUR talks, initiated in September 1994, became 
crucial to the DIRECON staff because international trade policies generated controversies at the 
domestic level as never before. Most significantly, the domestic farming lobby, fearing 
competition from the large scale agriculture in Argentina and Brazil, took the topic to Parliament 
and to mass media. In this heated phase, DIRECON officials carried out highly effective work, 
managing to not only squeeze everything possible out of MERCOSUR, as a key Argentinean 
official lamented (SO Cañellas 09/12/04), but also to gain ample support from the governmental 
coalition for the painful liberalisation process (Goméz 1998; Aninat et al. 2004: 22-26). 
 3) Rotation of Senior Officials: As in other Latin American countries, inter-agency 
rotation of key officials is fairly common in Chile. By the mid-1990s, this practice favoured 
DIRECON’s institutional rise as well as its coordination with the Ministries of Economy, 
Agriculture and Finance (SO Buvinic 17/02/05; Silva 2000: 315). Hence, Carlos Mladinic 
entered as DIRECON’s head of office in 1994 as a highly doted Undersecretary of Economy and 
left DIRECON in 1996 as Minister of Agriculture. His successor was Juan Gabriel Valdes, an 
internationally recognised academic who worked from 1994 to 1996 as head of the International 
Division of the Ministry of Finance, and therefore, acted as chief negotiator in the trade talks 
with Canada. As Valdes left DIRECON in 1999, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
On these grounds, DIRECON consolidated its role as a dynamic agency pushing forward Chile’s 
integration into world markets. After Juan Gabriel Valdes left office, it was, above all, Osvaldo 
Rosales (2000 - 2004) who fostered the role of DIRECON in the striking negotiations with the 
EU, US, EFTA, and South Korea.14  
Based on this clear institutional leadership of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the existing 
inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms began to work effectively. After an initial failed 
attempt to establish an Interministerial Committee for International Economic Negotiations in 
                                                 
14 Osvaldo Rosales served from 1990 to 1999 as Regional Adviser at the ECLAC headquarters in Santiago de Chile. 
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1992, a second version, in effect since 1995, enjoyed broad recognition inside the government.15 
Chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and attended by the heads of Finance, Economy and 
Agriculture, the Committee became the institutionalised advisory board in charge of counselling 
the presidency and concerting policy guidelines within the cabinet at ministerial level. The 
assistance from the General Secretary of the Presidency facilitated the link between trade 
policies and the official presidential agenda. Furthermore, the core technical coordination in 
negotiations, as well as in trade disputes (e.g. salmon exports to the US), had been operating 
inside the Committee of Negotiators, lead by the head of DIRECON. The coordination body 
convened the office holders of the different sectoral divisions more frequently than the more 
formal Interministerial Committee for International Economic Negotiations, where political 
representatives met. Nonetheless, (former) key officials commented that the formal provisions of 
inter-ministerial coordination have been increasingly replaced by informal interaction patterns 
(OE Sáez 27/09/04; SO Buvinic 17/02/05). Table 3.4 sums up the negotiation responsibilities in 
governmental areas outside DIRECON.16 
 
Table 3.4: Negotiations Responsibilities outside DIRECON  
 Ministry of Finance Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Ministry of Economy 
Department  in 
Charge 
Division of 
International Affairs 
ODEPA Undersecretariat of 
Economy 
Responsibilities Financial Services 
Investment Facilities 
Agriculture, (Phyto-) 
sanitary issues  
Intellectual Property, 
Technical Trade 
Obstacles 
Prominent 
Features 
High negotiation 
leverage in general due 
to the ministry’s 
institutional weight 
(e.g. taxes and tariffs) 
“Backed” by strong 
rural constituency; 
central role of 
agricultural concerns in 
trade talks 
Weak role in the area of 
market access for 
industrial goods 
Source: own elaboration based on Silva 2001; Porras 2003 
 
                                                 
15 According to the report by Sáez (OE 27/09/04), in the first phase the advisory board suffered from an extremely 
broad institutional environment, considering that agencies outside the areas of economy participated in the meetings, 
and as a result, the rhythm of these meetings was not dynamic and the results slowed down remarkably. 
16 Beyond the below enlisted core agencies, numerous other state entities influenced the course of trade policy 
actions. For example, during the US-FTA talks including 19 negotiation issues, the official team had been integrated 
by 22 governmental departments in total, covering the National Customs, Ministries of Internal Affairs, Education, 
Labour, Central Bank, National Copper Council, National Commission for the Environment, Undersecretariats of 
Telecommunications and Fishery, Superintendence of Banks and Insurance Entities, among others. 
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Despite DIRECON’s broadly acknowledged role in trade policy affairs, Table 6 
underscores the crucial roles of other sectoral entities in trade talks. Thus, the Ministry of 
Finance is a salient institution in light of its duties in the areas of financial services and 
investments affairs. In addition, the team monitors all trade issues, bearing in mind the 
Ministry’s key competencies in fiscal policies. The incidence of the Ministry of Agriculture is 
due to the controversies surrounding agricultural issues, both in the regional and in the 
multilateral spheres, and the fact that the agency maintained strategic relations with powerful 
agriculture advocates inside and outside Congress. Conversely, the Ministry of Economy 
became, in a sense, a “victim” of DIRECON’s strong role in negotiations. Apart from the 
intellectual property area, the presence of the Ministry of Economy in recent trade rounds has 
been rather weak, as Sebastian Sáez, the former chief of area lamented (OE 27/09/04). In 
consideration of the Economy/Foreign Trade Model (2.3), Sáez remarked that in order to assure 
consistency between foreign and national economic policies, a more distinctive participation of 
the Ministry of Economy would be essential, considering the agency’s responsibility for 
economic promotion and sectoral regulation. 
 
Resources 
It is common to hear foreign officials talking respectfully about Chile’s negotiation team (for 
example M. Cañellas from Argentina 09/12/04; Z. Rodriguez from Bolivia 17/12/04). However, 
as I previously mentioned, this local strength remains a somewhat new phenomena, dating back 
to the mid-1990s. The completion of the Uruguay Round and the first trade talks with Mexico, 
Bolivia, and Venezuela had been run by a rather small and inexperienced team (SO Paz 
28/09/04; Porras 2003: 41-42), as Carmen Paz (28/09/2004) serving from 1992 in the area of 
market access recalled: “for us, the breakthrough definitely came with the MERCOSUR 
negotiations; thereafter we started growing continuously. A skilled group of 50 negotiators was 
created inside DIRECON where initially we had only 10 to 15 persons.” 
To enhance professionalism within the agency, DIRECON was inspired by the USTR and 
Mexico’s Secretariat of Trade and Industry (SECOFI), and in the mid-1990s, introduced a matrix 
organisation based on geographic and issue areas that intersected in the different stages of 
negotiations and in the coordination of dispute settlements. As a result, the two divisions in 
charge of negotiations, the Multilateral and Bilateral Directorates, were closely linked with small 
offices responsible for either areas or topics, as shown below. 
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Table 3.5: Trade Divisions inside DIRECON 
 Directorates of Bilateral Affairs Directorates of Multilateral Affairs 
Geographic 
Areas 
North America 
MERCOSUR 
Andean Community 
Central America 
APEC 
WTO 
Asia 
OECD 
Topics Market Access 
Trade Defence 
Implementation and Administration 
of Agreements 
Intellectual Property 
Services, Investment/ 
Air Transport 
Trade and Sustainable Development 
Cooperation, Science and 
Technology 
Source: DIRECON 2005; see www.direcon.cl. 
 
Each small office has approximately three to four employees on average. The negotiation 
team is further composed by the head office, holding an advisory board, with two to three special 
advisors and the Trade Analysis Unit where six to seven economists carry out studies related to 
the impact of these agreements and the evolution of trade flows in general. Against the 
background of the numerous trade agreements currently in force, in recent years a trend to 
transfer personnel to post-negotiation areas involving the implementation, administration, and 
the evaluation of international trade agreements has become apparent. By October 2004, internal 
discussions were considering the creation of a Directorate to be exclusively in charge of 
implementation and administration (SO’s Paz 28/09/04; Ruis 18/02/05). 
In total, DIRECON employed around 500 persons in 2004, involving several divisions or 
offices which did not participate formally in negotiations, such as the Directorate for Export 
Promotion (Prochile), the Departments of Administration and Legal Affairs, and the recently 
created Office for Trade Disputes (SO’s Buvinic and Campos 17/02/05). The staff can be divided 
into three distinct labour regimes, as shown below: 
1) Permanent Civil Servants: This category includes permanent employees covered by 
social security and other security benefits for public servants. To increase the number of 
personnel, modifications to the annual budget law must be approved. Nonetheless, since 
1990 the possibility to increase the number of public servants (112) proved to be 
impossible in compliance with the dispositions of Decree Law 280/1990, considering that 
powers in Congress rejected an expansion of stable bureaucratic staff despite firm lobby 
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efforts displayed by DIRECON’s office holders. The wage structure implies rather 
modest salaries not exceeding the US$2,000 ceiling. 
2) Temporary Employees: As a result of the rising importance of the policy area, the number 
of temporarily hired employees increased significantly, reaching 206 persons in 2004 vis-
à-vis 86 in 2001 (DIRECON 2001; 2004a). In general, labour conditions are relatively 
poor since contracts have to be renewed on a yearly basis and do not consider social 
security benefits. The wage structure is similar to the previous category. 
3) Consultant or “honoured functionary”: This category was the most popular as salaries 
were often double those of permanent staff. Due to a lack of transparency related to the 
modalities of these specific consulting services, recent efforts sought to decrease the 
number of professionals hired under this category. Nonetheless, at the end of 2004, the 
number of consultants was still close to 200. 
In light of this combination of unrewarding, unstable and rather non-transparent posts which did 
not pass civil service exams, the task that has yet to be accomplished is the harmonisation of the 
prevailing labour regimes and the improvement of labour conditions for permanent civil 
servants. These institutional reforms are aimed to complement and strengthen the widespread 
public administration reforms implemented as of the transition to democracy.17 Nonetheless, 
despite the absence of stability in the labour force, DIRECON achieved the enhancement of trade 
policy skills through several provisions set forth. Hence, Juan Puig (SO 18/02/2005) from 
Human Resources stated that DIRECON worked closely with local universities and international 
organisations, such as the WTO, UNCTAD or IDB, to provide training programs (commonly 
referred to as “expertise”) for every single negotiator. Also, Puig mentioned that a university 
degree is required prior to entering office and many of the young professionals, averaging 35 
years, hold a MA degree or are about to be granted this degree. 
In general, all departments involved in trade policy affairs improved their expertise in the 
course of the 1990s. In this regard, the Ministry of Finance was awakened by Chile’s possible 
NAFTA adherence, and thus carried out the first local efforts. Sebastian Sáez, at that time special 
advisor to Alejandro Foxley’s team (OE 27/09/04), recollected that in order to be considered by 
                                                 
17 The Chilean government has undertaken considerable efforts in recent years to reform the public administration 
and the legal framework. In June 2000, the President created a Project for the Reform and Modernisation of the 
State. Subsequently in January 2003, the political parties were represented in Congress and the government signed 
an Agreement for the Modernisation of the State, Transparency, and Promotion of Growth. This Agreement 
provided 49 individual legal and administrative initiatives in areas such as: simplifying procedures in the public 
service, increasing fiscal transparency, decentralisation, creation of one-stop offices, and increasing the use of new 
technologies in the public administration, such as electronic signatures. As part of these reform efforts, new 
legislation on public procurement has already entered into effect. Additional information is available at 
MINSEGPRES online information, http://www.modernizacion.cl/. 
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the US, Chile was asked to first carry out exhaustive assessments of domestic sectors so as to be 
well informed with respect to the legal issues of the GATT regulations, particularly property 
rights. Sáez concluded that even the well trained economists working in the prestige laden 
agency had been faced with a widespread lack of preparedness; thereafter, ad-hoc forms or in-
house training were put forward. Subsequently, the training of professionals was systematised; in 
1994 an entire negotiation team was created in the Division of International Affairs under Juan 
Gabriel Valdes (head of area 1994-96) and Eduardo Aninat (Minister of Finance 1994-99). 
Although this team was partially transferred to DIRECON when the negotiations of the 
agreement with Canada concluded, the number of personnel currently working in the finance 
department is still considerable, equipped with seven to eight well trained economists. 
For the Ministry of Agriculture the turning point came into view with the MERCOSUR 
negotiations. The in-house capacity was first strengthened in an informal advisory unit that 
depended on the Ministerial Office, which in 1996 was transferred as a trade policy branch to the 
Agrarian Research and Policy Office (ODEPA). Created in 1992, ODEPA enjoys widespread 
operational autonomy from the Ministry and is responsible for monitoring and assessing the 
developments that affect domestic rural sectors. Out of the approximately 100 employees 
working in ODEPA, seven trade policy experts assigned to the Division for International Affairs 
monitor agricultural trade discussions and provide assistance in coordination with DIRECON 
(SO Cerda 17/02/2005). With regard to the Ministry of Economy, finally, its Trade Department 
has been modestly involved in recent negotiations. Sebastian Sáez (OE 27/09/04), head of the 
Department from 2001 to 2004 reported that the six professionals serving in this department 
worked on a broad range of trade-related topics but often could not assist in negotiation rounds, 
partly due to the low travel budget,. 
 
Openness 
From the outset of the 1990s, the trade policy experts inside the different government 
departments sought dialogue with the leading private sector entities in order to define economy 
wide and sectoral interests. State-business relations registered a noteworthy change before the 
democratic transition and concerned the intense policy coordination in the aftermath of the debt 
crisis in the 1980s. Eduardo Silva observed (1997: 156-172) that after the radical liberal 
adjustment policies implemented since 1975 entered into a deep legitimacy crisis against the 
numerous bankruptcies and huge trade and balance of payment deficits, the military regime 
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opted to establish a close state-business collaboration pattern, in which the following features 
stood out (see also Imbusch 1995: 324-378): 
1) Consultation: Economic policy related departments created communication channels 
toward business in the policy formulation stage, requiring each sector to propose meas-
ures that could stimulate investments. Beyond the predominantly informal interaction 
patterns, the Council for Economic and Social Affairs in the scope of the Ministry of 
Economy organised the first institutionalised forum in 1984, where business 
representatives were able to submit proposals to the state executive. 
2) Appointment of Policy Makers: The mostly inexperienced and orthodox liberal Chicago 
Boys, who presided over the first wave of economic reforms, lost influence inside the 
government. Top economic policy makers, especially inside sectoral ministries, such as 
economy, agriculture and mining, were now drawn from the entrepreneurship or from 
experienced civil service officers who where familiar which the concerns of local 
economic sectors. 
3) Selection of Interlocutors: The only ties that the Chicago Boys maintained before the debt 
crisis were informal and basically limited to the two principal holding companies closely 
interconnected with the banking sector. As Cruzat-Larraín and Víal collapsed in 1982, 
business associations began to be seriously considered as more viable options. Above all, 
the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC) composed of large-scale sectors 
from industry, agriculture, mining, commerce, banking and construction evolved into the 
government’s strategic partner. 
The democratic government that took office in December 1989 did not change this close state-
business collaboration pattern. Silva (1997: 173-179) and Imbusch (1995: 391-445) pointed at a 
marked “open door policy” applied by the top deputies since exhibiting credibility was 
considered crucial to settle the fears of investors. Therefore, office holders in the areas of 
economic matters collaborated directly with the umbrella organization CPC in the formulation of 
business wide issues like the tax and labour reform and with sector associations on specific 
policies (e.g. promotion schemes, infrastructure, regulations). 
Whilst the trade policy area had not been exempted from these close state-business 
interactions, it was transformed into the model case in the course of the 1990s; indeed the 
vigorous international trade diplomacy became a joint endeavour exclusively created under 
democratic ruling. Establishing the close network of bilateral, regional and multilateral 
arrangements required an intensive policy learning process by both the state and business, 
THE CASE OF CHILE 
 
77
 
however. As exposed in the previous subsection, on the public side efforts had to first of all be 
made to define each agency’s role in international trade policy affairs. Conversely, for local 
business, which had scarce knowledge about the properties of emerging regionalism, the 
deepening of trade relations through bilateral treaties initially aroused only suspicion. 
Particularly in the case of South American countries, the past experience of protectionism and 
financial turmoil were not considered solid grounds for deeper bilateral engagements in 
economic affairs. 
On the government side, consultation mechanisms testified to the state’s willingness to 
attract business enterprises to be its associates (Montero/Federici 1997; V. Silva 2000; 2001; 
Porras 2003; WTO 2003; Sáez 2002). For example, the Committee for Private Sector 
Participation, created in 1995 and chaired by the Minister of Economy, provided a means to 
inform the private sector of advances attained in negotiations and to learn the exporters’ view 
points in general. Aside from business factions represented by the CPC, the Central Workers 
Union (CUT) and academic scholars were also invited to join the policy debate. Subsequently, 
DIRECON established a special Council for Export Consultation in order to maintain direct 
relations with private sector entities regarding technical concerns. 
In practice though, the modus operandi of these formally established forums should be 
questioned to a certain extent. Data drawn from Montero/Federici 1997, Silva 2001, Porras 2003 
and Sáez 2002 provided only very brief descriptions. Conversely, verbal reports gathered from 
state officials and business representatives proved to be misleading or incomplete as regards the 
accurate denominations and responsibilities of the established channels (SO Paz 28/09/04; BR 
Font 27/09/04; BR Reus 27/09/04; OE Sáez 27/09/04). Therefore, we can infer that the concept 
of strongly institutionalised consultation procedures appears inappropriate appropriate. Rather, 
the mentioned verbal reports revealed that DIRECON officials began to establish close ties with 
business entities that went beyond the formal sphere; or as it was described by a representative of 
SOFOFA, the national industry chamber, “formal mechanisms were replaced by informal ones 
as reciprocal trust increased” (BR Reus 27/09/2004). 
This tendency towards close, informal channels between DIRECON and a rather limited 
group of business representatives was also criticised since important decisions on international 
trade policy affairs had been taken within rather exclusive circles. According to a confidential 
ex-state official report (September 2004), the Committee for Private Sector Participation (later 
denominated Public-Private Committee on International Economic Relations) has not convened 
since the year 2000, and thus, has increased business complaints as regards the somewhat non-
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transparent official coordination. Hence, the public sector responded by launching the Public-
Private Council for Export Development in April 2003. Thereafter, debates have been structured 
by four working groups on trade facilitation, international integration, export support schemes, 
and on promotion of exports and tourism. By July 2005, the Council had convened on five 
occasions, typically integrating the top functionaries from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Economy, Finance, and Agriculture, National Customs, CORFO, Prochile, ODEPA and the 
Foreign Investment Committee. Business participation was also widespread, and covered about 
40 of the leading entities (SOFOFA Annual Reports 2003-05). 
Controversial views were also gathered regarding the lack of transparency towards non-
business actors. On one hand, there is an official view sustained by Osvaldo Rosales (head of 
DIRECON 2001-2004), which pointed at the widespread dialogue forums provided for civil 
society within the scope of the free trade talks with the United States (CIPMA Seminar; October 
2001). Rosales mentioned that the Advisory Council, composed of 35 personalities from society, 
served as a permanent link to the government throughout the negotiations. Furthermore, 
numerous meetings were organised in order to consult with NGO’s, universities, and labour 
unions. Lastly, Rosales highlighted the survey data provided by the Foundation Futuro in which 
70 percent of Chileans considered a FTA as beneficial. 
On the other hand, a representative of the Chilean Alliance for Fair and Responsible 
Trade (OE 28/09/04) – a leading umbrella NGO comprised of environmental and human rights 
groups, unions and academic bodies – expressed its incongruity with the way trade talks with the 
US were conducted, as they “suffered from a gigantic democratic deficit since we did not know 
the legal text before it was signed,” and hence, advocated for the opening of real channels for 
citizen participation on trade issues, to ensure the legitimacy of commitments assumed by trade 
agreements. Instead, for the NGO “the dialogue organized by the government was somewhat 
hypocritical as the topics mentioned by us were disregarded at the negotiation table.” 
Finally, Porras (2003) observed that civil society participation has visibly increased in 
recent years. For example, since the trade talks with the EU the Central Workers Union (CUT) is 
usually present in the “room next door” with a special advisor. Moreover, the Chilean Alliance 
for Fair and Responsible Trade received a special mention from Porras (2003: 59-60), given its 
outstanding networking capacity with US organisations, such as Public Citizen, Sierra Club or 
Earth Friends. Despite these efforts, in line with Sikkink (1998), he concluded that achievements 
have not been enough to place topics such as environment, trade and gender, labour rights firmly 
on the public agenda. 
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Summary Independent Variable A1 
According to the three variable dimensions observed, the institutional strength of Chile’s state 
bureaucracy in the area of international trade policy affairs is rather high. As resumed in Box 3.2, 
from 1995 the government was able to define an organisational model recognised among key 
domestic actors, and build up an adequate trade policy staff that became increasingly familiar 
with state-of-the-art negotiation techniques and new trade issues. Furthermore, the democratic 
government maintained the distinctive state-business collaboration patterns already initiated 
during the authoritarian regime. 
 
Box 3.2: Summary Independent Variable A1 
Responsibilities Resources  Openness 
Neglected by the military 
leaders, international trade 
policy affairs received strong 
attention by government 
departments as of 1990. 
After struggle for 
competences in 1990-94, 
since the mid-1990s the 
challenging new regional 
forces have convinced 
domestic actors to opt for a 
strong, autonomous trade 
policy branch inside the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
In the course of the 1990s, 
there was a permanent 
increase of the trade policy 
advisory staff. In addition, the 
vast negotiation experiences 
gave Chile’s negotiation team 
international recognition; 
enhancing the stability of the 
bureaucratic cadre remains a 
pending task.  
 
Though rather informal, close 
ties towards business 
maintained by the DIRECON 
office point at the continuance 
of the business-state 
collaboration pattern initiated 
in the 1980s.  However, free 
trade critical NGO’s resisted 
governmental efforts to gain 
broader support from society 
for the local trade policies. 
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3.3. The Institutional Strength of Business Associations 
 
This section is structured in accordance with the variable dimensions of the Independent 
Variable A2. The first subsection, Institutional Leadership, analyses the establishment of a 
widely recognised peak, or “umbrella”, association capable of coordinating economic policies 
between the leading sectoral and regional representatives. It further describes the institutional 
mechanism that ensures the effective intermediation of trade interests among leading sectoral 
and regional representatives. The second subsection, Organisational Strength, makes an 
assessment of the professionalism involved in business advocacy, stressing the domestic pattern 
of financing, participatory behaviour, and in-house trade policy expertise. The final subsection 
summarises the results and provides an overview of the business representation pattern 
throughout the period of 1985-2004. 
 
Institutional Leadership 
Today’s strong influence of business associations in national politics has its origin in the debt 
crisis of 1982 when the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPS), a national umbrella 
organisation, became the privileged “civilian” associate of the authoritarian regime. In just a few 
years, the CPC gained broad internal and external recognition as a firm advocate of the 
pragmatic liberal model set forth in the mid-1980s. 
With the country’s transformation into a democratic regime, the behaviour of the leading 
private sector entities altered little. For local entrepreneurs it was clear that “development” was 
not primarily related to the established political system, but to a business friendly environment. 
Therefore, the capitalist’s mission went beyond simple lobbying by embracing broad activities 
aimed at convincing society of the appropriate direction to be taken. “It does not suffice to 
struggle for the increase of the GDP if the key stakeholders of the free enterprise do not share 
these results with the people,” were the words of the former CPC President, Manuel Feliú (1986-
90) in his book Free Entrepreneurship (Imbusch 1995: 367).18 
Given the marked institutional leadership of the national peak associations, the first 
democratic government of the centre-left coalition could introduce only small modifications in 
                                                 
18 In spreading this notion, the democratic regime did not mean to become an obstacle for the conservative business 
elites as they maintained, or even expanded, their areas of influence by controlling the major media companies, 
financing of political parties, closing links with universities and influential think-tanks, such as the Centre for Public 
Studies (CEP) and the Institute of Liberty and Development. For political party financing, see expert interview with 
Miguel Landeros Perkic, 10/11/2000. The control over the media is described in Robin 2001b; for links between 
business and think tanks see Qué Pasa from 11/06/01. 
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the tax and labour regulations, the two major reforms endeavours of the Aylwin administration.19 
Among other factors, the advocacy power of the CPC is explained by its membership, consisting 
of the six main sector associations that can generally be considered as the singular 
representatives in each of their corresponding sectors.20 
 
Table 3.6: Business Representation Structure in Chile 
Scale Industry/ Construction  Agriculture/ Mining Trade/ Banking 
CPC *1933 
 
Large-Scale 
Firms 
 
Society of Manufacturing 
Promotion (SOFOFA) 
*1883 
Chamber of Construction 
*1951 
National Society of 
Agriculture (SNA)*1838 
 
National Society of 
Mining (SONAMI)*1883
National Chamber of 
Commerce (CNC) *1858 
 
Association of Banks and 
Financial Entities (ABIF) 
*1943 
CONAPYME 
*1999 
Small-Scale 
Firms 
Confederation of Small 
and Micro Manufactures 
and Handicraft 
Associations 
(CONUPIA) *1966 
Confederation of 
Agriculture Producers 
(CPA) *1973 
(not CONAPYME 
member) 
 
Confederation of 
Commerce, Retailers and 
Tourism *1938 
Confederation of Truck 
Drivers *1953 
Source: own elaboration based on Imbusch 1995: 216-229. 
 
Table 3.6 indicates the marked segmentation between small and large scale representatives. In 
general terms, the influence of small-scale firms’ associations was weaker than that of large 
company representatives, due to the following three main reasons: 
1) Competitiveness Gap: The most competitive, outward oriented sectors are predominantly 
based on large firms (Castillo/Álvarez 1998). Also, the competitive range of small and 
medium size exporters are associated to large enterprise organisations (see later on in this 
section). 
2) Trajectory: Small firms’ organisations are much younger than large scale representatives 
in the area of agriculture (SNA), commerce (CNC), mining (SONAMI) and industry 
(SOFOFA) created in the years 1838 and 1883. Furthermore, CONAPYME, the peak 
association established in 1999, has encountered a strongly fragmented membership 
considering the high number of firms and sectors (Robin 2001a; González Gil 18/11/00). 
                                                 
19 While labour relations could not be improved in favour of trade unions (for example, collective bargaining, strike 
breaker), the tax reform meant only a temporary increase (during 3 years) of the corporate tax from 10 to 15 percent. 
For further details; see Imbusch 1995: 410-428; Silva 1997: 173-178. 
20 Nevertheless, the internal structure of associate members varies remarkably since the associations held affiliates in 
the rank of regional and sector chambers and individual firms. As a result, many firms and chambers are affiliated in 
different associations, thus representation structures are more complex than was first thought. For a detailed analysis 
of local association structures; see Campero 1988. 
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3) Financing: Small-scale firms’ associations suffer from scarce resources due to the fact 
that when it comes to paying dues, members are notoriously absent. CONUPIA (BR 
18/02/05), as the peak entity of small manufactures, reported that less than 25 percent of 
members meet payment deadlines regularly. As a result, CONUPIA and other 
associations have been dependent on subsidies provided by the Service for Technical 
Cooperation (SERCOTEC) to strengthen the organisational development of the highly 
fragmented segment of small and micro enterprises, and hence, to give counterbalance to 
the large-scale sectors that were evidently facing financial problems to a lesser degree.  
The leadership of CPC also faced a declining tendency towards the end of the 1990s. As was 
elucidate in greater detail in the MA thesis “Entrepreneurial Behaviour within the Process of 
Democratic Consolidation in Chile and Argentina (Robin, 2001: 52-61), increasing rivalry 
stemmed mainly from the Society of Manufacturing Promotion. From 1998, SOFOFA’s 
President, Felipe Lamarca, (1997-2001) provoked an open conflict with the umbrella 
organisation headed by Walter Riesco (1996-2000). Lamarca, an idiosyncratic, impulsive leader, 
and manager of the Compañía de Petróleos de Chile S.A. (COPEC) – Chile’s largest private 
company – undermined the CPC’s leadership through multiple activities, such as criticising 
official CPC positions, holding direct dialogue with the government with respect to labour 
policies, abstaining from the Executive Committee, refusing to pay dues as an affiliate member, 
and finally, in March 2000, by the temporary suspension of its CPC membership. Evidently, 
such conflicts were mainly based on personal rivalry between Lamarca and Riesco, best 
illustrated by the opposing points of view related to the trial of Augusto Pinochet; Riesco 
defended the former dictator whereas Lamarca did not (El Metropolitano 11/08/2000). 
Nonetheless, the Lamarca Chairmanship marked a dividing-line in the intermediation of 
local business interests. Although the CPC kept up an important “coordination force” during 
2001-2005 (the time when Juan Claro assumed both the chair of SOFOFA and the CPC), 
SOFOFA consolidated its leading role in areas such as trade, energy, education and state 
procurement, symbolised herein by the Pro-Growth Agenda I and II, where the industrialists’ 
organisation manifested its strategic relation toward the government. Two features accentuated 
the entity’s increased leverage: 
1) Multisectoral Approach: From 1990 to 2004, SOFOFA increased its membership from 
28 to 36 sector associations, further including 2,500 corporate affiliates and eight 
regional chambers (BR Reus 27/09/04; Robin 2001a). Moreover, the membership in 2004 
accounted for 90 percent of industrial production and 30 percent of the GDP (BR Reus 
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27/09/04), and also represented industry sectors, i.e. energy, telecommunications, water 
and sewage, and information technology for port services, as well as air, maritime and 
rail transport. The pursued multisectoral approach was underscored by the presidencies of 
Juan Claro (2001-2005) and Bruno Philippi (from 2005), who preside the Board of 
Directors of Emel SA (Energy distribution) and Telefónica, respectively. 
2) Export Champions: The most dynamic export branches are affiliated, without exception, 
to SOFOFA, i.e. the Salmon and Trout Producers Association, the Winery Association of 
Chile, the Federation of Food Processing Industries of Chile (FEPACH), the Chilean 
Lumber Corporation (CORMA), and the Fisheries Association of Chile (SONAPESCA). 
Several of these became affiliated as of 1997 when Felipe Lamarca assumed the 
Chairmanship. Moreover, SME exporters are also associate members through the 
Association of Exporters of Manufactures (ASEXMA), the major private export 
promotion agency. 
 
The Intermediation of Trade Interests and Organisational Strength 
As indicated, at the outset of the 1990s doubts prevailed among the Chilean entrepreneurship in 
relation to regional trade arrangements, perceiving them as somehow heterodox instruments that 
could undermine the achievements of unilateral trade liberalisation implemented under the 
authoritarian regime. But faced by the emerging regional initiatives of the MERCOSUR and 
NAFTA, the leading business entities began to respond to the changing international scenario as 
I outline subsequently in the case of CPC (peak association), SOFOFA (industry), SNA 
(agriculture), and the Santiago Chamber of Commerce (trade and services). 
 Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC): Supported by the Ministry of 
Finance, the prospect of becoming a member of NAFTA caused, at the beginning of the 1990s, 
strong reactions among the large-scale firms associated inside the CPC. For this reason, the 
umbrella organisation took over control and put into practice the so-called Program for Special 
Studies (PEPALC). Thereafter, acknowledged economists from the Catholic University carried 
out exhaustive impact assessment studies in order to measure the possible effects of a NAFTA 
membership on different economic sectors (Coeymans/Larraín 1992). Furthermore, the peak 
entity began to harmonise the prevailing private sector views within the Commission for 
International Affairs, where members would deliberate over the available integration options. By 
the mid-1990s, the CPC performed as an effective multisectoral coordination force in the scope 
of the controversial negotiations with the MERCOSUR states. While the industrial and service 
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sectors held strong offensive interests, the CPC authorities placed special emphasis on the 
concerns of the local agriculture sector to balance inter-sectoral views. Supporting the agreement 
in general terms, the umbrella organisation underscored the potential liberalisation costs for 
farmers, and thus, supported the claims of the National Agriculture Society (SNA) for effective 
compensation measures (Silva 2000: 327-323). 
After the negotiations with MERCOSUR, the CPC, as a forum for deliberation and 
multisectoral coordination efforts, underwent significant modifications. Since other sectoral 
entities, such as the SNA, SOFOFA, and the Santiago Chamber of Commerce, increased their 
protagonism in the trade policy area; the CPC’s coordination function began to decrease and 
become overshadowed by an increased focus on dissemination activities. For example, in 2001, 
when the “historical” opportunity to negotiate an FTA with the US finally became feasible, the 
CPC became a salient promoter of the trade agreement through awareness campaigns carried out 
inside and outside the country.21 With respect to the internal structure of the multisectoral 
organisation, Box 3.3 provides an overview of financing, internal trade policy making, trade 
policy expertise, and staff. Data was collected in 2001 and corroborated in 2004. 
 
Box 3.3: Organisational Properties of the Confederation of Production and Commerce 
Financing  Revenues originate exclusively from associate sectors; no supply of services 
Trade 
Policy 
Making 
Commission for International Affairs; monthly meetings are said to be attended 
regularly, totalling approximately 15 persons, including CPC staff 
Staff Approximately 10 officials, including administrative staff  
Trade 
Experts 
There is one economic policy advisors who dedicates 50 percent of time to the 
monitoring and coordination on trade policy concerns 
Sources: BR García Aspillaga 02/11/00; BR Font 27/09/04, CPC Annual Report 2003-04 
 
In general, the CPC was not prominent for its excellence in technical analysis due to the 
modest professional level of its staff. Instead, CPC has been characterised as a place where 
sectors can meet to coordinate business positions, underlining the umbrella organisation’s 
capacity to unite business, and to submit harmonised proposals to the authorities, or as Carlos 
Urenda, CPC’s Managing Director, stated (El Diario 18/12/01), “the government shall know our 
                                                 
21 For example, the CPC organised the campaign “Half Day for Chile” aimed at convincing key actors in the United 
States regarding the interest and the readiness of Chile to sign a free trade agreement. Therefore, every businessman 
travelling to the US informed the CPC and the CPC scheduled meetings with important members of Congress; see 
Font 27/09/04.  
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worries…, we contribute our experience and the government has the power to bring it to law.” 
Such matters were manifested by the active participation of CPC members in no less than 30 
private-public commissions, encompassing areas such as the environment, labour, energy, 
statistics, taxes, etc. However, as previously stated, in the trade policy area the ability to 
intermediate interests among business passed over, step-by-step, to the large sectoral 
associations. 
 Society of Manufacturing Promotion (SOFOFA): At the time Chile entered into 
negotiations with MERCOSUR, the internal structure of the umbrella organisation appeared 
inadequate for the coordination of technical tasks, such as setting schedules, defining rules of 
origin, and identifying technical trade barriers. SOFOFA, as a professional industrial entity, 
assumed the CPC’s Technical Secretariat as of 1995, thus holding consultations at the level of 
associate sectors and serving as a permanent channel with state authorities.22 Despite the high 
degree of technical readiness, SOFOFA’s institutional leadership was undermined for several 
years due to quarrels with the National Corporation of Exporters. Since its creation in 1988, this 
entity sought to perform as an alternative forum for the emerging non-traditional sectors of 
agriculture and industrial manufactures by responding exclusively to their needs. However, this 
aspiration failed to establish clear advocacy structures because many firms and associations in 
the area of non-traditional products (e.g. fruits, wines, metal mechanics, food processing, wine 
industry, and salmon production) were associates of both the National Corporation of Exporters 
and SOFOFA. 
In recent years, SOFOFA was able, nevertheless, to consolidate its leadership far beyond the 
traditional industry. Notably, manufacturing exporters throughout the sectors began to rely on 
SOFOFA’s intermediation capacities, including SME organisations, such as ASEXMA and 
ASIMET from the metal working industry. Finally, in December 2004 previous struggles 
officially came to an end, as the National Corporation of Exporters became a member of 
SOFOFA, paving the way for the establishment of the National Council of Exporters – SOFOFA 
which would represent all business export associations.23 Reviewing the activities displayed by 
SOFOFA during the crucial negotiations with the US, the EU, EFTA and South Korea, several 
different elements underline its outstanding role as a business interlocutor: 
                                                 
22 The attempts undertaken by CPC to rotate the Technical Secretariat among sector associations in subsequent 
negotiations – EU trade talks should have been coordinated by the National Chamber of Commerce – were restated 
by SOFOFA authorities (though written and verbal data gathered do not provide a full picture). For further 
information; see Silva V. 2000; 2001; Porras 2003; BR Reuss 27/09/2004. 
23 The President of the National Corporation of Exporters, Ronald Brown, mentioned in May 2004 that he was 
working with SOFOFA to overcome the fragmentation inside the exporter’s sector. Ronald Brown used to head the 
National Association of Exporters, an entity which is also under SOFOFA, representing mainly fruit exporters; see 
Journal LyDTech 25/05/04. For the National Council of Exporters-SOFOFA; see Annual Report 2004-2005, 28-29. 
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1) Deliberation and Coordination Forum: Since 1995, SOFOFA has organised the Council 
of International Relations, which serves as a deliberation body to inform on current trade 
policy topics and to define strategies. Meetings take places three to four times per year 
and working groups are put together as and when specific topics require in-depth 
solutions. The number of participating business officials and entrepreneurs has grown 
progressively, reaching a membership of 80 persons by 2004. Hence, the Council became 
a popular public-private consultation forum where official negotiators stated their points 
of view on current talks and export issues in general. Furthermore, since September 2003 
SOFOFA premises have been the venue for the Public-Private Council for Export 
Development, initially driven by the public sector (2.2.3). With regard to overseas 
contacts, SOFOFA was the seat of the Technical Secretariat for the Entrepreneurial 
Advisory Committees (CASE) which provided a formalised bilateral business exchange 
in-keeping with the existing ALADI agreements (Annual Reports 2001-2005; Reus 
27/09/2004; Robin 2001a). 
2) Capacity Building and Monitoring: SOFOFA has been the leading entity in familiarising 
entrepreneurs with the upcoming challenges of new regulations and promotion schemes 
through the organisation of seminars and workshops. Often the events have been 
organised in cooperation with DIRECON and other state agencies. Also, SOFOFA 
carries out permanent monitoring and evaluation of trade flows, tariffs and obstacles to 
Chile’s exports in foreign markets (Annual Reports 1997-2005). 
3) Collaborative Behaviour: Related to the features previously mentioned, SOFOFA acted 
in a proactive manner, formulating initiatives and proposals aimed at improving the 
administration of agreements and enhancing the access to new markets for local products. 
Due to these evident reasons, state authorities learned to appreciate this collaborative 
behaviour; thus, DIRECON officials began to maintain a more privileged relationship 
with SOFOFAthan with the National Cooperation of Exporters, which frequently stayed 
out of these activities due to its hostile behaviour and lack of interest to submit new 
proposals, as a confidential ex-state official report indicated (OE September 2004). 
Finally, Box 3.4 underscores the institutional strength of SOFOFA in pointing at the entity’s 
organisational grounds. 
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Box 3.4: Organisational Properties of the Society of Manufacturing Promotion 
Financing  The yearly budget of approximately US$ 1.5 million is covered up to 70 percent 
by “predictable” revenues from its members. The remaining 30 percent is funded 
through services (e.g. event management). Since 1990, the budget has steadily 
increased. 
Trade 
Policy 
Making 
The Council for International Relations brings together 70-80 business persons 
from foreign trade related sectors. Aside from the plenary meetings that take 
place three-four times a year; specialists of each branch contribute in the scope of 
ad-hoc working groups by submitting proposals for specific problems faced by 
exporters. The Committee of International Negotiations, which existed until 2001, 
was integrated into the Council for International Affairs and the ad-hoc working 
groups. In this regard, the most active branches are usually fruits, forestry, 
fishery, metal working and the chemical industry. 
Staff Approximately 50 officials, including administrative staff 
Trade 
Experts 
Area of Foreign Trade and International Economic Relations composed of two 
former trade diplomats and five-six assistants. 
Sources: Annual Report 2003-04; BR Pedro Reuss 27/09/04; Robin 2001a; Porras 2003: 25 
  
The apparent internal professionalism began to be constructed with the negotiations 
conducted with MERCOSUR and Canada, when SOFOFA authorities saw the need to 
incorporate state-of-the-art trade policy advisory skills. Thus, in 1995 SOFOFA hired Hugo 
Baierlein and Pedro Reuss, former trade diplomats from DIRECON. It was Hugo Baierlein who 
strengthened the Foreign Trade and International Economic Relations branch, placing emphasis 
on key issues involved in international trade policy affairs (e.g. specific rules of origin, 
schedules). Pedro Reuss, on the other hand, started to deal with the operational aspects involved 
in export business (customs procedures, market assistance, etc.). Moreover, Andres Concha, 
SOFOFA’s General Secretary since 1997, is said to have the capacity to bring together first class 
specialists from inside and outside SOFOFA, which proved crucial for the internal private sector 
organisation in preparation for the “mega talks” with the US, the EU and the Asian countries.24 
 National Society of Agriculture (SNA): What SOFOFA represents for the local industry, 
the SNA represents for agricultural elites. Chile’s oldest business entity (1838) is considered as 
the most influential member inside the CPC aside from SOFOFA. But contrary to SOFOFA, the 
                                                 
24 For example, Andres Concha in past negotiations was responsible for selecting the coordinators of the Technical 
Commissions created for the specific purpose of exchanging information permanently with state authorities; see BR 
Reuss 27/9/04; OE Sáez 27/09/04. 
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SNA membership behaved with strong reluctance regarding the world market integration 
strategy set forth. Therefore, SNA authorities faced the challenge of advocating both producers 
oriented principally towards the domestic market (such as cereals, vegetable oils, sugar, 
livestock), as well as outward oriented producers of fruits and wines. In the end, however, the 
defensive interests prevailed, given the fact that the concerns of exporters were dealt with inside 
SOFOFA. 
Certainly, the SNA’s main intervention during the 1990s took place in the different stages 
of the MERCOSUR talks, heading the domestic opposition against profound liberalisation 
commitments on varying policy levels (Gomez 1998). Highlighting the potentially enormous 
economic and social cost for traditional agriculture, the SNA was able to gain the support of the 
umbrella organisation CPC. Furthermore, the agrarian entity mobilised a broad movement by 
organising powerful demonstrations and marches in August 1995. In these demonstrations 
approximately 30,000 farmers throughout the regions and organisations demanded the 
consideration of agrarian concerns (Porras 2003: 52). These manifestations brought the issue into 
the public sphere and, above all, into Congress, where the agrarian sector enjoyed an important 
constituency (representatives of the Upper and Lower Houses) composed mainly by represen-
tatives from the rural areas in central and southern Chile. Also on subsequent occasions, such as 
the US free trade talks in 2001-02, negotiations with New Zealand in 2004, and in discussions 
addressing how and when to abolish the local Price Band System, the SNA authorities 
coordinated the protectionist interests in wheat, vegetable oils, and sugar producing sectors.  
Even though the trend towards liberalism could not, evidently, be halted, the SNA’s 
lobby achievements are rather impressive. In the field of agriculture, the usually liberal Chilean 
government upheld a wide range of supporting schemes, ranging from technological innovation, 
irrigation systems, technical and market assistance, investment and credit lines.25 Moreover, the 
long phasing-out modalities for the elimination of tariffs on sensitive products stand out. In the 
Chile-MERCOSUR agreement of 1996, the phasing-outs applicable to wheat, vegetable oils and 
sugar were not scheduled to begin prior to 2007, and thus reach their conclusions by 2014. In the 
US-Chile FTA, these sensitive products will be liberalised within a 12-year period. Box 3.5 gives 
a brief outline of the organisational properties of the top rural association. 
                                                 
25 The state institutions involved are CORFO, FIA, Prochile, CONICYT, INDAP, and CNR. For an overview, see 
“Governmental Agriculture Programs” on the SNA webpage, http://www.sna.upsystem.cl/. According to the WTO 
(2003), the majority of these support schemes are horizontal in nature, and thus, do not contravene WTO norms. 
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Box 3.5: Organisational Properties of the National Society of Agriculture 
Financing  The SNA revenues are strongly diversified and based on member 
dues, the organisation of Santiago’s International Fair (FISA), and the 
running of vocational schools (CODESSER), and a rural radio and 
research centre, among others. Aside from SOFOFA and the National 
Chamber of Construction, the SNA is the country’s most solvent 
business organisation. 
Trade Policy 
Making 
Working groups derive from the Board Council, composed of 11 
members. 
Staff Approximately 30 employees work in Santiago’s head office. 
Trade Experts The Department of Studies monitors international trade policies. 
The Department is directed by a Commercial Engineer with a MA 
Degree from Harvard in Public Administration. Assistance is further 
provided by an Economist and an Agricultural Engineer, respectively.  
Source: BR Gana Errazuriz 28/09/04; Imbusch 1995: 220. 
 
Although the SNA has recently enhanced its trade policy expertise through well trained 
professionals, the key for the entity’s leverage in domestic policy making has been based on its 
broad societal network (embracing numerous activities and services provided in rural areas), its 
strong constituency inside the Congress, and an outstanding presence in the mass media and in 
public spheres in general. Similar to rural organisations in Europe, the SNA therefore offers local 
farmers considerably more than mere lobbying, and thus, exhibits a high degree of social 
cohesion among the Chilean farming community. 
 Santiago Chamber of Commerce: In connection with the new area of trade in services, 
the Santiago Chamber of Commerce was able to become the main business interlocutor. In 1996, 
when the service issue was addressed in the scope of the negotiations with Canada, the Santiago 
Chamber of Commerce met the challenge of systematising and promoting domestic interests 
related to this intangible and extremely wide-reaching topic of services. Consequently, the 
Chamber hired a specialist, Claudio Ortiz, who had previously been responsible for negotiations 
in the scope of GATS in the mission to Geneva. The Committee of Service Exporting 
Companies was composed of approximately 30 associations and enterprises, and in recent talks 
with Mexico, Central America, the United States and the European Union, it sought to drive 
forward the liberalisation of service sectors, focusing mainly on software diverse engineering 
services, printing, energy distribution, maritime transports, etc. Nevertheless, progress in these 
THE CASE OF CHILE 
 
90
 
fields remains modest, both as regards market access conditions and export volumes. However, 
the fact that at this early stage advocacy was promoted is a signal of the distinctive proactive 
performance of the local business community (OE Sáez 27/09/04; Silva 2001: 59-61). 
 
Summary Independent Variable A2 
This section indicates a rather high institutional strength of business associations. Regarding the 
variable dimension Institutional Leadership, the coordination (intermediation) capacity of the 
multisectoral “umbrella” organisation CPC and the sectoral entities SOFOFA (industry), SNA 
(agriculture), and the Santiago Chamber of Commerce (trade in services) stand out. The 
organisation strength of those key business associations can be explained largely by the strong 
diversification of revenues, the members’ paying habits, the participatory behaviour of 
entrepreneurs and business entities, the large size of permanent staff, and the strengthening of in-
house trade expertise. 
 
Box 3.6: Summary Independent Variable A2 
Leadership Organisational Strength 
The six leading sector associations from 
mining, industry, trade, finance, construction, 
and agriculture are represented inside the 
broadly recognised peak entity, CPC. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the CPC’s 
intermediation capacity was lowered to a 
certain degree by SOFOFA, which assumed a 
multisectoral representation approach in 
several policy fields. Specifically, SOFOFA 
became the clear business interlocutor by 
convening and representing export related 
interests and cooperating steadily with 
DIRECON officials. The SNA achieved 
different policy making levels to ensure the 
effective representation of defensive rural 
concerns. Since 1996, services have been 
organised inside the Santiago Chamber of 
Commerce, systematising the interests in this 
often confusing negotiation issue. 
Aside from the widespread financial and 
administrative solidity of the Chilean business 
associations, they responded to the increasing 
technical requirements of international trade 
policy as of the 1990s. Therefore, the sectoral 
entities in industry, agriculture, and commerce 
all exhibited well prepared trade policy 
advisory units. SOFOFA and the Santiago 
Chamber of Commerce, for example, decided 
as of the mid-1990s to hire former trade 
diplomats to prepare members for upcoming 
foreign challenges and to guarantee efficient 
relations with state agencies. 
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3.4 Assessment 
 
After examining the evolution of the dependent and independent variables individually, in this 
final section I assess how, and to what extent, Chile’s success in implementing a coherent world 
market integration strategy has been caused by these two variables, or whether third variable 
influences became responsible for the observed policy output. However, before stressing the 
established causal relationship, it is important to point at what is so successful about the way 
Chile sought to integrate its economy into world markets. Two aspects should be mentioned.  
First, Chile’s export-led growth strategy has been developed gradually over the last 20 
years, and thus, has been sheltered from radical policy changes implying altering objectives and 
instruments, a common policy-making pattern in South America. Second, in light of shifting 
trade policy towards regional and multilateral spheres, Chile has made use, more than any other 
South America country, of international trade policy affairs as a tool for economic development. 
Hence, Chile has managed to implement a cohesive and all inclusive package of unilateral, 
regional, and extra-regional trade policy measures aimed at the favourable development of 
national exports. 
To explain the economic success registered from 1985, one must look at the key role of 
economic reforms implemented during the authoritarian regime (1973-1989). And indeed, most 
of the cornerstones of Chile’s economic policy currently in force date back to reforms 
implemented by the Chicago Boys who took control of the Finance Ministry during the 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, setting in motion the wave of privatisations and labour market 
reforms, and building a business-friendly tax environment. As these policies enjoyed broad 
acceptance among the local business sector, the transition to democracy was characterised by the 
strong disposition of the newly elected policy-makers to continue key economic policies, 
signalling predictability both inside and outside the country. 
On the contrary, the “authoritarian legacy” in the trade policy area is more ambiguous. 
The Multipolar Model, which at present exemplifies the country, is much broader than the trade 
reforms implemented under the military regime. Though the “success story” was launched in 
February 1985, when under the leadership of finance minister Hernán Buchi an export-oriented 
strategy was set forth, based on continuous unilateral tariff reductions and far-reaching export 
promotion schemes, the Chicago Boys conceived trade policy as a mere unilateral tool, and thus, 
did not take advantage of possible forms of reciprocal liberalisation that provide local industry 
with improved market access conditions in overseas markets. 
THE CASE OF CHILE 
 
92
 
 Thus, putting an end to this orthodox, “ivory-tower” attitude can be seen as the real 
achievement of democratic policy makers. They understood that successful world market 
integration goes beyond coherent, predictable, business-friendly domestic policies, but demands 
an accurate analysis of what is needed domestically and what can be obtained externally. In this 
regard, the democratic government that took office in 1990 did not only aim to preserve the trade 
policy of its authoritarian predecessor (e.g. in maintaining the “flat rate regime”) but to 
complement efforts in extending market access opportunities through preferential trade 
agreements all over the global, thus attaining a paradigmatic Multipolar Model. 
Aside from this clarification, which is particularly necessary due to the commonly 
claimed effects of the authoritarian policy reforms, Box 3.7 sums up the value of the observed 
variables and the explaining power each one possesses. Consequently, I will next explain when, 
and how, the values of variables changed over time and how they influenced the value of B. 
 
Box 3.7: Explaining Chile’s Successful World Market Integration Strategy 
Variable Variable 
Dimension 
Value (Variance 1985-
2004) 
Explaining Power for 
Policy Success (B) 
Responsibilities 1985-1994: rather low 
1995-2004: very high 
1995-2004: very high 
Resources 1985-1994: rather low 
1995-2004: very high 
1995-2004: rather high 
A1: Institutional 
Strength of State  
Bureaucracy 
Openness 1995-2004: very high 1985-2004: very high 
Leadership 1985-2004: very high 1985-2004: very high A2: Institutional 
Strength of Business 
Associations 
Organisational 
Strength 
1985-1994: rather high 
1995-2004: very high 
1985-1994: rather high 
1995-2004: very high 
C1: Heterogeneity Sectoral Preferences 1985-2004: rather high 1985-2004: rather low 
C2: Heterogeneity Foreign Preferences 1985-2004: rather low 1985-2004: rather low 
C3: Political Instability 1985-2004: very low 1985-2004: very low 
C4: Macroeconomic Instability 1985-2004: very low 1985-2004: very low 
 
Institutional Strength of State Bureaucracy 
According to Box 3.7, the explaining power of Variable A1 is mostly high. Principally, the 
emergence of a broadly accepted Foreign Affairs Model (responsibilities) as of 1995, based on 
the institutional strengthening of the General Directorate of International Economic Affairs 
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(DIRECON), was decisive for the successful Multipolar approach to world market integration. 
Prior to this, policies in the area of international trade policy affairs lacked coherence. As 
previously noted, during the military regime the DIRECON – created in 1979 – was only 
theoretically in charge of international trade policy affairs, since in practice trade policy had been 
dealt with merely as a unilateral issue ruled by the Ministry of Finance. During the first 
democratic government (1990-94), international trade policy was increasingly perceived as 
crucial for export development, but the Ministries of Finance, Economy, and Foreign Affairs 
sustained different priorities, and thus, caused a struggle for competencies. While the Ministry of 
Economy pursued the development of value-added exports by strengthening relations with Latin 
American markets (above all with the emerging MERCOSUR), the finance department focused 
its attention on the possible adherence to the NAFTA, as this option was seen as an opportunity 
to “cement” previous unilateral liberalisation. Finally, the Foreign Affairs Department, still 
rather weak, considered deepening trade relations with the Andean and Southern Cone states as 
an appropriate way to restore good border relations in the region. 
Due to a range of factors (explained in 3.2), from 1995 the different state departments 
involved decided to strengthen the DIRECON office, making it the leading international trade 
policy branch in order to take on the rising challenges of regional and multilateral forces. In the 
aftermath, inter-ministerial coordination improved as the division of labour was clearly set, i.e. 
the Ministry of Finance remained in charge of tariff policy, investment measures, and financial 
services; the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for negotiations on agricultural trade; and 
the Ministry of Economy served as an advisory unit in intellectual property rights, sector-
oriented regulatory issues and technical trade obstacles. 
Inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the DIRECON enjoyed a distinct autonomous 
status, for example regarding budget spending and the appointment of officials. Without 
significant interference from the political branch, the engagement of this economic policy agency 
could be exclusively focussed on improving market access conditions for export industries, both 
by means of negotiating preferential trade agreements within and out with the region, and 
through market assistance activities within the scope of the export promotion authority Prochile 
(also part of the DIRECON office). Due to this institutional setting and a continuous increase of 
its trade policy staff, from 1995 DIRECON was able to spur international trade talks all over the 
globe, becoming a pioneer in South America by signing comprehensive free trade agreements 
with Canada, the United States, the European Union, South Korea, Singapore, and China. 
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While the strengthened DIRECON largely accounts for this vigorous trade policy, it 
could be observed, conversely, that the increasingly successful trade policy caused a further 
strengthening of the DIRECON. Therefore, the policy success consolidated the purpose of the 
international trade policy branch, and made it much less dependent on inferences of changing 
policy-makers sustaining altered priorities (a common pattern in South America). Moreover, 
since these agreements embraced a broad range of policy areas beyond border measures (for 
example involving the regulation of property rights, state procurement and investment related 
measures), the DIRECON has become more than a mere trade policy branch in charge of 
international negotiations, but can be conceptualised as a sort of pilot agency where important 
decisions for all economic policy areas are adopted.  
Another crucial factor of A1 that had a strong influence on the Dependent Variable B was 
the high degree of openness to business. Indeed, the establishment of close working relations 
with business entities, above all with the Society of Manufacturing Promotion (SOFOFA), is 
essential to appropriately understand why, and how, Chile pursued the Multipolar approach to 
world market integration. In the tradition of the military regime, which in the aftermath of the 
debt crisis in 1982-83 opened steady participation channels to organised business sectors, the 
systematic incorporation of business views has been a key element, particularly for DIRECON. 
There are two main reasons for this: First, the ambitious trade agenda set forth required the 
private sector to contribute with its “decentralised intelligence” from markets through the 
provision of information on trade obstacles, investment perspectives, and market trends. Second, 
SOFOFA became a strategic partner for the DIRECON inside the business sector, as it shared 
the principals and objective of the Multipolar Model, thus providing firm domestic coalitions and 
disseminating the properties of trade policy among local sectors. 
 
Institutional Strength of Business Associations 
The explaining power of A1 is strongly linked to the effects of A2. In fact, inviting business to 
participate actively in the development of the Multipolar Model without relying on strong 
interlocutors inside the private sector would have entailed only limited effects. In this regard, 
both variable dimensions - Leadership and Organisational Strength – became relevant.  
Specifically, the leadership of the multisectoral organisation CPC, a business-wide 
recognised entity, in the coordination of sectoral positions was crucial for Chile’s international 
trade policy until the mid-1990s. By then, the CPC had become responsible for organising the 
private sector before the possible adherence to the NAFTA treaty. For instance, in carrying out 
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exhaustive impact assessments as regards such an integration step, the CPC managed to channel 
and articulate the strong interest among the local entrepreneurship, and herewith, signalled to the 
Chilean and US governments the marked preposition to face this challenge. Thus, the CPC 
played a similar role to the one adopted by the Mexican business council, CCE, which Schneider 
(1997) qualified as decisive when accounting for Mexico’s entrance into the NAFTA.26  
From 1994 to 1996, moreover, the leadership of CPC was crucial in the harmonisation of 
opposing sectoral views within the controversial negotiations with the MERCOSUR. While the 
industrial and services related sectors favoured far-reaching economic integration (albeit a full 
membership was rejected due to the customs union concept), the CPC authorities placed special 
emphasis on the defensive concerns of local farmers in order to balance the inter-sectoral 
interests. Supporting the free trade agreement in general terms, the umbrella organisation 
stressed the potential liberalisation costs for farmers, and thus, supported the claims of the 
National Society of Agriculture (SNA) for far-reaching compensation measures and long 
phasing-out schemes. As a result, the agreement with MERCOSUR became viable despite strong 
heterogeneous interests among domestic sectors.   
In the second and more dynamic stage from the mid-1990s, the schemes of business 
intermediation underwent significant changes. The variable dimension organisation strength 
attained more relevance because sectoral associations increased their protagonism. As was 
pointed out previously, SOFOFA became the privileged interlocutor of the DIRECON office, not 
only because of its leadership among export-oriented branches, but especially due to its 
collaborative behaviour in supporting trade policy officials through the permanent monitoring of 
foreign markets and accomplished technical proposals. For this purpose, SOFOFA hired two 
former trade diplomats to build up an Area of Foreign Trade and International Economic 
Relations as of 1995, when negotiations with MERCOSUR and Canada where underway, 
attaining herewith state-of-the-art trade policy advisory skills. Aside from SOFOFA, other 
sectoral entities from agriculture (SNA) and services (Santiago Chamber of Commerce) likewise 
increased their trade policy skills in order to facilitate an efficient exchange with state 
authorities. 
In sum, the manner in which Chile pursued its integration into world markets assumed a 
neocorporatistic flavour, considering the close state-business collaboration pattern. Aimed at 
improving the capacity to coordinate public policies – in this case international trade policies – 
the Chilean government was interested in establishing close and stable relations with particular 
                                                 
26 But contrary to Mexico, the US government however decided later to leave Chile and other Latin American 
countries out of the NAFTA, and to launch to FTAA initiative embracing the whole Western Hemisphere. 
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business associations, wherein strong leadership and organisation strength were the most 
important selection criteria. In general, such policy-making patterns are criticised for their lack 
of inclusiveness because they imply “representation monopoly”, leaving little room for minority 
actors or groups facing collective action problems.  
In Chile’s trade policy, indeed, several actors’ preferences have been reflected scarcely. 
One clear exclusion is the segment of import-competing small-scale manufacturers, workers and 
other members of the civil society, all of which suffer from the widespread fragmentation of 
their interests. In parts, the centre-left coalition Concertación, in power since the transition to 
democracy in 1990, sought to compensate such asymmetries, for instance by providing technical 
assistance and subsidised loans to small manufacturers so as to enhance their competitiveness27. 
Regarding the participation of civil society, the government made widespread efforts to foster 
dialogue with a broad range of society actors on international trade policy affairs. To date, 
however, the free trade critical civil society organisations have largely felt excluded from the 
world market integration strategy in force. 
 
Control Variables C1-C4 
Assessing the influence of selected control variables C1-C4, disturbing effects could be mostly 
controlled in the case of Chile. Studying the sectoral preferences (C1) involved, one is tempted 
to argue that the successful development of the export-oriented strategy has been made possible 
by the small and homogenous private sector that survived the drastic reforms undertaken from 
the 1970s (see Bartell 1995; Montero 1990). But this argument losses validity when the large 
number of signed free trade agreements is sought to bring in line with the marked protectionist 
attitude of the influential farming elite organised inside the National Society of Agriculture 
(SNA). Hence, the coherent implementation of particular trade policies might be favoured by 
rather homogenous, export-oriented preferences for local manufacturers (e.g. compared to the 
more heterogeneous industry in Argentina), but strongly opposed to by farming sectors 
vulnerable to free trade (e.g. compared to the homogenous, export-oriented preferences of 
Argentinean farmers). 
Regarding the preferences of other countries (C2), only once was Chile strongly 
restricted in its pursuit of a Multipolar Model. In the 1990s, Chile was ready to undertake a 
comprehensive NAFTA-style agreement with the United States. But for reasons not related to 
                                                 
27 Chile strengthened its framework dedicated to improve the competitiveness of SMEs, increasing expenditures 
from 0.34 to 0.93 percent of the GDP between 1990 and 1999 (Ministry of Economy 2000). 
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Chile, this step could not be accomplished until 2003. Thus, the course of action was influenced, 
but not the essence of Chile’s approach to world market integration. 
Finally, Chile has not suffer from any political (C3) or macroeconomic (C4) crisis 
features in the last 20 years, strongly differing from most South American countries. As 
mentioned, during the period of analysis, Chile passed from authoritarian to democratic rule. But 
the concerted way of administering this process avoided the emergence of political crisis and 
drastic changes in the making of economic policy. 
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Reus, Pedro Society of Manufacturing 
Promotion (SOFOFA) 
Corporate Manager; Ex-
DIRECON Official 
27.09.2004
  
Font, Barbara 
   
Confederation of 
Production and Commerce 
(CPC) 
Economic Policy Advisor 
28.09.2004
  
Gana Erraruiz, 
Francisco 
National Society of 
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Head of Study Department  
28.09.2004
  
Paz Cortez, 
Carmen 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs/ DIRECON 
Trade Policy Advisor; Market 
Access Affairs 
28.09.2004 Confidential Chilean Alliance for Fair 
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Monitoring International Trade 
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9.12.2004 Cañellas, Marcelo Ministry of Economy and 
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affairs 
17.12.2004 Rodriguez, Zandra  Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Bolivia 
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Integration 
17.02.2005 Buvinic, Alejandro DIRECON 
 
Director of Legal Affairs; since 
1995 involved in trade talks 
17.02.2005 Campos, Jaime DIRECON Legal Advisor 
17.02.2005
  
Cerda, Andrea ODEPA; Foreign Trade 
Department 
Agriculture Trade Policy 
Advisor  
 
18.02.2005 Puig, Juan DIRECON Director Human Ressources 
18.02.2005
  
Ruis, Carlos DIRECON Sub-Director of Administrative 
Department 
18.02.2005 Ingrid   CONUPIA 
 
Administrative Assistant 
Previous Conversations 
2.11.2000 Macarena García 
Aspillaga 
CPC Economic Policy Advisor 
10.11.2000 Miguel Landeros 
Perkic 
Congress Legal Advisor 
18.11.2000 Verónica González 
Gil 
University Mayor; CPC Professor of Economics; 
Member of CPC Board of 
Directors 
 
 
 
Selected Interview Partner 
 
Sáez, Sebastián: Economist; by 2005 Consultant to the International Trade and Integration 
Division of ECLAC of the United Nations. He published two papers on trade policy making in 
Chile (2002) and in Latin America (2005). Between 1990 and 1994, Sebastián Sáez worked 
inside the Ministry of Finance as trade policy advisor. Afterwards, he served inside DIRECON 
as coordinator of the FTAA talks, and was further engaged in negotiations on services in the 
scope of the WTO. Finally, in the period of 2000-04, Sebastián Sáez directed the Foreign Trade 
Division inside the Ministry of Economy and became a member of the Advisory Council within 
the US-Chile FTA talks. 
 
4 Argentina 
 
 
“To follow Chile’s example is the simple answer for Argentina” commented Chilenean 
economist Sebastian Edwards in the middle of Argentina’s economic, social and political crisis 
in January 2002 (Wall Street Journal 25/01/2002). Accordingly, rather than raising import tariffs 
and strengthening ties with Brazil in the scope of MERCOSUR, the transitory administration of 
Eduardo Duhalde (01/2002-04/2003) could have adopted a pragmatic reform program similar to 
the one Chile had pursued in early 1985, by cutting import tariffs, fiscal expenditures and 
corporate taxes. Nevertheless, these foreign recommendations would not have been welcomed by 
many of the 35 million Argentineans, since for them it was clear that the economic downturn of 
the 2,736,690 km2 Southern Cone state had nothing to do with a lack of liberal commitment, but 
rather an overdose of it. To a large extent, these controversial views about the “Argentinean 
Case” underline the dilemma that to date there has been no firm domestic consensus on which 
economic model to pursue, i.e. whether structural adjustment policies implemented as of 1989 by 
the Carlos Menem presidency (1989-1999) represented only the first step of reforms towards 
sound integration into world markets, or a new failed endeavour in the country’s economic 
policy.  
Focussed on trade policy, this chapter discusses the principal features of the world market 
integration strategy pursued from 1986 and 2004, and provides explanations for the principle 
shortcomings observed herein. Accordingly, it is structured along the following lines. The first 
section outlines the different policy areas that made up the world market integration strategy 
(Dependent Variable B), i.e. unilateral trade regime, regional and extra-regional integration, 
sector and export promotion. Section two enlightens the organisation of Argentina’s public sector 
in the trade policy area (Independent Variable A1), thus showing how the local bureaucracy was 
organised regarding the conduction of international trade policy affairs along the period of 
analysis. Subsequently, section three elucidates the institutional responses of the business sector 
on the same issue (Independent Variable A2). Based on section one to three, section four 
provides an assessment of the case, and explores the links between the independent and 
dependent variables, and controls the possible influences of other variables (C1-4) on the B 
value. 
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4.1 World Market Integration between the Springboard and Multipolar Model 
 
This first section is structured in accordance with the different policy areas making up the world 
market integration strategy (Dependent Variable B), i.e. unilateral trade regime, regional and 
extra-regional integration, sectoral and export promotion policies. The final subsection 
summarises the results and provides an overview of the trade performance from 1985 to 2004. 
 
Unilateral Trade Regime 
As with other states affected by hyperinflation during the 1980s, trade liberalisation in Argentina 
was transformed by the end of the decade into a tool for macroeconomic adjustment, leaving 
little space for proactive export promotion policies. Therefore, in August 1989 the new 
administration of Carlos Menem announced a significant reduction of tariffs in order to reduce 
domestic prices. On a par with earlier reform efforts, during the period of 1989-90 the 
inflationary pressure remained high. Against this turbulent background, three Ministers of 
Economy set forth distinct reform approaches. While the first team of Nestor Rapanelli (July-
December 1989) planned to reach a simplified tariff structure ranging from 5 to 25 percent 
within four years, the second team of Ermán Gonzalez (1990) sought a reduction of tariff 
dispersion by setting a flat rate of 22 percent by January 1991. Later, the uniform tariff structure 
was abandoned by Domingo Cavallo in March 1991, who replaced it with a three-level tariff 
structure of zero percent for raw materials and capital goods not produced locally, 11 percent for 
intermediate products and 22 percent for nationally manufactured consumer and capital goods. 
Through these reform measures, average import tariffs were lowered within two years from 30 to 
10 percent and NTB’s, such as import quotas and licences, were eliminated (Chudnovsky/Porta 
1991; Casaburi 1998; Viguera 1998). 
As a result of the implemented reform measures, the previously protected industrial 
sector began to operate within an increasingly more competitive environment.1 Nonetheless, the 
turning point for the local industry first came into view as of mid-1991, when Domingo 
Cavallo’s team defined methods to bring the rampant inflation under control. Indeed, after a 
fixed exchange rate regime, or currency board, was introduced in April 1991, inflation rates 
sharply decreased within a few months and remained close to zero until the drastic currency 
devaluation in 2002. This stable economic climate – combined with the simultaneous pursuit of 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that Argentina implemented a trade liberalisation program in the late 1970s, but it was 
abandoned after the financial crisis in the early 1980s. 
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ambitious privatisations and the deregulation of foreign investments – enabled high economic 
growth in the 1990s, leading Argentina to become an attractive destination for FDIs, above all 
for telecommunications, finance, and other services and commodity related sectors 
(Chudnovsky/Lopez 2001). However, beyond the macroeconomic achievements, the currency 
board implied a strong currency appreciation and enhanced the pressure on local industry to 
lower costs compared with those of foreign competitors. In this respect, Domingo Cavallo’s 
economic team (1991-96) was less susceptible to the protectionist claims from threatened sectors 
than in the past, even though several important permanent and temporary exceptions were 
conceded, as exposed below: 
¾ Automotive Regime: Since 1991, the automotive sector maintained privileged 
protectionist measures due to a high peak tariff for fully manufactured vehicles (quotas at 
the onset; later 35 percent in the scope of MERCOSUR), broad fiscal incentives, local 
content and export performance requirements and the administration of trade volumes in 
the scope of MERCOSUR. 
¾ Price Band for Sugar: Since 1992, Argentina has levied variable import duties on sugar 
according to price band mechanisms. Consequently, imports from Brazil – the world’s 
largest producer – have been effectively controlled. 
¾ Statistical Tax: In the GATT, Argentina bound a statistical tax of 3 percent designed to 
finance the collection of statistical information relating to imports and exports. In 1998, 
the tax (temporally increased to 10 percent) had to be reduced to 0.5 percent in view of 
the fact that a WTO panel concluded that duties were by no means limited in amount to 
the approximate cost of services rendered. Afterwards, the MERCOSUR block increased 
the nominal external tariff by 3 percent, compensating for the loss of customs revenues. 
¾ Safeguard and Antidumping Measures: Diverse measures such as quotas, additional 
tariffs and license requirements temporarily affected imports of sensitive products such as 
paper, consumer electronics, steel, textiles, clothing and footwear. Furthermore, 
Argentina evolved into one of the most prominent users of anti-dumping measures inside 
the WTO, mainly against imports from Brazil, China, and the EU. Similar to the 
safeguard measures applied, the application of antidumping duties varied according to the 
evolution of relative prices and were often used by large companies from the paper, steel, 
textiles and chemical industries to temporarily lower competition from abroad (Viguera 
1998). 
As of 1999, the application of protectionist measures became increasingly common as the 
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country entered into a four-year recession. By the time Brazil decided to enforce a drastic 
unilateral devaluation of its currency in January 1999, Argentina began to impose numerous ad-
hoc restrictions that hindered Brazilian imports in the area of textiles, steel, footwear, consumer 
electronics, plastics, cleansing products, pork meat, etc. Although some sectors, such as plastic, 
footwear, paper and the petrochemical industry, reached private agreements aimed at the self-
restriction of sales from Brazil, most of the actions lacked a legal fundament and caused severe 
intra-MERCOSUR conflicts. An alleged “solution” for those disputes emerged in January 2002 
as Argentina (against severe fiscal and foreign debt constrains) could no longer maintain the 
previously “sacrosanct” currency board regime.2 Therefore, the values of the Argentinean Peso 
and the Brazilian Real converged during 2002, approximating anew (at least in a macroeconomic 
perspective) the playing field among the competing sectors. Due to the Peso devaluation, local 
exports registered remarkable growth rates as of 2003 while imports sharply declined in 2002-
03.3 
Nevertheless, as Brazil’s manufacturers slowly but surely began to recover their previous 
market presence in the course of 2003, protectionist voices from consumer electronics, textiles 
and footwear industry again began calling for import restrictions. As a result of these lobby 
actions and Brazil’s reluctance to include safeguard provisions in the scope of MERCOSUR, in 
September 2004 Argentina increased tensions through quantitative import restrictions and 
licenses for sensitive goods such as washing machines, televisions and footwear. In sum, the 
recurrent trade disputes, especially with Brazil, point to the fact that intra-regional trade is still 
susceptible to discretionary policies and prevailing asymmetries on the regional level, thus 
suggesting unresolved issues, as will be shown in the next subsection. 
 
Regional Integration 
In the context of inflation and debt restructuring throughout the region, the Argentinean-
Brazilian Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE) signed in July 1986 
suggested a new beginning between the contracting parties. Moreover, for the democratically 
elected governments of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) and José Sarney (1994-1990), the PICE 
provided appropriate grounds for good neighbour policies, after the tense relations during 
previous military regimes (Hirst 1998; Campbell et al. 2000). Hence, the bilateral agreement 
                                                 
2 The deterioration of the economic environment led the government to implement (in 2001) a two-tiered foreign 
exchange system which would lower the cost of local exports compared with import prices. 
3 While most of the previous NTB’s applied in the MERCOSUR framework were abolished in the aftermath of the 
currency crisis, import operations were hampered by exchange controls imposed during the 2002 crisis. In the 
course of 2003 these controls were made more flexible or abolished. 
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covered 23 so called sector protocols aimed at fostering trade, and cooperation in science, 
defence, nuclear waste, infrastructure, and energy, among others. 
Compared with the rigid multilateral method applied in the 1960s and 1970s in the scope 
of the Latin American Free Trade Area (ALALC), PICE pursued a flexible bilateral integration 
approach based on the ALADI treaty signed in 1980.4 Furthermore, the parties keenly sought to 
prevent the determination of unrealistic goals and time schedules, aiming to progress first in 
specific areas where both consensus and implementation were feasible and to deepen the focus 
of integration step by step.5 Carlos Bruno, key official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
commented (OE 04/03/05): “We hoped to create a dynamic integration by selecting specific 
sectors with high potential for complementarities,” and thus, “leave behind the declaration of 
illusionary projects which only caused unfulfilled hopes and depressed feelings.” 
While for Brazil, Argentina was crucial to enhance its regional leadership at a time when 
Latin America was increasingly marginalised in the aftermath of the debt crisis, for Argentina 
the emphasis was firmly on economic factors. Aside from the physical proximity and Brazil’s 
domestic market roughly quadrupling the Argentinean market, local technocrats perceived 
integration with Brazil as key for industrial policies since the search for intra-industrial 
complementarities was seen as the appropriate instrument to enhance productivity, thus 
overcoming the standstill of previous decades compared with the impressive industrial 
development from mid-1960s that took place mainly in the areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro. 
However, Argentina rejected a rapid dismantling of barriers in order to avoid a deepening 
of the existing industrial asymmetries, which would have confirmed Argentina’s role as Brazil’s 
supplier of raw materials and buyer of manufactured products. Thus, at negotiation tables, 
Argentina, in particular, proceeded gradually, arduously seeking possibilities for intra-industrial 
exchange and harmonised trade growth by expanding concessions step by step. Paradigmatic to 
this “exploration and experimentation” concept was the first protocol for capital goods such as 
                                                 
4 ALADI created in 1980 by the Montevideo treaty substituted ALALC and has acted since then as an institutional 
framework for the economic integration agreement between the 12 member states. The original ALALC treaty 
defined the creation of a FTA within 12 years. In 1969, the schedule was extended to 20 years, i.e. until 1980. 
However, the requirement to extend concessions among all members (“multilaterisation”) hindered the contracting 
parties beyond common minimalist versions. 
5 In a first round, twelve protocols were adopted; 10 of them were related to economic and trade affairs; two were 
based on Aeronautic Cooperation and Nuclear Waste. In the following years (1986-1986) the number of Protocols 
signed increased to 23. Sectoral agreements were aimed at expanding trade, encouraging bilateral investments, and 
fostering cooperation in areas such as nuclear energy and biotechnology. Protocols of: Capital Goods; Trade; 
Binational Enterprises; Financial Issues; Investment Funds; Energy; Economic Studies; Aeronautic Cooperation; 
Steel Industry; Transportation; Communications; Nuclear; Cultural; Economic Planning; Food; Automotive, etc. 
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machinery, hand tools, and electronic equipment. These branches appeared to be perfect for the 
endeavour as growth perspectives were attractive and the potential for substitution of extra-
regional imports was high (less than 10 percent originated from each one of these countries in 
1986). Moreover, a slow and balanced expansion of trade volumes would have less of an impact 
on the balance of payment than large scale sectors such as steel, foodstuffs and automobiles. 
Finally, Argentina considered the development of this diversified sector, which was dominated 
by small, innovative family enterprises requiring a qualified labour force, as crucial for the 
country’s industrial policy; and expected a high degree of spillovers towards other branches due 
to its central position within the national innovation system (Chudnovsky/Porta 1989; 1990). 
But despite promising exports in which Argentina could take advantage of its diversified 
industry focused on short production series (compared with the large scale production in Brazil) 
the PICE approach soon came under pressure. After a first liberalisation period that restored 
trade flows to pre debt crisis levels, the exchange of concessions slowed down from mid-1987. 
Nevertheless, to reaffirm political commitments for bilateral integration, Brazil and Argentina 
signed, in November 1988, the Integration and Economic Cooperation Treaty, committing the 
States to undertake measures that would culminate in a common regional market within ten 
years. But since the ambitious goal was not sustained by clear enforcement mechanisms, its 
implementation was handed over to the forthcoming presidencies (Campbell et al. 101-106). 
At the outset of the 1990s, the new administrations of Carlos Menem (Argentina) and 
Collor de Mello (Brazil) had strong incentives to further economic relations in light of the global 
trend towards building regional blocks and the trust created among the neighbours during the 
1980s. Conversely, the new economic policy makers indicated their determination to abandon 
any kinds of protectionism. Especially for Argentina, which promoted market oriented reforms 
to a greater extent than Brazil, integration efforts were required to attract FDI’s, so as to expand 
trade, and consequently, accelerate the transformation of the local economy (Cavallo 2001). This 
conceptual turn – personalised by Domingo Cavallo who acted first as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (1989-90) and then as Minister of Economy (1991-96) – represented a complete break 
from the PICE ideology, or in the words of Aldo Ferrer:  “the model changed from integration to 
international insertion” (1997: 8; see also Bustos 1992). 
The guidelines for this “international insertion” were embodied in the Act of Buenos 
Aires signed by Argentina and Brazil in July 1990, and later, in March 1991, when commitments 
were extended to Uruguay and Paraguay in the scope of the Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUR) that was founded in Asunción, Paraguay. Accordingly, trade liberalisation would 
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no longer be flexible, sectoral and balanced, but would respond to an automatic, linear and 
universal tariff elimination mechanism through which free intra-trade was to be reached as of 
January 1, 1995. And indeed, the ambitious 4-year-term (considering that such an objective had 
not been reached during decades of negotiations) was surprisingly implemented in almost 90 
percent of tariff lines. With regards to the remaining sensitive products, the Final Adjustment 
Regime established a schedule to reach intra-regional free trade by 1999. In the aftermath, the 
liberalisation efforts led to a rapid expansion of intra-zone trade, increasing sales in the 1990-97 
periods from US$4,100 to 20,100 million. Simultaneously, the share of intra-MERCOSUR trade 
augmented from 8.9 to 26.6 percent of total members’ exports (CEI 1998). 
Results began to change, nevertheless, as of 1998 when the emerging economies, both 
within and out with Latin America, started to stumble. By this time, it had become more and 
more evident that during the “golden age” of MERCOSUR little had been implemented to 
consolidate the gains of integration (Nofal 1997a and b; Campbell et al. 2000; Bouzas/Da Motta 
Veiga/Torent 2002; Peña 2003; MERCOSUR 2004). Consequently, mainy failures of the 
MERCOSUR approach came to light, particularly in the following key areas: 
 The Circulation of Goods: Despite the nominal removal of intra-zone tariffs, the sugar 
and automotive sectors resisted the liberalisation and depended on provisional regimes that, 
although modified on several occasions, were to remain in force until 2005 (sugar) and 2006 
(automobiles). However, the Minister of Economy, Roberto Lavagna, indicated on several 
occasions during 2004, that Argentina would not liberalise these sectors due to the prevailing 
structural and regulatory asymmetries. Similar arguments were put forward in the case of 
countless NTBs employed to offset competitive deficits in sensitive sectors. Aside from 
quantitative restrictions, a vast range of “hidden” NTBs were based on divergent national 
regulations on technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards. To date, the will for 
harmonisation and/or mutual recognitions has been marginal or absent. 
 Customs Union: The Common External Tariff (CET) planned by the Asunción Treaty for 
January 1, 1995 contrasted from the outset with Argentina’s notion of integration, which was 
aimed at the expansion of trade and the attraction of FDIs only. Despite widespread 
unwillingness to develop common external policies, prior to the presidential meeting in Ouro 
Preto in December 1994, Brazilian negotiators left no doubt about their keenness to meet the 
original deadline set forth in 1991, regardless of the progress on harmonisation in other areas.6 
                                                 
6 The period between March 1991 and December 1994 was denominated as the Transition Period, formally 
concluded by the Ouro Preto Protocol. This agreement defined the institutional framework of MERCOSUR, and 
thus, ruled the internal decision making structure; see Boldorini/Zalduendo 1995. 
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However, the trade-off turned out to be somewhat unbalanced. Besides the fact that Brazil was 
able to impose most of its domestic tariff structure, for Brazil the CET represented the essence of 
MERCOSUR, considering that only in this event could the economic block face common 
international relations under Brazil’s leadership. Conversely, for Argentina the reasons to agree 
on the CET were not obvious. Even though transitory exceptions were included in order to adapt 
to national realities (44 percent of imports did not comply with the CET at the outset) and the 
country’s average tariff rate was lowered only from 15.4 to 13.9 percent, the decision implied a 
cementation of the dependency on Brazil concerning the way trade integration should be 
pursued.7 
In the aftermath, constant discussions on the customs union negatively affected both 
MERCOSUR’s internal and external agenda. By January 2001, when national exception lists 
were theoretically  to be abolished, Argentina continued to maintain considerably higher tariffs 
for various product lines such as footwear, clothing, textiles, leather, sugar, pork meat and 
automobiles (Crespo Armengol/Geffner 2001). On the lower tariff side, salient intra-
MERCOSUR disputes have repeatedly arisen due to Argentina’s reluctance to increase its tariffs 
on several capital goods and IT equipment in order to guarantee certain protection for Brazil’s 
industry. Aside from the discussions on the widespread perforation of the CET structure, 
members have been unwilling, until now, to deal with the customs union debate openly, bearing 
in mind that the goal of achieving a customs union would require not only a perfect CET but also 
wide-reaching measures, i.e. abolishing intra-zone customs, establishing a common customs 
authority with harmonised procedures and the unified application of antidumping and 
contingency measures. 
 Regulatory and Structural Asymmetries: As indicated, most problems in the perfection of 
the common regional market are related to the asymmetries in domestic regulations and the 
degree of competitiveness. Consequently, as of 1992 ten intergovernmental working groups 
launched negotiations not only to agree on the CET structure but also with regard to the 
harmonisation of intra-regional asymmetries in the areas of tax, promotion, industrial, energy, 
labour, customs, technical and sanitary rules. In this regard, the Act of Las Leñas signed in June 
1992, where a schedule was defined to harmonise regulatory differences in fields where 
asymmetries jeopardised the creation of a common market, should have represented a mile stone. 
                                                 
7 As a consequence of the CET, Argentina reorganised its tariff scheme by increasing the number of levels from 
three to eleven, ranging from 0 to 20 percent (later the number of tariff levels was reduced to eight). According to 
the so-called Final Regime towards a Customs Union, countries were to include sensitive products in their exception 
list to give these sectors additional time to proceed with the restructuring process. Argentina maintained exceptions 
for 300 tariff items, mainly chemical and metal products, paper and footwear; see Bouzas/Pagnotta 2003: 57-58. 
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Nevertheless, more than a decade later efforts have been largely ineffective. In general terms, the 
fact that Brazil’s private sector suffers from higher fiscal burdens than in Argentina, but enjoys 
more generous and consistent industry and export promotion schemes, such as fiscal incentives, 
soft loans, research and development activities and market assistance. Conversely, in the 
MERCOSUR sphere, the powerful Brazilian State carried out largely insignificant efforts to 
overcome competitivity gaps, for instance by supporting productive chains and intra-industrial 
cooperation.8  
 New Topics: As progress in traditional areas slowed, Argentina sought to expand intra-
zone liberalisation to service and state procurement areas. Nonetheless, by 2004, tangible results 
were still meagre. Although a protocol for service liberalisation was signed in 1997, and later, 
members made reciprocal concessions in four negotiation rounds according to the positive list 
approach (as in the scope of GATS), the protocol had not been put into force. The state 
procurement area is still very new and is covered by a protocol with only modest concessions 
signed in 2003. The agreement is still awaiting ratification by some of its members. Above all, 
Brazil is hesitant to foster these new topics, as important concessions could entail disadvantages 
within “mega talks” in the extra regional and multilateral sphere (3.1.3). 
 Macroeconomic Coordination: As the negative effects of currency devaluations 
questioned the benefits of integration, the enhanced coordination of macroeconomic policies 
began to be seen as crucial for the consolidation of MERCOSUR. Thus, a “Mini-Maastricht” in 
December 2000 defined economic convergence targets for the period 2002-2010 between 
member states. Even so, the measures lacked enforcement provisions and have yet to be put into 
effect. 
 Implementation: Contrary to the overambitious goals set forth in the Asunción Treaty, the 
Heads of State repeatedly announced the implementation of policies already outlined, for 
example in the  “MERCOSUR Agenda” in December 1995, “the Buenos Aires Agenda” in June 
2000, and the “Objectives 2006” declared in July 2003. Undeniably, the numerous efforts to re-
launch the regional agenda disseminated a picture of ineffective and irrelevant communitarian 
regulatory and policy frameworks that, consequently, appeared rather futile for business 
operations. The shaky legal ground was emphasised by the fact that up until 2004, only 550 out 
of 1,112 norms (Decisions, Resolutions, and Directives) were put into force; i.e. for the rest, 
incorporation into internal juridical systems was non-existent (MERCOSUR 2004). 
                                                 
8 In 2005, members finally began to be concerned about funding options to establish a MERCOSUR Fund for 
Reconstruction and Development, inspired by the convergence regimes administered by the UE. 
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Extra (Sub-) Regional Integration 
The customs union was an idea born in Itamaraty, Brazil’s powerful Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Brazil’s diplomacy aimed at consolidating the country’s leadership in South America through 
common regional trade policies was initiated when the US Initiative for the Enterprise of the 
Americas was announced in June 1990. Since the offensive of the Bush administration to foster 
free trade in the hemisphere was warmly received in countries such as Chile and Argentina, for 
Brazil the moment had come to work on the creation of a regional block to counter the US 
expansion towards South America. Itamaraty’s strategy sustained throughout the presidencies of 
Collor de Mello, Franco, Cardoso and Lula da Silva, consisted of the establishment of the 
MERCOSUR as a core group aimed to be expanded steadily throughout the rest of the South 
American states.9 
As previously mentioned, Argentina’s position differed from this strategy since the 
government of Carlos Menem pursued a structural adjustment policy in line with the Bretton 
Woods Institutions; moreover, Argentina maintained a foreign policy with the US which had 
been commonly denominated as “carnose relations” that made Argentina (together with Chile) a 
strong candidate for entry into the NAFTA. In this context, by mid-1994 it was Brazil who urged 
Argentina to make a clear commitment in favour of the customs union approach (Campbell et. al 
2000: 154-158). The decisions finally taken in Ouro Preto in December 1994 hampered 
Argentina’s later attempts to follow a Multipolar Model in the same way that Chile had done. 
While its neighbour entered into an intensive network of bilateral trade relations inside and 
outside Latin America as of 1990, MERCOSUR’s external negotiations were deadlocked in the 
regional as well as in the extra regional sphere, as I shall summarise below: 
Chile, Bolivia, Andean Community of Nations (CAN), and Mexico: As previously stated, 
MERCOSUR was expected to become a regional nucleus that would expand towards other 
ALADI states. Therefore, the trading block sought to agree, under the framework of ALADI, on 
full FTAs with Chile, Mexico, and the CAN within a 10-year period (Campbell et. al 2000: 156). 
The idea was to conduct external talks under the “4 + 1” formula through which MERCOSUR 
negotiate as a block with each individual country. 
                                                 
9 The idea to integrate South (or Latin) American economies has been given different names. After creating ALALC 
and ALADI in 1960 and 1980, in 1993 Brazil (under Itamar Franco) put forward the concept of the South American 
Free Trade Area. However, the project later stalled. More recently, in December 2004, the “Lula” administration 
convinced regional Heads of States to announce the Community of South American Nations. In 2005, the detailed 
contents and modalities were still not clear. 
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Chile turned out to be the most challenging case for the new “4+1” scheme. As a bustling 
and stable economy in the Southern Cone linked to the Pacific area, from the start Chile was 
invited to join MERCOSUR as a full member. However, the Andean country rejected the 
customs union and only accepted a status as Associate Member involving the complete 
dismantling of tariffs and specific dispositions regarding transportation, investment, and energy, 
among others.10 During the negotiations that ended in September 1996, key official reports 
suggested that the Chilean team was better prepared, and thus able to make use of the diverging 
interests within MERCOSUR (SO Cañellas 9/12/04; Campbell et. al 2000: 181-185). In the end, 
the agreement signed in the ALADI framework (ACE No. 36) entailed the removal of most 
tariffs within eight years, and ten year for sensitive products. Argentina’s major agricultural 
exports such as cereals, beef, dairy products and vegetable oils were treated as ultra sensitive 
goods that would only be liberalised after 15 and 18 years, respectively.  
Of less importance were the talks with Bolivia that reached their conclusion three months 
later. As the Bolivia chapter explains, Bolivia sought a far-reaching alliance with the Southern 
Cone. Therefore, this poor Andean country largely waived the Special Treatment Status 
embodied in the ALADI Treaty and accepted, for example, fairly rigid rules of origin, harsh 
restrictions on textile exports – Bolivia’s major interest in manufactures – and left out special 
safeguards for agricultural goods. Similar to the Chile agreement, Argentina’s interests such as 
duty-free imports of wheat, vegetable oils, meat, cheese, chocolate, and biscuits were treated as 
ultra sensitive products to be liberalised in 15 to 18 years. 
After the talks with Chile and Bolivia concluded, MERCOSUR’s external agenda became 
gridlocked for a prolonged period of time. Though negotiations were initiated with Mexico, and 
Andean and Central American states, eight years passed before the next FTA was signed; this 
time with the CAN members Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela.11 Nonetheless, these 
negotiations became an extremely burdensome endeavour. In two occasions, April 1998 and 
December 2002, the parties announced that an FTA had to be reached within a specific period of 
time through so-called Framework Agreements. But the deadlines set forth could never be met, 
underlining the difficulties faced when transforming official rhetoric into tangible outcomes. 
Hence, the negotiations suffered from heterogeneous blocks on both sides as the Argentinean 
official, José Lopez Aramburu, summed up (SO 30/11/04): “To keep the process ongoing, we 
tested all possible sorts of negotiations; starting in 1997 with the “4+4” method, but as talks 
                                                 
10 Regarding issues beyond trade, Argentina paid special attention to improved transport ways towards the Pacific 
Ocean, while Chile had strong interests in Argentina as the main foreign supplier of natural gas; see Chapter II. 
11 Meanwhile, the countries confirmed or extended the existing bilateral Partial Scope Agreements, usually 
consisting of a limited number of tariff preferences for specific periods called “historical inheritance.”  
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
114
barely advanced, Brazil opted for the bilateral way and renegotiated the existing Partial Scope 
Agreements with each Andean state; we did the same and ended up in October 1999 with modest 
preferences for slightly more than 1000 items.” In December 2002, the process was initiated 
once again by Brazil. This time the Framework Agreement enabled the countries to carry out 
their negotiations in which ever way they saw fit. Peru was the first CAN member to initiate 
talks with Argentina and Brazil, and subsequently the remaining states entered into bilateral 
talks, ending up with two Framework Agreements (ACE 58 with Peru; ACE 59 with Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Ecuador) with a common legal text and bilateral phasing-out lists. 
The FTA, finally signed in October 2004, was concluded mainly due to Brazil’s firmness 
to build a strategic partnership between the regional blocks. In order to achieve this Brazil 
accepted broad concessions, such as maintaining the Andean Price Band System (Chapter IV), a 
special agriculture safeguard and long phasing-out schemes. Argentina faced an adverse scenario 
as its agricultural interests were relegated and defensive concerns identified in textiles and 
apparels were undermined by Brazil’s political determination. Moreover, the minor partners 
Paraguay and Uruguay jeopardised the talks over the years through their lack of interest in 
negotiating and their claims to compensate the special treatment granted to the CAN (SO’s 
Monti 18/11/03; Aramburu 30/11/04). 
Furthermore, in 2004 the FTA with Mexico was anticipated to reach a conclusion. After 
years of delayed negotiations, the parties signed a Framework Agreement in December 2002 in 
order to enable each member of MERCOSUR to enter into bilateral talks with Mexico. 
Nonetheless, the most specific result for Argentina was an increase in the annual quota for the 
duty free import of 50,000 automobiles. In this case, multinational companies reached a prior 
agreement which the governments homologated thereafter. To date, Mexico has insisted on the 
exclusion of Chapters 1 to 24 involving all tariff agricultural items. According to Adrian Makuc 
(SO 22/04/2004), National Director of Foreign Trade Policy, a breakthrough in these arduous 
talks depended primarily on previous substantial agreements between Mexico and Brazil. 
Therefore, the local foreign trade agenda once again relied on actions taken by Brazil. 
WTO, FTAA, EU-MERCOSUR and ASIA: MERCOSUR’s extra regional agenda 
encountered similar deficiencies to those of its regional agenda, although with varying contexts. 
Despite this, the actions undertaken in the multilateral agenda can be seen as an exception. 
Although Argentina’s top policy makers were not present at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Doha, as of 2002 the country assumed – jointly with Brazil – a protagonist role within the 
Development Round launched in Doha. For example, after the unsuccessful Cancun Ministerial 
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Conference in September 2003, Argentina convened the developing coalition G-22 (thereafter 
known as G-20) to discuss the group’s post-Cancun agenda, urging the developed countries to 
continue agricultural reforms to achieve the full integration of agriculture under the WTO 
disciplines.12 Even though pertinent dealings have been onerous and the firmness of the group 
has not always been upheld, different reports highlighted the effective (though informal) 
coordination between MERCOSUR and other emerging states, becoming key players within 
multilateral talks in general, and in agriculture trade in particular (SO Mermet 21/11/03; 
Narlikar/Tussie 2003).  
Of a more conflictive nature than the coordination inside WTO were the activities of the 
MERCOSUR block in the extra-regional sphere. Although the countries shared significant 
interests, since 1995 the common representation within the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) and the EU-MERCOSUR talks have been marked by a lack of internal cohesion, 
explaining in part the impossibility to agree on latest generation FTAs that enable steady 
preferential access to US and EU markets. Moreover, as regards the Asian region, the 
MERCOSUR expansion toward the Pacific was behind schedule compared with regional 
competitors and bore hardly any fruits compared with the bilateral strategy pursued by Chile as 
illustrated in Chapter II.13 
This poor record contrasts with the rhetoric sustained by the Argentinean State since 
2002. Directed by Martin Redrado, chief negotiator from February 2002 to September 2004, 
trade diplomacy pursued a “multipolar strategy” with enthusiasm (Redrado 2003; Redrado/ 
Lacunza 2004). Therefore, Redrado did not overlook any opportunity to public stress the 
importance of all possible venues for negotiations. Technically supported by the Centre for 
International Economy (CEI), a think-tank attached to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the key 
official put into evidence the potential benefits of ongoing, planned and insinuated talks through 
sophisticated impact studies which had never before been conducted domestically (CEI Studies 
No. 1-8). Accordingly, complete FTAs with the EU, FTAA, CAN, South Africa, and East Asian 
States would entail more opportunities than risks, and hence, render a significant GDP growth. 
To some extent, the ambitious market access strategy put forward by Martin Redrado was 
shared by his Brazilian colleagues. Nonetheless, their rationale showed significant differences. 
                                                 
12 In the end, twelve countries (including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Mexico, 
Paraguay, South Africa and Venezuela) signed the final political statement of the Group. 
13 The expansion toward the Pacific had been on the table since 1997; see MERCOSUR/GMC XXV/Acta Nº 01/97. 
Yet despite the interests announced, concrete diplomatic actions only took place as of 2003. A first partial scope 
agreement was signed with India in March 2005. Nevertheless, coverage was modest, entailing preferential 
concessions of 10, 20 and 100 percent for 450 products. Agricultural goods had to be excluded in this first round. 
Nonetheless, the parties are heading towards a comprehensive FTA in the future. 
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While the CEI Studies sustaining the outward oriented position of Martin Redrado focused on 
market access opportunities for export champions, Brazil cautiously examined the impact of new 
topics involved in international trade policy affairs. Hence, the role of Brazil was striking in the 
FTAA process where the South American leader acted as an adversary to US concerns. By 
insisting on clear US commitments to improve market access for agriculture, to abolish great 
subsidies in this sector, and to revise its discretional antidumping legislation, Brazil left no doubt 
as regards the preconditions to enter into discussions on the issues of services, state procurement, 
investment and intellectual property rights (OE Nogués 6/10/03). Brazil’s firmness on these new 
topics, combined with the reluctance of both the US and the EU to grant significant concessions 
in the area of agriculture, hindered the conclusion of negotiations.  
Had it not been compelled to coordinate positions with Brazil, Argentina would most 
likely have signed two bilateral treaties in a similar fashion to Chile. On the political level, the 
keenness of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, directed by Redrado, to accomplish negotiations was 
evident, above all in the case of the nearly completed talks with the EU in September 2004. In 
deed, critical voices from within the Ministry of Economy and the local industrial sector even 
suggested (in a colloquial manner) that: “Redrado would sign any paper where the media is 
present.” Moreover, from a technical perspective it should be emphasised that Argentina’s legal 
framework provides, in general, wider market access and a more extensive national treatment 
status to foreign companies than in Brazil. Therefore, an independent Argentina could have 
submitted more liberal offers on investments and services than was possible in coordination with 
Brazil. 
 
Export and Sector Promotion 
“The best industrial policy is the policy which does not exist,” can be taken as the prevailing 
expert opinion of the 1990s (OE’s Bouzas 15/06/04; Chudnovsky 25/06/04). Indeed, in contrast 
with other states such as Colombia, Brazil or Mexico, key policy-makers in the Ministry of 
Economy did not define active industrial policies after the previous protectionism system and 
subsidies were largely abolished as of September 1989.14 Moreover, the market-led approach 
was underscored by means of the deregulation of the foreign investment regime and the 
privatisation of state owned companies during the period 1990-93 (Chudnovsky at al. 1996). 
                                                 
14 The end of the former industrial regimes was embodied in the Economic Emergency Law enacted in September 
1989 in the context of the macroeconomic crisis. For example, the Law caused the dissolution of the Argentina Buy 
Act obliging the state to favour local production. Subsequently, in 2002, Law No. 25,551 introduced this system 
again, but the preferential margins aimed to favor SME’s are marginal in order not to contravene WTO provisions. 
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As of 1991, when economic openness began to pressure local industrialists due to the 
over-valued Argentinean Peso, increasing demands to revise the neutral policy approach led to 
the adoption of numerous ad-hoc alleviation measures, but did not render significant conceptual 
turns in the way the Cavallo Team managed economic policies.15 The sectors with permanent 
border protection and specific fiscal incentives were limited to the automotive and sugar 
industries, nevertheless. In more recent years, slightly greater emphasis was placed on assistance 
mechanisms for the development of small-scale firms, for example by opening subsidised credit 
lines, increased labour flexibility, and technical assistance. However, the most effective 
“industrial” and “export promotion” policy was implemented as a result of the involuntary 
breakdown of the Currency Board in January 2002, that is, through a floating exchange rate 
regime the exchange rate remained high, decreasing production costs significantly and resulting 
in an export surge as of 2003.  
Disregarding this currency impulse, official export promotion instruments were 
considered insufficient vis-à-vis those maintained by competing neighbours. Nonetheless, 
according to Bouzas/Pagnotta (2003: 69-81), the low effectiveness of national policies was not 
related primarily to their absence, but to the frequent modifications and erratic implementation of 
them, as is briefly outlined below. 
 Fiscal policies: Since 1985, Argentina has applied diverse tax refund systems to refund 
import duties, value added tax and other local taxes paid during the different processing stages. 
Traditionally, this system was applied in the form of export subsidies that refunded up to 20 
percent on the FOB value for highly elaborated products. But in the second half of the 1990s, 
these rates were sharply reduced and have recently ranged between 0 to 6 percent. Moreover, 
since export taxes were broadly introduced after the Peso devaluation in 2002, the average export 
tax of 5.3 percent was higher than the average export refund (4.2 percent) in 2004, and 
particularly affected commodities such as cereals, oil seeds and hydrocarbons, by applying duties 
of up to 20 percent. Finally, the refund mechanisms available were often described as 
burdensome, causing notorious delays in the reimbursement of paid taxes, such as the value 
added tax.16 
                                                 
15 In the context of vehement import pressure mainly from Brazil, by the end of 1992 Cavallo implemented wide-
reaching export subsidies and industrial reconversion regimes. However, no later than 1996, these temporary 
supporting schemes came to an end and were not replaced afterwards; see Kosacoff/ Ramos 2001: 222-238. 
16 In order to refund or circumvent import duties on inputs, two mechanisms have been applied to date. Large scale 
exporters of cereals, automobiles, and steel usually take advantage of the Draw Back facility. Exporters have 
complained since 1991 with respect to delayed refund of duties which in the years 1991-1997 resulted in an 
estimated debt of US$2.5 billion (WTO 1999); see also La Nación 22/04/03. Conversely, SME exporters generally 
opt for the less bureaucratic Temporary Admission, enabling companies to get the benefit of duty free import of 
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 Export Financing: Since 1992 export (pre-) finance assistance has been made available 
through the publicly owned Investment and Foreign Trade Bank (BICE). Compared with the 
facilities provided in Chile by CORFO and Brazil through BNDES and SEBRAE, export 
financing in Argentina traditionally faced three shortcomings (Bouzas/Pagnotta 2003: 75-79; 
Iglesias 2002). Firstly, BICE served mainly as a second-tier institution, with subsidies for credit 
lines from commercial banks. As a result, the diffusion of available credit lines depended 
primarily on the public relations of the banks involved. Secondly, the fact that BICE did not 
assume any responsibility for risky loans prevented interest rates for loans from being set below 
10 percent; compared to 5-7 percent in Brazil and Chile. Thirdly, the credit volumes offered were 
modest up until 2003 (US$178 million) as 87 percent of total funding was dedicated to 
investment facilities. 
 Market Assistance: Since 1994, the Export-Ar Foundation has been in charge of 
Argentina’s official export promotion. The promotion authority is composed of both public and 
private sector institutions and depends on the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Consequently, the 
activities are sustained in coordination with 120 official global representations. Aside from 
offering trade data and market studies, in recent years the Export-Ar Foundation has become a 
very active player in the organisation of trade missions and assistance at international fairs. 
Nevertheless, the major limitations of local export promotion have been related to modest 
resources combined with a high degree of fragmentation (BR Cerquetella 26/09/03; OE 
Campbell 17/11/04; Redrado 2003). For example, the Export-Ar Foundation’s annual budget of 
around US$3 million is incomparable with foreign agencies such as the Chilean Prochile, who 
manage budgets of US$20-25 million. Nonetheless, López de Carril, former Export-AR director, 
claimed that official promotion expenditures would also be close to US$25 million when budget 
provisions for all provinces were considered (El Clarin 10/09/01). The dispersion of resources 
earmarked by the federal system was also emphasised in the central government. By 2004, four 
Undersecretariats held responsibilities in the area of export promotion.17 Furthermore, the Export 
Promotion Guide published in November 2003 by the Undersecretariat of SME and Regional 
Development enlisted no less than 22 private and public institutions located in Buenos Aires 
dedicated to trade promotion activities.18 Since the individual budget of these organisations 
                                                                                                                                                             
inputs. 
17 While the Undersecretariat (US) of International Commerce (Foreign Affairs) was the main executive agency, the 
US of Foreign Trade (Economy) defined export promotion regimes. Furthermore, the US’s of SME and Regional 
Development and Agricultural Markets (Economy) defined and ran programs for small and agro exporters. 
18 The institutions ranged from central, provincial and city government, public banks and privately organised entities 
such as the Bank Boston Foundation, Gas Natural BAN, Argentina Export Foundation, the Argentinean Chambers 
of Export and Commerce, the Association of Importers and Exporters, the Foundation Banco Credicoop, etc. 
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tended to be modest, there was an obvious dissemination of resources, even though target groups 
and type of services might differ somewhat. 
 
Summary Dependent Variable B 
In general, Argentina’s approach to world market integration sustained from 1985 to 2004 has 
been rather unsuccessful, matching the criteria for neither the Multipolar nor the Springboard 
model. Resuming this section, the following box highlights the observed shortcomings. The 
principal weakness concerned the radical change of the modes of integration in 1990, and the 
adoption of the customs union concept which contrasted with the domestic economic policies. 
Furthermore, the lack of implementation of the regional integration objectives in the scope of 
MERCOSUR, questioned the credibility of the emerging trading block in external negotiations. 
Finally, the uncoordinated protectionist measures undermined the liberal achievements without 
making reference to a clear heterodox strategy of inserting involved industries gradually into 
world markets. 
 
Box 4.1: Summary Dependent Variable B 
Unilateral 
Trade Regime 
Regional 
Integration 
Extra-Regional 
Integration 
Export 
Promotion 
Sector 
Promotion 
1989-91: 
Abolishing 
NTBs and 
reducing 
average tariff 
rates from 30 to 
10 percent; later 
14 percent. 
Exceptions: 
Automotive 
regime, and Ad-
hoc protection 
for non-
competitive 
sectors  
 
In 1990, radical 
conceptual 
change to 
integration by 
shifting from the 
gradual, sectoral 
PICE to the 
automatic, 
horizontal 
MERCOSUR. 
From 1995, 
problems in 
accomplishing 
the regional 
market and 
custom union. 
From 1995, the 
lack of collective 
action capacity of 
MERCOSUR 
prevented the 
trading block 
from becoming an 
integration force 
inside Latin 
America and from 
establishing 
strong extra-
regional trade 
relations. 
 
Official export 
promotion 
suffered from the 
combination of 
frequent 
modifications of 
instruments, 
modest 
resources, and 
institutional 
fragmentation 
among 
promotion 
agencies. 
Apart from the 
automotive 
regime, sectoral 
policies were 
absent, and thus, 
pointed at the 
non-existence of 
sectoral 
strategies to 
enhance 
international 
competitiveness. 
 
Despite the incoherent implementation of world market integration related policies, in 
quantitative terms, national exports developed rather successfully in augmenting external sales 
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from US$8,400 to 34,500 million between 1985 and 2004. Due to the trade surpluses in 1985-90, 
and particularly in 2001-04, moreover, the constant trade deficits registered during the Currency 
Board 1991-2000 could be reverted and resulted in an overall trade surplus. From a qualitative 
perspective, however, the dependence on natural resources and natural resource-based 
manufactures persisted during the period of analysis, with only a slight decrease from 80 to 70 
percent. Significant modifications of the national export structure concerned the shift from 
traditional agriculture goods like cereals and meat towards soybeans and its derivates, and a 
strong increase in hydrocarbon exports. In the area of manufactures of industrial origin, the 
country is challenged to broaden foreign sales in a qualitative manner because the “export 
champions” of the 1990s – above all in the scope of MERCOSUR – were the heavily 
concentrated industries of steel, automotives and petrochemicals. By 2004, the future of the local 
automotive industry was moreover uncertain in light of a gradual transfer of assembly factories 
towards the Brazilian market, which has taken place since the end of the 1990s. 
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4.2 State Bureaucracy: Between the Foreign Affairs and Economy Model 
 
This section is structured along the following lines. The first subsection, responsibilities, outlines 
the division of labour in the conduction of international trade policy affairs, including the inter-
ministerial coordination among the different sectoral departments involved. Then, under 
resources, there is a description of how the trade policy team has evolved in the last two decades 
with respect to staff size, technical expertise, and the application of civil service models. Finally, 
the subsection openness discusses consultation mechanism towards business and civil society.  
 
Responsibilities 
As in other countries in the region, trade policy has been a field dealt with mostly inside the 
executive branch. Even though legislative powers held the responsibility of approving 
international agreements, and legislating tariff and customs policies, Congress has been 
described as a passive actor that follows the executive branch and delegates responsibilities to it; 
except for specific Congress lobby actions that took place to protect the local sugar and 
pharmaceutical industries (Bouzas/ Avogadro 2002: 1-3).  
This “top down” policy making style should not give the impression of a uniform actor 
who defines trade policy matters in a rather authoritarian way. From an historical perspective, 
trade policy affairs have been an area affected by frequent personnel changes entailing further 
modification regarding the ministerial structure. Accordingly, since the Secretariat of Foreign 
Trade was created in 1968, this area had changed its denomination and attributions no less then 
eleven times by 1985, sharing its denomination with Industry, Mining, Economic Affairs, 
Maritime Interests and International Negotiations and holding the status of Secretariat, 
Secretariat of State, Ministry and Military Delegation. In the same period of time, this area was 
run by 21 different officials.  
Against this record, office holder “No. 22” represented a break through as regards the 
development of trade policy. In December 1985, Robert Lavagna – a widely recognised 
economist close to the Peronist party – insisted on merging the Secretariats of Foreign Trade and 
Industry into one “super agency” within the Ministry of Economy, thus being in charge of 
industrial development, SME assistance, export promotion and trade policy exchange (OE 
Campbell 17/11/04; 07/03/05).19 Due to this setting, the new Secretariat of Industry and Foreign 
                                                 
19 Minister of Economy Juan Sourrouille (father of the macroeconomic Plan Austral) at that time ignored political 
considerations and selected (as new head of the area with Roberto Lavagna) a member of the Peronist party inside 
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Trade (SICE) assumed a crucial role in the integration with Brazil, bearing in mind that 
Lavagna’s entrance “coincided” with the Declaration of Iguaçu where both states declared the 
will to foster bilateral relations on a broad range of issues starting with trade, science, energy, 
defence, culture, etc. To understand negotiations with Brazil from a bureaucratic perspective, 
Carlos Bruno (OE 4/03/05) – foreign policy advisor and (Under-) Secretary of Foreign Economic 
Affairs (1983-1989) – divided the PICE negotiation process into three phases: 
 
Table 4.1: Ministerial Organisation in the Negotiations with Brazil (1983-1989) 
Phase Institutional Setting Personal Leadership 
 
1983-1985 
 
Foreign Policy 
Approach after 
Return to 
Democracy 
The design and negotiation of furthering 
relations with Brazil was exclusively carried 
out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Integration was conceptualised as a political 
project to overcome the historical bilateral 
tensions concerning border areas. 
Nonetheless, for the foreign policy makers it 
was clear that economic cooperation would be 
crucial for further integration in other areas. 
Dante Caputo, as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Oscar 
Romero, as Secretary of 
Foreign Economic Affairs. 
Romero assumed the overall 
coordination of the process 
due to his close relations with 
Brazil’s political and business 
elites.  
 
1986-1987 
 
The Rise of the 
SICE and the 
Sectoral PICE 
Approach 
The SICE team was responsible for the design 
of the PICE. During negotiations, confirming 
reports mentioned the excellent relations 
between key officials and effective 
coordination in the scope of the 
Interministerial Task Force, where the heads 
of the SICE, Secretariat of Foreign Economic 
Affairs and National Directorate of Economic 
Policy (Ministry of Economy) met regularly. 
Roberto Lavagna became the 
PICE’s mastermind. Oscar 
Romero remained as the 
political coordinator of the 
process. 
 
Mid-1987-1989 
The Decline of 
SICE and 
PICE 
After Lavagna left office in mid-1987 in 
disagreement with the anti-inflationary Spring 
Plan, the PICE team inside the SICE lost 
political support in the Economy Ministry. 
Based on these grounds, the MFA took charge 
of the process. 
Carlos Bruno, new Secretary 
of Foreign Economic Affairs, 
and Beatriz Nofal, 
Undersecretary of the 
Industrial Development area 
in the SICE. 
Source: OE Bruno 4/03/05; others: OE’s Campbell 07/03/05, 17/11/04; Chudnovsky 25/06/04; SO Salafia 7/12/04 
 
The decline of SICE as a conceptual force for regional integration was accelerated from mid-
1989 when the Peronist government of Carlos Menem entered office. On this occasion, Domingo 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Radical government of Raúl Alfonsín. 
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Cavallo, as first Minister of Foreign Affairs tried to speed up the power shift towards his 
department that had begun with Roberto Lavagna’s office departure. Jorge Campbell, by then 
head of the foreign trade division inside the SICE, recalled (OE 8/06/04): “Only 30 days after 
Cavallo took office, I found a draft project on my desk which sought to transfer the Foreign 
Trade Service (composed of hundreds of well trained trade diplomats) to Cavallo’s Ministry. 
Considering that this initiative meant an enormous drain of knowledge on foreign markets, I 
obviously rejected the draft and collected legal arguments against it.”20 
Nevertheless, legal defence strategies in the Ministry of Economy soon lost force and the 
expansion plans developed by Cavallo were accomplished by the amended Ministerial Law of 
December 1992 (Law No. 24,190). With this legal base, still in force today, the principal 
modification was related to the transfer of the primary responsibility for the execution of trade 
promotion to the now denominated Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade and 
Worship (MRECIC). Through the inclusion of the Foreign Trade Service in the MRECIC, the 
previously weak economic branch within the ministry was significantly strengthened. 
Nonetheless, several factors, outlined below, prevented the MRECIC from taking over the 
effective responsibility for the conduction and coordination of international trade negotiations. 
1) Foreign Trade Service versus Diplomatic Cadre: At the outset, the incorporation of the 
Foreign Trade Service turned out to be a laborious process in which the horizontally 
organised staff had to be integrated into the distinctive hierarchical composition of the 
diplomatic service, as exposed in the subsection resources. 
2) Lack of Political Leadership: After completing the incorporation of the Foreign Trade 
Service, the Secretariat of Foreign Economic Affairs (responsible for international trade 
policy affairs) suffered from weak political leadership during the Fernando de la Rua 
administration (2000-02). Several verbal reports highlighted the passive behaviour and 
lack of knowledge on trade policy issues displayed by Horacio Chighizola, chief 
negotiator in 2000-01.21 However, as of February 2002 when Martín Redrado began to 
vehemently seek a Multipolar strategy, the negotiations force inside the Ministry was 
increasingly utilised. 
                                                 
20 Jorge Campbell’s perspective was altered radically when, in 1994, Menem appointed him as new chief negotiator 
of the MRECIC. Due to evident reasons (ibid.), “I gladly received the team transferred by the amended Ministerial 
Law since it implied a clear institutional upscale for my area.” Cavallo, by then Minister of Economy, conversely 
encountered the outcome of his ambitions. Nonetheless, Campbell concluded conciliatory, “Cavallo would have 
possessed the power to bring the area back, but he was coherent in leaving the Service at that point since he was 
really convinced that the MRECIC required a strong trade policy branch.” 
21 For Carlos Bruno (OE 4/03/05), during the De la Rúa presidency, the MRECIC enjoyed the best negotiation cadre 
ever. But the problems were the heads of the Ministry. Both Minister Rodriguez Giavarini and Secretary Horacio 
Chighizola did not master this topic and did not have the necessary time to learn the international trade policy logic. 
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3) Inter-ministerial Coordination: The unstable and conflictive coordination pattern 
between the MRECIC and the Ministry of Economy was common to the entire study 
period. This was clearly seen, for instance, in the scope of MERCOSUR when officials 
from the Secretariat of Industry and Trade demanded the exclusive responsibility for the 
intra-zone regulation of the automotive trade. 
Difficulties with regard to inter-ministerial relations have often been linked to the trade policy 
role of the Ministry of Economy and Public Works, which since May 2003 has been the Ministry 
of Economy and Production (MEP). Despite the amended Ministerial Law, in the 1990s the MEP 
remained the key trade policy agency, considering its widespread competencies in every area 
related to the definition and implementation of trade policies, i.e. tariffs, export promotion 
regime, customs polices, and trade defence. Consequently, in setting the “red lines” for 
international negotiations, economic policy makers remained in charge of the definition of 
“what” the official delegation was supposed to negotiate, while the trade diplomats in the 
MRECIC determined “how” to proceed in international trade policy affairs.  
In practice though, this division of labour has proven far more ambiguous, since the 
MRECIC began depending less on external expertise due to the Foreign Trade Service. 
Conversely, the Ministry of Economy faced the costs of Cavallo’s endeavours as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and sought to compensate the loss of human resources by establishing a special 
MERCOSUR area. Nonetheless, the team established in May 1993 did not depend on the 
Secretariat of Industry and Trade, but evolved inside the Secretariat for Economic 
Programming.22 As a result, in the following years the Ministry of Economy operated with two 
distinct teams in the scope of MERCOSUR and the pre-negotiation phase with Chile.23 Even 
though officials involved in these processes reported that inter-team relations became 
increasingly cordial, the superposition caused an evident dissemination of resources (SO’s 
Mosquera 7/12/04; Makuc 14/03/05; Cañellas 9/12/04). However, the Ministry of Economy’s 
decline as a trade policy branch was to be observed principally as of 1996, when the two areas 
were merged in the scope of the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade inside the Secretariat of 
Industry and Trade. In the following subsection, I shall demonstrate that the steady deterioration 
is best explained by the drastic reduction of budget resources, frequent alternating of office 
                                                 
22 According to a confidential report by a state official, Alejandro Mayoral, former Director of Economic Policy and 
Central Bank official, gained the confidence of Domingo Cavallo and convinced him to create a new “bureaucratic 
space” within the Ministry’s macroeconomic area. 
23 One team was headed by Mayoral and the other by Carlos Kesmann, the latter at that time Undersecretary of 
Foreign Trade. 
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holders and subordination of trade policy concerns against the emerging fiscal and debt crisis.24 
To wide extents, the unsteady development of the trade policy area within the state 
bureaucracy was reflected in the survey carried out from March to October 2004 among 82 state 
officials, business representatives and experts. The survey candidates were asked: Inside the 
executive branch, is there a clear division of labour in the conduction of international trade 
policy affairs? If not, in what areas can ambiguity be identified? In the case of business 
representatives and experts, two thirds perceived a rather unclear division of labour. With regard 
to state officials, it is noteworthy that none of the functionaries consulted qualified the 
designation of responsibilities as very clear. Conversely, only one third of state officials 
perceived the division of labour as rather unclear. 
 
Table 4.2: Division of Labour in International Trade Policy Affairs 
 Experts (12) State Officials (12) Business (58) Total (82) 
very clear 1 0 2 3   (4%) 
rather clear 3 7 14 24 (33%) 
quite unclear 7 4 32 43 (58%) 
very unclear 1 0 3 4   (5%) 
No response 0 1 7 8 
 
When asking in what areas ambiguity could be identified, additional comments mostly 
referred to the unclear role of the Ministry of Economy and Production (MEP) in the 
international trade policy area. Daniel Chudnovsky points out the following (OE 25/06/04): 
“Considering that the MEP had not defined clear industrial policies as of the 1990s, the 
presence of the Secretary of Industry (and Trade) in international trade negotiations does not 
make much sense.” These critical remarks were confirmed by experienced MEP officials, 
commenting that too often they were assigned to participate in talks, but were not given a well 
defined, clear mandate based on domestic policies. 
The alleged “partnership model” was undermined mainly through the manner in which 
topics and negotiation forums were divided between the two ministries. In fact, the MEP 
participated in all negotiation forums and was assigned the responsibility for domestic 
coordination in areas such as market access, rules of origin, state procurement, investment and 
defence of trade, whereas the MRECIC has been in charge of topics such as intellectual property 
                                                 
24 For example, Jose Machinea, appointed Minister of Economy by the De La Rúa’s administration, was entirely 
absorbed by establishing an IMF coordinated rescue package in the order of US$40 billion. 
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rights, services and dispute settlement.25 According to verbal reports, the distribution of 
responsibilities relied mostly on the personal characteristic of key negotiators, and thus, proved 
difficult to identify for foreign observers. Particularly inside the MEP, the negotiation power has 
been in the hands of a small group of stable bureaucrats, in light of constantly changing office 
holders. For example, Adrián Makuc,  as National Director of Foreign Trade Policy, was present 
in all forums and topics, and held a prominent role in the WTO framework, above all in the area 
of industrial goods. Furthermore, Marcelo Cañellas, as Director of Regional Trade Policy, 
assumed a leading position in talks in the scope of ALADI and the area of market access.26  
Notwithstanding, the MRECIC has become the clear leading force in the major 
negotiation forums and topics, although certain areas of intervention are still controlled by the 
MEP. Therefore, the foreign affairs department became the responsible entity for the integration 
process with Brazil and subsequent MERCOSUR affairs as of the late 1980s, and from 2002 for 
the efforts undertaken in the extra-regional sphere, for instance the FTAA and EU-MERCOSUR 
negotiations. Contrary to the MEP, the MRECIC is clearly organised in-line with negotiation 
forums, and maintains a formal structure. The South American and Hemispheric Integration 
division is responsible for affairs inside the Western Hemisphere (e.g. MERCOSUR, ALADI, 
FTAA), and the Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs division is in charge of multilateral trade talks 
and bilateral negotiations with extra-regional partners. The nation’s chief negotiator is the 
Secretary of Foreign Economic Affairs and Foreign Trade. 
Survey results also provided a rather negative picture to the following question: Is their 
close inter-ministerial coordination among the departments involved in International trade 
policy affairs? If not, in what areas can coordination gaps be identified? Although state officials 
underlined remarkable improvements as of 2002, when new office holders entered into closer 
cooperation in light of the forthcoming “mega negotiations” (SO’s Lipovetsky 10/05/04; Makuc 
4/09/03), the opinions of experts and state officials, respectively, were less conclusive. While 10 
out of 12 experts stated that coordination efforts between the MEP and MRECIC were rather or 
very sporadic, two thirds of the state officials considered the exchange as rather close and stable. 
This variance might be explained by the fact that the opinions of experts were negatively 
influenced by conflictive relations held in the past, whereas state functionaries emphasised the 
ongoing coordination efforts that had been generated since 2002, after a period of institutional 
turmoil in the trade policy area, as the following subsection outlines. 
                                                 
25 For example, in the FTAA talks, a National (and Alternating) Coordinator was appointed for each topic. These 
positions held the responsibility for domestic consultation and data gathering from all state agencies involved.  
26 Also, agricultural topics had been in the hands of Gustavo Ideogram, National Director of Agricultural Markets. 
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Table 4.3: Inter-Ministerial Trade Policy Coordination 
 Experts (12) State Officials (12) Business (58) Total (82) 
very close  0 0 1 1   (1%) 
rather close 2 8 22 32 (46%) 
rather sporadic 6 3 19 28 (40%) 
very sporadic 4 0 5 9   (13%) 
no response 0 1 11 12 
 
The information gathered from verbal and written reports indicated that in recent years 
no formal body existed to facilitate inter-ministerial coordination. The previous attempts to 
institutionalise the inter-agency exchange are lengthy however, and embrace among others the 
Interministerial Council of Foreign Trade during the administration of Raul Alfonsín (1983-89), 
the Foreign Trade Council in the Carlos Menem administration (1990-99) and the 
Interministerial Committee of International Trade during the government of Fernando De la Rúa 
(2000-01). According to observations by Jorge Campbell (OE 7/03/05), key trade policy official 
in 1986-87, 1989 and 1994-99, “those who govern, normally do not attend reunions of such 
formal mechanisms,” and “by sending functionaries of third or even fourth rank, these special 
bodies lost power very fast and disappeared slowly but surely.” Instead, Campbell concluded, 
“interactions merely depend on how key officials get along with each other.”  
Accordingly, during 2003 and 2004 inter-ministerial coordination was improved due to 
personal efforts undertaken by the Minister of Economy, Robert Lavagna and Martín Redrado, 
Secretary of Foreign Economic Affairs and Foreign Trade. Together with the Secretaries of 
Agriculture (Miguel Campos) and Industry and Trade (Alberto Dumont), the key officials 
typically held coordination meetings on a twice monthly basis, although their version of events 
after these meetings sometimes differed, as a senior official anecdotally remarked.27  
 The national coordination prior to the sessions held in MERCOSUR’s technical and 
decision making bodies - Working Groups, Trade Commission and MERCOSUR Group – 
nevertheless was described as insufficient. Ad-hoc reunions held by the so-called National 
MERCOSUR Section, which is composed of eight regular senior officials (four alternates) from 
the MEP, MRECIC and the Central Bank, are said to be poorly attended by the principal senior 
officials (SO Makuc 22/04/04). With regard to these institutional deficits that negatively affect 
                                                 
27 For example, Adrian Makuc commented (SO 22/04/04) after a reunion regarding the ongoing discussion on the 
Multilateral System of Preferences among developing countries, that Dumont explained to his officials that in the 
next coordination meeting in Geneva, negotiation modalities shall be discussed. Redrado’s interpretation was 
different, he told his staff that modalities must be defined immediately not waiting for the Geneva meeting. 
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the national implementation of decisions taken within the intergovernmental bodies (as exposed 
in the previous section), for the MERCOSUR expert, Félix Peña, the National Section should 
become an institutionalised body with responsibilities, a regular agenda and a MERCOSUR 
Directorate open to the public (Peña 2003; El Cronista 19/06/03). 
 
Resources 
The assignment of human and financial resources correlated with the division of responsibilities 
throughout the study period. In this sense, the Foreign Trade Service operated for a long time as 
the technical backbone of the Ministry of Economy, and thus, played a crucial role when Roberto 
Lavagna assumed leadership in the sectoral negotiations under the PICE framework in 1986-87. 
Considering that about 70 percent of trade diplomats served abroad, the remaining 50 to 100 
servants provided crucial inputs used at the negotiation table, such as information on the amount 
each sector was able to export each year, major technical obstacles to bilateral trade and items 
suffering from deficits, etc. On the political and advisory level, Lavagna appointed a well trained 
group of committed experts who fully shared the policy approach concerning the industrial 
connotation of trade integration.28 For example, negotiations on capital goods (the PICE’s first 
and most promising protocol) were directed by Daniel Chudnovsky, a internationally known 
expert in national innovation systems and supply chain development (OE Rúa Boiero 26/11/04). 
Mainly composed of economists and sector specialists, the unit specialising in export 
promotion enjoyed a special status. Experts remembered that the country’s leading negotiators 
involved in the GATT and MERCSOUR talks emerged out of this agency, naming, for example, 
Nestor Stancanelli, Ambassador to Australia in 2004, Alberto Dumont as Secretary of Industry 
and Trade (in 2005 Ambassador to Geneva) and Rodolfo Rodriguez, acting Ambassador to 
South Korea (OE’s Bouzas 15/06/04; Ochoa 9/12/04). Jorge Campbell, who directed the Service 
on three occasions, summarised (OE 17/11/04): “The Service, professionalized in the 1970s 
under the former Foreign Trade Secretary, Leopoldo Tettamanti, was less rigid than the 
diplomatic career, considering that officials could take up work at any level, often after working 
for several years in the private sector. Although the recruitment system was less transparent, 
tending often to amiguismo, in my opinion, the staff was better prepared to participate in trade 
talks than teams trained in ISEN (the official Diplomatic School).” 
After the Foreign Trade Service was transferred to the MRECIC in 1993, the Ministry of 
                                                 
28 The appointees mostly involved in the Brazil negotiations were Pedro Dudiuk as Chief Advisor, Jorge Campbell 
as Head of Foreign Trade Exchange and Beatriz Nofal heading the area of Industrial Development. 
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Economy suffered from a loss of human resources, and demanded compensation so as to manage 
the far-reaching competencies that the Ministry still held. To face the emerging MERCOSUR, 
Domingo Cavallo created an advisory team specialised in regional integration and MERCOSUR 
affairs, as exposed in the previous section. Nonetheless, even though the cadre financed by 
means of the UNDP until 1997 produced a handful of first class negotiators, from the mid-1990s 
the foreign trade branch inside the Ministry of Economy continuously deteriorated in the context 
of permanently changing office holders and sharply declining budget resources. Table 4.4 
highlights the frequent personal changes and the drastic reductions of expenditures related to the 
“Definition of the Trade Policy Program” (50-0-17) that went far beyond budget cuts made in 
other budget items.29 
 
Table 4.4: The Decline of the Trade Policy Branch inside the Ministry of Economy 
Year Budget 
$ Peso 
Minister of 
Economy 
Secretary of 
Industry and Trade 
Undersecretary of 
Foreign Trade 
1996 28,600,000 Domingo Cavallo+ 
Roque Fernandez 
Carlos Sánchez*  
Alieto Guadagni** 
Carlos Kesman 
Alejandro Mayoral 
1997 19,000,000 Roque Fernandez Alieto Guadagni Alejandro Mayoral 
1998 9,500,000 Roque Fernandez Alieto Guadagni Félix Peña 
1999 7,300,000 Roque Fernandez 
Jose Machinea ++ 
Alieto Guadagni  
Debora Giorgi*** 
Félix Peña 
2000 5,200,000 Jose Machinea Debora Giorgi  
Javier Tizado 
Gonzalo Martinez 
Mosqueraº 
2001 5,200,000 Jose Machinea 
R. Lopez Murphy 
Domingo Cavallo 
Debora Giorgi****  
 
Adolfo Ibañezºº  
Julio Noguesººº  
Diana Tussie 
2002 4,600,000 
(approximately 
US$2 mn) 
Remes Lenicov/ 
Juan I. Mendiguren 
+++ 
Roberto Lavagna/ 
Aníbal Fernandez 
E.Braun Cantilo***** 
Carlos Leone 
Dante Sica 
 
Fernando 
Martinez°°°º 
Juan Carlos Estévez 
2003 7,800,000 
(US$2.6 mn) 
Roberto 
Lavagna++++  
Alberto 
Dumont****** 
Hugo Polverini 
Guillermo J. Feldman 
2004 5,000,000 
(US$1.7 mn) 
Roberto Lavagna Alberto Dumont Guillermo J. Feldman 
Source: Secretariat of Finance 1996-2004/ Library Ambassador Leopoldo H. Tettamanti 2005  
+ M. of Economy and Public Works    * S. of Trade and Investment         ° U.S of Trade, Industry and Mining 
++ M. of Economy       ** S. of Trade, Industry and Mining  °° U.S. of Trade and Investment 
+++ M. of Production       *** S. of Trade          °°° U.S. of Trade Policy   
++++ M. of Economy/Production      **** S. Trade and Industry          °°°°U.S. of Trade Policy and Administration 
         *****S. of Trade, Industry, SME and Regional Development 
                                                 
29 Excluded from this item is the National Foreign Trade Commission (CNCE) in charge of antidumping and 
safeguard analysis. The staff employed in the CNCE (created in 1994) has earned an outstanding reputation and 
have higher salaries than functionaries from the Secretariat of Industry and Trade.  
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From the time when Domingo Cavallo left office in mid-1996, the areas of trade and 
industry have seen several office holders “who poorly defended the area in times of fiscal 
constraints,” according to a confidential state official report from the Ministry of Economy and 
Production (March 2005). Hence, Alieto Guadani (1996-99) paid little attention to foreign trade 
policy concerns, and focused exclusively on issues linked to the automotive regime. In addition, 
the policy areas have been reorganised numerous times, since the change of governmental 
authorities typically implied modifications in the ministerial structure, as Table 4.4 underscores. 
Therefore, in the period between 1999 and 2003, the foreign trade area lost not only enormous 
financial resources, but also credibility both inside and outside the Ministry of Economy. 
The survey data collected in 2004 generally replicates this irregular development of the 
trade policy staff (though responses did not refer only to the economy department). The survey 
asked: Is the official team in charge of international trade policy affairs adequately staffed in 
order to comply with the technical requirements of modern international trade policy affairs 
(staff size, talent and experience)? If not, in what areas/issues can limitations be found? From 
the answers obtained, merely 40 percent considered the official trade policy team to be 
adequately staffed. Surprisingly, in this regard, business officials perceived the staff to be more 
adequate than the state officials themselves. Nonetheless, the most negative responses stemmed 
from the experts since two thirds considered the human resources as rather or very inadequate. 
 
Table 4.5: Trade Policy Staff 
 Experts (12) State Officials (12) Business (58) Total (82) 
very adequate 0 0 0 0   (0%) 
rather adequate 4 4 23 31 (44%) 
rather inadequate 4 6 24 34 (48%) 
very inadequate 4 1 1 6   (8%) 
no response 0 1 10 11 
 
When asking in what areas/issues limitations could be found, the most common 
comments were, “the number of negotiators is too small compared with other countries;” “there 
are no effective civil service provisions guaranteeing a stable cadre;” “we do not enjoy the 
social prestige that our Brazilian colleagues do;” and “the generalist type prevails, while 
specialists in particular topics are hardly to be found.” According to the ministerial structures in 
2004, trade policy expertise could mostly be found in the following agencies: 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship (MRECIC 2004a): The 
“economic branch” of MRECIC has grown considerably since the mid-1980s, when Argentina 
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began to foster integration with Brazil and participated in the Uruguay Round. Today trade 
policies are dealt with inside the State Secretariat of Trade and Foreign Economic Affairs which 
accounted for four percent of the annual budget in 2004 (US$8.3 million) and ten percent of 
personnel (150 officials). This modest share is explained by the fact that the maintenance of 
foreign offices was responsible for almost 80 percent of the expenditures and 50 percent of the 
total staff serving in the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. The trade policy division is composed of 
the Undersecretariat of International Trade dedicated to export promotion activities, and the 
negotiation areas are divided into the Undersecretariat of American Economic Integration and 
MERCOSUR Affairs, and the National Directorate of International Economic Negotiations.30 Of 
the geographical divisions – South America, Hemispheric, Bilateral, Multilateral and 
MERCOSUR Affairs – MERCOSUR has proved to be the key area, accounting for around 25 
employees, whilst the remaining offices were composed of just 5 to 13 state officials. Yet, the 
core team in charge of conducting and coordinating international trade negotiations has not 
surpassed 30-35 diplomats. 
State officials in the MRECIC enjoy a distinct status in the public sector, mainly due to 
the steadiness of the diplomatic career, the transparent and meritocratic recruitment system and 
the diplomatic training in the National Foreign Service Institute (ISEN) created in 1963. 
Although salaries are usually higher than in other ministries, the prevailing remuneration 
structure renders unrewarding outcomes for those serving at the domestic level for prolonged 
periods of time. Luis Ariel Castillo (SO 2/12/03) addresses this issue below: “There are no 
incentives to become a mastermind in WTO affairs since it simply does not pay. A Minister (the 
upper three ranks within the diplomatic scale) sitting on those specific topics cannot earn more 
than US$2,000, whereby in a Consulate in Montreal he would be paid US$8,000. Therefore, 
nobody wants to become a “specialist;” rather they pretend to be “generalist” like Henry 
Kissinger, despite the fact that we obviously require only one real Kissinger and not three 
hundred mediocre copies of him.”31 
Nevertheless, even if the “generalist” serving abroad has been favoured by prevailing 
incentives, there is no doubt that trade policy officials in the MRECIC work in a stable 
environment and exhibit a sound professional background. Furthermore, the dominance of jurists 
                                                 
30 The National Directorate of International Economic Negotiations could be nominated as unofficial Under-
secretariat as it is directly under the Secretariat’s office. 
31 The critical objection tends to be confirmed by quantitative data since only 17 percent of the “economic branch” 
belongs to the three upper diplomatic levels, while the share in foreign embassies is 26 percent. In the case of the 
highest level (Ambassador), the share is three and nine percent, respectively. In qualitative terms it stands out that in 
2004 the crucial division of MERCOSUR affairs was headed by a second level Minister having in mind the 
existence of 224 higher ranking diplomats. 
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in the diplomatic cadre has been reduced, particularly since sector experts and economists from 
the Foreign Trade Service were incorporated in 1993. 
 Ministry of Economy and Production (Legal and Administrative Department/MEP 2004): 
MEP is traditionally the most powerful government department, holding the areas of Finance, 
Agriculture and Fishery, Industry and Trade, SME and Regional Development and 22 
decentralised agencies such as the Federal Administration of State Revenues (AFIP) and the 
National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI). Within this vast organisation, the 
Undersecretariat of Trade Policy and Administration inside the Secretariat of Industry and Trade 
is relatively weakly doted and has lately suffered a severe decline, as I previously exposed. Of 
the two National Directorates that compose the entity – Foreign Trade Policy and Foreign Trade 
Administration – the former holds competencies for international negotiations, while the latter is 
in charge of trade defence, export and import regimes. Another decentralised agency, the 
National Commission of Foreign Trade (CNCE) is exclusively in charge of analysis in the range 
of antidumping and contingency measures. In 2004, the Undersecretariat as a whole (without 
CNCE) had 113 employees on its payroll; with roughly 50-60 functionaries in each National 
Directorate. 
However, the principal restriction of the trade policy area goes further than the limited 
number of functionaries. For Adrian Makuc as Head of Foreign Trade Policy (22/04/04), work 
became unrewarding in light of the severe budget cuts for travel, IT equipment and the 
possibility to hire qualified labour. Therefore, the motivations for the handful of experienced 
negotiators attending a broad range of forums and issues were drastically reduced (SO’s Cañellas 
9/12/04; Makuc 14/03/05). As regards civil service provisions, since 1998 (when Adrian Makuc 
was recruited as National Director) no further formal recruitment of executive positions and 
internal upgrades have taken place. Consequently, the National System for the Administrative 
Profession (SINAPA) – which in 1991 introduced pertinent norms on recruitment, permanent 
evaluations of the cadre, and a transparent promotion regime – has been evaded in practice in 
recent years. Since the Peso devaluation, moreover, salaries have decreased in relative terms. 
Inside the National Directorate of Foreign Trade Policy, two officials held in 2004 executive 
functions guaranteeing a monthly income of 4,700and 5,300 Pesos, respectively (US$1,500-
1,800). Conversely, general staff do not reach the US$1,000 ceiling. Lastly, the single possibility 
for an upgrade in salary categories was to accept the new labour regime created in 2002 (Decree 
1421/02) that requires the annual renewal of contracts and excludes social security. 
Inside the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock and Fishery, developments have been 
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slightly different (SO Petri 15/04/04). For a long time, trade policy expertise was not directly 
linked to the rural sector. Thus, in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, the Agriculture 
department undertook serious efforts to construct a team of talented economists who mastered 
state-of-the-art impact assessments. In close coordination with colleagues from MRECIC, the 
compact team of 5-6 professionals has been leading technical discussions with Brazil and the 
WTO regarding formulas that can significantly lessen the distortion in agricultural trade. It 
should be noted, furthermore, that leading economists like Gerardo Petri and Gustavo Idigoras, 
who formed part of the Agriculture department, originated from the Governmental Economists 
cadre, a program initiated by Domingo Cavallo in 1994 and financed by the World Bank 
(Guidobono/Zuvanic 1997). The polemic policy maker – inspired by his experiences as President 
of the Central Bank where civil service is widely implemented – maintained the idea of building 
a stable cadre of economists who had been previously trained through the four most prestigious 
MA courses at the domestic level. Nevertheless, the idea was not sustained by Cavallo’s 
successors, as after three years of practice the program was suspended. 
 
Openness 
Against the background of institutional changes inside the executive branch, the modes of 
interaction towards business and other society actors also underwent modifications. Concerning 
the incorporation of business into trade policy affairs, this can be divided into three distinct 
periods. The First Phase (1986-90) encompasses negotiations with Brazil in the PICE program 
where the official team performed according to the reluctance of local industrialists to open their 
markets to Brazilian competitors. Consequently, the negotiations on the sectoral protocols 
involved the permanent exchange of ideas with business entities prior to and at the negotiation 
reunions. Particularly, the exchange of concessions in the capital goods area implied an 
exhaustive consultation procedure with the national Association of Metallurgical Industry 
(ADIMRA), therefore taking into account the widespread defensive concerns regarding the 
competition from the large-scale Brazilian industry (OE Rúa Boeiro 26/11/04; Chudnovsky/ 
Porta 1989). 
The Second Phase (1990-95) was marked by the policy-making style of Domingo 
Cavallo that implied little comprehension with regard to protectionist attitudes. Therefore, the 
room for business to correct the unilateral trade reforms undertaken became small (although 
there was an increased disposition to apply antidumping measures for particular import pressures 
suffered by large companies from the steel, petrochemical and paper industry, as discussed in 
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Viguera 1998; Calvo 2001). In the scope of MERCOSUR, the dismantling of intra-zone tariffs 
between 1991 and 1994 also adopted an automatic, linear and universal approach that left little 
margin for lobby. Also, the decision to accept the CET responded to a top down policy making 
pattern. While in Brazil policy evolved from a close coordination among state, business and 
labour organisations (Da Motta Vega 2002), in Argentina this crucial decision was made inside 
the executive power (Bouzas/Pagnotta 2003; Botto 2004). 
Finally, the Third Phase began in 1995 after the Ouro Preto Protocol, covering the time 
when policy makers sought to foster trade integration with enhanced private sector participation, 
even when key decisions had been taken earlier. Thus, several institutions were established at the 
intergovernmental level to involve business in the arduous process of perfecting the regional 
market; i.e. through the submission of proposals to the Working Groups of the Common Market 
Group (GMC) and the Trade Commission (CMC), and the establishment of the MERCOSUR 
Economic and Social Consultative Forum that provided a special consultation channel for 
business and labour as of 1996. 
Conversely, domestic consultation mechanisms remained informal. An exception, 
however, was the Private Sector Advisory Council on Foreign Trade (CACE) established in 
August 1998 by the Foreign Trade Undersecretary, Felix Peña (1998-99). Peña stated (OE 
24/10/03) that “CACE existed already in earlier administrations but we revived the entity since 
closer public-private coordination urged us to do so. Above all in 1999 when Brazil devaluated 
its currency, approximately 30-35 sectoral representatives met regularly (without periodicity) in 
the Salón Federal of the Secretariat of Industry and Trade. Usually, I started with a briefing and 
later the sectors commented on their worries and proposals.” Nonetheless, the activities of 
CACE came to an end when Felix Peña left office in November 1999, and the relation with 
business again relied on traditional forms of ad-hoc consultations; i.e. while the Secretariats of 
Industry, Trade and Agriculture in the Ministry of Economy traditionally maintained close ties 
with sectoral business representatives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was often characterised as 
being somewhat disconnected from domestic business concerns. 
In contrast to this general perception, from 2002 Martin Redrado began to display the 
properties of trade diplomacy towards business and to other society actors (Redrado 2003). As 
indicated in the previous section, the Secretary of Trade and International Economic Affairs 
promoted “his” Multipolar strategy through several mechanisms, as outlined below. 
Business Consultation Mechanism: From mid-2002, the MRECIC invited business 
entities to participate in the FTAA process, by reporting on market access negotiations and 
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requesting detailed contributions from business on trade policy affairs. According to Nora 
Capello (SO 27/11/03), in charge of overall FTAA coordination, about 100 associations were 
consulted and, after a certain degree of insistence, the vast majority of them provided answers. 
Other consultations were carried out within the EU-MERCOSUR and CAN-MERCOSUR 
negotiations. Moreover, in November 2002, Redrado created the National Council of 
International Trade, initially comprised of 35 business and academic entities (2003: 164; 
afterwards this number strongly increased). Roughly eight times a year, the “makers of trade 
policy” met to inform on the status of ongoing trade negotiations and to analyse the official 
presentation with Council members. 
Media Presence and CEI: As never before, a State Secretary in charge of trade policies 
had sufficient media presence to inform on international trade policy and disseminate the 
proactive Multipolar strategy followed. In order to generate academic support for the new 
approach, Redrado revitalised the quasi dormant Centre of International Economy (CEI) by 
bringing forth his former team of economists from the liberal Foundation Invest. The CEI was 
created in 1986 within the MRECIC scope for the analysis and deliberation of topics that 
affected Argentina’s world market integration. Afterwards the think tank went through numerous 
ups and downs, and thereafter, came to principally depend on the concerns of current office 
holders. Accordingly, since 2002 the CEI has applied sophisticated models of general and 
sectoral equilibrium in order to demonstrate the benefits of deeper integration within the FTAA, 
MERCOSUR-UE, MERCOSUR-CAN, and with Asia, etc. (CEI Study Nr. 1-8). 
Nonetheless, critical voices lamented that Redrado’s personal agenda was the centre of 
attention (OE Nogués 06/10/03). Therefore, the permanent working relations with business did 
not go beyond previous administrations, for instance compared with the open attitude of the 
tandem partnership of Guido Di Tella as Minister and Jorge Campbell as Secretary (OE Rúa 
Boeiro 03/09/04). For example, although the National Council of International Trade was 
conceptualised as an ambit for consultation as well as to “nourish official negotiators with 
concrete business proposals” (Redrado 2003: 162), the outstanding purpose concerned the 
diffusion of Redrado’s views on the ongoing negotiations (BR De Kojic 15/09/03; SO Makuc 
22/04/04; OE Rúa Boeiro 03/09/04). One member commented that rather than meeting among 
policy advisors from business entities to work on specific topics, the chief negotiator pursued a 
more political profile by convening the entities’ presidents, i.e. powerful people who know little 
about trade policy. Consequently, when Redrado was appointed President of the Central Bank, 
the Council’s activities ceased. 
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Studying the survey data, the responses gathered in 2004 indicated that the existing 
consultation channels facilitated very or rather close relations between state and business. The 
survey asked: Does the government closely coordinate with business associations in trade policy 
affairs, involving the conduction of international trade negotiations and the implementation of 
trade agreements? If not, in what sectors/issues can coordination gaps be identified? As can be 
seen below, only 30 percent of the responses were critical. Several experts pointed at the 
sporadic nature of interactions and stated that only a few sectors have stable access to authorities 
(OE’s Nogués 06/10/03; Porta 12/04/04; Sanguinetti 25/06/04; Yoguel 05/03/05). Accordingly, 
the large scale dominated automotive and steel sectors were said to enjoy a privileged status, 
while small scale manufacturers, farming units and business representatives from outside the 
capital city were disregarded to a certain extent. 
 
Table 4.6: State-Business Coordination 
 Experts (12) State Officials (12) Business (58) Total (82) 
very close 0 2 4 6   (8%) 
rather close 7 7 33 47 (63%) 
rather sporadic 2 3 16 21 (28% 
very sporadic 0 0 1 1   (1%) 
no response 3 0 4 7 
 
Concerning transparency in trade policy affairs, experts, state officials and business 
representatives were asked: In your opinion, does the government take adequate measures to 
ensure transparency concerning advances and possible impacts of ongoing international trade 
negotiations? Can improvements be noted in the last ten years as regards such? In general, the 
surveyed people indicated a considerable degree of openness, though responses gathered among 
experts insinuated a lack of transparency regarding the governmental efforts to inform the public 
on trade policy affairs. Strikingly, 90 percent of consulted business representatives recognised 
that compared with the 1990s (making reference to the creation of MERCOSUR and the 
completion of the Uruguay Round) the government improved the way in which the interested 
public can be informed on advances and impacts of international trade policy affairs. 
 
Table 4.7: Transparency in International Trade Policy Affairs 
 Experts (12) Business (58) Total (70) 
very transparent 0 5 5   (8%) 
rather transparent 2 38 40 (62%) 
rather non-transparent 6 11 17 (27%) 
very non-transparent 1 1 2   (3%) 
no response 3 3 6 
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Viewing transparency measures set forth to inform non-business actors, dialogue forums have 
been separated from business consultation channels. Exemptions are small business associations 
such as the Argentinean Agrarian Federation (FAA) representing farming units, and the 
Assembly of Small and Medium Entrepreneurs (APYME). Both entities explained that they felt 
better considered in the scope of the Civil Society Consultative Council, a mechanism created in 
December 2002 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to strengthen civil society participation in 
ongoing mega negotiations of the FTAA and MERCOSUR-EU (BR’s Peretti 11/03/05; Del 
Bono 14/03/05). In part, the Civil Society Consultative Council can be seen as a response to the 
shortcomings of the MERCOSUR Economic and Social Consultative Forum (FCES), established 
by the Ouro Preto Protocol. The FCES, comprised of agents from the economic and social 
sectors of the four member states, has been described as a rather ineffective mechanism to raise 
the legitimacy of the integration process outside governmental spheres, mainly because the 
information spread was ex-post decisions, and in general, since its influence over decision 
making was non-existent (Nofal 1997a; Botto 2001).32 Nonetheless, for Ambassador Hugo 
Varsky (SO 13/9/04), appointed Special Representative to the Civil Society Dialogue as of 
August 2003, “the participation of civil society shall be vital to MERCOSUR because we pursue 
a different approach to integration than in NAFTA and FTAA where civil society does not really 
have a voice.” 
However, Varsky admitted that the Consultative Council’s leverage on policy making has 
been modest to date, even though the reunions turned out to be extremely positive experiences 
where pluralism and mutual respect reigned, becoming vital symbols that helped to improve the 
environment for the actors involved. Indeed, the space provided by the MRECIC since 2003 has 
been widely used. While at the outset about 30 organisations met to review the development of 
trade negotiations, by the end of 2004, the Council had already attracted 340 organisations from 
labour, environment, women’s rights, small scale farming and industry, human rights, etc. The 
activities have been broad in scope and include a daily newsletter, plenary reunions and events in 
more than a dozen Sectoral Commissions on technology, small business, family farming, 
transportation, regional development, youth and integration, and gender, etc. (MRECIC 2004b). 
 
 
                                                 
32 Argentina’s section consists of the UIA, CAC, SRA, the labour organisation CGT, and the Consumer Association 
ADELCO. The FCES meets twice a year and formulates recommendations for the MERCOSUR Group. 
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Summary Independent Variable A1 
In general, the institutional strength of Argentina’s state bureaucracy in the area of international 
trade policy affairs has been rather low during the period of analysis. As resumed in Box 4.2, the 
responsibilities in the area of international trade policy, in particular, were imprecisely divided 
between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economy. Regarding the variable dimension 
resources, the Foreign Affairs Ministry was strengthened by the incorporation of the Foreign 
Trade Service in 1993, while the Ministry of Economy lost this cadre consisting of well-trained 
trade diplomats. The relations maintained with business associations have, in general, been rather 
close, even though a stable institutional environment for state-business collaboration has thus far 
remained absent. From 2002, the executive branch also sought to strengthen ties with civil 
society actors. 
 
Box 4.2: Summary Independent Variable A1 
Responsibilities Resources  Openness 
The “partnership model” in which 
the Ministry of Economy defines 
“what has to be negotiated in 
international trade policy affairs”, 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
decides “how” to implement those 
inputs, was unclear during the period 
of analysis, except from 1986-87 
when the Secretariat of Industry and 
Foreign Trade became responsible 
for designing the innovative PICE 
approach. Given the absence of clear 
policy guidelines, the foreign affairs 
department gained weight and 
defined integration polices based on 
limited inter-ministerial consensus.  
While the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry was strengthened 
by the incorporation of the 
Foreign Trade Service as 
of 1993, the trade policy 
branch inside the 
Economic Ministry has 
undergone a steady 
deterioration since 1996. 
Since the mid-1990s, the 
executive branch has 
made considerable 
improvements in 
informing non-state 
actors on trade 
integration matters and 
incorporating business 
entities in the policy 
formulation, even though 
institutionalised 
coordination has been 
missing so far.  
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4.3 The Institutional Weakness of Business Associations 
 
This section is structured in accordance with the variable dimensions of the Independent 
Variable A2. The first subsection, Institutional Leadership, analyses the domestic attempts to 
establish a widely recognised peak or “umbrella” association, capable of coordinating economic 
policies between the leading sectoral and regional representatives. It further describes the 
institutional mechanism aimed at the intermediation of trade interests among leading sectoral and 
regional representatives. The subsection two, Organisation Strength, assesses the professionalism 
involved in business advocacy, stressing the domestic pattern of financing, participatory 
behaviour, and in-house trade policy expertise. The final subsection summarises the results and 
provides an overview of the business representation pattern analysed from 1985 to 2004. 
 
Institutional Leadership 
In Argentina, business associations assumed, from an early stage, a leading role in the defence of 
private entrepreneurship interests (Acuña 1995; Birle 1995). The process of creating national 
sector organisations dates back to the middle of the 19th Century when the agrarian elite and 
traders in Buenos Aires established the Argentinean Rural Society (SRA) in 1866 and the Buenos 
Aires Traders’ Union (BOLSA) in 1854. Meanwhile, towards the end of the century, farmers 
became the main suppliers of agrarian products to European markets; furthermore, in 1887 the 
local manufacturers created a specialised advocate with the Argentinean Industrial Union (UIA). 
Other sectoral peak entities were founded before 1930 such as the National Chamber of 
Commerce (CAC 1924) and the Argentinean Banking Association (ABRA 1919).  
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Nevertheless, serious problems arose when capitalists sought to bring together distinct sectoral 
perspectives. Table 4.8 below illustrates the main attempts of entrepreneurs to establish 
multisectoral representation structures since the 1950s. 
 
Table 4.8: Development of Multisectoral Representation Structures since the 1950s 
Type 1950           1960             1970           1980            1990           2000 
Peak 
Associations 
CGE *  __       _____________________                  ________________________       
Coordination 
Forums 
ACIEL            __________________(58-73) 
APEGE                                                   __ (75-77) 
G-11 (including labour)                                          __(84-85) 
G-17                                                                                __(87-88) 
MENA (mainly SME associations)                        _______(83-89) 
Grupo Regente (mainly SME associations)                      __(88-89) 
G-8                                                                                    ___________(88-99 
Grupo Productivo                                                                                   ___(99-01) 
Business 
Councils 
G-9 or Industry Captains                                       _________(83-91) 
CEA (1976-2002)                _______________________________________ 
AEA**  (2002 -)                                                                                                 _____      
Source: Birle 1995: 201 (data up to 1991); own elaboration from 1991 
* dissolved between 55-58 and 1977-1984 ** AEA: merger between the CEA and the Invest Foundation 
 
Table 4.8 indicates a marked fragmentation inside the domestic business sector that could be 
overcome only temporarily. Since the political and economic environment for collective business 
actions has varied greatly over the last 50 years, much of this fragmentation can be explained by 
endogenous business factors. Subsequently, I next summarise the most relevant aspects (Alberti/ 
Acuña/Golbert 1984; Acuña 1995; Birle 1995; Viguera 1998; Robin 2001). 
 Ideological Struggles (1952 – 1982): In forming the Coordinated Action of Free Business 
Institutions (ACIEL) from 1958 to 1973 and the Permanent Assembly of Entrepreneurial Entities 
(APEGE) from 1975 to 1976, large business entities tried to counteract the General Economic 
Confederation (CGE) created in 1952. Together with the General Workers Organisations (CGT), 
the CGE was created as the “civilian partner” of Juan Domingo Perón (President from 1946-
1955 and 1973-1974) who put forward a state interventionist model aimed at creating import 
substitution industries and strengthening organised labour. Therefore, the peak association 
representing mainly SME’s oriented to the domestic market depended heavily on the political 
support of the Peronist party, and thus, was dissolved twice under military ruling. Conversely, 
large scale business failed to overcome interest gaps between the exporting landowners, the 
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banking sector, and manufacturers. Consequently, during the “business friendlier” military 
regime from 1976 to 1983 where market oriented policies were initiated, state-business 
collaboration took place only in informal spheres through which a limited group of finance and 
industrial companies prospered at the expense of the rest of the economy. 
 Return to Democracy (1983-1989): In 1983 collective business attempts continued to be 
arduous, although the new democratic regime provided space for national consensus. With the 
end of violent ideological struggles among social movements and military forces, the 
government of Raul Alfonsín expressed its will to search for broad consensus related to 
economic reactivation programs and the control of inflation through price and salary agreements, 
as shown by the Austral and Spring Plans in 1985 and 1987, respectively. Nevertheless, while 
business factions failed to build reliable multisectoral interlocutors (for example with the G-9, G-
11, G-17, MENA, and REGENTE), the leading labour association, CGT, acted as a solid rock 
throughout the Alfonsín government. 
 Towards a Business-Led Model (1990-1997): By getting rid of the main principles related 
to the Peronist administrations, Carlos Menem bet his political resources on the relationship with 
large-scale business. Indeed, the ambitious privatisation program, the deregulation of foreign 
investment and the macroeconomic stability achieved provided the grounds for enhanced unity 
among entrepreneurs. Thus, the G-8 - comprised of the eight leading sector associations from 
industry, agriculture, banking, trade and construction – reached, in 1991, a broad internal and 
external recognition as an interlocutor of the economic reforms implemented by the Domingo 
Cavallo team. The privileged status of the G-8 was based on the fact that the informal alliance 
embraced all relevant sectors, and on the unconditional political support for the recently initiated 
structural adjustments. Conversely, opposing voices from domestic market oriented industries 
were virtually excluded from the decision making process. 
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Winners and Losers of Economic Reforms (1998-2002): During the second Carlos 
Menem administration (1995-1999), the inter-sectoral consensus regarding the economic model 
to follow became increasingly undermined by opposing sector perspectives inside the G-8. Table 
4.9 presents the rival factions which emerged, clearly reflecting the winner and loser groups of 
the prevailing economic policy. 
 
Table 4.9: Winners and Losers of the Economic Reforms of the 1990s 
 “Winners” “Losers” 
Sectors Finance; trading; warehouses; 
privatised public utilities such as 
suppliers of water, gas and electricity 
and telecommunications; industrial 
commodities  
Industry and SME in general; textiles 
apparel, footwear and metal works in 
particular 
Properties Mainly transnational companies 
Large-scale firms 
Mainly domestic companies 
Small, medium and large sized firms 
Sectoral 
Entities 
ABA (Banking) BOLSA (Finance, 
Trading), CAC (Commerce) 
UIA (Industry); to a lesser extent: 
CRA (Agriculture), CAC 
(Construction) 
Forums Argentinean Entrepreneurial Council 
CEA (1967) 
Productive Group (1999) 
Policy 
Rationale 
The currency board regime favoured 
foreign capital inflows due to 
international credibility and US$ 
assets. Moreover, the highly valued 
currency enabled low-cost imports 
and high set tariffs for public utility 
companies. Privatised firms enjoyed 
flexible labour regimes negotiated on 
firm levels. 
Despite macroeconomic stability, 
credits for local industry remained 
scarce and expensive. The highly 
valued currency decreased 
competitiveness of local production. 
Most industrialists still faced rigid 
labour norms that had been established 
decades ago at a sectoral level. 
 
In 1999, when the country entered into a four-year recession and Brazil implemented 
drastic currency devaluation, the opposing factions began pursuing individual means of 
lobbying. As was highlighted in my MA thesis on business participation in democratic regimes, 
these advocacy styles differed remarkably (2001). The “winners” sought to defend the 
achievement of the 1990s increasingly in informal spheres provided by the CEA, a business 
council sustained by leading executives from about 30 large-scale companies from banking (e.g. 
Bank Boston, HSBC-Roberts), public utilities (Telefónica, Aguas Argentinas), holding groups 
(IRSA and Excell), food processing (ARCOR, Unilever, Quickfood), petrochemicals (Dow 
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Chemical, YPF) and the steel giant Techint Group. In this context, the UIA’s traditional 
industrialist voice weakened since its power base originated from the large-scale steel, 
petrochemical and food processing industries. Hence, the industrial peak entity evolved into the 
leading advocate of the “loser group” which, in 1999, created the so-called Productive Group, an 
informal alliance composed of threatened industries, agricultural and construction entities that 
became the main opponent of the Currency Board.33 However, the breakdown of the fixed 
exchange rate regime in January 2002 cannot be ascribed to the influence of this heterogeneous 
and loosely organised alliance of “loser factions,” but rather reflected the advocacy power of 
large-scale companies associated to the CEA, considering that the currency board endured for 
eleven years despite sharply increasing foreign debt. 
 Post Convertibility (2002-2005): The drastic Peso devaluation caused the former 
conflicts between the “winning banks” and the “losing industry” to vanish somewhat, while the 
previous intra-industrial heterogeneity came into view again. Therefore, while the Argentinean 
Entrepreneurship Association (AEA), founded in May 2002, represented the “establishment” 
formerly associated to the CEA, the UIA moved into the centre of controversies. Instead of 
bringing industrialists together, the devaluation and debt crisis caused conflicts which were 
stalled by the entity’s presidential elections in April 2003. For the first time in 12 years and for 
the second time since the institution’s reform in 1981, members failed to establish a consensus 
list between the competing internal movements – the Argentinean Industrial Movement (MIA) 
composed of large-scale sectors and the National Industrial Movement (MIN) representing 
SME’s. 
Nevertheless, more than ever before, conflict lines went beyond divergences between 
MIN and MIA and were explained by a rather diffuse mix of political allies, personal rivalries 
and macroeconomic preferences (OE Ochoa 9/10/03; BR’s Pons 10/09/03; Pegoraro and Kait 
15/09/04; El Clarín 20/04/03). After years of passive behaviour in the UIA, the country’s main 
steel company Techint interfered in business politics by supporting the “industrialist list” which 
argued in favour of a new, more state-led development approach after the distinctive market-led 
concept followed during the 1990s. Therefore, the oppositional group headed by Guillermo 
Gotelli, a footwear industrialist, represented not only the majority of the MIN but also influential 
MIA elements, such as the Industrial Union of Buenos Aires and ADIMRA, the peak association 
                                                 
33 The entities associated in the Productive Group (UIA, CAC and CRA) demanded measures to reactivate the 
threatened sectors by investment in public works, increased access to credits, safeguard measures, etc.; see 
Declaración de Tigre June 23, 2000 signed by Eduardo Baglietto (CAC), Manuel Cabanellas (CRA) and Osvaldo 
Rial (UIA). Nonetheless, the polemic leader of this opposing movement against the prevailing economic model 
became José Ignacio de Mendiguren, a medium sized entrepreneur from the clothing industry who acted from 1999 
to 2001 first as Vice-President of the UIA and then from April 2001 as formal head of the Industrialist Union.  
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
144
of the metal industry. On the other hand, the official and finally winning “consensus list” was led 
by Alvaro Gaiani, President of the food industry entity, COPAL. Other important members of 
the winning coalition were the associations representing automobiles (ADEFA), the 
petrochemical industry (CIQIP) from the MIA, and the Association of Paper and Cellulose 
Producers (AFCP) from the MIN. 
UIA elections took place one month before the presidential election where Nestor 
Kirchner (the left-wing candidate from the Peronist Party) defeated Carlos Menem, who 
traditionally maintained close political allies with the winning group, for example with Alvaro 
Gaiani (COPAL) and Hector Massuh (AFCP). In the aftermath, UIA authorities sought to agree 
with Nestor Kirchner even though the elected State President began putting forward a notably 
anti-Menem discourse. The losing “industrialist list” supported by the Techint Group and its 
president Paolo Rocca, on the other hand, held a clear advantage due to their closer political 
relations and conceptual coincidences with Nestor Kirchner. Thus, to further undermine the 
UIA’s leadership, the opposing group established an independent organisation called the 
“Industrialists Group” and started to organise several “Federal Industry” events outside of 
Buenos Aires. As a result, both industrial streams struggled during 2003-04 for acknowledgment 
as the leading force within national manufacturing. Nevertheless, in April 2005 before the 
internal elections took place, conflicts were overcome as the opposing factions agreed on the 
establishment of a consensus list.34 
 
Intermediation of Trade Policy Interests 
Regarding the trade policy area, the lack of intermediation capacity inside the business sector 
went beyond the problem of absent multisectoral mechanisms where opposing trade policy 
interests could have been effectively coordinated. During the period of analysis, distinctive 
features of intra-sectoral fragmentation hindered the pursuit of coherent business proposals, as I 
outline below, dividing these into agricultural and manufacturer interests. 
 Manufacturers’ Interests: As of 1981, when the UIA moved away from representing 
individual firms and adopted a mixed system of regional and sectoral chambers, the industrial 
entity became the single representative of local manufacturers. But this institutional turn made 
the UIA an unreliable trade policy interlocutor for the government because internal heterogeneity 
enhanced, considering that two opposing streams emerged from within the entity (Birle 1995; 
                                                 
34 Since the Industrial Group had no chance to reach the majority and the sectors inside the official coalition 
maintained their interest to improve relations with Nestor Kirchner, both factions were eager to find a consensus. 
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
145
Schwarzer 1998). While the “liberal” large-scale branches of the automotive, petrochemical, 
steel, metal and food industry organised inside the MIA, the MIN movement represented the 
inward-looking sectors made up of regional associations out with Buenos Aires and SME 
dominated entities from the apparel, footwear, plastic, paper, graphic, and metallurgic industries, 
among others. Even though the institutional weight of the MIA had traditionally been superior, 
since the 1980s the UIA’s official position had to take into account the concerns of the MIN 
faction in order to prevent the drainage of small and medium size manufacturers and regional 
chambers to other industrial chambers.35 
Therefore, in 1986 the UIA was unsupportive of the Alfonsín administration’s pursuit of 
deeper integration with Brazil, and from 1987, set forth (encouraged by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions) a gradual economic opening through unilateral reforms (Calvo 2001). On these 
heterogeneous grounds, state authorities established a privileged dialogue with the so-called 
“Industry Captains” where the principal industrial leaders were informally organised.36 
Nonetheless, the majority of these sectors similarly supported the official strategy only faint-
heartedly, and defensive points of view emerged from within certain sectors, such as the steel 
and automotive industry (Campbell et al. 2000: 102). Accordingly, it would be wrong to qualify 
the large-scale industry associated inside the MIA faction as truly liberal, considering the 
traditional close ties maintained with state authorities in order to improve access to public 
contracts, soft loans, subsidies, and to guarantee the preservation of domestic markets (Birle 
1995; Calvo 2001; Sidicaro 2003). 
In the 1990s, nonetheless, the resistance against trade liberalisation lowered. In particular, 
the successful control of inflationary pressures from 1991 supported the market-led approach 
promoted by the economic team of Domingo Cavallo. Consequently, the UIA authorities opted 
for a strategy of following the official course so as to maintain privileged relations with the 
Cavallo team.37 Nevertheless, in light of this conceptual turn, the UIA’s intermediation capacity 
                                                 
35 To provide space for concerted action, the factions decided on a majority-minority electoral mechanism that 
allowed the nominally weaker MIN to be represented in the directing bodies. Due to this arrangement, the big 
industrialists’ movement, MIA, occupied the UIA presidency except during the terms of 1991 – 1993 (Israel Mahler 
from the metallurgic industry) and 2001 – 2003 (José Ignacio de Mendiguren from the apparel industry). 
36 Industrial Captains were Jorge Haiek (SOCMA), Eduardo Braun (Astarsa), Ricardo Zinn (Sevel), Guillermo Kuhl 
(Scania), Jaime Nuñez (Bagley), Vittorio Orsi (Sade), Miguel Roig (Bunge y Born), Carlos Tramutola (Propulsora), 
Carlos Bulgheroni (Bridas), Alberto Hojman (BGH), and Sebastián Bagó (Bagó), among others. 
37 In 1989-91, when unilateral reforms were implemented, the UIA was headed by Gilberto Montagna of COPAL. 
His liberal orientation was questioned inside the UIA as several branches suffered from lowered border protection. 
Thus, UIA members voted for Israel Mahler in 1991 as representative of the threatened metal working industry 
(ADIMRA). But opposition against trade reforms did not last long and practically disappeared when Domingo 
Cavallo assumed the post of Minister of Economy. Consequently, the following presidencies of Jorge Blanco 
Villegas (1993-97), Claudio Sebastiani (1997-98), and Alberto Alvarez Gaiani (1998-99) where marked by a pro-
governmental attitude. 
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in trade policy affairs did not significantly improve, and instead, gave place to two tendencies 
which further undermined the UIA’s credibility as an interlocutor of the national industry. On the 
one hand, several threatened sectors organised inside the MIN such as textiles, apparel, footwear 
and several metallurgical branches made use of the “outside advocacy” method by carrying out 
lobby activities through direct, bilateral channels with the government, and thus, distanced 
themselves from the internal bodies in charge of inter-sectoral coordination (OE Rua Boeiro 
26/11/04; BR Martinez 8/03/05). On the other hand, the “inside advocacy” approach was applied 
by few sectors and served to obtain official support for specific interests. In this case, the often 
protectionist interests of the entities representing sugar and paper (MIN) and the steel, 
automotive, food processing and petrochemical industry organised inside the MIA stand out. 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to state that all branch associations have been frequent users of 
direct channels towards the government. In general terms, the UIA has rarely been perceived as 
an institution where trade policies are debated and coordinated among associate membership, 
rather it has been seen by both the public and the private sector merely as a temporary option to 
follow particular interests, depending on who holds power in the UIA Executive Board and 
which sector maintains close relations with office holders. Principally, for the large-scale 
automotive and steel industry, the importance of the UIA as a lobby organisation was limited 
because both sectors maintained fluent relations both at a company level and through their 
branch organisations CIS (steel industry) and ADEFA (automobiles). 
 Agribusiness’ Interests: The interests of local agribusiness have mostly been represented 
by individual firms, while collective business action in the process of opening foreign markets 
was largely absent (OE Campbell 17/11/04). Therefore, the Coordinator of the Food and 
Beverage Industry (COPAL), founded in 1976 and representative of 20 branch chambers, was the 
most active entity, although it often faced internal divergences between groups pursuing the 
preservation of the domestic market, like the sugar producers or the processed food industry, and 
export-oriented food commodities such as oleaginous, cereals or meat. The profile of the 
Argentinean Export Chamber (CERA), created in 1927, does not resemble that of an entity that 
unifies sectoral positions and advises official negotiators at the negotiation table. Instead, CERA 
has played a role as a promoter of general export concerns, for example, in claiming the refund 
of duties paid, the improvement of customs procedures or the modernisation of local ports, etc. 
Concerning the allegedly powerful farmers from the Pampa zone, the existence of no less than 
four peak organisations stands out: Argentinean Rural Society (SRA), Argentinean Rural 
Confederations (CRA), Argentinean Agrarian Federation (FAA), and the Confederation of Rural 
Cooperatives (CONIAGRO). The lack of a common institutional framework hindered in the past 
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the collective representation of agriculture concerns on the national policy level. In addition, the 
administrative capacity of these traditional rural entities often does not match with the technical 
requirements of international trade policy affairs (SO Carpinacci 25/11/03; BR Tomás 14/11/04). 
Against this background, the creation of the Institute of International Agriculture 
Negotiations (INAI) in 1999, in the aftermath of the failed WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Seattle, represented an institutional novelty. Founded by five entities representing cereals and 
oleaginous crops, in recent years INAI has assumed the leadership in convening rural 
organisations. For Gerardo Gargiulo (2003: 53), the emergence of this agricultural policy 
institute is in part explained by the fact that the leading entities such as the SRA and COPAL 
resisted the adaptation of their policy advisory structures in accordance with the challenges of 
current agricultural trade controversies. Instead, the booming food commodity sectors were the 
ones that faced up to the fact that “the international developments of production, consumption 
behaviour, prices and the conservation of natural resources and technology were not favouring 
Argentina,” as a young INAI professional summed up (BR Tomás 17/11/04). Therefore, directed 
by Ernesto Liboreiro, the think-tank strengthened its analytical skills in the multilateral sphere, 
the emerging regional talks, and issues related to transgenic food and bio-safety. Moreover, since 
2002, INAI has been responsible for the Agriculture Round Table where private and public 
sectors deliberate on current issues of agriculture talks, i.e. export subsidies and credits, quota 
systems and liberalisation formulas discussed within the WTO scope. Even though many rural 
entities were hesitant in committing to regular participation, the round table evolved into a lively 
common place that helped to increase the awareness of risks and opportunities in trade talks and 
to improve public-private coordination (BR’s Liboreiro 29/04/04; Tomás 17/11/04; SO’s Petri 
15/04/04). 
 
Organisational Strength 
Based on a survey with 58 business associations (selection), in this subsection I will shed light 
on aspects related to the organisational strength of private sector representatives, stressing the 
importance of diversified revenues, reliable payment of membership dues, active member 
participation, the existence of permanent staff and in-house trade policy expertise. 
 Diversification of Association Revenues: Business chambers in Argentina rely primarily 
on the payment of affiliation dues. Only six of the organisations consulted indicated that in 2004 
at least 40 percent stemmed from other sources. Even though the majority (56 percent) had extra 
revenues, the income collected through service providing and events did not surpass 10 percent. 
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Consequently, it can be assumed that such activities are modest or non-existent and that business 
associations in Argentina consider themselves to be exclusively lobby organisations (see also OE 
Rúa Boeiro 26/11/04), disregarding observable exceptions in the case of the associations of milk 
producers (UGT), fruits (CAFI), small-scale farming (FAA), importers and exporters (AIERA) 
and books, where service providing is an integral part of the entity’s action. 
 
Table 4.10: What share of revenues originates from other than affiliation dues? 
More than 40% 11-40% 0-10% 0% No Response 
6 (11%) 2 (4%) 33 (62%) 12 (23%) 5 
 
In the UIA, service supply is largely absent and predominantly based on a few external 
funding activities such as the SME-Observatory supported by private, public and international 
donors and the Euro Centre of Enterprises Cooperation within the EUs AL-Invest Program.38 
However, to maintain its administration, more recently the UIA has depended on incomes from 
the Annual Industrial Conference. Since 1994, Argentina’s main industry chamber is responsible 
for this event, where state presidents, ministers, state secretaries, academia, and leading 
entrepreneurs present their points of view on current situations faced by local industry. 
According to data from 2000, the event generated additional revenues in the amount of 
US$450,000, representing roughly 60 percent of income in that year (El Clarín 18/12/2000). 
However, verbal reports indicated that in recent years only 20-30 percent of total revenues have 
originated from the Annual Congress (BR’s Biglieri 17/09/03; Lafitte 23/09/04). 
Predictability of Association Revenues: Most entities benefited from a regularly paying 
membership, i.e. 50 percent of the answers stated that 80 to 100 percent of members meet the 
payment deadline regularly. A rather low share (eight chambers) acknowledged serious problems 
in ensuring that their members comply with the established financial obligations, i.e. less than 50 
percent habitually disburse the affiliation dues. Héctor Kolodny from the Argentinean Chamber 
of Clothing Industry (CIAI; 08/09/04) states somewhat anecdotally that “the first expenditures 
that firms stop paying during times of crisis are the free coffee for employees and chamber’s 
affiliation dues.” 
 
                                                 
38 SME-Observatory is a technical unit created in 1996 to conduct surveys and data gathering on the economic 
realities of SME’s. Founding members are the Techint Group, UIA Foundation, Province of Cordoba, Secretariat of 
Science and Technology, and several public banks. The Euro Centre of Enterprises Cooperation is an organism co-
financed by the European Commission and UIA helping in the internationalisation of Argentinean SME’s and 
industries and creating strategic alliances with European counterparts. 
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
149
Table 4.11: What share of membership regularly meets the payment deadline? 
80-100% 50-79% 20-49% less than 20% no response 
29 (54%) 17 (31%) 5 (9%) 3 (6%) 4 
 
Other reports confirm Kolodny’s observation, indicating that in previous years effective 
paying habits were considerably worse than the survey results suggest. Above all, traditional 
industrial associations suffered a severe economic loss during the recession that took place 
between 1999 and 2002. Most entities like the UIA were obliged to carry out debt rescheduling 
to regularise economic relations with members.39 Drastic methods had to be implemented by 
ADIMRA, the national representative of the metallurgical industry. Since the sector entered into 
a deep crisis in the 1990s, most members disappeared or refused to pay their dues, as Alejandra 
Cerquetella from the Trade Department explained (BR 26/09/03). To prevent institutional 
collapse, in 2001 ADIMRA introduced a “mandatory contribution” of one percent of the salary 
volume through a collective labour agreement with the sectoral trade union, UOM.40 Although 
its implementation has been polemic, many chambers began to consider the cost and benefits of 
the new financing scheme; i.e. several sectors such as the plastic, graphic and glass industry have 
since followed suit. Adrian Biglieri, UIA Executive Director, explains (BR 17/9/03); “in the 
aftermath of the deep crisis we underwent, our members see the mandatory contributions as a 
solution to guarantee them sound revenues; it is a matter of fact that many countries such as 
Brazil, France and Spain use these systems, why should we not follow those successful 
examples?” 
 Participatory Behaviour of Member/Business: When asking about the properties of 
internal policy making, around 60 percent of the entities qualified their members’ participation 
as rather or very active. Conversely, 24 and 14 percent of chambers consulted assessed the 
behaviour as rather passive or very passive, respectively. In 32 of a total of 58 entities, responses 
made reference to activities inside the Foreign Trade Commission, while the remaining quorums 
concerned the participation in the Board of Directors, since a specialised body was absent. In 
sum, the results provide a scenario in which members normally attend meetings, which generally 
take place twice a month, and submit technical proposals. 
 
                                                 
39 Nevertheless, the most effective method became the polemic internal election in April 2003 where most chambers 
cancelled their debts to be enabled for voting, as Roberto Pons from the Trade Department stated, BR 10/09/03. 
40 The implementation of the agreement still faced difficulties in 2003-04 since firms inside the fragmented metal 
industry rejected the mandatory solution and other competing chambers saw the mandatory solution as illegal and/or 
also claimed part of the income; see El Cronista 9/09/03; BR’s Romiro 10/11/2003; Ruiz from CAMIMA 28/02/05. 
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
150
Table 4.12: Business/ member participation in trade policy affairs 
 Experts State Officials Total Experts/ 
State Officials (24) 
Business* (58) 
very active 0 0 0   (0%) 15   (27%) 
rather active 2 2 4   (17%) 19   (34%) 
rather passive 8 6 14 (61%) 14   (25%) 
very passive 2 3 5   (22%) 8    (14%) 
no response 0 1 1 2 
* Responses refer to the behaviour of members inside the internal bodies of each chamber. 
 
Nonetheless, these rather positive impressions contrast with the impressions gathered 
from experts and state officials concerning the behaviour of business entities in international 
trade policy affairs. About 80 percent of the responses suggested a widespread passivity. Several 
statements underlined that activity prevails merely in a negative sense, i.e. in the search for the 
preservation of home markets. Indeed, out of the most active chambers mentioned – CIQyP 
(petrochemicals), CIPA (food brands), COPAL (food processing in general), ADIMRA (metal 
industry), CIS (steel industry), CILFA (national laboratories), CICA (footwear), and FITA 
(textiles) - only COPAL and CIQyP represented clearly outward-oriented industries.41 When 
analysing the minutes of meetings provided by the MERCOSUR Department of UIA and the 
Agriculture Round Table organised by INAI – the liveliest common places during the most 
recent trade talks – the results also indicate a somewhat limited involvement of business factions. 
 
Table 4.13: MERCOSUR Department and Agriculture Round Table 2002-2004  
 Average Attendance Min/Max  Regularly Participating Entities 
UIA 
MERCOSUR 
Department  
2003 – 2004 
15  
(22 non-attendance) 
11/19 As of the 1990s: CIQyP, CIPA, 
COPAL, ADIMRA, CIS/ Techint 
More recently: FAIGA, AFARTE, 
CAIE, CIAI, CICA and CILFA 
INAI 
Agriculture 
Round Table 
2002-2003 
14 business 
10 state or academia 
13/32 80-100% : INAI, CERA, SRA, 
CIARA-CEC 
50-80%: CIL, CERA, CIPA, Cereal 
Stock markets Buenos Aires/Rosario 
Source: UIA - Minutes number 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 out of 33 and 39 meetings held in 2003 and 2004, respectively; 
INAI – all minutes of the 11 events organized during 2002-03. 
 
                                                 
41 Specific comments were made by state officials related to business consultation procedures. For example, reports 
referred to market access talks with the CAN, the adherence of new WTO members and the state procurement 
negotiations with MERCOSUR and the EU, making it clear that only between 10 and 15 percent out of the universe 
consulted responded to the deliberations; see Monti for CAN market access 18/11/03; Alonso for state procurement 
4/12/03; Mermet for WTO adherences 20/11/03. 
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Regarding decision making inside the UIA, the MERCOSUR Department has evolved in 
recent years into the most popular deliberation body.42 Even so, during 2003 and 2004 the 
number of non-attendances (22 on average) clearly exceeded the number of attending members. 
From an intra-temporal perspective, the recent participation by members seemed to nevertheless 
be higher than during the 1990s, when only five to six representatives from the petrochemical 
(CIQyP), food processing (CIPA, COPAL) and steel and metal works (ADIMRA, CIS/ Techint) 
regularly attended weekly meetings, according to Rodolfo Rúa Boeiro (OE 26/11/04), 
Department Secretary from 1995 to 1999. Accordingly, in 2003-04 regular participation could be 
expanded, embracing the representatives of graphics (FAIGA), electronics (AFARTE; CAIE), 
apparel (CIAI), footwear (CICA) and national laboratories (CILFA). Strikingly, the Sugar 
Producers Centre (CAA) – the only sector excluded from intra-MERCOSUR trade – is 
represented by Jorge Zorreguieta who chaired the MERCOSUR Department since the late 1990s. 
In contrast to the industrial trade policy deliberation, the Agriculture Round Table is still 
a rather young enterprise. According to INAI’s Meeting Minutes, the eleven meetings held in 
2002-03 had an average participation of 24 people, of which 14 where from agricultural 
organisations. Thus, the number of regular participants was rather limited, and mainly included 
large company representatives of cereals, oleaginous crops, beef and dairy products. Numerous 
organisations of small and medium sized producers and representatives in the range of fruits, 
vegetables, meats, food brands, flowers, honey producers, coffee, tea, spices, etc. to date 
remained reluctant to participate in the Agriculture Round Table. 
Strikingly, large companies also exhibited a rather passive trade policy advocacy. In this 
regard, the assessment of Christiane de Kojic, since 1962 trade policy advisor of the influential 
Chamber of Food Manufactures (CIPA), can be considered as highly valid. Asked about the 
members’ participation, de Kojic stated (BR 15/09/03), “As members’ collaboration in our 
Foreign Trade Committee was close to zero, I decided to proceed through e-mail, to inform the 
companies on official papers, and to consult them only on specific policies where they might be 
directly affected. As they usually do not reply, I define our chamber’s position and send notes to 
the Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs; astonishing as it may be, even our largest 
companies do not hire trade policy specialists. Only Molinos (food industry giant; 
www.molinos.com.ar) hired a talented professional with a MA from FLACSO, though their 
                                                 
42 In theory, the UIA Trade Department is also responsible for the area of International Trade Negotiations. 
Nonetheless, since the Mercosur Department was established in 1993, the area increasingly passed over to the 
MERCOSUR Department, for two main reasons. Firstly, external negotiations were no longer conducted 
unilaterally, but began to be coordinated in the MERCOSUR scope. Secondly, the MERCOSUR Department has 
been the only body that held plenary sessions and not small issue commissions, and thus, became the place to be to 
learn about the latest news. 
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executives do not take her comments really into account.” 
 Size of Staff and Trade Expertise: Obviously, the participatory behaviour is closely 
associated with the size and professionalism inside business organisations. In this regard, the 
results generated by the survey present a clear picture. In general, local entities operate with 
moderate staff bases. Almost 50 percent consisted of five or less employees, usually comprising 
a Managing Director and one or two assistants. Only ten organisations had more than ten 
employees on their payroll, and just two had more than 20. In this respect, the UIA headed the 
group with 44 employees, followed by ADIMRA with roughly 30 workers. Other rather large 
organisations were the pharmaceutical entities CILFA, CAEME and COOPERALA with 24, 14 
and 11 employees, the Chamber of Plastic Industries CAIP (18), the Union of Public Sector 
Suppliers (18), Chamber of Petrochemical Industries CIQYP (15), Chamber of Books (14) and 
the Textile Industry Federation FITA (13). Albeit no specific data was provided by COPAL, 
SRA and the Chamber of Commerce (CAC), their headquarters most probably comprises more 
than ten employees, but less than in the case of the UIA and ADIMRA, according to what could 
be observed during visits to their offices. 
 
Table 4.14: What is the size of permanent staff? 
more than 20 11-20 5-10 1-5 no response 
2 (4%) 8 (14%) 19 (35%) 26 (47%) 3 
 
Verbal reports stated that principally large industrial entities cut down the personnel as of 
the 1990s. Juan Pablo Laffitte (BR 23/09/04), UIA Administrative Director as of 1990, 
commented that in the last 14 years total staff was reduced to about 20 percent. As regards 
technical staff, Rodolfo Rúa Boeiro, recalled his time as head of ADIMRA’s Technical 
Department that coincided with the PICE program (26/11/04): “By 1986-87, I had attended 
sectoral negotiations as head of the Commission for International Negotiations in the UIA Trade 
Department (in representation of ADIMRA). We used to hold weekly meetings with close to 30 
people, 20 of them were experts like me and Jose Maria Fumagalli (well-known expert from the 
petrochemical industry); only as far as ADIMRA, my team was made up of 16 persons, 12 of 
them professionals, i.e. economists and engineers, etc.” In 2003-2004, ADIMRA’s technical staff 
in the Departments of MERCOSUR, Foreign Trade and Statistics totalled two persons each, after 
it had almostceased to exist towards the end of the decade in light of the economic crisis 
experienced.  
In general terms, the number of experts involved in trade policy advocacy correlates with 
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the modest size of the staff shown in Table 4.14. In no less than 57 percent of the entities, none 
of the employees were specifically assigned to monitor trade policy affairs in 2003-04. While the 
vast majority of this group (26 organisations) explicitly relied on the Managing Director’s 
knowledge, seven entities reported that no one actively monitored the trade policy area. 
 
Table 4.15: Who within the staff is monitoring and analysing trade policy affairs? 
Think-tank  
(3 officials) 
Trade Department  
(1-2 officials) 
Managing 
Director 
none no response 
5 (9%) 17 (31%) 26 (47%) 7 (13%) 3 
 
Out of the 22 chambers with remunerated trade policy advisors, 17 organisations 
depended upon a Trade Department with one or two employees. Nevertheless, the chambers 
often hired external advisors in order to keep costs low.43 Conversely, entities enjoying 
significant policy advisory units seemed rare, since only five chambers stated that more than two 
persons were in charge of trade policy affairs; UIA (7; CENI), INAI (4), CERA (ad-hoc paid 
consultants in the Institute of International Strategies), FITA (3), CIL (3) and CIQyP (3). 
Furthermore, the SRA’s Economic Study Department is believed to possess three economists. 
Apart from INAI, the UIA authorities tried to respond to the changing trade policy 
scenario with the creation of the Study Centre for International Negotiations (CENI) in February 
2003. According to Osvaldo Kacef (BR 22/09/03), at that time the senior analyst, CENI aimed to 
strengthen the industrial sector’s analytical capacities related to trade negotiations and to 
improve coordination with authorities.44 Consequently, the team initially composed of two senior 
and six junior analysts began to carry out sectoral analysis to assess the impact of ongoing trade 
integration scenarios. Nonetheless, CENI faced initial problems due to the lack of internal and 
external recognition, considering that comments were mostly critical with respect to the quality 
of documents developed. Some of these could not be published since corresponding chambers 
were internally divided as regards the conclusions reached. Additionally, the first CENI Director, 
Alejandro Mayoral, did not attend the meetings of the Trade and MERCOSUR Departments, and 
hence, no direct technical support was provided.  Lastly, personnel were downsized in 2004 and 
the question of who should be financing what amount of activities became increasingly unclear. 
                                                 
43 According to Rúa Boeiro (15/03/05), close to 50 percent of the experts in the UIA MERCOSUR Department were 
external advisors. In general, chambers pay low salaries ranging between US$100-500. By the time Rúa Boeiro 
worked as Department Secretary (1995-99), close to 50 percent of the consultants provided free services due to their 
interest to obtain contacts and reputation. Conversely, the number of highly doted policy advisors was small, such as 
Osvaldo D’Imperio, President of COPAL’s Foreign Trade Commission, advising numerous companies and 
chambers in the farming and food processing sectors. 
44 In February 2003, the UIA signed a common understanding with the Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs 
in order to establish permanent exchange of trade policy analysis and sectoral views; see UIA Conventions 2003a; b.  
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The shaky grounds of CENI point to the lack of professionalism inside the UIA. With 
respect to the departments aimed at finding intra-sectoral consensus on a technical level, a study 
carried out by Alberti et al. (1984) elucidated that out of the six areas, two had not been 
operating in 1983-84 and the remaining four were supported by only one assistant each (OE 
Alberti 10/01/01). 20 years later, the state of affairs is remarkably similar, albeit the number of 
departments has increased to ten. Even though all technical areas were sustained by 
administrative staff, the MERCOSUR Department is the only one supported by a paid expert. 
Conversely, the once vital Departments of Trade and Economy were no longer supported 
technically at the beginning of the 1990s (SO Makuc 14/03/05; OE Rúa Boeiro 15/03/05). As of 
1993, the UIA compensated for the absent expertise in part by the creation of the Institute for 
Industrial Development (IDI), a think-tank that analysed economic policies and their effects on 
local industry. Due to the Techint Group’s financial assistance, the UIA maintained a group of 
half a dozen well-trained economists coordinated by Jose Machinea, Minister of Economy 1999-
2001. Even though their publications enjoyed broad recognition, the IDI experience came to an 
end after only six years. Fernando Martinez from FITA (BR 8/03/05) summed up the 
intermezzo: “the IDI was sustained by the great idea to install an analytical body to counter 
short-sighted business politics, …but mainly the critical papers regarding the economic policies 
of the 1990s did not insert the executive bodies of the UIA, therefore the IDI started to lose 
power and finally came to an end in 1999 as Machinea was appointed Minister of Economy.” 
In the context of the insufficient professional structures of business advocates, 
impressions gathered from experts and state officials are not surprising; i.e. 90 percent 
considered the technical level of proposals submitted in the scope of international trade policy 
affairs as rather low or very low. 
 
Table 4.16: How do you assess the technical level of business proposals submitted in the 
area of international trade policy? 
 Experts State officials Total 
very high 0 0   0   (0%) 
rather high 1 1 2   (9%) 
rather low 6 6 12 (52%) 
very low 5 4 9   (39%) 
no response 0 1 1 
 
In this regard, comments either indicated that most sectors were short of professionals to 
elaborate sound proposals or that contributions made by large-scale sectors did not go beyond 
the limited logic of specific companies, instead of projecting the sector-wide development in a 
long-term perspective. 
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Summary Independent Variable A2 
This section indicates a low institutional strength of business associations. Regarding the 
variable dimension leadership, the lack of multi-sectoral coordination capacity stands out, 
negatively affecting the intermediation of economy and trade related policies before the 
government. Beyond the lack of multisectoral coordination, the effective intermediation of trade 
interests has been hindered by strong forms of intra-sectoral fragmentation on the side of 
offensive agribusiness interests and among the mostly defensive manufacturing branches. The 
organisation strength of local business associations is largely deficient for various reasons, as 
exposed in Box 4.3.  
 
Box 4.3: Summary Independent Variable A2 
Peak 
Association 
In past decades, local business factions were not able to build 
stable multisectoral coordination mechanisms. The business 
wide alliances that have been established thus far (such as the 
G-8 in the 1990s) have been characterised by their informal 
setting and susceptibility to changing political and economic 
contexts.  
 
Leadership 
Trade Policy 
Coordination 
On the sectoral level, the national manufacturer’s 
representative UIA was unable to coordinate sector-wide trade 
policy proposals during the whole period of analysis. 
Regarding the export-oriented interests of local agriculture, 
timid attempts to coordinate agricultural concerns were 
launched with the creation of the Institute of International 
Agriculture Negotiations (INAI) in 1999. However, the intra-
sectoral fragmentation among the traditional rural entities 
remains widespread, considering the existence of four peak 
entities representing local farmers. 
Organisational Strength  
 
The maintenance of close coordination patterns with local 
business factions has been negatively affected by the 
organisational weakness of business entity structures regarding 
their composition of revenues, participatory behaviour and 
trade policy advisory units. On the other hand, the creation of 
the think-tanks INAI (1999) and CENI (2003) can be seen as 
promising initiatives as they enabled the permanent analysis of 
international trade policy affairs by a handful of mainly young 
professionals. However, the future of CENI appeared uncertain 
in 2004 due to the lack of financial means and limited 
exchange with the entity’s technical bodies. 
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4.4 Assessment 
 
After examining the evolution of the dependent and independent variables individually, in this 
final section, I assess how, and to what extent, Argentina’s failure to implement a coherent world 
market integration strategy has effectively been caused by the two explaining variables, or 
whether third variable influences became responsible for the observed policy output. 
Before analysing the cause-effects links, however, I point out the main aspects that 
explain the way that Argentina pursued its integration into world markets. In the period from 
1985 to 2004, the country’s economic policy underwent drastic changes that took place in the 
context of macroeconomic turmoil, particularly observed in 1988-90 (hyperinflation) and in 
2001-02 (debt crisis). These turbulences also influenced the development of the trade policies, 
which had to adapt to the prevailing constraints and possibilities. Nevertheless, several empirical 
puzzles related to trade policy demand explanations which exceed the argument of 
macroeconomic crisis (C4). The following four situations stand out: 
First, in 1986-87, with the Integration Programme for Economic Cooperation (PICE) 
agreed on with Brazil, an innovative integration approach had been developed that adequately 
took into account the balance of payment constraints and the limited economies of scales of the 
local industry. The question thus arises: What explains the creation of the PICE, and what 
limited its advances?  
Second, in 1990-94, the establishment of MERCOSUR represented a radical conceptual 
shift in trade integration, with the adoption of a fast and universal liberalisation approach (rather 
than a gradual, sector-specific one), and set the goal of building a regional market including a 
customs union. The question that arises here is thus: Why such a radical policy shift occurred, 
and why was the customs union approach selected, given that it contradicted Argentina’s 
unilaterally applied economic policy? 
Third, from 1995 to 2004, the implementation of the regional integration objectives, 
related to the establishment of the common market and the customs union, did not proceed as 
initially foreseen because member states only minimally assumed the MERCOSUR as a 
reference scheme for unilateral policy-making. Moreover, Argentina’s trade and sector-oriented 
policies were applied in an uncoordinated, ad-hoc manner, underlining the high unpredictability 
of domestic policies. For what reason, hence, were long-term trade integration strategies not 
defined that would have taken into account the threats and possibilities of each sector? Why was 
MERCOSUR not used as the impetus for sectoral development, inline with the springboard 
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
157
logic? 
Fourth, from 2002 to 2004, Argentina’s trade policy became more active as the 
government aimed at the implementation of a Multipolar strategy, promoting national exports 
towards all possible foreign markets. Compared to previous stages, how can this greater attention 
to export concerns be explained, and why was its coherent implementation still uncertain in 
2004? 
In the light of these questions, Table 4.17 sums up the value of the observed variables and 
the explaining power each one possesses. Therefore, I will next explain when and how the values 
of the variables changed over time and how they influenced on the value of B. 
 
Table 4.17: Explaining Argentina’s Rather Failed World Market Integration Strategy 
Variable Variable 
Dimension 
Value (Variance 1985-
2004) 
Explaining Power for 
Policy Success/Failure 
Responsibilities 1985-1987: rather high 
1988-2004: rather low 
1985-2004: very high 
Resources 1985-2004: rather high* 1985-2004: rather high 
A1: Institutional 
Strength of State  
Bureaucracy 
Openness 1985-1989: rather high 
1990-1995: very low 
1996-2004: rather high 
1985-1989: rather low 
1990-1995: rather high 
1996-2004: rather low 
Leadership 1985-2004: very low 1985-2004: very high A2: Institutional 
Strength of Business 
Associations 
Organisational 
Strength 
1985-2004: very low 1985-2004: very high 
C1: Heterogeneity Sectoral Preferences  1985-2004: rather high 1985-2004: rather low 
C2: Heterogeneity Foreign Preferences 1985-2004: rather high 1995-2004: rather low 
C3: Political Instability 2001-2002: very high 2001-2002: rather high 
C4: Macroeconomic Instability 1988-1990: very high 
2000-2002: very high 
1988-1990: very high 
2000-2002: very high 
* The value refers to the trade policy staff inside the Ministry of Economy from 1985 to 1992, and to the staff of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1993, that is, when the Foreign Trade Service had been incorporated. 
 
Institutional Strength of State Bureaucracy (A1) 
According to Table 4.17, the explaining power of the Independent Variable A1 turned out to be 
high, and was mostly concentrated in the variable dimension responsibilities. In fact, the local 
“partnership model” in which the Ministry of Economy defines “what” has to be negotiated in 
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trade policy affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decides “how” to implement those inputs 
on the international level, was unclear during practically the whole period of analysis, negatively 
affecting the development of international trade policies.  
In 1986-87, the Secretariat of Industry and Foreign Trade (SICE) inside the Ministry of 
Economy took over the clear responsibility of designing the innovative PICE approach, whilst 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry launched initial talks and assumed the overall coordination within 
this first substantial integration step with Brazil after the return to democracy in 1983. The 
previous merger of the areas of “trade” and “industry” inside a single state secretariat (a 
precondition set by Roberto Lavagna on taking office) is moreover crucial to explain the sectoral 
approach to integration that combined export promotion with industrial policies. By then, the 
technical work inside the SICE was strongly supported by the Foreign Trade Service, a 
specialised cadre of career trade diplomats inside the Ministry of Economy (resources). 
Furthermore, the staff in charge of the different sectoral negotiations maintained close working 
relations with the private sector (openness). Hence, the state bureaucracy exhibited rather 
adequate institutional structures for successful trade integration initiatives. On the side of the 
private sector, however, such conditions were not present, as I later expose. 
 In the aftermath, the institutional strength of the executive branch declined, explaining to 
wide extents the posterior failures occurred in the country’s world market integration strategy. In 
particular, effective inter-ministerial coordination could no longer be ensured in the light of an 
unclear division of labour for the conduction of international trade policy affairs. Instead, the 
course of action became strongly dependent on personalised decisions and undermined the 
institutional role of state bureaucracy as a whole (responsibilities, resources, and openness). 
Specifically, Domingo Cavallo, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1989-90) and Minister of 
Economy (1991-1996), defined – being advised by a group of personal advisors from the 
orthodox-liberal think-tank Mediterranean Foundation – the scope of economic reforms that 
included trade liberalisations. A reflection of the policy style sustained by Cavallo’s economic 
advisory team also became the integration scheme embodied in the MERCOSUR treaty of 1991, 
which aimed at a fast expansion of intra-regional trade and the attraction of foreign investment. 
These new rules favoured the industries from the steel, petrochemicals, foods, and automobile 
sectors, where large companies dominated, whilst small-scale manufacturers, especially in the 
range of capital goods, shrank due to the lack of industrial policies, increased import competition 
and overvaluation of the local currency.  
Contrary to the PICE, the private sector organisations were widely excluded from the key 
decisions regarding the institutional set-up of MERCOSUR (openness). The adoption of the 
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Customs Union in December 1994, which contradicted national policies both before and 
afterwards, had been described as a concession to Brazil in order to avoid deteriorating bilateral 
relations (the goal of reaching the CET had yet to be defined in 1991). Evidently, the concession 
made by Carlos Menem was opposed to by the economy minister (who favoured a free trade 
zone), although Mr. Cavallo (then as foreign affairs minister) supported the decision in March 
1991 when the Asunción Treaty was signed and the goal of reaching a CET by 1995 was set, as 
Jorge Campbell, chief negotiator inside the Ministry of Affairs (1994-99) explained.45 
From 1995, the ambitious goals set in the scope of MERCOSUR – which required the 
harmonisation of trade, macroeconomic, sectoral, and fiscal policies – overstrained the 
institutional capacities of the local bureaucracy. In particular, the trade policy staff inside the 
Ministry of Economy experienced a steady decline after the Foreign Trade Service transferred to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993 and with the continued budget cuts that took place from 
1996 (resources).  
Given the decreasing capacity of the Ministry of Economy to monitor and technically 
support the international trade policy, the trade policy branch inside the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
increasingly assumed the role of defining both policy guidelines and the implementation of 
negotiations strategies on the MERCOSUR and extra-regional level. Effectively, however, these 
far-reaching responsibilities weren’t assumed before 2002 because of a range of internal 
constraints, in particular the difficulties to incorporate the Foreign Trade Service in the 
traditional diplomatic career scale and the weak leadership of the office holders in charge 
between 1999 and 2001 (resources). 
In the period of 2002-04, under chief negotiator Martin Redrado, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs assumed nearly full responsibility – although opposed to in parts by the Ministry of 
Economy – to put forward an ambitious Multipolar Model by planning and initiating numerous 
negotiations in the regional and extra-regional sphere. Moreover, Mr. Redrado insisted on a 
marked involvement of the private sector and revived the Centre of International Economy (CEI) 
in order to convince a broad public with technical arguments of the pursued Multipolar strategy 
(openness).  
By the end of 2004, however, it remained in doubt whether the proactive Multipolar 
strategy could be successfully implemented, for two main reasons: First, a lack of intra-
                                                 
45 Anecdotically, Campbell reported that Cavallo called only ten days prior to the Ouro Preto Protocol for a meeting 
with Menem and Di Tella in order to put arguments on the table in favour of a simple FTA, which was, by then, too 
late to retract. Later on, Cavallo remained the Customs Union’s major adversary. By March 2001, when he was 
again appointed Minister of Economy, the dynamic but unpredictable technocrat openly threatened to downgrade 
MERCOSUR to a FTA. 
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MERCOSUR cohesion persisted in 2004, and thus, the conclusion of initiated and planned free 
trade talks was highly uncertain. Between 1995 and 2004, when Chile and Mexico rapidly 
expanded trade relations towards (extra-) regional areas, the negotiations launched by 
MERCOSUR mostly deadlocked. Second, although state-business coordination was much more 
intense in 2004 than in the first half of the 1990s, the business sector still faced similar 
institutional deficits. 
 
Institutional Strength of Business Associations (A2) 
With respect to the explaining power of Independent Variable A2, the institutional deficits of 
organised business hampered the coherent implementation of trade policies over the whole 
period of analysis. In 1986-87, significant progress in the sectoral negotiations with Brazil in the 
PICE scope was avoided due to the lack of intermediation capacity of the national manufacturers 
associations UIA. Instead of coordinating between export-oriented and import-competing 
sectors, defining effective compensation measures for threatened sectors, the UIA authorities 
proved to be an unreliable interlocutor for the government. Therefore, sectors and individual 
companies pursued their mostly protectionist interests outside the UIA institutions, and in so 
doing, limited the state officials’ room for negotiations. 
In the 1990s, the UIA and seven other leading sectoral associations were organised in the 
scope of the G-8 alliance. Contrary to previous decades, the private sector demonstrated unity 
and supported the ongoing economic reforms launched by Mr. Cavallo. But beyond a general 
business consensus, which was largely based on the conviction that liberalisation was needed to 
control inflationary pressure, the leading business organisations did not develop detailed 
concerted policy proposals regarding the MERCOSUR. Instead, the attitude towards this 
regional integration schemes depended on short-term interests affecting the particular sectors. 
For example, the behaviour of local business on the CET issue has been described as 
passive in comparison with Brazil, where the private sector provided permanent advice to its 
diplomacy during negotiations; indeed, prior to Ouro Preto, no domestic policy debate really 
took into account the long-term impacts of a common trade policy regime (Botto 2004; Bouzas 
and Pagnotta 2003; Motta Veiga 2002). Initial criticism expressed against the CET,  principally 
by the powerful industries such as food processing, steel, and chemicals, disappeared in the light 
of the impressive import growth in Brazil that had taken place since the beginning of 1994 (a 
consequence of Brazil’s macroeconomic stabilisation plan “Real”). 
From 2002 to 2004, when the Argentinean government began to pursue an ambitious 
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external trade agenda, denominated “Multipolar strategy” by chief negotiator Martin Redrado, 
the participation of business associations was mostly faint-hearted or disperse. Contrary to the 
1990s, a multisectoral coordination mechanism no longer existed. Moreover, the UIA, as the 
leading industrial entity, suffered as it became divided internally, since several sectors such as 
the steel, metalworking, and textiles, built up their own “industrialist group”, undermining the 
leadership of the “official UIA”. At any rate, trade policy efforts set forth by the UIA authorities 
were focussed almost exclusively on the claim for an institutionalised safeguard mechanism 
inside the MERCOSUR in order to protect local industries from threatening import surges 
originating from Brazil. 
The business support for Mr. Redrado’s Multipolar strategy was limited primarily to the 
branches related to booming agriculture commodities. From an institutional perspective, the 
creation of the Institute for International Agriculture Negotiations (INAI) in 1999 can be seen as 
the first timid attempts by local farmers to overcome the fragmentation among rural 
representatives and the lack of professional advocacy structures. Backed by chambers 
representing cereals and oleaginous crops, after the failed WTO Ministerial in Seattle, INAI 
began to serve as a steady technical counterpart of the Secretariat of Agriculture and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs within the agriculture talks on the regional and multilateral sphere. Although 
market access conditions were not improved fundamentally within the period of 1999-2004, the 
enhanced public-private coordination lead to a stronger presence of the Argentinean government 
in this crucial policy area. 
In general, close coordination patterns with local business factions have been negatively 
affected by the organisational weakness of business entities regarding their composition of 
revenues, participatory behaviour and trade policy advisory units. In this sense, the creation of 
the think-tanks INAI (1999) and CENI (2003) can be seen as promising initiatives, as they 
enabled the permanent analysis of international trade policy affairs by a handful of mainly young 
professionals. However, the future of CENI appeared uncertain in 2004 due to the lack of 
financial means and limited exchange with the entity’s technical bodies. 
 
Control Variables C1-C4 
Assessing the influence of selected control variables C1-C4, certain disturbing effects on the 
value of B were observed regarding C2, C3 and C4. 
Heterogeneity of Foreign Preferences (C2): Being, together with Brazil, one of the 
world’s largest foodstuff producers, the sensitive agriculture issue caused notable difficulties in 
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the free trade talks with the US, EU, CAN, and Mexico. On the other hand, problems linked to 
heterogeneous agriculture interests became, in parts, compensated by the attractive consumer 
markets offered by the emerging trading blocks; indeed from 1995, North American, European 
and Asian countries demonstrated clear interests in deepening trade relations with MERCOSUR 
states. Moreover, other FTAs such as those signed between Chile-Canada, Chile-EU and 
Australia-US, indicated the possibility of excluding certain tariff items from reciprocal 
liberalisation or defining special phasing-out schemes for sensitive products.  
Therefore, the main factor for the deadlocked talks was the inadequate implementation of 
the internal agenda of MERCOSUR, especially the harmonisation of economic policies, and 
opposing interests between Argentina and Brazil. For example, Brazil’s defensive concerns in 
new behind the border issues contrasted with the far-reaching liberalisation commitment of 
Argentina (key issues in the FTAA and MERCOSUR-EU negotiations). 
Inside MERCOSUR, integration progress depended strongly on Brazil assuming a clear 
agenda setting role. Therefore, failures in regional integration can be largely explained by 
Brazil’s reluctance to limit its national policy-making autonomy, widespread protectionist 
measures against intra-zone imports, and its unwillingness to provide necessary funds to face 
structural asymmetries among members. It is important to note, however, that Argentina 
confirmed the absent commitment among members for deeper regional integration, considering 
the lack of incorporation of communitarian norms into national law and the repeated entry 
barriers for intra-zone imports. Chile, on the other hand, from the onset mistrusted the intra-
regional liberalisation efforts, and hence, decided to set forth independent forms of trade 
integration refusing the MERCOSUR’s Customs Union. 
Macroeconomic instability (C4): Throughout the 1980s, Argentina suffered from strong 
inflationary pressure, a shortage of foreign capital, and high fiscal deficits, explaining in parts the 
decline of the sectoral PICE approach in 1988-89. Later, the introduction of the Currency Board 
in 1991 and the economic stabilisation in Brazil by 1994 provided favourable grounds for the 
expansion of intra-regional trade and the consolidation of MEROCOSUR. This integration 
friendly context was again interrupted by Brazil’s abrupt currency devaluation in January 1999 
and Argentina’s breakdown of the Currency Board in January 2002. In the meantime, Argentina 
faced macroeconomic turbulences due to its growing foreign debt and fiscal deficits ranging 
from 3.4 to 5.4 percent of GDP. The period from 2003 to 2004 was again encouraging for 
regional integration in the context of low inflation and a comparable evolution of exchange rates 
between Argentina and Brazil.  
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In conclusion, in the last 20 years trade relations in the Southern Cone were largely 
influenced by macroeconomic factors. On the other hand, it can be argued that successful 
regional integration policies were not hindered primarily by macroeconomic variables but due to 
scant advances made during the “golden times” of MERCOSUR (particularly 1994-98 and 2003-
04) in which no solid base was built for encountering more unstable circumstances. In these 
periods, practically no progress was noticeable regarding the harmonisation of trade and 
economic policies, such as the convergence of the CET, (phyto-) sanitary measures, and 
liberalisation of services, among others. Also, in times of macroeconomic stability it was largely 
the development of coherent unilateral policies on export promotion and sectoral development, 
which would have supported the ongoing world market integration process. 
Political instability (C3): In accordance with C4, political instability was registered in 
1989-1990 and 2001-02. In the latter occasion, the combination of an unemployment rate beyond 
20 percent, a four-year recession and rampant fiscal and debt crises caused the compulsory 
resignation of State President Fernando de la Rúa. Strikingly, the stabilisation of the economy 
and political system took place within 2002. As indicated under macroeconomic instability, the 
instability registered in 1989-90 and 2001-02 generated a backlash principally for the ongoing 
trade integration endeavours with Brazil. Conversely, the country’s behaviour in the times in 
between did not provide significant evidence that coherent trade policies had been implemented. 
Heterogeneity of Sectoral Preferences (C1): In the past, the private sector often used to 
be divided into export-oriented agriculture and inward-looking industry. This heterogeneity 
could explain the failed attempt to create a business-wide coordination pattern, such as the 
establishment of a strong peak association. But as of 1990, when economic reforms were 
implemented, this explanation seems no longer valid. First, many manufacturing sectors have 
become export-oriented and peak tariffs came down to 22 percent, disregarding the automotive 
regime maintained in the MERCOSUR. Second, intra-sectoral division became as widespread as 
inter-sectoral differences. While the rather homogenous rural interests are represented by no less 
than four peak entities and several branch organisations lobbying outside these institutions, the 
manufacturers’ association UIA was not able to coordinate a wide range of existing common 
interests among local manufacturers, becoming particularly evident from the economic opening 
in the 1990s. Therefore, the main problem of domestic business advocacy has institutional roots 
and is not due to the existence of extremely heterogeneous preferences. 
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Myriam  
NEI ADIMRA Assistant Social Policy 
Department 
27.11.2003 Barabás, 
Laura 
NEI CICA (Chamber of Industry 
Footwear) 
Chief of Foreign Trade 
Department 
27.04.2004 Caminoa, 
Raquel 
Survey CEC (Center of Cereals 
Exporters) 
Chief of Economic Study 
Division 
28.04.2004 Miralles, 
Gustavo 
Survey CAPOC (Chamber of Organic 
Foods Producers) 
President 
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29.04.2004 Liboreiro, 
Ernesto 
Survey INAI Managing Director 
29.04.2004 Amigo, Jorge Survey FEDECITRUS (Citrus Fruits 
Federation) 
Managing Director 
03.05.2004 Caminoa, 
Raquel 
Survey CIARA (Chamber of 
Vegetable Oil Industry) 
Chief of Economic Study 
Division 
03.05.2004 Laso, Luis Survey Argentinean Chamber of 
Legume Producers 
Manging Director 
03.05.2004 Confidential Survey Chamber  of Pneumatic 
Industry 
Managing Director 
05.05.2004 Borrel, 
Eduardo 
Survey CLIMA (Center of 
Metallurgical Industry) 
Managing Director 
04.05.2004 Hernández, 
Gregorio 
Survey CARMAHE (Traders and 
Producers of Machines and 
Tools) 
Managing Director 
05.05.2004 Rusansky, 
David 
Survey CACIOFA (Traders in 
Photographs and Optic 
Goods) 
Managing Director 
05.05.2004 Cantarella, 
Juan 
Survey AFAC (Association of 
Component Producers; 
Chemical Industry) 
Managing Director 
06.05.2004 Monica Survey CICOMRA  (Chamber of 
Informatics and 
Telecommunication) 
Administrative Assistant 
06.05.2004 Claudia 
Massari 
Survey CAFCCo (Chamber of 
Cardboard Industry) 
Administrative Assistant 
06.05.2004 Domenech, 
Roberto 
Survey CEPA (Center of Poultry 
Industry) 
Executve President 
06.05.2004 Quiñones, 
Victor Hugo 
Survey CAEME (Arg. Chamber of 
Pharmaceutical Specialities) 
Manager of International 
Relations 
07.05.2004 Rodriguez 
Canedo, 
Fernando 
Survey ADEFA (Association of Auto 
Motor Producers) 
Managing Director 
07.05.2004 Del Carril, 
José 
Survey FAIM (Arg. Federation of 
Mill Industry) 
Managing Director 
07.05.2004 Padilla, 
Guillermo 
Survey Arg. Chamber of Liqueur 
Producers 
President 
10.05.2004 Ackermann, 
Beatriz 
Survey Arg. Chamber of Peanuts Managing Director 
11.05.2004 Argüello, 
Daniel 
Survey Arg. Union of Public Sector 
Providers 
Managing Director 
11.05.2004 Valenciano, 
Eugenio 
Survey AFAT  (Association of Arg. 
Farming Equipment Industry)
Managing Director 
11.05.2004 Sethson, 
Jorge 
Survey Arg. Chamber of Books Institutional Manager 
12.05.2004 Mustones, 
Pertti/ 
Colombo, 
Emilio 
Survey FITA (Arg. Federation of 
Textiles Industries) 
Trade Policy Advisors 
13.05.2004 Alvarez, 
Anibal 
Survey Chamber of Glucose and 
Derivates Producers 
Managing Director 
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
172
13.05.2004 Fonaris, 
Antonio 
Survey Chamber of Arg. Brewery 
Industry  
Managing Director 
13.05.2004 Petersen, 
Cristina 
Survey CAPDROFAR (Arg. 
Chamber of Pharmaceutical 
Drugs) 
Trade Policy Advisor 
13.05.2004 Martinez 
Villa, Anibal 
Survey Arg. Association of Cement 
Industry 
Managing Director 
13.05.2004 Gataldi, 
Gustavo 
Survey Chamber of Abrasive 
Products Industry 
Managing Director 
13.05.2004 Gataldi, 
Gustavo 
Survey Chamber of Paint Industry Managing Director 
13.05.2004 Gataldi, 
Gustavo 
Survey Chamber of Ceramics and 
Floors Industry 
Managing Director 
13.05.2004 Gastaldi, 
Gustavo  
Survey Arg. Federation of Salt 
Producers 
Managing Director 
17.05.2004 Miquel, 
Miguel 
Survey CAFI (Arg. Chamber of 
Fruits Producers) 
Secretary of Board of Directors 
17.05.2004 Di Meglio, 
Victor 
Survey CAEM (Arg. Chamber of 
Mining Companies) 
Managing Director 
19.05.2004 Concilio, 
Andrea 
Survey CAIAMA (Arg. Chamber of 
Aluminium Industry) 
Managing Director 
20.05.2004 De Fina, 
Adriano 
Survey AIERA (Association of 
Importers and Experts of 
Argentina) 
Managing Director 
24.05.2004 Confidential Survey CIL (Center of Diary 
Industry) 
Managing Director 
27.05.2004 Lopez, Juan 
Carlo 
Survey COOPERALA (Chamber of 
Pharmaceutical Laboratories) 
Sub-Manging Director 
27.05.2004 Salamanco, 
Héctor 
Survey ABC (Arg. Consortium of 
Meat Exporters) 
Managing Director 
28.05.2004 Iglesias, Raúl Survey CADIPSA (Arg. Chamber of  
 Beverage Industry) 
Administrative Director 
31.05.2004 Rúben I. 
González 
Survey Arg. Union of Meat Industry Managing Director 
31.05.2004 Prato, 
Ricardo 
Survey Arg. Chamber of Consumer 
Electronics and Air 
Conditioners 
Policy Advisor 
31.05.2004 Pereyra, 
Homero 
Survey Arg. Chamber of Jewellery 
and Watches 
President 
01.06.2004 Sanchez, 
Oscar 
Survey CAIP (Arg. Chamber of 
Plastic Industry) 
Manging Director 
07.06.2004 Greenberg, 
Enrique 
Survey CASEL (Arg. Chamber of 
Security Electronics) 
President 
07.06.2004 Galarce, 
Rafael 
Survey CAEMA (Arg. Chamber of 
Electro Mechanics and 
Components) 
General Secretary 
07.06.2004 Días, Patricio Survey General Confederation 
Economy; and of Commerce 
and Services 
Public Relations Manager 
08.06.2004 Etchemendy, 
Cesar 
Survey AFCP (Association of 
Cellulose and Paper Industry) 
Director Sectorial Studies  
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09.06.2004 Fumagalli, 
Jose Maria 
Survey CIQYP (Chamber of 
Chemical and Petrochemical 
Industry) 
Managing Director 
10.06.2004 Guillermo 
Draletti 
Survey General Union of Milk 
Producers 
Managing Director 
18.06.2004 Maito, 
Miguel 
Survey CILFA (Chamber of 
Argentinean Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories) 
Chief of Foreign Trade and 
Sanitary Regulation 
Department 
03.09.2004 Rúa Boiero, 
Rodolfo 
Survey CAC (National Chamber of 
Commerce)  
Vice-President of Commission 
for Trade Negotiations 
08.09.2004 Kolodny, 
Héctor 
Survey CIAI (Argentinean Chamber 
of Clothing Industry)  
Managing Director 
09.09.2004 Ibáñez, 
Alberto  
NEI UIA President Trade Department 
15.09.2004 Pegoraro, 
Jorge/Kait, 
Samuel 
NEI Industrialists Group Managing Director; 
Institutional Advisor 
23.09.2004 Laffitte, Juan 
Pablo  
NEI UIA Head of Administration 
17.11.2004 Tomás, 
Aurelio  
NEI INAI Trade Policy Analist 
28.02.2005 Ruiz, 
Fernando 
Survey CAMIMA (Chamber of SME 
sized Metalurchical Industry) 
Manging Director 
08.03.2005 Martinez, 
Fernando 
NEI FITA (Arg. Federation of 
Textiles Industries) 
Policy Advisor 
14.03.2005 Del Bono, 
Liliana 
NEI APYME (Assembly of Small 
and Medium Entrepreneurs) 
Manager of International 
Relations 
11.03.2005 Peretti, Pedro NEI FAA (Arg. Agrarian 
Federation) 
General Secretary 
 
 
 
Selected Interview Partners 
Campbell, Jorge: Industrial Engineer; currently President of International Media Consulting 
Group (IMCG); before the mid-1980s, Jorge Campbell worked in several trading companies 
dedicated to cereal exports; as Undersecretary of Foreign Trade Exchange (1986-87) he acted as 
one of the principal negotiators in the sectoral PICE talks with Brazil. Later in the government of 
Carlos Menem, he first assumed the position of Undersecretary of Foreign Trade (1989) inside 
the Ministry of Economy and later – between 1994 and 1999 – Campbell headed the Secretariat 
of Foreign Economic Relations inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus being the country’s 
chief negotiator in international trade policy affairs. Besides, Jorge Campbell has published 
several articles on foreign trade and integration affairs, with the comprehensive compilation on 
MERCOSUR’s history in 2000 standing out. 
Makuc, Adrián: Economist, currently National Director of Foreign Trade Policy and the 
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Ministry of Economy’s highest doted permanent functionary in international trade policy affairs. 
Before 1993, Makuc worked inside the industrial peak entity UIA as policy advisor inside the 
Trade Department. Then, he became part of the erected MERCOSUR Division inside the 
Ministry of Economy which later merged into the Foreign Trade Division inside the Secretariat 
of Industry and Trade. In 1998, Adrián Makuc was appointed through formal recruitment 
procedure as National Director of Foreign Trade Policy. Against the steady decline of the 
Ministry’s trade policy branch and the continuous alternation of office holders of the 
Undersecretariat in charge, as one of the few career bureaucrats and accomplished negotiator he 
acted somehow as a solid rock in hard times. 
Rúa Boeiro, Rodolfo: Economist, currently President of the Centre of Studies on 
Economic Integration and International Trade. Since the 1980s, Rúa Boeiro has acquired vast 
experience as trade policy advisor of business entities and annalist of Argentina’s trade 
integration matters. During the PICE talks in the 1980s and when MERCOSUR was established 
in 1990-91, he directed the Technical Division of the powerful Association of Metallurgical 
Industry of the Argentinean Republic (ADIMRA) and acted as President of the UIA Commission 
of International Trade Negotiations inside the Trade Department. Later, between 1995 and 1995 
Rúa Boiero served as General Secretary inside the UIA MERCOSUR Department. Lastly, he has 
occupied the Vice-Presidency inside the Commission of International Trade Negotiations of the 
National Chamber of Commerce (CNC). 
 
5 Peru 
 
  
Five years after Bolivia and simultaneously with Argentina, in 1990 Peru embarked on a 
development strategy based on economic stabilisation. In this way, the government of Alberto 
Fujimori sought to recuperate the credibility of Peru’s economic policy which had been eroded 
during previous decades. The outlined “path to recovery” was driven by structural adjustment 
policies that differed greatly from measures previously in force, particularly the ISI strategy 
followed under the military ruling of Juan Velasco-Alvarado (1968-75) and the macroeconomic 
chaos caused during the populist government of Alan García (Paredes/Sachs 1991). 
Regarding the pursued world market integration strategy, section one outlines the various 
incoherencies between the unilateral trade regime, (extra-) regional integration, and export and 
sector promotion policies that persisted throughout the economic policy shift that took place 
during the 1990s. Indeed, it was not before 2002 that a domestic consensus began to emerge 
regarding the need to set forth proactive measures in the international trade field in order to 
overcome the country’s modest export performance. Section two elucidates the organisation of 
Peru’s public sector in the trade policy area (Independent Variable A1), emphasising the way in 
which the domestic bureaucracy was organised for the conduction of international trade policy 
affairs during the period of analysis. Then, section three discusses the organisation of the 
business sector concerning the same issue (Independent Variable A2). Based on sections one to 
three, section four provides an assessment of the case, and explores the links between the 
independent and dependent variables, and controls the possible influences of other variables (C1-
4) on the B value. 
 
5.1 The Late Pursuit of the Multipolar Model 
 
This first section is structured in accordance with the different policy areas that constitute the 
world market integration strategy (Dependent Variable B), i.e. unilateral trade regime, regional 
and extra-regional integration, and sectoral and export promotion policies. The final subsection 
summarises the results and provides an overview of the trade performance from 1985 to 2004. 
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The Unilateral Trade Regime 
A month after taking office, Alberto Fujimori declared that trade policy reform would be a key 
element for macroeconomic adjustments, so as to overcome the rampant inflation and 
discretional practices applied to the administration of foreign trade. Above all, trade 
liberalisation was intensified as of February 1991, when Carlos Boloña became Minister of 
Economy and Finance. Consequently, in March 1991 the trade regime in force differed greatly 
from the legal framework applied when Alan Garcia (1985-90) left office 
(Abusada/Illescas/Taboada 2001). Three main differences can be clearly identified: 
1) Tariff Rates: Average import tariffs were lowered from 46.5 to 16.8 percent and the 
maximum rates were reduced from 84 to 25 percent. 
2) Tariff Structure: The reduction of tariff dispersion became a crucial element for the new 
economic policy. In total, the former tariff structure composed of 39 tariff levels ranging 
from 15 to 84 percent was reduced to just 2 levels, of 15 and 25 percent. While the lower 
level covered inputs, capital goods and consumer goods not produced locally, 25 percent 
charges were applied to domestic manufactures such as foodstuffs, clothing, footwear, 
electronics, and pharmaceuticals. Moreover, in December 1990, the government set the 
goal to gradually achieve a flat rate of 15 percent within four years. 
3) Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): The efforts to abolish the vast array of NTBs became even 
more wide-reaching than the tariff liberalisations. Numerous import licenses, which in 
539 products such as dairy, chocolates, textiles, yarns, wood furniture and consumer 
electronics provided a full import protection procedure, were annulled .Furthermore, the 
reform of NTBs embraced a complex protectionist regime of sanitary and phytosanitary 
rules, import state monopolies, technical obstacles, import visas and other administrative 
burdens, which in total accounted for 18 types of restrictions (Abusada/Illescas/Taboada 
2001: 69). 
As a consequence, since 1992 Peru has become a reliable trading partner applying the tariffs 
established as a main instrument of border protection (WTO 2000). Trade defence came under 
the management of a novel decentralised agency (known as INDECOPI) which guaranteed a 
strict technical analysis of possible anti-dumping and safeguard measures (Camminati/ 
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Thorne/Webb 2005). As a result of this institutional shift, defence measures were applied 
sparingly.1  
Conversely, problems in the implementation of a liberal, predictable and neutral trade regime 
emerged with respect to Peru’s plan to reach a uniform tariff structure (“flat rate”), which 
challenged the Common External Tariff (CET) applied by the Andean Community of Nations 
(CAN), composed of Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia. When the CET went 
into effect in January 1995, with four tariff levels, Peru insisted on two levels covering 15 and 25 
percent, concentrating on 87 tariff items in the lower category. Subsequently, in April 1997, both 
levels were lowered by a further five percent down to 12 and 20 percent. Nonetheless, as a tariff 
surcharge of 5 percent was established for 320 agricultural products such as dairy, vegetables, 
potatoes, fruits, cereals, wheat, sugar and maize, four levels of 12, 17, 20 and 25 percent were 
put into effect. Lastly, in April 2001 and March 2002, respectively, Peru opened new tariff lines 
of four and seven percent for inputs not produced locally that, up to that time, had been in the 
order of 12 percent. Since 2002, Peru has set forth a tariff structure embracing no less than seven 
tariff lines. 
 
Table 5.1: Peru’s Tariff Structure by December 2002 
Tariff lines 4 % 7 % 9 % 12 % 17 % 20 % 25 % 
No. Items 1614 1070 1 3165 47 763 331 
Source: CAN General Secretariat 2003: 6, based on Central Bank data. 
 
By these measures, Peru moved closer to the escalated tariff concept applied by the CAN, 
maintaining 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent as the principal tariffs. In the past, Peruvian manufacturers 
suffered from a competitive disadvantage compared to Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, since 
their industries enjoyed not only generally higher border protection of 20 percent border tariffs, 
but were also able to buy inputs such as raw materials, and intermediate and capital goods based 
on a lower, five percent rate. Moreover, numerous CET exceptions allowed CAN members the 
duty free import of inputs, and extra protection, for example in the automotive regime with up to 
40 percent tariffs (González Vigil 2001: 112-152). 
                                               
1 Since the institutional reform was launched in 1992, a total of 81 trade protection cases have been presented, of 
which 57 were followed by a dumping investigation. The application of antidumping duties was approved for 29 of 
the cases investigated (mainly steel and textiles). Only two cases of safeguard investigations were recorded, one of 
which was against Chinese textile clothing garments and was still in the negotiation phase in 2004. On December 
23, 2003, Peru embarked upon a 200-day-long interim safeguard measure on 106 tariff items.  
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Conversely, trade in agricultural goods has been ruled under similar conditions to those 
of its Andean neighbours. In the WTO scope, sensitive agricultural products such as rice, wheat, 
milk, and maize were set at 68 percent, significantly higher than Peru’s general 30 percent bound 
rate. The rates effectively applied to agricultural products average 14 percent vis-à-vis the 16 
percent adopted within the CAN, according to FAO data (2003). When surcharge taxes are 
included, average tariffs are practically equal. Beyond nominal tariffs, Peru faced, jointly with 
the Andean countries, the uncertainty as to whether the applied Price Band System for sensitive 
agricultural products is compatible with WTO rules. The main argument sustained by the CAN 
to maintain this stabilisation mechanism (i.e. allowing import costs to vary freely within a fixed 
floor and a ceiling price) is related to compensating the distortion in world markets generated by 
the subsidies paid in developed countries, particularly in the areas of grains, oils, milk, meat, and 
sugar.2 Compared with the Andean Price Band System covering 138 items, in Peru only 29 items 
were subject to variable tariffs, mainly affecting product groups of dairy, maize, sorghum, rice 
and sugar.3  
 
(Sub-)Regional Integration 
To a great extent, the trade reforms applied since 1990 coincided with the conceptual shift within 
the Andean sphere. The liberal reform waves throughout the region encouraged the heads of 
Andean countries to revitalise the dormant integration process by means of fostering intra-zone 
trade and marking trade openness towards extra regional partners. Therefore, in December 1991, 
the State Presidents of Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela agreed, through the 
Barahona Act, on the creation of the Andean Free Trade Area and on the adoption of a CET by 
January 1, 1992. With respect to the liberalisation of intra-zone trade between Peru and Ecuador, 
the abolishment of restricting border measures was set for July 1, 1992. 
Nevertheless, the framework defined in December 1991 contrasted with the views of the 
key policy makers in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). The team headed by Carlos 
                                               
2 Beyond the absence of subsidies, in the Peruvian case the fact that the elimination of NTB’s from 1991 was not 
accompanied by a compensatory increase in import tariffs, as occurs in Europe through the “tariffication” option 
embodied in the WTO agreement for agriculture, stands out. 
3 The Price Band is applied as follows. Every month, a new set of floor-ceiling prices for each relevant commodity 
are published; if the price of a product under the PBS (e.g. sugar) falls below its floor price, the system is triggered, 
and a new specific duty is imposed to bring the sugar price back to the floor price level. This additional tariff is valid 
for all shipments of sugar until the system is revised with the publication of the new set of trigger prices. The experi-
ence of the price band scheme applied during 1995-2002 according to FAO data (2003) showed that Peru’s total 
taxes for sugar were as high as 54 percent (without PBS 25 percent)  and 59 percent for rice  (without PBS 20 
percent) at certain periods of the year. Therefore, the FAO report concluded that although Peru maintained the tariffs 
applied below the bound rates in the scope of the WTO (68 percent), the country may face difficulties in pursuing 
border protections of these heights in the event tariffs are considerably reduced as a result of further multilateral 
negotiation rounds. 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
THE CASE OF PERU 
 
179 
Boloña, with its distinct orthodox-liberal orientation, opposed the abolishment of the two level 
structure (15/25) and its conversion into a flat rate of 15 percent in 1995. The Boloña team 
argued that an escalated, and moreover perforated, CET would cause unpredictable fiscal 
policies, higher protection and discretional policy making. The MEF team further rejected the 
notion of the planned free trade area considering that an “even playing field” at the Andean level 
was hampered by intra-regional trade distortions due to export subsidies, free trade zones and 
rules of origin (Boloña/Illescas 1997; Abusada/Illescas/Taboada 2001: 136-143). 
During 1992, the negotiation arena for Peru’s full incorporation into the Andean 
integration scheme became increasingly small due to Boloña’s inflexible position (Boloña 1993: 
96). When a deadlock was finally reached by August 1992, the Andean Decision 321 embodied 
the temporary suspension of Peru’s participation in the creation of the four-tiered CET, the intra-
regional liberalisation and the less substantial macroeconomic harmonisation policies. So as to 
better arrange its coexistence with the Andean partners and to move further into the intra-
regional liberalisation commitment, Peru negotiated bilateral trade agreements with each CAN 
member by the end of 1992. But with the exception of the treaty with Bolivia, the signed 
agreements turned out to be limited in scope, covering a few hundred products which basically 
reflected the advocacy strength of local sectors, as Gonzalez Vigil observed (2001: 119-120). 
In the following years, Peru’s relation with the CAN evolved erratically and was marked 
by a peculiar mix of liberal orthodoxy, foreign policy concerns and discretional policy making. 
With no specific modalities or deadlines, in 1994 the member states agreed on Decision 353 
which defined Peru’s gradual reincorporation into the Andean Free Trade Area, the conduction 
of common foreign affairs and macroeconomic coordination. However, as virtually no advances 
could be registered in the aftermath, in 1997 the Andean integration stood again at a crossroads. 
Particularly for the leading CAN countries, Colombia and Venezuela, the cost of maintaining 
Peru as a formal member seemed to outweigh those of loosing the uncommitted partner (Tello 
2004: 108). Therefore, on January 27th the CAN Commission (the main policy making body) 
defined a 45 day deadline in which the modalities of Peru’s participation in the CAN had to be 
clearly set. 
Under this pressure, Peru opted finally to remain within the CAN. The Andean Decision 
414 of July 1997, which defined the country’s gradual reintegration into regional process, 
established a tariff reduction schedule to be initiated on August 1, 1997 and concluded on 
December 31, 2005. As regards the CET, the strategic goal was upheld but modalities had to first 
be negotiated in the scope of the Andean Commission. From 1997 to 2005, Peru made 
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noteworthy efforts to remove residual border restrictions in intra-regional trade. Although for 
several products (mainly sugar, cotton, maize, vegetable oils and petroleum) significant tariff and 
non-tariff burdens remained, as a General Secretariat Report summarised (CAN 2005), 99 
percent of Peru’s tariff items affecting Andean imports had been cancelled out by August 2005.  
The Report’s views regarding the plans to reach a customs union implying a perfect CET 
were less optimistic however. Even though a “breakthrough” took place in January 2002 when 
the members stipulated the full CET application by December 31, 2003 (and later in October, an 
agreement was reached for 62 percent of the Andean nomenclature by means of Decision 535), 
recent years’ experiences highlighted the unreliable commitment of Peru’s government. Despite 
the diplomatic insistence to converge the external tariffs, to date Peru has rejected the definitive 
abolishment of the flat rate ideal. 
In 2005, the future of the CAN was uncertain as the planned integration steps aimed at 
going beyond an Andean FTA generally failed to materialise. The commitment assumed in May 
1999 to establish an Andean Common Market by 2005, requiring the creation of conditions for 
the free movement of goods, services, investments and people, proved to be impossible to reach 
in light of modest concessions that barely went further than previously implemented unilateral 
commitments (Niño Tarazona 2003; CAN 2005). Even though all members exhibited limitations 
in their dedication towards the Andean integration, Peru’s unreliable participation has been 
considered as the most detrimental factor to the harmonisation of trade policies, and thus, 
prevented the creation of a solid trading block in the challenging regional and multilateral 
sphere. 
 
Extra- Subregional Integration 
Fifteen years of advances and setbacks within the Andean scope entailed negative impacts on 
Peru’s economic integration plans beyond the sub-regional sphere. Cesar Peñaranda, the Chief 
Advisor in Boloña’s team, stated (OE 08/07/04), “as we left office in December 1992, 
comprehensive free trade talks were scheduled with Chile and Mexico given the fact that we 
sought a bilateral strategy outside the Andean Group, in the way that Chile did”. Whatever the 
intentions of the Boloña cadre may have been, the subsequent office holders did little, in fact, to 
make Peru resemble the Chilean case during the 1990s, as I shall briefly summarise below. 
ALADI: Inside Latin America, for a long time Peru only pursued so-called Partial Scope 
Agreements that were based on limited, temporary tariff preferences; for instance with 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and Uruguay. During the 1990s, the only comprehensive 
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FTA was signed with Chile in June 1998. The bilateral treaty known as ACE No. 38 established 
the goal of dismantling tariffs by 2016, including immediate liberalisation of one third of tariff 
items, and a schedule for future liberalisation in 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 15 and 18 years. Another attempt 
to negotiate a similarly structured treaty with Mexico became deadlocked as the talks initiated at 
the end of 1996 came to an end only a few months thereafter. Furthering relations with the 
MERCOSUR block became a possibility in 1997, when Peru suggested a bilateral approach in 
the context of its possible departure from the CAN. However, the later reincorporation into the 
Andean integration scheme put an end to this opportunity. Instead, Peru became part of the free 
trade talks between MERCOSUR and the CAN launched by the first Framework Agreement in 
April 1998. After years of frequently interrupted negotiations, in August 2003 Peru agreed with 
Argentina and Brazil (afterwards also with Uruguay and Paraguay) on the full liberalisation of 
tariff lines within 15 years. Insofar as sensitive agricultural products, Peru reserved its right to 
maintain both the Price Band System and residual border duties until 2020. 
FTAA – FTA with the United States: Peru’s actions directed to North America proved 
more proactive than its trade diplomacy in South America. During the 1990s, the United States 
evolved into the prime market for local exports, increasing its share of total exports between 
1994 and 2004 from 16 to nearly 30 percent (WTO 2000; MINCETUR 2005a). Between 1991 
and 2002, trade relations had been ruled by the Andean Trade Promotion Act (ATPA), a 
unilateral trade preference scheme enacted by the US Congress. In 2002, ATPA was renewed 
and expanded by means of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), 
providing duty-free access for roughly 6,000 non-traditional products in the range of agriculture, 
jewellery, textiles and clothing.4 
Against the increasing non-traditional exports, in 2000, Peru set forth a vigorous lobby 
campaign in the US capital city to promote not only the renovation of ATPA but to expand 
coverage for textiles and clothing. Simultaneously, the country held strong interests in the FTAA 
negotiations formally launched in 1998, because the hemispheric project was perceived as a 
window of opportunity for local manufactures and services (Fairlie 2003). But as the FTAA 
stalled due to strongly opposing views between MERCOSUR and the US, the Ricardo Toledo 
administration demonstrated its keenness to negotiate a bilateral FTA as had been signed by 
Chile and various states in Central America. For example, Peru put into evidence its alignment 
with the US by its departure from the development faction G-22 in October 2003 in the 
                                               
4 The ATPA (later APTDEA) offers three main advantages over the US GSP; it covers more tariff categories; 
imports under ATPA are not subject to GSP competitive-need and country-income restrictions; and qualifying rules 
for individual products are more liberal in terms of local-content requirements; see www.ustr.org. 
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aftermath of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún. Therefore, the Bush administration 
announced on May 3, 2004 that Peru and Ecuador would join the first round of negotiations in 
the US-Andean Free Trade Agreement (US-AFTA) scheduled for May 18-19, which had 
originally been planned to be initiated only with Colombia (USTR press releases “AFTA”; 
www.ustr.gov). 
Despite Peru’s strong interest, trade talks could not be concluded before December 2005, 
and thus, the initial goal of concluding negotiations by December 2004 was missed. Disregarding 
the impact of the US domestic politics, on the Peruvian side two sensitive issues were mainly 
responsible for hindering the fast conclusion of the negotiations. 
1) Agriculture: Local agriculture is dominated by subsistence farming located in mountain 
areas. Sixty percent of productive units are smaller than 0.3 hectares and only 25 percent 
of cultivated land responds to productive units beyond 15 hectares, mostly found in the 
coastal areas in the north (MINAG 2004). Hence, peasants felt threatened by the potential 
“invasion” of subsidised US wheat, maize, sugar, and meat. The US government, 
moreover, refused to accept the maintenance of the Price Band System as a compensation 
mechanism for market distortions through domestic support. 
2) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR): Under Colombia’s leadership, the Andean countries 
tried to avoid the adoption of US standards of IPR protection and enforcement that went 
well beyond TRIPS standards. For example, by extending the 20-year patent protection 
for branded drugs and the limitation of parallel imports and compulsory licensing, the 
availability of cheap generics becomes increasingly difficult. Furthermore, the Andean 
negotiators were keen to exclude plants and animals from patentability because of their 
legal impact on the Andean biodiversity. Patent applicants should, furthermore, be 
required to disclose the source and country of origin of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge used in the invention, thus, enabling fair and equitable benefit sharing. 
In general, the Peruvian government maintained, however, less antagonistic positions 
compared to Colombia, and as a consequence, was able to complete the talks by December 2005, 
while the negotiations between Colombia and the US continued throughout 2006. While 
Colombia made numerous objections concerning the new negotiation areas of intellectual 
property, state procurement, services and investment, for Peru this agreement was considered, 
above all, as a powerful anchor that would magnify the structural adjustment reforms of the 
1990s that were aimed at the attraction of FDIs and the modernisation of domestic economic 
sectors.  
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APEC: As of 2002, Peru announced its involvement in several trade policy forums, so as 
to underline its new proactive course in the search for external markets. For example, through 
extensive presidential visits throughout the Asian Pacific Area during 2003-04, the government 
emphasised its will to capitalise Peru’s APEC membership as of 1998. The expanding markets in 
the pacific neighbourhood were to be conquered through mining, fish and non-traditional 
exports, such as fruits and vegetables. In the aftermath, the free trade talks were nevertheless 
limited to negotiations launched with Thailand in January 2004, whereby six rounds were 
concluded by August 2005 with no agreement yet reached (La Gestión 16/08/05). 
European Union: With respect to the EU, Peru has been seeking to take advantage of its 
CAN membership, as the Andean block sustains the strategic objective of reaching an 
Association Agreement with the European countries that would involve, among other aspects a 
Free Trade Area. Nonetheless, the process has been arduous thus far. After a Political Dialogue 
and Cooperation Agreement in December 2003 determined that negotiations would be initiated, 
the parties agreed in January 2004 to carry out a Joint Evaluation of the integration degree 
attained in the Andean region. Through this previous study on the institutional framework of the 
CAN and the functioning of the sub-regional market and customs union, the EU expressed 
evident doubts about the reliability of the CAN as a negotiation partner. In the meantime, Peru’s 
exports benefit from preferential access in the scope of the Andean GSP that was launched in 
1990, and renewed at the beginning of 2002 and 2005. 
 
Trade and Sector Promotion 
The involvement in regional and hemispheric liberalisation initiatives urged the government to 
consider accompanying measures that would prepare the local economy for the impact of free 
trade. Indeed, after the state ceased to be an active promoter and facilitator of sectoral 
development in the 1990s, the debate on supportive public policies was revitalised, especially in 
recent years, reaching a peak when Peru decided to participate in the US-AFTA talks. The 
responses given by the government of Ricardo Toledo (2001-06) embraced the following two 
programmes: 
1) National Competitiveness Council (CNC). An attempt to foster economic development 
came to life in April 2002. According to the WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2004-
05 (in which Peru ranked 68 out of 117), the CNC placed priority on ten working streams 
covering the articulation of supply chains, technical innovation, educational reform, 
infrastructure, judicial reform, environment and natural resources, among others. The 
principal method used within the CNC scope was the increase of coordination among 
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state and private actors involved in the policy area and the definition of policy guidelines 
and strategies. 
2) National Export Plan 2003-2013 (PENX): With respect to the development of exports, in 
2003 the national government initiated the PENX. As with the CNC, state authorities 
invited private sector entities to collaborate on several strategic topics affecting the 
competitiveness of local exports, such as the development of supply chains, research and 
development, quality standards, trade promotion and intelligence, customs procedures, 
and transport systems. Accordingly, the sectoral focus considered clothing, jewellery, 
processed fish, non-traditional agriculture and leather manufactures, among others. 
The evaluation made by consulted experts proved to be rather sceptical as regards official 
efforts to accompany international trade policies, nonetheless. The more heterodox economists  
stated that attempts rarely went beyond the rhetorical level, and thus, scarcely differed from the 
structural adjustment policies implemented in the 1990s (OE’s Cornejo 4/10/04; González Vigil 
15/07/04; Campodónico 14/03/05; Dávila 13/07/04; Rebosio 14/07/04). The more orthodox 
comments underscored the lack of consistency and clearly stated that the “domestic policy 
agenda” should not only embrace promotion activities, but that it should also address the 
modernisation of education, public administration, judicial, transport and tax systems, among 
others (OE’s Garcia 7/07/04; Peñaranda 8/07/04; BR Teullet 7/07/04). 
Regarding the promotion of exports, the responsibilities were assumed by the Peruvian 
Export Promotion Commission (PROMPEX) created in 1996. The work of PROMPEX has been 
considered as highly effective regarding the promotion of non-traditional exports, especially in 
developing “clusters” among roughly 40 private organisations in the range of agricultural 
products, such as asparagus, mangoes, and lemons (Brenes/Emmons/Madrigal 2001). Despite its 
apparent effectiveness, the activities put forward by PROMPEX have been seriously limited by a 
modest budget allocation that ranged from US$3 to 5 million (MEF budget data 2004-05; La 
Gestión 20/06/02). 
Other facilities offered to exporters were severely reduced in the 1990s. For example, 
specific programs for export finance or credit guarantees were no longer available in 1994, as 
private companies, operating under market conditions, took over the supply of such services. 
Refunds to non-traditional exports of up to 30 percent of the FOB value paid as of the late 1970s 
(for example through CERTEX) were abolished in the 1990s, moreover. Instead, a 
reimbursement scheme began operating in 1995 which implied a refund of 5 percent of the FOB 
value, regardless of the actual amount of duties paid on imported inputs. Nevertheless, this 
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drawback mechanism has only been applied to small scale exporters and limited further to 
exports that do not incorporate inputs imported under preferential regimes.5 
 
Summary Dependent Variable B 
In general, Peru’s approach to world market integration sustained from 1985 to 2004 has been 
disappointing, meeting the criteria for neither the Multipolar nor the Springboard models. In 
summarising this section, Box 5.1 below highlights the main failures observed. Aside from the 
structural adjustment set forth in 1990, the Peruvian government didn’t pursue clear economic 
integration objectives on the regional and multilateral level. It is only in the present decade that 
Peru has begun to implement more active international trade policies through noteworthy efforts 
undertaken in the hemispheric and Pacific area, and predominantly, by fostering non-traditional 
exports towards the US market.  
 
Box 5.1: Summary Dependent Variable  
Unilateral 
Trade Regime 
Regional 
Integration 
Extra-Regional 
Integration 
Export 
Promotion 
Sector 
Promotion 
1990-91: Trade 
reform that 
abolished NTBs 
and lowered 
average tariffs 
from 46.5 to 
16.8%; later 
10.9%.  
Failed “flat 
rate” by ending 
up with 7 tariff 
lines as of 2002 
Exceptions: 
Price Band 
System for 
agriculture 
products 
 
Uncommitted 
and erratic CAN 
membership. In 
1992, Peru 
suspended the 
membership so 
as to adopt a flat 
rate and to define 
individual forms 
of trade. But in 
1997, Peru 
returned, though 
conflicts on the 
CET issue have 
yet to be cleared 
up. 
Peru signed FTAs 
with Chile and 
MERCOSUR. 
Since 1998, Peru 
participated with 
enthusiasm in the 
hemispheric 
FTAA process. 
As the FTAA 
stalled, Peru 
launched 
bilateral free 
trade talks with 
the US as of May 
2004 
(negotiations 
were completed 
in December 
2005) 
Until 
PROMPEX was 
created in 1996, 
Peru maintained 
no official export 
promotion 
scheme. 
The National 
Export Strategy 
2003-2013 seeks 
the development 
of non-
traditional 
exports, though 
support schemes 
have been 
modest thus far. 
 
As of 1990, the 
state mostly 
withdrew as an 
active promoter 
and facilitator of 
sectoral 
development. 
                                               
5 In 1998, drawback refunds totaled US$55 million, which represented less than 1 percent of the total value of 
exports; see WTO 2000. Large scale exporters had the possibility to refund the general tax paid on used inputs. 
Other measures provided to lower production costs were the temporary admission regime enabling the duty free 
import of inputs.  For a detailed analysis of local trade promotion schemes, see Arbués Pérez Espinoza 2003. 
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Between 1985 and 2004, Peru registered a considerable export growth, with export sales rising 
from US$2,977 to 12,486 million, herein overcoming the stagnation of exports observed in the 
1970s and 1980s. The overall trade balance was negative, however, with the constant deficits 
from 1991 to 2001 standing out. In addition, the strong dependence on traditional mining and 
fishery commodities was not significantly altered, since these tariff items accounted for roughly 
70 percent of all exports throughout the period of analysis. The most promising non-traditional 
exports turned out to be textiles and clothing aimed at the US market, and agriculture and fishery 
products such as asparagus, mangoes, frozen fish, and calamari, whose exportation was 
geographically more diversified. 
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5.2 State Bureaucracy: From the Economy to the Foreign Trade Model? 
 
This section is structured along the following lines. The first subsection, responsibilities, exposes 
the division of labour in the conduction of international trade policy affaires, involving the inter-
ministerial coordination among the different sectoral departments involved. Then, resources 
provides a description of how the trade policy team evolved in the last two decades with respect 
to staff size, technical expertise, and the application of civil service models. Finally, the 
subsection openness discusses the mechanism for consultation with the business and civil 
society. 
 
Responsibilities 
Traditionally, trade policy relied on the executive branch, which operated without significant 
interference from Congress (OE Araoz 23/02/04; Fairlie 2003). However, the FTA talks with the 
US made Congress increasingly aware of its role in monitoring and approving international 
commitments, above all regarding the defence of sensitive areas in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, 
and textile manufactures; albeit in the latter case the struggles were mainly in the area of imports 
from China (BR Manzur 26/02/04). Being at loggerheads with the outward oriented 
MINCETUR, in 2005 the Foreign Trade Commission in Congress put forward a Trade 
Negotiation Law to urge the executive to regularly inform the legislative on negotiation 
strategies pursued at the international level (La Gestión 16/08/05). 
Historically, economic policy in general, and trade policy in particular, were under the 
exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). In 1969, as the military 
regime under Juan Velasco opted for the implementation of a distinct ISI model, the regulation 
and promotion of foreign trade were granted independent status in the state executive. After four 
years of coexistence with industrial policies, as of 1973 trade concerns received the exclusive 
attention of the Ministry of Trade. Later, the area of trade policy went through a broad variety of 
institutional settings as shown in Table 5.2.  
 
Moreover, Table 5.2. clearly indicates that “foreign trade” and “integration” affairs have 
been divided, although the strengthening of intra-regional trade was central within the scope of 
the regional integration endeavours of the Andean Group, ALALC and ALADI. 
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Table 5.2: Foreign Trade and Integration Affairs in the Ministerial Structure 1969-2004 
Term/Presidency Foreign Trade Integration 
1969 – 1973/ Juan Velasco Ministry of Industry and 
Trade  
1973 – 1976/ Juan Velasco Ministry of Trade 
National Integration Office 
(ONIT) 
1976 – 1977/ Francisco 
Morales Bermúdez 
Ministry of Trade Ministry of Integration 
1977 – 1980/ Francisco 
Morales Bermúdez 
Ministry of Industry, Trade, 
Tourism & Integration 
(MICTI) 
ONIT in force until 1981 
1980 – 1985/ Fernando 
Belaunde 
Ministry of Economy, 
Finance and Trade 
Ministry of Industry, 
Tourism and Integration 
(MITI) 
1985 – 1987/ Alan García Ministry of Industry, Trade, Tourism and Integration 
1987 – 1990/ Alan García Foreign Trade Institute (ICE) Ministry of Industry, 
Domestic Trade, Tourism 
and Integration (MICITI) 
1990 – 2000/ Alberto Fujimori 
2000-2001/ Valentín Paniagua  
MEF 
PROMPEX; INDECOPI 
Ministry of Industry, 
Tourism, Integration and 
International Trade 
Negotiations (MITINCI) 
2002 – Ricardo Toledo MINCETUR; INDECOPI MINCETUR 
Source: General Office of Administration/ MINCETUR 2004a 
 
In the 1970s, Latin American integration affairs were assumed by the National 
Integration Office (ONIT), a technical department under the presidential office. The interim 
existence of the Ministry of Integration emphasised the political tone that regional integration 
enjoyed at that time. As the government of Fernando Belaunde took office in 1980, the area of 
foreign trade was again transferred into the Ministry of Economy and Finance, whereas 
integration affairs were placed together with industry and tourism in the MITI area.  
Major institutional innovations were introduced during the APRA administration of Alan 
García (1985-1990). After the creation of the broad-reaching Ministry of Industry, Trade, 
Tourism and Integration in 1985, in 1987 the populist left-wing government decided to create the 
Institute of Foreign Trade (ICE), which absorbed the most relevant trade policy competencies, as 
Enrique Cornejo, the first ICE President (at that time 29 years old), remembered (OE 4/10/04): 
“Our idea was to drive forward the development of exports, therefore, a special agency with 
ministerial rank was established merging the competences in trade related areas of promotion, 
regulation, and international negotiations.” Verbal reports indicated that the ICE worked rather 
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professionally during its first year of existence, but later began to deteriorate due to excessive 
bureaucratic procedures, corruption, and political party influences (OE’s Cornejo 4/10/04; Lopez 
09/02/05; SO Elmore 10/02/05; 4.2.2). Regarding the conduction of international trade policy 
affairs, the clarity was undermined due to the fact that the ICE covered all areas related to trade 
policy, while the MICITI remained formally in charge of integration affairs, hence causing inter-
ministerial conflicts in the conduction of trade negotiations in the ALADI and Andean Group 
scope (SO Brandes 15/02/05). 
Once again, the institutional setting was strongly modified under the administration of 
Alberto Fujimori. In times of rationalisation and macroeconomic crisis, the oversized ICE staff 
disappeared in 1991. But the responsibilities held by ICE were not transferred “neatly” to the 
Ministry of Industry, Domestic Trade, Tourism and Integration, as Victoria Elmore observed 
(SO 2/10/05). While the MEF took over the resolute leadership in the definition of new tariff 
structures and the abolishment non-tariff measures, other areas like trade promotion, contingency 
measures, and international trade negotiations became virtually unaccounted for, and were later 
divided among different ministries. In October 1992 regional and multilateral trade affairs were 
granted legal status when the MICITI was transformed into the Ministry of Industry, Tourism, 
Integration, and International Trade Negotiations (MITINCI). 
During the 1990s, the MITICI operated as a weak agency, since active industrial policies 
almost vanished. With regard to trade policy, the MEF defined the structure of border measures, 
and the 1992-created National Institute of Intellectual Property and Defense of the Competition 
(INDECOPI), became simultaneously in charge of competition policies, protection of intellectual 
property rights and the application of contingency measures. From 1996, the newly created 
PROMPEX hosted trade promotion actions in the scope of the office of the Vice-President. 
 Moreover, the orthodox-liberal economic policy inside the MEF, which lead reform 
endeavours in the 1990s, left no space for independent policy making as regards international 
trade policy affairs. Adolfo Lopez (OE 9/02/05), former Vice-Minister of Integration 1990-91 
and currently a CAN official, recalled; “when Peru was about to suspend its participation in 
1992, Minister of Economy, Carlos Boloña, invited himself to the meetings of the CAN 
Commission. Boloña sat next to Peru’s formal MITINCI representative and instructed him to 
sign the documents under his supervision and will.” For Lopez (ibid.), the limitation of 
MITINCI’s negotiation role was t an extent self-inflicted. “Our negotiators who came over (the 
CAN headquarter is located in Lima) were never able to negotiate the official position designed 
by the MEF. Consequently, they did not provide sound technical arguments to the Andean 
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partners indicating why Peru wished to pursue the flat rate, and based on what fiscal reasons 
Peru could not immediately liberalise intra-regional trade.” 
Studying the internal structure of the MITINCI office, this lack of coherent trade policy 
in the Andean scope is reflected by the two opposing “schools”, which prevented, as of 1991, the 
creation of a concerted position within the ministerial staff. 
 
Table 5.3: The Two Trade Policy “Schools” inside the MITINCI  
 “Integration School” “Foreign Trade School” 
Policy Rationale Favoured the Springboard Model 
in maintaining close relations 
with the Andean states. 
Favoured the Multipolar Model in 
withdrawing from the CAN and 
furthering bilateral relations with the US 
and APEC states. 
 
Leaders and 
Institutional 
Scope 
Eduardo Brandes; Head of the 
National Directorate of 
Integration Affairs 
Victoria Elmore; Head of the Foreign 
Trade Advisory Unit and (from 2000) 
National Director of Multilateral Affairs 
 
Strategic 
Partners 
Manufacturers (SNI) Ministry of Economy and Finance 
(MEF) 
Source: SO’s Sánchez (9/07/04); Elmore (10/05/05) ; Brandes (15/02/05)  
 
In general terms, the staff inside the National Directorate of Integration Affairs (until 
2000 this was the only division of the Vice-Ministry of Integration and International Trade 
Negotiations) put forward a rather heterodox policy approach in favouring subregional, i.e. 
Andean, integration schemes and coordinating closely with the local industry associated to the 
National Society of Industry (SNI). In doing so, Eduardo Brandes, head of this division, veered 
from the rhetoric sustained by most (Vice-) Ministers in charge during the 1990s, as well by the 
Foreign Trade Advisory Unit that operated rather informally until 2000 in the Vice-Ministerial 
Office. This unit, directed by Victoria Elmore, shared the orthodox-liberal policy goals of the 
MEF in sustaining the flat rate concept and the need to withdraw from the CAN.  
According to Victoria Elmore (SO 10/02/05), her point of view first began to be 
considered at the end of the 1990s, coinciding with Alfredo Ferrero taking office in March 1999. 
Ferrero, who was invited to become the Vice-Minister of Integration and International Trade 
Negotiations, began to encourage the hemispheric and pacific forums of FTAA and APEC and 
argued in favour of a steady expansion toward new markets. To accentuate the new geographical 
priorities, the National Directorate of Multilateral Affairs was established in 2000. Under 
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Alfredo Ferrero (who remained in office during four years under the constant changes of office 
holders and was appointed as Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism in November 2003) the 
“foreign trade school” gained rising recognition among state and business actors. Finally, a 
vigorous lobby undertaken by Ferrero and Raúl Diez Canseco (Minister and Vice-President 
07/2001-11/2003) led to the creation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism 
(MINCETUR) in May 2002, which was further backed by an IDB loan of US$5 million (IDB 
2002). 
Separated from industrial policy, the MINCETUR assumed the responsibility for the 
formulation and execution of export promotion schemes and the conduction and coordination of 
trade negotiations in the regional and multilateral spheres. However, as regards the transparency 
of those responsibilities, the survey carried out from March to October 2004 among 51 experts, 
state officials and business representatives suggested a somewhat ambiguous picture. The survey 
candidates were asked: Inside the executive branch, is there a clear division of labour in the 
conduction of international trade policy affairs? If not, in what areas can ambiguity be 
identified? 
 
Table 5.4: Division of Labour in International Trade Policy Affairs  
 Experts (11) State Officials (15) Business (25) Total (51) 
very clear 0 0 3 3   (8%) 
rather clear 6 5 9 20 (53%) 
rather unclear 3 6 6 15 (39%) 
very unclear 0 0 0 0   (0%) 
no response 2 4 7 13 
 
Although no responses considered the division of labour as very ambiguous, almost 40 
percent of respondents had some difficulty in clearly ascribing the ministerial roles in 
international trade policy affairs. Analysing the answers categorically, it is surprising that state 
officials tended to perceive responsibilities as less clear than experts and business 
representatives. As evidence, several officials highlighted the unresolved issue of the division of 
work between MINCETUR and the Ministry of External Affairs, Peru’s official negotiator 
abroad and coordinator also in foreign economic affairs. For example, regular conflicts arouse in 
the WTO scope as the mission in Geneva is in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 
this regard, a MINCETUR official objected that the Ministry’s multilateral competencies were 
often undermined as the reports from Geneva related to ongoing multilateral talks were often late 
or incomplete (SO February 2004).  
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Insofar as business, the vast majority of respondents recognised MINCETUR as a very 
clear leader in ongoing international negotiations, while the role of the Ministries of Production 
and Foreign Affairs were described as insignificant. Conversely, the peak entity representing 
domestic market oriented farmers, CONVEAGRO, considered the Ministry of Agriculture as the 
main negotiator unit, and hence, tried to minimise the role of the open market-oriented 
MINCETUR staff. The metal industry still perceived the MEF as the agency that holds the 
ultimate decision in crucial moments. Above all, the (changing) role of the MEF was discussed 
by experts stressing the agencies key policy-making position in the 1990s. Thereafter, 
commentaries portrayed the MEF as a “super agency” where the economic model was developed 
without interference from other departments. Conversely in 2004, the MEF was still perceived as 
the most powerful ministry, but other economic policy areas, such as MINCETUR, gained 
institutional weight inside the government of Ricardo Toledo (2001-2006). 
In the 2003-04 period, international trade negotiations took place under the permanent 
participation of no less than five ministries and numerous specialised bodies, such as INDECOPI 
and the National Customs Authority who acted as providers of technical support on specific 
topics (Box 5.2). This organisation model demanded that MINCETUR adopt a distinct role as 
coordinator, as the contribution of a broad range of policy areas was required. The survey results 
provided in 2004 indicated, nonetheless, clear shortcomings regarding the pattern of inter-
ministerial coordination. In this regard, the questionnaire asked: Is their close inter-ministerial 
coordination among the departments involved in International trade policy affairs? If not, in 
what areas can coordination gaps be identified? 
 
Table 5.5: Inter-Ministerial Trade Policy Coordination 
 Experts (11) State Officials (15) Business (25) Total (51) 
very close 0 0 0 0   (0%) 
rather close 0 2 6 8   (23%) 
rather sporadic 7 8 8 23 (66%) 
very sporadic 1 1 2 4   (11%) 
no response 3 4 9 16 
 
The results turned out to be fairly identical throughout the categories, given that no sector 
considered the inter-ministerial coordination pattern as a very close, and only 8 out of the 35 
answers rated coordination efforts as rather close. Apart from the usually lamented absence of 
“the culture of sharing information and of inter-agency teamwork”, the most commonly stated 
shortcomings involved three major aspects: 
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1) Competition: As indicated, competition persisted between the MINCETUR staff, 
representing the new dynamic trade policy, and the cadre of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, as Peru’s official negotiators abroad. 
2) Policy Approaches: Each staff followed its own trade integration concept. MINCETUR 
officials claimed to be the vigorous force in opening markets through bilateral 
agreements worldwide. The interest of the MEF officials was to maintain uniform tariff 
rates and to further unilateral liberalisation. The US free trade talks were considered only 
as a pragmatic tool for the consolidation of the liberal model implemented in the 1990s 
which would weaken moreover the Andean Community’s influence. The Ministry of 
Agriculture advocated the defensive rural interests and sought to slow down trade 
liberalisation via international negotiations. Lastly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
pursued (with little success) the opportunity to foster economic integration in South 
American integration, considering this to be a useful tool for foreign policies. 
3) Style of Governance: Despite the fact that the MEF and MINCETUR, as trade policy 
agencies, shared important policy goals such as the relationship with the US and the 
consolidation of economic reforms, their style of governance contrasted markedly. In this 
regard, a young MEF official claimed, significantly, “MINCETUR fellows are captured 
by business factions and lack consistent policies” (October 2004). Conversely, a group of 
MINCETUR officials lamented “When MEF officials enter, all good intentions 
immediately come to an end”, indicating the orthodoxy upheld by the MEF officials as 
regards predictable fiscal policies and the flat rate concept (February 2005). Hence, the 
MEF maintained distant relations with business factions in order to sustain its 
technocratic style of governance. 
 
As outlined in Box 5.2, despite inter-agency divisions, in the scope of the US-AFTA talks the 
Peruvian government sustained a formal organisational chart in which inter-ministerial 
coordination was shown on both the political and the negotiation level through the Multisectoral 
Commission and the Technical Committee, respectively. On the political level, the US-AFTA 
talks initiated by MINCETUR enjoyed strong presidential support, given that they were defined 
as a key project for the enhancement of the limited popularity of Alejandro Toledo’s presidency.6  
 
                                               
6 In 2004-05, the popularity of the Toledo administration oscillated between 5 and 15 percent. 
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Box 5.2: Peruvian State Organisation in US-AFTA Talks 
Political Level: Multisectoral Commission 
Head: Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism - Alfredo Ferrero 
Members: Vice-Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministries of Economy and Finance; Foreign Affairs; 
Production; Agriculture; Mining and Energy; Justice; Health and Labour; Embassy in Washington 
Negotiation Level: Technical Committee 
Head and Chief Negotiator: Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade – Pablo De la Flor 
Members: MINCETUR and Ministries of Economy and Finance; Foreign Affairs; Agriculture; 
Production 
Area Responsibilities 
MINCETUR: Market Access; Customs Procedures; Technical Obstacles; Trade Defence and 
Competition Policy; Dispute Settlement; Capacity Building; Electronic Trade; Labour and 
Environment Protection 
MEF: Service 
PROINVERSION: Investment 
MINAG: Agriculture 
INDECOPI: Intellectual Property 
SENASA: (Phyto-) Sanitary Measures 
Source: www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe 
 
On the negotiation level, coordination mechanisms depended mostly on informal links 
among key bureaucrats. Rather than maintain plenary sessions in the Technical Committee, 
Chief Negotiator Pablo De la Flor, according to a young MINCETUR negotiator (February 
2005), was said to prefer individual meetings with the main negotiators of each area. Proceeding 
in this manner, Pablo De la Flor possessed a privileged position as he was the only one who 
accurately knew the possible trade offs among the areas involved. This “bilateral strategy” 
allowed De la Flor to better control the influence of key officials, above all Eduardo Brandes 
(MINCETUR), head of the market access area and Javier Illescas (MEF), who directed service 
negotiations. Nonetheless, by February 2005, during my last field trip in Peru, these talks were 
still ongoing, pending revealing final stage actions in these historic talks. 
 
Resources 
When analysing the human and financial resources involved in trade policy making since 1985, 
three distinct periods can be highlighted. The first phase covers the time prior to 1990 and 
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implies the ISI model that was embodied paradigmatically in the Foreign Trade Institute (ICE) 
created in 1987. The ICE, in charge of regulating import and export trade, among others, rapidly 
evolved into a fast expanding bureaucratic space where politics, hyper-legalism and corruption 
reigned. Although the ICE started with 170 officials in 1987, the number of employees involved 
in the administration of foreign trade increased to 900 in 1990 (OE Cornejo 4/10/04; SO Elmore 
10/02/05). The areas of promotion and negotiation continued to operate in a rather autonomous 
way however, and remained “technical bodies” with no more than 30 professionals (SO Elmore 
10/02/05). 
The second phase started with an abrupt decline of resources in 1990-2001, as instructed 
by the Fujimori government. In particular, agencies coupled with state interventionism, such as 
the ICE, the National Planning Institute (IPE), and state owned development banks were 
abolished, as they contravened the initiated market-oriented model. In the case of ICE, only a 
small number of about 10-15 officials were transferred to the Ministry of Industry, Domestic 
Trade, Tourism and Integration (MITICI). At first, this group was practically unaccounted for, 
since the enacted austerity plan prohibited the hiring of new personnel, as Victoria Elmore 
commented (ibid.). As a result, the small number of ICE officials (who had committed 
themselves not to work for the public sector during five years) entered MITICI as a part of a 
“Trade Development Project” that was initially supported by a private sector fund. After roughly 
one year, the local business entities refused to continue funding trade policy staff, and thus, the 
payment of salaries came to depend on means provided by the World Bank, and later, the 
Andean Development Corporation (CAF). 
Simultaneously, the integration area in the MITICI (later MITINCI) also suffered from 
severe budget cuts. Adolfo Lopez, Vice-Minister of Integration (1990-91) reflected (OE 
9/10/05): “The MITINCI was one of the entities most affected by the austerity plans; the state 
could not dismiss teachers, doctors, or policemen since they were indispensable, but MITICI 
meant the fullest expression of bureaucratic inefficiency for the sake of producing onerous 
paperwork involved in the regulation of domestic trade, subsidies, and price controls. During the 
eight months I stayed in office, I was compelled to reduce the staff in the Vice-Ministry from 100 
to 30 employees including chauffeurs, and in the entire Ministry from 2.500 to 800.” In the 
following years, the MITINCI staff further reduced, ending up with just 180 employees, as Jaime 
Garcia, Vice-Minister of Integration and International Trade Negotiations in the mid-1990s, 
reported (OE 07/07/04). On this basis, both the regional and the multilateral areas were relegated 
during the 1990s, and were covered by no more than a handful of policy experts. While the 
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multilateral area operated as an advisory unit in the Vice-Ministerial Office, regional affairs were 
dealt with in the National Directorate of Integration Affairs. 
Lastly, the third phase was developed gradually. For Jaime Garcia (ibid.), the FTAA talks 
launched at the Santiago Summit in 1998 “served as a clear dynamic force” that subsequently 
entailed a vibrant institutional development during the administration of Alfredo Ferrero. Aware 
of the domestic shortcomings, as of July 2002 striking efforts were undertaken in the scope of 
the new MINCETUR to create a team of trade policy advisors capable of handling the 
demanding international trade policy scenario. In contrast to the 1990s, “today, the country’s 
best negotiators are convened, though certain areas are not adequately dealt with by the still 
rather modest team”, concluded Garcia.  
The impression stated by the former MITINCI official was corroborated, to a great 
extent, by data from the 2004 survey. The following question was posed: Is the official team in 
charge of international trade policy affairs adequately staffed in order to comply with the 
technical requirements of modern international trade policy affairs (staff size, talent and 
experience)? If not, in what areas/issues can limitations be found? 
 
Table 5.6: Trade Policy Staff 
 Experts (11) State Officials (15) Business (25) Total (51) 
absolutely adequate 0 1 0 1   (2%) 
rather adequate 3 1 11 15 (34%) 
rather inadequate 5 11 9 25 (57%) 
very inadequate 1 1 1 3   (7%) 
no response 2 1 4 7 
 
Strikingly, it was the business sector that made the most positive assessment of the official 
negotiation team, perceiving its capacities as even higher than state officials, who considered 
their own skills in only 2 out of 14 given responses as adequate. In this issue, it stands out that 
business responses primarily made reference to market access issues, and hence, to areas in 
which MINCETUR negotiators enjoyed accumulated experience in the scope of ALADI. In 
contrast to the business sector, both experts and state officials placed emphasis on the lack of 
specialists in new trade topics, particularly in services, competition policy, state procurement, 
intellectual property, and environmental measures. However, in all these categories, objections 
pointed at the rather small team and the fact that the majority of “MINCETUR boys” barely had 
any field experience. Consequently, the main responsibility in the ongoing talks was still in the 
hands of a handful of functionaries who had acquired experience since the 1980s. According to 
ministerial structures in 2004, negotiation expertise could be found in the following agencies. 
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MINCETUR – Vice-Ministry of Foreign Trade (VMCE): In July 2004, MINCETUR staff 
totalled 467 employees, involving the Ministerial Office, the Vice-Ministries of Tourism and 
Foreign Trade, and several decentralised agencies (MINCETUR 2004b). The VMCE had 96 
functionaries. Of these, about 40 could be considered a part of the official negotiation team; 
these were spread through the National Directorates of Integration, Multilateral and Bilateral 
Affairs. The latter area emerged as a result of the reorganisation that took place in February 
2004, in an attempt to respond to trade talks with the US and future bilateral efforts. In 
December 2003, the VMCE began introducing a matrix organisation based on geographical and 
issue areas, and thus, mimicked the organisational model applied by Chile, Mexico and the US. 
Nevertheless, I had difficulties when gathering sound data, due to the fact that the official 
structure was virtually suspended during the US-AFTA talks which started in May 2004 and 
involved “practically the entire VMCE”, according to comments made by officials during my 
visits to Lima. In this regard, critical voices remarked that MINCETUR had become a “single 
issues agency,” neglecting other crucial affairs for local export development. 
Aside from MINCETUR, who represented the majority of the official team, 20 
negotiators originated from other state agencies. Table 5.7 provides an overview of the internal 
structure of the five main areas outside MINCETUR, involved in the US-AFTA talks. 
 
Table 5.7: The Peruvian Negotiation Team beyond the MINCETUR  
 MEF MINAG Foreign Affairs PRODUCE INDECOPI 
Entity in 
Charge 
General 
Directorate of 
International 
Economy 
National 
Office of 
Agrarian 
Planning 
Undersecretariat 
of Economic 
Affairs & 
International 
Negotiations 
General 
Directorate 
of Industry 
Intellectual 
Property 
Tribunal 
Negotiators/ 
Assistants 
3/6 4/8 3/7 2/12 3/6 
Areas Financial 
services, market 
access 
Agriculture, 
sanitary rules 
(SENASA) 
Market access, 
intellectual 
property  
Technical 
norms, 
environment 
Intellectual 
property, 
trade 
defence 
Labour 
Regime 
Temporary 
Contracts 
Temporary 
contracts 
Diplomatic 
career 
Temporary 
contracts 
Private 
sector 
regime 
Evaluation Important but 
small area 
Strengthened 
as of 1999 
Small area Domestic 
involvement   
Important 
but small 
area 
Source: SO’s Sanchez 9/07/04 (MEF); Romero 24/02/04 (MINAG); García 9/07/04 (INDECOPI); Alfaro 12/07/04 
(Foreign Affairs); Talavera 13/07/04 (Produce). 
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Studying Table 5.7, the staff monitoring and analysing international trade negotiations 
was rather weakly doted. Out with MINCETUR, an organisational strengthening took place only 
in the Ministry of Agriculture, which had been strongly affected by structural adjustment policies 
at the beginning of the 1990s. While the Uruguay Round came to an end without the steady 
participation of the Ministry of Agriculture, since 1999 a team of young economists has been 
gradually formed in order to carry out professional assessments in this crucial negotiation area. 
In general terms, state reforms set forth as of the 1990s did not cover the strengthening of 
bureaucratic staff in most areas of the central government. Although several well equipped, 
autonomous, state agencies were established for the administration of taxes, market and banking 
regulations, the planned wide-reaching public administration reforms could not be carried out 
due to an insufficient political will to enter into such complex reforms of the so-called second 
generation. Within the central government, during the 1990s emphasis was placed only on the 
financial area, above all the MEF and the Central Bank, where bureaucratic quality could be 
enhanced by generous contracts financed by the World Bank and the UNDP (Wise 2003: 254-
166; OE Morón 11/02/2005). In recent years though, labour regimes sustained by international 
donors have expanded more and more towards other Ministries. Aside from career diplomats in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I did not meet a single high-ranking official whose salary was 
not paid by international donor funds or enjoyed special advisory status – with good reason. For 
example, in the case of Eduardo Brandes, as chief negotiator in the market access area, it simply 
did not pay to continue working in the bureaucratic career as salaries barely exceeded US$1,000, 
vis-à-vis labour regimes applicable to temporary officials who were paid monthly salaries of up 
to US$5,000 for top positions, including special advisors (BR Brandes 15/02/05).  
As of July 2004, only 20 percent of the VMCE staff was permanent, and mainly covered 
administrative personnel. Another 20 percent corresponded to short-term government contracts, 
which required renewal every three to six months. The remaining officials worked under 
contracts supported by the UNDP, and to a lesser extent, by the IDB. In this case, most contracts 
lasted one year and did not cover social security benefits in the same way as government 
contracts. Top salaries of US$3,000 and up were allocated under special circumstances for a 
small number of top officials and special advisors in the Ministry and Vice-Ministry, where 
transparency was widely absent.7 Therefore, the bureaucratic staff in the trade policy area was 
unstable and resembled the common situation in the Peruvian State. The lack of reliable 
                                               
7 However, the formal salary structure for MINCETUR officials determined monthly earnings from US$900 for 
assistants and junior Technical Staff, US$1100 for professionals, US$1500 for Assistant Directors, US$1750 for 
Directors, and US$1900 for General Directors; see SO Franco (14/02/05); MINCETUR (2005b). 
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employment perspectives is explained by the prevalence of short-term contracts and the 
dependence of political or personal connections when appointing state officials, thus, rendering 
the civil service an unrewarding enterprise (OE Morón 11/02/2005). Consequently, a position in 
the MINCETUR might be an excellent springboard for graduates from national elite schools 
such as the Catholic, Pacific and Lima Universities to obtain overseas fellowships, or a job offer 
in a multinational company, an international organisation or a well endowed NGO, but provides 
virtually no promising long-term career perspectives. 
 
Openness 
Until recently, claims for enhanced transparency in the making of trade policies were largely 
absent. For example, “the Congress approved in blank the Uruguay agreements, negotiated by a 
handful of Peruvian officials” as Alan Fairlie observed (2003: 2), underlining the indifference as 
regards the evolution of the multilateral trading system. The “closer” Andean integration process 
faced a similar apathy. “Unfortunately, our integration endeavours are long-term oriented 
policies that have not been shared by the societies. Probably most of the limeños (people from 
Lima) do not even know that the CAN headquarters is located in their city”, lamented a CAN 
official (OE Larrazabal 24/02/04). For most observers, the FTAA process brought foreign trade 
affairs into a broader public sphere for the first time. It was the combination of the US 
involvement and the efforts of top policy makers to emphasise the concerns of exporters in the 
political arena that made the Peruvian people more aware of the properties of ongoing free trade 
talks. Therefore, in May 2004 the US-AFTA talks soon became a daily political topic in which 
most Peruvians held an opinion. 
From the official side, a new style of policy making was introduced, especially with the 
founding of MINCETUR in July 2002. For MINCETUR officials it has become an integral part 
of their work – in part due to personal political ambitions – to heighten awareness as regards the 
official trade policy strategy, among civil society, the Legislative and the private sector, and 
hence, to commit those sectors. Furthermore, the US$5 million loan granted by the IDB in the 
scope of the Foreign Trade Policy Development Program (IDB 2002) placed special emphasis on 
the strengthening of dissemination activities and consultative mechanisms. This “new openness” 
came into view with abundant trade policy information provided by the web page www.tlcperu-
eeuu.gob.pe, public lectures before and after negotiation rounds, trade policy reviews and 
bulletins, dialogue at negotiations inside the “room next door” with congressmen, civil activists, 
labour and business, and finally, strong media presence (Araoz 2004; OE Araoz 23/02/04). 
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These efforts were also manifested in the survey data from 2004. Concerning 
transparency in trade policy affairs, experts and business representatives were asked: In your 
opinion, does the government take adequate measures to ensure transparency concerning 
advances and possible impacts of ongoing international trade negotiations? Can improvements 
be noted in the last ten years as regards such? Almost two thirds of answers indicated a very or 
rather transparent conduction of trade negotiations. Moreover, 17 out of 21 private sector 
responses indicated that transparency exhibited in 2004 was superior when compared with the 
1990s concerning trade policy-making in the sphere of the WTO and CAN. Critical voices 
against the information provided stemmed from sectors that were threatened by the US-AFTA 
talks; i.e. the rural sector, national laboratories, and SME companies in general. For example, the 
concern of these areas was the lack of detailed information on updated draft texts. General 
objections were expressed by various organisations in Arequipa (Peru’s second largest city, 
located in the south), indicating that regions are largely omitted from centralised trade policy-
making processes. 
 
Table 5.8: Transparency in International Trade Policy Affairs 
 Experts (11) Business (25) Total (36) 
very transparent 3 7 10 (31%) 
rather transparent 3 9 12 (38%) 
rather non-transparent 2 7 9   (28%) 
very non-transparent 1 0 1   (3%) 
no response 2 2 4 
 
Negative perceptions related to transparency exhibited by official negotiators could be noted also 
among left-wing representatives opposed to the free trade talks, such as Humberto Campodónico 
from the State University of San Marcos (OE 14/12/05). In this regard, these voices usually 
pointed at the intolerable confidential provisions within the trade talks imposed by the US 
government. However, when compared with the strong opposition emerging in Bolivia, local 
trade unions, NGO’s, and universities remained largely dormant. Even though a “Movement 
against the FTAA” was established and began to coordinate actions against free hemispheric 
trade, Teivo Teivanen from the San Marcos University observed that in Peru the left-wing 
movement is still very weak and fragmented after the Fujimori regime in the 1990s eradicated 
not only the ideological roots of the terrorist groups like the Shining Path, but also the social 
base of left-wing parties and movements (OE Teivanen 2/10/04). 
Regarding interaction patterns with the private sector, on the other hand, the Fujimori 
administration required a reliable coalition with business interlocutors to attain the sound 
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implementation of market-oriented reforms. Therefore, the authoritarian leader, more than any 
other civilian force, prompted the business sector to participate in the new economic ruling. Key 
elements of this business friendly government style, according to Francisco Durand (1998), were 
the steady exchange with the National Confederation of Private Entrepreneurship Institutions 
(CONFIEP), the State President’s continuous presence at the Annual Business Executives 
Conferences (CADE) and the appointment of entrepreneurs and business representatives as key 
officials in economic areas. 
In the trade policy area, however, state-business relations turned out to be more 
conflictive and distant. Crucially, it was above all the local manufacturers associated to the 
National Industry Society (SNI) who opposed the flat rate concept pursued by the policy-makers 
of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. For Herbert Mulanovic, the SNI’s Institutional 
Advisor, the technocratic and often dogmatic style of governance did not favour a collaborative 
climate with the industrial branches which saw themselves increasingly threatened by foreign 
competitors (BR 11/02/05).  
In contrast, the relations with MITINCI were more fluid in general, according to 
Mulanovich, since its officials were usually more familiar with the problems faced by local 
manufacturers. Particularly, in recent years the office holders from MITINCI (and later from 
MINCETUR and the Production Ministry) entered into a strategic alliance with the SNI, the 
Exporters Associations (ADEX), and to a lesser extent, with the Lima Chamber of Commerce 
(CCL), and the Exporters Society (COMEX). Actions undertaken in February 2004 were para-
digmatic of this situation. Faced by devastating popularity rates (below 10 percent at that time) 
President Alejandro Toledo decided to reorganise the Ministerial Cabinet. To avoid mandatory 
resignations to office, the head of MINCETUR, Alfredo Ferrero, called the leading business 
entities to back his administration (El Comercio 15/02/04). In the aftermath, Ferrero remained in 
his post, whereas Alfonso Velásquez, at that time President of ADEX, was appointed Minister of 
Production. 
Those close personal ties were evidently reflected in the survey data from 2004. The 
surveyed people were asked: Does the government closely coordinate with business associations 
in trade policy affairs, involving the conduction of international trade negotiations and the 
implementation of trade agreements? If not, in what sectors/issues can coordination gaps be 
identified? More than 70 percent of the respondents considered state-business coordination as 
very or rather close. On the business side, practically without exception, the industry and export 
representatives made positive comments on the openness of MINCETUR’s officials. Negative 
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opinions stemmed mostly from certain sectors complaining of a lack of transparency, i.e. 
domestic market oriented agriculture, small manufacturers, regional chambers, and national 
laboratories. These chambers preferred direct contact with their corresponding sector Ministries 
of Agriculture and Health or tried to channel their concerns through the legislative powers. 
 
Table 5.9: State-Business Coordination 
 Experts (11) State Officials (15) Business (25) Total (51) 
very close 3 1 8 12 (26%) 
rather close 6 7 8 21 (46%) 
rather sporadic 1 4 5 10 (22%) 
very sporadic 0 1 2 3   (6%) 
no response 1 2 2 5 
 
Despite the mostly close perceived coordination, the consultation mechanisms used by 
the MINCETUR were characterised as ad-hoc. While Pablo De la Flor (Vice-Minister) and 
Alfredo Ferrero (Minister) usually provided general overviews before and after each negotiation 
round, the head of (sub) areas frequently invited the business entities involved to meetings for 
consultation with the sectors and to coordinate positions among the entities. In this regard, 
responses revealed that areas such as agriculture, services and investment, coordinated by 
officials from the MINAG and the MEF were marked by a rather or very high degree of business 
openness. Moreover, during the US-AFTA talks the public-private exchange was facilitated by 
the Entrepreneurial Council of International Negotiations (CENI), an initiative born inside the 
business sector, as I shall expose in the next section. 
 
Summary Independent Variable A1 
In general, the institutional strength of Peru’s state bureaucracy in the area of international trade 
policy affairs has been rather low, although intra-case variance could be noticed. Since 2002, the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR) has held the responsibilities in export 
related issues, hence trying to overcome inter-ministerial conflicts in this policy area. Regarding 
the variable dimension resources, the international trade policy expertise, mostly absent during 
the 1990s, was considerable strengthened by the creation of MINCETUR. With respect to 
openness, MINCETUR, in particular, maintains very close relations with the leading trade and 
industry chambers. 
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Box 5.3: Summary Independent Variable A1  
Responsibilities Resources  Openness 
Set by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEF), in the 1990s 
trade policy responded strictly to 
unilateral adjustment policy 
logic, thus leaving little room for 
trade integration concerns. 
Since 2002, the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Tourism 
(MINCETUR) was created to 
define and coordinate all aspects 
related to the development of 
national exports. The division of 
labour in international trade 
policy among the numerous 
agencies involved remained 
complex though. 
In the 1990s, the number of 
trade policy advisors with 
negotiation experience 
reduced to just a handful. 
As of 2002, a negotiation 
team was formed in the 
MINCETUR scope. Deficits 
remained regarding the lack 
of field experience on the 
part of young negotiators and 
the still scarce expertise in 
new trade issues. 
 
Particularly the key officials 
of MINCETUR made 
international trade policy 
affairs – above all the FTAA 
and US-AFTA talks – 
popular within society.  
With regard to state-business 
coordination, the building of 
strategic alliances between 
MINCETUR officials and 
trade and industry entities has 
become a key element of 
policy making. 
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5.3 Organised Business: Between Solid and Fragile Rock 
 
This section is structured in accordance with the variable dimensions of the Independent 
Variable A2. The first subsection, Institutional Leadership, analyses the domestic attempts to 
establish a widely recognised peak or “umbrella” association, capable of coordinating economic 
policies between the leading sectoral and regional representatives. It further describes the 
institutional mechanism aimed at the intermediation of trade interests among leading sectoral and 
regional representatives. The second subsection, Organisational Strength, makes an assessment 
of the professionalism involved in business advocacy, stressing the domestic pattern of 
financing, participatory behaviour, and in-house trade policy expertise. The last subsection 
summarises the results and provides an overview of the business representation pattern from 
1985 to 2004. 
 
Institutional Leadership 
In “From Fragile Crystal to Solid Rock” (1995), Francisco Durand elucidates how Peru’s 
entrepreneurship was able, after several failed attempts, to establish a multisectoral organisation 
in 1984 that increasingly acted as the single business spokesmen on the national level.8 Box 5.4 
highlights four reasons necessary to explain the institutional setting that allowed, in November 
1984, the organisation of the National Confederation of Private Entrepreneurship Institutions 
(CONFIEP) integrating seven main sector associations from manufacturing, mining, fishing, 
export, commerce and construction. 
 
                                               
8 A first attempt to join business took place in 1974, when the SNI created a “United Front for the Defence of 
Private Property” to oppose the nationalisation of the fishing industry. Nonetheless, most associations did not dare 
challenge the authoritarian regime in search of a state-led economy and opted to be passive to avoid trouble, for 
example, having in mind the mandatory dissolution of the elite National Agrarian Society in the context of the 
agrarian reform implemented in 1969 (Durand 1995: 148). After General Juan Velasco left office in 1975, private 
sector entities continued to be divided although the government’s was less hostile to capitalists. The Peruvian Union 
of Private Entrepreneurs (UEPP) created in 1977 by the trade and industry chambers, for example, ceased activities 
after six months. In this case, Durand argued (ibid.:149) that policy makers sought to exacerbate internal divisions 
by granting special favours to exporters and diversified business groups while seeking to isolate industrialists. 
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Box 5.4: The Four Reasons that Explain the Creation of CONFIEP 
Return to 
Democracy 
The adoption of a new Constitution in 1979 and the return to democracy in 1980 
emphasised the right for free organisation and the search for concerted actions 
among the local business and labour sectors. 
 
Personal 
Leadership 
A generation of political business leaders, such as Jorge Calmet, Alfonso 
Bustamante or Arturo Woodman (known as gremialistas) fought for the creation 
and recognition of a formal peak organisation. Thereafter, the gremialistas 
attempted to institutionalise the policy dialogue with the government and to 
identify common positions beyond short-sighted sectoral needs. 
 
Economic 
Crisis 
Severe economic decline and increasing unemployment in 1983-84 urged the 
local business leaders to coordinate their actions so as pressure the government 
to insure predictable economic policies. 
 
Tangible 
Advocacy 
Outcome 
Three months prior to CONFIEP’s creation, the coordinated action of the main 
sector associations prevented governmental plans from increasing taxes on credit 
transactions, i.e. the increase was only marginal (from 7 to 10, instead of 17 
percent). 
Source: own elaboration based on Durand 1995: 150-153 
 
The breakthrough, related to the consolidation of a “solid business rock”, occurred in 
1987, however, when the CONFIEP membership managed to block the nationalisation of the 
banking sector. Prior to this, the populist governance style of the left-wing leader, Alan García, 
had marginalised formal business entities and maintained fluid relations “only with the big 
ones,” in other words, with the country’s largest multisectoral conglomerates, known as grupos.9 
As these informal channels proved to be more fruitful, for example, reaching individual tax 
stability contracts, the grupos that held important assets in the finance, manufacturing and 
commodity sectors were reluctant to bet their resources on the new official alliance, and thus, 
undermined CONFIEP’s internal recognition.10 
But the situation changed markedly at the time when Alan García announced the 
nationalisation of the banking sector in July 1987, which severely affected the basic principles of 
private entrepreneurship. Therefore, the most influential business sectors supported the 
                                               
9 For example, a widespread modification of tax incentives for economic sectors had been approved two days after 
Christmas 1985, without prior consultation. While business as a whole was negatively affected, foreign and large 
national companies were entitled to sign tax stability contracts with the government for a specific term. 
10 For example, CONFIEP faced certain competition levels with the Peruvian Institute of Business Administration 
(IPAE), comprised only by individual companies, and set forth a distinctive informal dialogue with the state. IPAE, 
founded in 1962, was also responsible for the organisation of the Annual Conference of Executives (CADE) that as 
of the late 1960’s became the major business-government event of the year; see Durand 1985: 139-140. 
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CONFIEP in order to strengthen multisectoral coordination patterns. As a result, the state 
intervention in the banking sector could be mostly avoided and the umbrella organisation 
consolidated itself as an acknowledged business interlocutor in central economic policy areas. 
By 1988, CONFIEP had managed to notably expand its membership by increasing the number of 
affiliates from an initial 7 to 23 associated chambers (Durand 1995: 163-167). 
By the time Alberto Fujimori came into office, the institutional leadership of CONFIEP 
favoured the establishment of efficient state-business relations. Hence, the umbrella organisation 
became the main supporter of the ongoing structural adjustment reforms. Although industrial 
sectors could no longer expect extensive subsidies, the associated entrepreneurship as a whole 
supported the wide-reaching liberal reforms embracing taxes, foreign trade, investment, labour 
regulations, and the privatisation of state owned companies.  
The support went beyond economic reforms and involved affinity with the governmental 
fight against terrorism in particular, and in general the turn towards a “semi-authoritarian” ruling 
launched through the self-coup in April 1992.11 Until the Fujimori regime collapsed in the midst 
of the political crisis in 2000, a majority group inside CONFIEP was convinced that hardliner 
policies inline with Chile’s authoritarian experience were inevitable in order to overcome the 
prevalent structural lags of the local economy (Durand 1998; Caretas 04/04/02). The fluid state-
business relations were underscored by numerous entrepreneurs holding key positions. For 
example, in January 1993, Diego Calmet, a business tycoon from the construction sector, 
CONFIEP President (1990-91) and early gremialista,, was appointed as Minister of Economy 
and Finance. Consequently, during the following six years Calmet ruled over the super agency 
and maintained tight connections with the CONFIEP authorities. 
Calmet’s long permanence in office (until May 1998), however, did not render 
harmonising effects on the internal composition of the peak entity. Throughout the second 
administration of Alberto Fujimori (1995-2000), clear conflict lines emerged between the 
“productive sectors” headed by the SNI, and the service oriented areas, i.e. banking, insurance, 
privatised public utilities, construction, and the national mining and fishery societies. The 
conflict stalled in March 1998 as the affiliates were not able to agree on the consensus oriented 
                                               
11 The political system enacted by Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) converted Peru into a controversial “semi-
authoritarian” regime. In April 1992, as President of the State, Fujimori faced opposition to his reform efforts, and 
dissolved the Parliament through an “auto-coup.” The subsequent power shift inside Congress and the revised 
constitutional provisions enabled the implementation of profound economic reforms, as well as effectively dealing 
with terrorist movements. In any case, democratic checks and balances were increasingly abolished due to the 
presidential influence over the legislative and judicial branches and mass media, heading into a marked top down 
policy making, where policies reflected the presidential will and that of a handful of key technocrats in “super 
agencies” such as the Ministries of Economy and Finance, Presidency, Defense, and National Intelligence Service 
(Wise 2003: 233-287). 
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election system, thus, the group that lost power, composed by the SNI, ADEX and the Lima 
Chamber of Commerce, left the Executive Committee, and in August 1998 created its own 
Entrepreneurial Coordinator of Production and Trade (El Comercio 28/08/98; 25/09/98; 
23/9/98). At CONFIEP’s election in April 1999, inter-sectoral tensions were temporarily lowered 
since the rival alliance accepted the direction of Roque Benavides; President of the National 
Mining Association and Buenaventura, Peru’s largest mining company. The definitive break-off 
occurred in April 2004 nonetheless. At that time, the SNI, ADEX and CCL no longer accepted 
the internal modus operandi and decided to disaffiliate. Box 5.5 underlines the four main factors 
involved in the inter-sectoral conflict initiated as of 1998. 
 
Box 5.5: Factors that Explain the Division inside CONFIEP 
Representation 
Pattern 
When CONFIEP was created in 1984, among the seven founding members 
were the SNI, ADEX and CCL. In the following years, their leverage in the 
expanding Executive Committee drastically decreased considering that most 
new affiliates stemmed from services. Particularly, finance related branches 
increased their level of influence based on the banking association and on 
new members representing pension funds, insurance entities, and stock 
markets. 
 
Pro or Against 
Fujimori 
 
Past presidents from the “service-oriented side,” such as Diego Calmet (90-
91), Arturo Woodman (94-95), Jorge Picasso (96-97) and Manuel 
Sotomayor (98-99) were unconditional “Fujimoristas” because they 
enjoyed special treatment in tax matters, privatisation and state procurement 
affairs. Nevertheless, opposing leaders, such as Eduardo Farah (SNI), 
Manuel Yzaga (SNI) and Carlos Castro (ADEX) were political of the 
Fujimori regime, both from political and economic perspectives. 
 
Economic 
Model 
Beyond the personal level, the sectors most favoured by the liberalisation of 
foreign trade, constitutional guarantees for FDIs, strong local currency and 
privatisations were large scale companies in the mining, finance and public 
utilities sectors. The initial reform consensus began to be bitterly questioned 
as the economy stagnated as of 1998. Therefore, manufacturers and 
exporters vigorously protested and demanded the correction of the services 
and commodity friendly model. 
 
Trade Policy While the services and commodity sectors sustained the MEF plans to reach 
a low flat rate, industrialists and exporters fought for an escalated tariff 
structure similar to the CAN, enabling cheaper inputs and higher protection 
for domestic production. 
Source: El Comercio 22/02/1998 and 13/03/1998; Caretas 05/04/2001 and 04/04/2002 
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The Intermediation of Trade Interests 
One of the main conflict areas was the definition of trade policies. It is clear that as of 1998, 
CONFIEP no longer provided a space where economic sectors were able to coordinate their 
points of view. Apart from the never ending discussions related to tariff structures and the pros 
and cons of the prevailing economic model, the climate inside the peak entity deteriorated due to 
an increasing distrust among business leaders holding opposing political ties and private 
company interests. 
On the other hand, the bustling regionalism both inside and outside Latin America 
persuaded trade and industry chambers to define appropriate institutional settings to respond to 
the challenging international scenarios. With regard to the ambitious FTAA process, it was the 
Lima Chamber of Commerce (CCL), being the country’s largest and most traditional entity, 
which in 1998 gave life to the so-called FTAA-Peru Commission. Under the personal leadership 
of CCL-President, Samuel Gleiser, the FTAA-Peru Commission became a widely acknowledged 
forum where the Peruvian entrepreneurship underlined its affinity with the ongoing hemispheric 
integration project. The following three levels comprised the institution’s action lines: 
1) Working Groups: To monitor the evolution of free trade talks, nine working groups were 
created on the basis of negotiation issues such as market access, services, agriculture, 
investment, and intellectual property rights. Albeit that participation was not balanced 
within the nine working groups, the collaboration covered no less than 16 business 
chambers, four universities and four professional organisations of lawyers and engineers, 
among others (Gleiser 2003). 
2) General Assemblies: By the time the FTAA experienced an impasse in 2004, the FTAA-
Peru Commission had organised 25 General Assemblies. At these events the Working 
Groups presented the topics developed by them, thus facilitating the coordination of 
actions in the framework of Americas’ Business Forum.12 Furthermore, state officials had 
the opportunity to point out their points of view regarding ongoing talks (SO Honorio 
8/07/04, OE Aroaz 23/02/04). 
3) FTAA Forum: As of 2001, the Commission organised the Annual FTAA Forum as a 
platform to disseminate hemispheric projects in a broad public sphere, with extensive 
media presence and an increasing attendance of 300 persons in 2001, 500 in 2002 and 
                                               
12 The Americas Business Forum was organised prior to each Ministerial Conference. Business representatives from 
all over the hemisphere met in workshops and submitted recommendations to the official sector on the framework 
agreement.  
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700 in 2003, originating from the business and political spheres (Gleiser 2003; Empresas 
& Negocios 20/10/2003). 
Despite the broad success in the diffusion and promotion of the hemispheric integration 
project, the leading entities from Lima saw the need to revise the coordination mechanisms 
before the forthcoming bilateral trade talks with the US. Two main problems were identified. 
The entities considered it important to professionalize the internal structure of the commission 
and to expand its underlying objectives, i.e. the institution requires the permanent support of a 
Technical Secretariat to organise the business participation in all possible negotiations in which 
Peru is involved. 
The second problem concerned the overly prominent role of the Lima Chamber of 
Commerce, and above all, of its former President, Samuel Gleiser, who chaired the FTAA-Peru 
Commission. Consequently, the proposal of Gleiser to create the Entrepreneurial Commission of 
International Negotiations in September 2003 was first rejected by the industrial and exporting 
sectors (CENI 2003). After numerous anecdotes came to light with respect to the common 
Vanity Fair among local business leaders, in March 2004 the leading entities finally agreed on 
the creation of the Entrepreneurial Council for International Negotiations (CENI). Roque 
Benavides (president of CONFIEP 1999-2001 and successful mining entrepreneur) was 
appointed President and Political Speaker.  
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A comparison with the FTAA-Peru Commission is shown in Table 5.9, pointing to the principal 
organisational properties of the new CENI. 
 
Table 5.9: Comparison of CENI and the FTAA-Peru Commission  
 CENI FTAA-Peru Commission  
Members 25 16 
Leadership SNI, ADEX, COMEX, CCL CCL 
Absentees CONFIEP, trade unions, civil 
society, universities (with the 
exception of the UP) 
Defensive agrarian interests, small 
manufacturers, trade unions, civil 
society  
Working 
Groups 
8 main groups and 12 subgroups 
mainly in the areas of market 
access  
9 main groups 
Decision 
Making 
Bodies 
Consensus oriented decision 
making in the scope of the 
Multisectoral Council; Technical 
Secretary summarises and filters 
proposals from working groups  
Informal in the scope of General 
Assemblies and Annual FTAA Forums; 
creation of general proposals for 
presentation at the FTAA level 
emphasising policy dialogue 
Technical 
Secretariat 
Independent Technical Secretariat 
headed by César Peñaranda, high 
ranking economist; 
Remunerated personnel (2); 
Emphasis on “technical support ” 
As of December 2002, Silvia Seperack, 
Head of the Foreign Trade Division 
inside CCL was in charge 
Non-remunerated personnel were hired; 
Emphasis on “coordination” 
Scope US-AFTA in 2004-05, 
subsequently other regional and 
multilateral forums 
FTAA 
Shortcomings Lack of consensus; regular 
meetings only in market access, 
agriculture and state procurement 
Lack of professional structures and 
rules; regular meetings only in the area 
of market access 
Source: Peñaranda 2004; CENI 2004 a; b; BR Seperack BR 31/10/03; OE Cano 5/10/04 
 
To a certain extent, CENI was able to overcome previous shortcomings in the 
coordination of business interests. Due to its remarkable multisectoral approach, the well 
equipped Technical Secretariat and the formal decision making structure, CENI became an 
acknowledged space in the course of the US-AFTA talks for coordination and the exchange of 
information. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, little progress had been made in surmounting 
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the heterogeneity of private sector interests, or as a key official stated (Brandes 15/02/05); “up to 
now, we have not been able to rely on sound business consensus.” Thereafter, the main obstacle 
for the efficient functioning of CENI was the institutional fragmentation that affected the 
coordination in each sector, as I shall outline below: 
The National Agrarian Convention (CONVEAGRO): Founded in 1994, CONVEAGRO 
struggled from the outset due to the marked collective action problems inside the rural sector, 
considering the high number of peasant farmers and entities representing them. Though 
numerous passed efforts failed, CONVEAGRO has evolved in the past years into an important 
forum where small and medium sized peasant farmers can present their cases, and identify 
common strategies to defend home markets (OE Sueiro 14/12/04). During US-AFTA talks, 
representatives from 18 associated institutions, representing, among others, coffee, rice, cotton, 
sugar, maize, milk, and live stock producers participated in the weekly assemblies, holding lively 
debates on the perspectives and impacts of the ongoing trade talks. Therefore, CONVEAGRO 
became the main advocate for the defence of agrarian interests using varying lobby options, 
mainly through close links with Congress members and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Nonetheless, participation in CENI was controversial. In December 2004, the leading rural entity 
suspended its membership since the positions related to phasing-out schemes and the local price 
band system contrasted with exporting and industrial sectors. Shortly after, however, 
CONVEAGRO rejoined CENI, mainly due to improved access to MINCETUR officials (BR 
Rebosio 14/07/04). 
Association of Agro-Exporter Entities (AGAP): In contrast to the defensive rural concerns 
represented by CONVEAGRO, the AGAP has been trying, since January 2004, to unify the 
positions of a dozen rural organisations that represent exporters of grapes, lemons, asparagus, 
mangoes, lúcuma, onions, tomatoes, coffee and medicinal plants. According to the Managing 
Director, Alberto Blondet, (BR 16/07/04), the AGAP seeks the representation of the modern, 
outward oriented agrarian sector in a comprehensive way, and thus, aims to overcome individual 
lobby by firms or sectors. Nevertheless, the recently established advocacy group has been 
challenged to achieve higher internal and external recognition. 
National Society of Foreign Trade (COMEXPERU): Beyond the recently founded 
AGAP, since 1989 Peruvian exporters have been divided into the Society of Exporters (later 
COMEXPERU or “COMEX”) and the Exporters Association (ADEX). According to Patricia 
Teullet, Managing Director of COMEX (BR 07/07/04), “our members left ADEX because the 
organisation promoted policies hostile to traditional exports.” Indeed, COMEX is considered as 
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the large exporters’ voice and acted as the executive branch of the national mining and fishery 
associations. Moreover, several big firms in the area of non-traditional agriculture and industrial 
goods are associated, and, when it became COMEXPERU from 1998, the entity also began to 
advocate in favour of importers’ interests. In total, by 2003-04 the COMEX represented about 80 
medium and large scale companies, accounting for 60 percent of exports and 40 percent of 
imports (SO Mathews 30/10/03; BR Teullet 07/07/04). Contrary to other chambers, 
COMEXPERU consequently followed an orthodox-liberal course sustained by economists such 
as Roberto Abusada and Fritz Du Bois from the Peruvian Institute of Economy (IPE), who acted 
as the principal advisors of economic reforms implemented by the MEF. In so doing, the entity’s 
participation in the CENI scope has been controversial, as the intransigent liberal views often 
contrasted with more heterodox positions developed by local industry and agriculture. 
Exporters Association (ADEX): The advocacy style of ADEX differed from COMEX. In 
searching for close ties with state departments from industry and trade, the chamber normally 
pushed for active polices such as fiscal incentives and other promotion facilities. Therefore, 
ADEX has become a prominent export promotion agency carrying out projects dedicated to the 
assistance of small and medium size exporters. With respect to the loggerheads maintained with 
COMEX, ADEX officials emphasised the former trajectory (founded in 1973) and the leading 
representation in the area of non-traditional exports (BR´s Ordoñez, Garcia Seminario 17/02/04). 
Nonetheless, the latter assertion must be questioned as both COMEX and AGAP represent non-
traditional agro exporters, and the outward oriented textile and apparel industry has also been 
represented by the SNI (BR Reaño 16/02/04). In general terms, the influence of ADEX in the 
making of trade policies was limited in the past due to its intermittent participation, as an 
experienced key official observed (SO February 2005). 
National Industry Society (SNI): The most influential policy maker in the private sector in 
general, and for the manufacturers in particular, was the “Society.” Founded in 1896, and as of 
1974 holding a Commission for Foreign Trade and Integration, the SNI was perceived as the 
local embodiment of the “protectionist club”, with the power to influence state officials as 
regards subsidies and the imposition of measures to preserve the domestic market for the 
predominately medium or large sized industrialists (SO’s Illescas; Sanchez 9/09/04). For 
example, in the US-AFTA talks, the national laboratories associated in ADIFAN severely 
opposed ALAFARPE, the association defending property rights of multinational companies. 
Nevertheless, the outward orientation of Peruvian manufacturers increased notably over the 
years, and hence, offensive interests raised its leverage inside the entity. Above all, the SNI 
Committee of Textiles, representing the companies exporting textiles to the US market, in recent 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
THE CASE OF PERU 
 
213 
years became the most influential organisation among the 46 sectoral committees associated in 
the SNI. However, Managing Director, Martín Reaño, admitted (BR 16/02/04) that even though 
about 90 percent of formal industry belongs to the Textile Committee, certain competition 
persists as most companies are likewise associated in ADEX and the companies in “Gamarra” 
(the most important industrial district for clothing and textiles manufacturers) have their own 
associations. 
Lima Chamber of Commerce (CCL): The CCL, created in 1888, is the country’s largest 
and most traditional entrepreneurial entity. In numerous occasions, the CCL authorities were 
responsible for private sector wide initiatives such as the creation of the FTAA-Peru 
Commission or policy proposals that facilitated foreign trade operations. Furthermore, the CCL 
has been the leading player in the provision of services and the organisation of seminars and 
events. In the recent negotiations held in the hemisphere, the chamber assumed certain leadership 
in the newer trade topics of services, investment and state procurement, informing local business 
of their importance of them through workshops and seminars or by coordinating activities in the 
scope of the CENI and the FTAA-Peru Commission (BR 31/10/03 Seperack). Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, the intermediation of trade policy concerns in the area of market access was 
inhibited by a very extensive membership covering roughly 4,000 companies in trade, services, 
and to a lesser extent, in industry.  
 
Organisational Strength 
Based on a survey with 29 business associations (selection), in this subsection I will shed light 
on aspects related to the organisational strength of private sector representatives, stressing the 
importance of diversified revenues, reliable payment of membership dues, active member 
participation, the existence of permanent staff and in-house trade policy expertise. 
Diversification of Association Revenues: The majority of entities consulted were financed 
in 2004 exclusively by affiliation dues, and thus, suggested a somewhat low degree of 
diversification in local business organisations. Practically all the SNI committees and large 
company chambers from foreign trade (COMEX), fishery (SNP), mining and energy (SNMPE) 
and insurance (APESEG) reported that no other income was generated. Six chambers 
commented that additional funds constituted 10-40 percent, and a further 6 entities claimed to 
generate over 40 percent of their incomes from outside sources. Therein, the external income 
originated from the issuance of certificates of origin (CCL, ADEX and the SNI), promotion 
activities and service suppliers in general (ADEX, AGAP, CCL, Arequipa Chamber of 
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Commerce and PERUCAMARAS) and international donor projects (CONVEAGRO, and SME 
associations such as COMPYMEP and COPEI). 
 
Table 5.11: What share of revenues originates from other than affiliation dues? 
More than 40% 10-40% 0-10% 0% No response 
6 (22%) 6 (22%) 0 (0%) 15 (56%) 2 
 
Predictability of Association Revenues: Concerning the prevailing paying habits, the 
results shown in Table 14 indicate that most entities depending strongly on affiliate dues had the 
capacity to collect these means. Out of this group, only the SNI Committees for cosmetics, 
vegetable oils, biscuits and cleaning agents admitted that certain irregularities occurred; that is 
only 50 to 75 percent of members regularly met the payment deadline. A similar situation was 
faced by chambers such as the AGAP representing agro exporters, SNI, ADEX and the Arequipa 
Chambers of Trade, Industry and Agriculture. 
 
Table 5.12: What share of membership regularly meets the payment deadline? 
80-100% 50-79% 20-49% less than 20% no response 
12 (48%) 10 (40%) 0 (0%) 3 (12%) 4 
 
In general, very few interviewees acknowledged wide-scale problems with regards to 
internal funding. Only the small scale organisations COMPYMEP, CONVEAGRO and the dairy 
livestock association FONGAL lamented the limited capacity to obligate associates to comply 
with their financial duties, considering that the chambers suffered from a disperse and informal 
membership composed of micro and small size firms. In the rural sector, funding problems were 
accentuated with the prohibition of mandatory contribution schemes, a result of the agrarian 
reform implemented under the Fujimori government, as Miguel Caillaux remarked (BR 
14/07/04). To improve the entities’ revenues, it has become quite common to search for 
economic support provided by international donor organisations. For example, in the case of 
CONVEAGRO, the insufficient payment by affiliates was compensated through contributions 
made by CEPES, an NGO dedicated to rural development which provided approximately 90 
percent of the peak association’s income in 2004. 
Participatory Behaviour of Members/Business: Data relating to the participation of 
entrepreneurs in trade policy affairs provided a rather ambiguous picture. In no less than 17 
chambers, responses indicated a rather or very active behaviour in the scope of internal decision 
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making, whereas only seven chambers reported widespread passivity in connection with 
attendances at Board Meetings and the submission of proposals. On the other hand, by 2004, 
only one out of three entities held an internal body dedicated to foreign trade or integration 
affairs, such as in the case of the APESEG representing insurers, COMPYMEP, CCL, SNI, 
ADEX, Textile Committee, CONVEAGRO, AGAP and the Arequipa Chambers of Commerce 
and Agriculture. Consequently, two thirds of the answers provided referred to participation in the 
Board of Directors where a broad mix of topics was debated. 
 
Table 5.13: Business/ member participation in trade policy 
 Experts State Officials Total Experts +  
State Officials (25) 
Business*(29) 
very active 2 1 3   (14%) 5    (21%) 
rather active 4 3 7   (32%) 12 (53%) 
rather passive 3 9 12 (54%) 1   (4%) 
very passive 0 0 0   (0%) 5   (21%) 
no response 1 2 3 6 
* Responses are referred to the behaviour of members inside the internal bodies of each chamber. 
 
Moreover, the rather positive impressions gathered among business representatives 
contrasted in part with the observations collected among experts and state officials evaluating the 
behaviour of business in international trade policy affairs. In general, assessments made by state 
officials were more critical than those from experts. In the latter case, six out ten answers 
indicated very or rather active business behaviour, making reference to the private sector 
organisation in the scope of FTAA and AFTA talks. Moreover, two responses underscored the 
rent-seeking attitude, and thus, gave a negative connotation to active business participation. For 
the state officials consulted, the coordination efforts undertaken by means of the FTAA-PERU 
Commission and CENI were considered to be advances in local trade policy advocacy. However, 
beyond this general acknowledgment, no less than 9 out of 13 responses qualified the private 
sector as still rather passive with regard to attendance at convened meetings and the creation of 
policy proposals. On three occasions, the SNI representatives were exempted from general 
criticism, although their behaviour was associated with defensive lobbying strategies. Similar 
observations were made by a functionary from the Ministry of Agriculture, who recognised the 
recent efforts of CONVEAGRO in the defence of domestic markets.13  
                                               
13 Detailed information was provided by young MINCETUR official as regards formal consultations in negotiations 
on services undertaken in May/June 2002 (Paredes 21/02/04). Accordingly, out of the roughly 100 public and 
private entities consulted, only ten made concrete observations about the ongoing negotiations in the scope of FTAA 
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As outlined earlier, the launched US-AFTA talks suggested a turning point in the way 
local business encountered international trade policy affairs. Table 5.13 overviews the activities 
put forward in the scope of the Entrepreneurial Council on International Negotiations (CENI). 
Since the data provided covers the period up to December 2004, the list only encompasses the 
activities undertaken shortly after the completion of the 6th Negotiation Round in Tucson, 
Arizona. 
 
Table 5.14: CENI Working Groups from May to December 2004 
 Coordinating 
Entity 
No. 
Meetings 
No. of 
average 
participants 
Entities/Companies 
Participating 
Tariffs 
 
SNI 
 
27 15 1. SNI 2. ADEX, others: 
CCL, COMEX, Pacific 
University (UP) 
Rules of 
Origin 
SNI 
 
9  
 
8 1. SNI 2. ADEX, others: UP, 
CCL, COMEX 
Textile and 
Clothing 
SNI/ADEX 
 
9  
 
11 1. SNI 2. ADEX, others: 
COMEX, UP, Cotton 
Producers Association 
Technical 
Obstacles 
ADEX 
 
8  7 1. ADEX 2. CCL, others: 
National Fishery Society, UP, 
COMEX 
Safeguard  SNI 9  
 
10 1. SNI, others: UP, ADEX, 
MINCETUR, CONVEAGRO 
Customs 
Procedures 
ADEX 6  5 1. ADEX, others: CCL; SNI; 
COMEX; UP; TALMA 
(airport services) 
State 
Procurement 
and 
Investment 
COMEX 9 by 
August 
10 1. COMEX, others: CCL, 
SNI, UP, CONVEAGRO, 
Chambers of Construction 
and Banking 
Agriculture/ 
Subsidies and 
Safeguards 
CONVEAGRO 
 
Weekly 
meetings  
approx. 15 CONVEAGRO, SNI, 
COMEX, AGAP, poultry 
farming association 
Source: CENI 2004b; BR Guillermo Rebosio14/07/2004 on the Working Group “Agriculture” 
 
In general terms, the work inside the CENI was rather ambiguous. Even though the 
creation of the coordination mechanism was perceived as an important breakthrough, the 
participation in the working groups turned out to be fairly uneven and intermittent. For example, 
                                                                                                                                                       
and WTO. Among these, eight stemmed from public institutions, while the remaining two were submitted by the 
banking and insurance associations. 
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out of the 25 entities associated in the CENI, the organisations regularly attending meetings were 
usually limited to the SNI and its sector committees (representing close to 40 percent of total 
attendance), ADEX, COMEX, CONVEAGRO and CCL. Moreover, the strong presence of UP 
scholars, who participated on average with two-three persons, made the participation record 
seem higher than it actually was. In addition to the limited participation, activities beyond the 
traditional market access area were rather scarce. Even though 20 working groups were initially 
foreseen, the majority of them were either never put into practice, or carried out activities in an 
irregular manner (OE Cano 05/10/04). The main deficits were identified in newer topics. With 
the exception of the controversial sessions organised by COMEX on investment and state 
procurement, other topics such as financial service issues, electronic trade and 
telecommunications, trade in service in general, competition policies, labour and environment 
regulation were not addressed systematically within the scope of CENI. 
Staff Size and Trade Expertise: The question of whether the CENI would be capable to 
overcome the limitations identified stands in close correlation with the disposition of the 
Peruvian entrepreneurs to strengthen the fairly modest internal structure of business 
organisations. Accordingly, the survey carried out in 2004 brought to light the fact that merely 
one third of the entities consulted had more than five employees, suggesting that local business 
organisations are sustained by a Managing Director and one or two administrative assistants. 
Middle range entities holding six to ten employees were COMEXPERU, SNI-Textile 
Committee, National Fishery Society and the Arequipa Rural Society SADA. Lastly, the top five 
were composed by SNI (60), ADEX (45), National Society of Mining & Energy (30), SNI 
Committee of Metal Mechanics (17, including the Centre of Industrial Development) and the 
Arequipa Chamber of Commerce and Industry (15). No detailed information was obtained in the 
Lima Chamber of Commerce, supposedly Peru’s largest business chamber. 
 
Table 5.15: What is the size of permanent staff? 
more than 20 11-20 5-10 1-5 no response 
 3 (11%) 2 (7%) 4 (15%) 18 (67%) 2 
 
This picture remains quite constant when the in-house trade policy expertise is analysed. 
While two organisations admitted that no one had really been observing what was going on in 
the policy field, the vast majority (21 out of 29 chambers) simply relied on the knowledge 
exhibited by the Managing Director. Conversely, in five entities one or more professionals 
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monitored and analysed the evolution of international trade policy affairs; SNI, COMEX, CCL, 
ADEX, Arequipa Chamber of Commerce and CONVEAGRO. 
 
Table 5.16: Who within the staff is monitoring and analysing trade policy affairs? 
Think Thank  
(3 officials) 
Trade 
Department (1-2) 
Managing 
Director 
None no response 
2 (7%) 3 (11%) 21 (75%) 2 (7%) 1 
 
Against this background, the negative impressions gathered from experts and state 
officials were not surprising. Indeed, three quarters of the responses obtained qualified the level 
of technical expertise displayed in the business trade policy proposals submitted by Peru’s 
private sector entities as rather or very low, emphasising moreover that knowledge existed 
merely in traditional market access areas but did not cover new topics in the area of international 
trade policy. 
 
Table 5.17: How do you assess the technical level of business proposals submitted in the 
area of international trade policy? 
 Experts (11) State Officials (15) Total (26) 
very high 0 0 0   (0%) 
rather high 3 2 5   (24%) 
rather low 5 6 11 (52%) 
very low 1 4 5   (24%) 
no response 2 3 5 
 
Special comments were generally related to the five principal chambers in the policy 
field. The most positive quotes referred to the SNI. Eduardo Brandes, key negotiator in the 
market access area since the late 1970s, recalled that although clashes with the SNI frequently 
occurred on the political level, the technical support provided by the SNI colleagues was steady, 
and thus, invaluable (SO 15/02/05). In the course of the 1980s, Brandes commented, the 
industrial leading association sent its functionaries abroad in order to advise the official team at 
the negotiation table. By 2003-04, SNI officials not only assumed informal advisory functions 
but also belonged to the negotiation team. Ramon Morante, as head of the Foreign Trade 
Department reported very proudly that within the FTAA talks he was the single business agent 
possessing an official status as negotiator (BR 29/10/03). In the US-AFTA talks, the former 
MITINCI bureaucrat entered the team as special advisor to the Production Minister, Alfonso 
Velásquez. Aside from Morante, the leading sectoral Committees of Textiles and Food 
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Processing were run by well trained trade experts, often appreciated by state authorities.14 Lastly, 
the technical overhead of SNI Committees was equipped by the Institute of Economic and Social 
Studies (IEES), an in-house think-tank where three-four professionals carried out statistical and 
sectoral analysis.15 
Furthermore, positive quotes also referred to the COMEX team, although its work has 
been more distant from the official negotiation team than the SNI’s. The compact staff directed 
by Patricia Teullet, Vice-Minister of Economy 2001-02, consisted of three economists who 
participated actively in domestic trade policy making discussions. However, due to its modest 
budget resources, the representative of big exporters often depended on inputs from its strategic 
partner, i.e. the orthodox-liberal Peruvian Institute of Economy (IPE). The Exporters Association 
(ADEX) was recognised to a lesser extent for coherent policy analysis. The vast majority of its 
employees are usually involved in promotion activities supported by donor organisations. In the 
past, modest and unstable resources underlined the entity’s dependence on voluntary 
contributions by associated entrepreneurs. Compared with the permanent presence of the SNI 
functionaries, the trade policy expertise displayed by ADEX staff has been intermittent. By 2004 
though, the Economic Studies Department, with three employees, was directed by Carlos 
González, an economist holding a MA degree. 
The Lima Chamber of Commerce (CCL) is considered to be the richest business entity 
and provider of a broad array of services, publications and events. However, the in-house trade 
policy expertise is limited. The Foreign Trade Department composed of half a dozen employees 
clearly focused on commercial operations, the provision of market data for members and the 
coordination of seminars to inform local traders on upcoming market challenges. Finally, a new 
actor in local trade policy debates was CONVEAGRO. The fact that the rural leading entity was 
converted into a widely recognised interlocutor was closely linked to the technical support 
provided by the Peruvian Centre of Social Studies (CEPES). Founded in 1976 and financed by 
diverse international donors, the NGO has specialised in rural development, carrying out projects 
to strengthen the articulation of agrarian interests. In 2004, CEPES shared office space with 
CONVEAGRO and permanently attended weekly Assembly meetings. By the time the US-
AFTA talks began, CEPES-CONVEAGRO hired Guillermo Rebosio, an economist from the 
                                               
14 Martín Reaño, Managing Director from the Textile Committee, served in the past as governmental advisor in the 
area of rules of origin which became an increasingly fuzzy issue due to new complex mechanisms requiring mixed 
models in order to calculate the local content of exports in the scope of preferential trade regimes, among others. 
15 The IEES was deactivated during 2003 since its former head went over to UNCTAD in Geneva. In 2004, IEES 
was run by Javier Davila, professor in economy at the Lima University for 13 years and specialised in international 
commerce and the Asian-Pacific area.  
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Catholic University. Jointly with two other assistants, Rebosio began to work hand in hand with 
the Ministry of Agriculture in the evaluation and drafting of negotiation proposals. 
 
Summary Independent Variable A2 
This section points out the rather low institutional strength of business associations. Regarding 
the variable dimension leadership, the peak associations CONFIEP diminished as a reliable 
interlocutor of trade interests in the course of the 1990s. Lately, the main sectoral associations 
agreed on a multi-sectoral council in order to coordinate private sector concerns in the scope of 
the US-AFTA negotiations. The organisation strength of business associations is mostly absent, 
for the reasons outlined in Box 5.6. 
 
Box 5.6: The Institutional Strength of Business Associations 
Peak 
Association 
A reliable business interlocutor at the beginning of 
economic reforms, the CONFIEP capacity to intermediate  
among business sectors vanished as of 1998 due to the division 
of “productive” sectors that felt excluded from the economic 
model and benefited sectors related to services and 
commodities. 
 
Leadership 
Trade Policy 
Coordination 
Although consensus building was limited, the private sector 
organisations were rather proactive regarding international 
trade policy affairs in establishing the “FTAA-Peru 
Commission” and the “Entrepreneurial Council of International 
Negotiations (CENI)” in 1998 and 2004, respectively. 
 
Organisational Strength  
 
Peru’s business advocacy is weakly organised due to poorly 
diversified incomes and the lack of technical capacities in the 
trade integration area. Thus, the participation in the FTAA-
Peru Commission and CENI working groups was intermittent 
and limited to a few officials of the leading trade and industry 
chambers. 
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5.4 Assessment 
 
After examining one by one how the dependent and independent variables evolved during the 
period of analysis, in this final section I assess how, and to what extent, the pursuit of Peru’s 
world market integration strategy can be explained by the two independent variables, or whether 
third variable influences became responsible for the mostly unsuccessful world market 
integration strategy.  
But before stressing cause-effects links, I point out the main aspects which account for 
the way Peru pursued its integration into world markets. In the period from 1985 to 2004, the 
context of Peru’s trade policy-making was marked by macroeconomic turmoil which occurred in 
the second half of the 1980s and the subsequent shift towards broad structural adjustment 
policies, as recommended by the Bretton Woods Institutions. On the political level, Peru’s 
democratic consolidation initiated in 1980 became questioned by a semi-authoritarian style of 
governance assumed by Alberto Fujimori, State President from 1990 to 2001. These 
macroeconomic and political factors, embodied in variables C3 and C4, set the framework for 
domestic trade policy-making, as it had to adapt to the prevailing constraints and possibilities. 
On the other hand, several empirical puzzles related to Peru’s approach to world market 
integration demand explanations which go beyond the influence of C3+4. The following two 
stand out in particular: 
First, why did Peru not pursue a Multipolar Model from 1992, when the country decided 
to suspend its Andean Group membership? On the domestic level, at the beginning of the 1990s, 
there was a clear determination to pursue – as Chile did – the flat rate concept in combination 
with an individual bilateral trade integration strategy, as this was seen as more beneficial than 
being attached to the integration goals of Colombia and Venezuela, in particular. In the end, 
however, Peru returned to the CAN in 1997 and ended up applying seven different tariff lines 
instead of the initially pursued flat rate. 
Second, why did Peru set forth a rather active trade policy in the ongoing decade, 
specifically as regards the strengthening of trade relations in the Western Hemisphere, the 
Pacific Area, with MERCOSUR, and the implementation of the National Export Strategy 2003-
2013? Though the pursued Multipolar Model had yet to be consolidated in the period of analysis, 
the trade policy applied in recent years differed notably from the rather passive trade policy 
approach, i.e. only unilateral liberalisation, sustained in the 1990s. 
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In light of the posed questions, Table 5.17 sums up the value of the observed variables 
and the explanatory power each one possesses. Therefore, I will next explain when and how the 
values of variables changed over time, and how they influenced on the value of B. 
 
Table 5.18: Explaining Peru’s Rather Failed World Market Integration Strategy 
Variable Variable 
Dimension 
Value  
(Variance 1985-2004) 
Explaining Power for 
Policy Success/Failure 
(B) 
Responsibilities 1985-2001: rather low 
2002-2004: rather high 
1985-2004: very high 
Resources 1985-1990: rather high 
1991-2001: very low 
2002-2004: rather high 
1985-2004: rather high 
A1: Institutional 
Strength of State  
Bureaucracy 
Openness 1985-1998: rather high 
1999-2004: very high 
1985-1998: rather low 
1999-2004: very high 
Leadership 1985-2004: rather low 1985-2004: rather high A2: Institutional 
Strength of Business 
Associations 
Organisational 
Strength 
1985-2004: very low 1985-2004: very high 
C1: Heterogeneity Sectoral 
Preferences 
1985-2004: rather high 1985-2004: rather low 
C2: Heterogeneity Foreign Preferences 1985-2004: rather high 1985-2004: rather low 
C3: Political Instability 2000-2001: very high 2000-2001: rather low 
C4: Macroeconomic Instability 1989-1991: very high 1989-1991: very high 
 
Institutional Strength of State Bureaucracy (A1) 
According to Table 5.17, strong explanatory power can be ascribed to Variable A1; indeed the 
observed influence on the dependent variable was strong during the whole period of analysis. 
Above all, regarding the first question posed, the modifications inside the state bureaucracy that 
took place in the 1990s explain to a wide extent the incoherencies in the area of international 
trade policy. 
Due to the public sector reforms implemented at the onset of the 1990s, specialised trade 
policy entities such as the Foreign Trade Institute (ICE) and the Ministry of Industry, Domestic 
Trade and Integration (MICITI) were dissolved (ICE) or drastically downsized (MICITI) in light 
of severe budget cuts affecting the central government. On the other hand, some key agencies, 
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such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), were greatly up-scaled. But the MEF staff, 
which became responsible for the structural adjustment reforms involving trade liberalisation, 
did not rely on traditional career bureaucrats, but was recruited from a group of special advisors 
close to the Peruvian Institute of Economy (IPE), a private think-tank based on orthodox-liberal 
standpoints. 
This team, headed by economy minister Roberto Boloña, viewed trade policy as an 
instrument for the unilateral liberalisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Herewith, the 
application of uniform tariffs was perceived as modern since discretional policy-making could be 
avoided and the predictability of fiscal revenues increased. The aim of reaching a flat rate by the 
end of 1994, however, stood in contradiction with the intention of the Andean Group to establish 
a Common External Tariff (CET) that assumed an escalated structure with four tariff levels. 
Moreover, the intra-regional exchange of goods was unfavourable for Peru, as less than 10% of 
exports went to the Andean markets, whilst imports from Andean Group members were 
noticeably higher, causing permanent trade deficits from a Peruvian perspective. 
As Boloña directly interfered in regional negotiations, in July 1992, Peru’s suspension of 
the Andean Group membership was a coherent decision in mind of the ongoing unilateral trade 
policy. In the aftermath though, the coherence of the country’s world market integration strategy 
couldn’t be attained. Instead of pursuing a Multipolar Model, as was planned by Boloña’s 
advisory team, from 1992 Peru perplexingly did not establish a flat rate, nor set forth an active 
bilateral negotiation strategy, and neither did it promote non-traditional exports.  
In the 1990s, the special advisory staff inside the MEF (resources) focussed on unilateral 
trade reforms, whilst reciprocal forms of liberalisation played only a secondary role. Moreover, 
the responsibilities in the area of international trade policy were not clearly defined. For 
example, between 1991 and 1992 no state department was directly in charge of international 
negotiations in the scope of ALADI and the WTO. From October 1992, when the Ministry of 
Industry, Tourism, Integration and International Trade Negotiations (MITINCI) was created, the 
Peruvian government disposed again of an international trade policy branch. But the MITINCI 
was insufficiently staffed to implement active trade policies in the regional, extra-regional, and 
multilateral sphere (resources). Moreover, the few trade policy officials inside the MITINCI 
were divided into a group that supported the policy guidelines of the MEF (and thus the 
separation from the Andean Group), and another faction favouring the return to the Andean 
integration scheme. 
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The intra-governmental work became further intricate by the diplomatic staff inside the 
Ministry of External Affairs who sought, from the mid-1990s, a more protagonist role in 
international economic affairs (responsibilities). By then, the Peruvian diplomacy tried, together 
with parts of the MITINCI staff and local manufacturers, to enable Peru’s return to the Andean 
Group, and thus, began stressing numerous inconveniences for definitive departure from the 
CAN, such as the displacement of its headquarters located in Lima, the difficulty in conducting 
common foreign affairs, the loss of privileged market access in the Andean markets, and the 
mandatory withdrawal from numerous shared institutions, i.e. the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF), Latin American Reserve Fund (FAR), and technical assistance programs. 
Therefore, ias a result of “one of the rare occasions of coordination between the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and the MITINCI, that the hardliners inside the MEF could be displaced”, 
according to Luis Tello (2005: 118), who analysed the domestic power shift that took place by 
May-June 1997 when Peru returned to the Andean Group. 
With the turn of the century, the institutional strength of the trade policy was significantly 
enhanced, explaining to a large degree the shifting approach to trade integration. Increasingly, 
the MITINCI staff focused on integration options in the Western Hemisphere and the APEC 
area. Above all, it was Alfredo Ferrero – Vice-Minister of International Negotiations and later 
Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism – who managed to create domestic consensus to 
strengthen the development of national exports, especially to the US markets. Therefore, export-
specific concerns gained increasing recognition among the public and private sector, making 
possible, in May 2002, the creation of well-doted trade policy staff inside the new Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Tourism, MINCETUR (responsibilities and resources). In the aftermath, 
MINCETUR became the visible agency of the new proactive trade policy approach put forward 
from 2003, i.e. involvement in free trade talks with the US, comprehensive FTA with 
MERCOSUR, launched bilateral negotiations with Thailand, and the start of the first National 
Export Strategy based on 10-year objectives. 
Whether this new trade policy approach will prove sustainable largely depends on the 
question of whether the mostly personalised style of governance leads into a major degree of 
institutionalisation of the trade policy-making. This is especially the case with respect to the high 
degree of openness that was maintained by Alfredo Ferrero. Under his direction, the government 
undertook multiple actions to make trade policy not only more transparent but also more popular 
within business, parliament and civil society. In particular, the close relations to local business 
factions became crucial to legitimise more active trade policies, mostly aimed at the US market. 
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The key officials from MINCETUR, therefore, built up strategic alliances with the National 
Industry Society (SNI) and the Exporters Associations (ADEX). 
 
Institutional Strength of Business Associations (A2) 
As indicated, the firm support of the leading industrial and export chambers – strongly 
encouraged by the export-oriented textile companies – was decisive to embark on the trade 
policy strategy that originated inside the MINCETUR department. Indeed, the Peruvian private 
sector behaved rather proactively as business coordination mechanisms were established in the 
scope of the FTAA-Peru Commission (1998-2003) and the Entrepreneurial Council of 
International Trade Negotiations (CENI), which joined business proposals during the free trade 
talks with the US, launched in May 2004. These institutional efforts had the effect of increasing 
awareness among local business regarding the upcoming challenges of the international trade 
agenda and facilitating dialogue with government authorities. 
On the other hand, the institutional deficits of these initiatives have been widespread, and 
hence, put into question the sustainability of the pursued Multipolar approach that requires, 
among other tasks, the effective implementation of undertaken free trade agreements. By 2004, 
private sector organisations in Peru generally did not count on professional structures 
(organisational strength), i.e. most entities did not diversify their revenues, held small staff and 
did not permanently monitoring international trade policy affairs. Hence, the participation inside 
the CENI working groups was intermittent and focussed on traditional market access issues, 
while complex behind-the-border topics were mostly neglected. Moreover, 76 percent of 
surveyed experts and state officials qualified the technical level of trade policy proposals 
submitted by business entities as rather or very low. 
With reference to previous periods, institutional deficits of local business associations 
negatively affected the coherent pursuit of international trade policy. In particular, the lack of 
concerted trade policy proposals (leadership) underscored Peru’s difficulty to pursue coherent 
positions in the scope of the Andean Group. The peak entity CONFIEP, a strong business 
interlocutor of the structural adjustment reforms at the outset of the 1990s, lost its multisectoral 
coordination capacities towards the end of the decade, as opposing groups emerged inside the 
entity. On the one hand, services (mainly finance and public utilities) and commodity oriented 
sectors (mining and fishery) had benefited from the economic model in force, and hence, 
sustained the rationale of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, pursuing a flat rate model and 
individual forms of integration. On the other hand, the “productive group”, favouring an 
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escalated tariff structure and a return to the CAN, were represented by the three leading industry 
and trading chambers; SNI (manufacturers), ADEX (exporters), and CCL (chamber of 
commerce). 
It is important to consider, nevertheless, that difficulties in coordinating trade policy 
interests went beyond the internal division of the CONFIEP, but also encompassed institutional 
fragmentation and the lack of solid trade policy proposals within the two groups, especially 
among manufacturers’ and exporters’ associations. Although the “productive group” petitioned 
for an escalated tariff system and the return to the CAN, there was no evidence of a 
comprehensive approach to world market integration either between the chambers composing the 
“productive group” or within each chamber. Instead of deeper commitments to pursue a 
Springboard Model, based on completing a common regional market, manufacturers were 
mainly concerned with uncertain market access conditions in the Andean markets and higher 
taxes on raw material and intermediate goods. In the aftermath, therefore, the “productive group” 
no longer acted as a firm advocate of the Andean integration process, for example by insisting on 
the convergence of external tariffs or the harmonisation of economic policies on the regional 
level. 
 
Control Variables C1-C4 
Assessing the influence of selected control variables C1-C4, disturbing effects were mostly kept 
under control in the Peruvian case. 
Heterogeneity of Sectoral Preferences (C1): In general, trade policy interests among the 
private sector are relatively homogenous, especially since structural adjustment reforms were 
implemented in 1990-91, when maximum tariff rates came down to 25%. While the commodity 
sectors (mainly mining and fishery) traditionally have been outward-looking, the Peruvian 
manufacturing sector has strongly increased its export orientation, focussing principally on 
consumer goods (textiles, clothing, and foodstuff) and intermediates (plastic, chemicals, and 
various metals). Contrary to other South American countries such as Colombia, Brazil and 
Argentina, the fabrication of capital goods, normally inward-looking, is largely absent.  
The main challenge for trade policy coordination was represented by the agriculture 
sector, thus far dominated by largely uncompetitive small scale production, for instance of 
maize, wheat, rice and sugar. Strikingly, however, the principal trade policy conflicts observed, 
above all in the scope of the CAN, where identified among manufacturers, which affected the 
coherence of Peru’s world market integration. Hampered by collective action problems, the 
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coordination of defensive rural concerns (in the scope of CONVEAGRO) first came into view 
when the free trade talks with the United States were envisaged. Nevertheless, the opposition 
organised inside CONVEAGRO, the main sectoral representative, did not posses the sufficient 
strength to avoid the conclusion of the free trade agreement, which was completed by the end of 
2005. 
Regarding the Heterogeneity of Foreign Preferences (C2), Peru’s decisions on trade 
policy matters had to take into account heterogeneous foreign preferences in the scope of the 
CAN, in particular. The goal of reaching a Customs Union on the Andean level reflected the 
interests of Colombia, and to a lesser extent, Venezuela. The multi-level or “escalated” tariff 
structure reflected their industrial policy preferences, enabling their manufacturers to expand 
their modest domestic markets in a familiar and less competitive environment. Therefore, Peru, 
which preferred a flat rate model, had two options. The first considered the definitive withdrawal 
from the CAN, so as to follow individual integration modes, and the second alternative required 
negotiating the Peruvian position within the Andean scope with perseverance and coherent 
technical arguments. Nonetheless, in the end, neither policy option was followed with the 
necessary determination. 
Political Instability (C3): In Peru, the most noteworthy political crisis features can be 
linked to the government of Alberto Fujimori (disregarding the social unrest caused by the 
hyperinflation of the 1980s). In particular, the auto-coup initiated by Alberto Fujimori in April 
1992 stands out, with the subsequent implementation of a semi-authoritarian regime by 
circumventing essential democratic checks of balances, and finally, the compulsory resignation 
of Fujimori in November 2000. Afterwards, Valentín Paniagua became transitory Head of State 
until July 2001, when Alejandro Toledo assumed the position as democratically elected State 
President for the period of 2001-06. 
Nevertheless, the impact of these abrupt political shifts on Peru’s trade policy was 
modest, for two main reasons. Firstly, the way trade policies were made under the Fujimori 
regime hardly differed from modes in the fully democratic regimes of the region, insofar as key 
players were found inside the executive power and the business sector. Secondly, the shift 
towards a more active trade policy approach was initiated at the end of the Fujimori regime. In 
1999, Alfredo Ferrero (from November 2003 Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism) assumed 
the position of Vice-Minister of Integration and International Trade Negotiations and began to 
pursue a dynamic Multipolar approach. Later on, Mr. Ferrero persisted in office under various 
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ministers and state presidents, while at the same time, the new trade policy approach gained 
rising recognition among state and business actors. 
Macroeconomic Instability (C4): After the macroeconomic turmoil witnessed in the 
second half of the 1980s, Peru experienced significant macroeconomic improvements. Compared 
with fiscal deficits of 9.4 and 7.5 percent of GDP in 1989 and 1990, and annual inflation rates of 
2,775 and 7,650 percent in those years, the numbers registered in the aftermath were very 
favourable. Although annual budget deficits reached roughly 2 percent on average and until 1994 
certain inflationary pressure remained at an annual variation rate of 139, 57, 39 and 31 percent, 
the Peruvian government was able to set stable grounds for economic prosperity involving the 
development of local exports. 
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Interviews 
 
OUTSIDE EXPERTS (OE) 
Date Name Type Organisation Function 
30.10.2003 
15.07.2004 
González 
Vigil, 
Fernando 
NEI 
Survey 
Pacific University/ 
Research Centre CUIP 
Professor of Economics 
23.02.2004 Araoz, 
Mercedes 
Survey Pacific University/ 
Research Centre CUIP 
Professor of Economics; 
Responsible for Civil 
Society Dialogue (IDB 
consultant) 
24.02.2004 Larrazabal, 
Juán 
NEI General Secretariat CAN  International Functionary; 
Expert in ITN 
27.02.2004 Mendez 
Chang, Elvira 
Survey Catholic University/ 
Faculty of Law 
Director of Study 
Department 
07.07.2004 Garcia, Jaime Survey Universidad de Lima/ 
Economics Department   
Consultant; Ex-MITINCI 
official 
08.07.2004 Peñaranda, 
Cesar 
Survey Málaga-Webb Consulting Economist; CENI 
Executive Secretary; Ex-
MEF advisor 
13.07.2004 Davila, Javier Survey Institute of Economic and 
Social Studies IEES; 
Lima University 
Professor in Economics; 
Head of IEES 
14.07.2004 Tello, Mario Survey Catholic University/ 
Business Centre 
CENTRUM 
Professor of Economics; 
International Consultant 
14.07.2004 Rebosio, 
Guillermo 
Survey Peruvian Centre of Social 
Studies (CEPES) 
Economist; Agriculture 
Policy Advisor 
30.09.2004 Arredondo, 
Alberto 
Survey Institute for Development 
of Southern Peru (Pro 
Sur) 
Economist; Consultant of 
Entrepreneurial 
Development  
04.10.2004 Cornejo, 
Enrique 
NEI Lima University/ 
Department of Economics 
Professor of Economics; 
APRA Economic Policy 
Advisor; Ex-ICE President 
05.10.2004 Cano, Janet NEI Universidad de Lima; 
CENI 
Professor of Economics; 
Assistant of CENI 
Executive Secretary  
02.10.2004 Teivanen, 
Teivo 
NEI San Marcos University/ 
Master Program in Social 
Science  
Professor of Political 
Science; Expert in Social 
Movements; Democracy 
and Global Transformation 
09.02.2005 Mindreau, 
Manuel 
Survey Pacific University/ 
Research Centre CUIP  
Professor of International 
Relations 
09.02.2005 Lopez, Adolfo NEI General Secretariat CAN International Functionary; 
Ex-Vice-Minister of 
Integration 
11.02.2005 Morón, 
Eduardo 
NEI Pacific University/ 
Research Centre CUIP 
Professor of Economics; 
Expert in State Reforms 
11.02.2005 Tello, Luis NEI San Marcos University/ 
History Department 
Researcher; Expert in 
Andean Integration 
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14.02.2005 Campodónico, 
Humberto 
NEI San Marcos University/ 
Department of Economics 
Professor/ International 
Trade and Globalization 
Affairs 
14.02.2005 Sueiro, 
Ernesto  
NEI CEPES Agriculture Policy Advisor 
STATE OFFICIALS (SO) 
Date Name Type Agency Function 
30.10.2003 Mathews, 
Juan Carlos 
NEI MINCETUR/Vice-
Ministry of Foreign 
Trade (VICE) 
National Director of Export 
Development 
17.02.2004 
21.02.2004 
14.07.2004 
15.02.2005 
Paredes 
Castro, 
Ricardo 
Survey,  
NEI 
VICE Trade Policy Advisor; 
Multilateral and Services 
Affairs 
18.02.2004 
10.02.2005 
Elmore, 
Victoria 
Survey 
NEI 
VICE National Director of 
Multilateral Affairs 
24.02.2004 Romero, 
César 
Survey Ministry of Agriculture/ 
Planning Office of 
Agrarian Policy 
Trade Policy Advisor; 
Agriculture Affairs 
25.02.2004 Mesias, Luis Survey VICE Trade Policy Advisor; 
Market Access 
08.07.2004 Honorio, 
Liliana 
Survey VICE FTAA Director 
09.07.2004 Illescas, Javier Survey MEF/Vice-Ministry of 
Economy 
General Director of 
International Economy, 
Competition and Private 
Investment 
09.07.2004 Sanchez, 
Viviana 
Survey MEF/Vice-Ministry of 
Economy 
Legal Advisor; Market 
Access Affairs 
09.07.2004 García, Luis 
Alonso 
Survey INDECOPI President of Intellectual 
Property Division 
12.07.2004 Alfaro 
Espinosa, 
Silvia 
Survey External Affairs 
Ministry/ 
Undersecretariat of 
Economic Affairs and 
International 
Negotiations  
Trade Diplomat; Market 
Access Affairs 
12.07.2004 Paredes, Paul/ 
Gervasi, Ana 
Survey Undersecretariat of 
Economic Affairs and 
International 
Negotiations 
Director of International 
Economy Department/ 
Policy Advisor in 
Agriculture Affairs  
13.07.2004 Talavera, 
Karin/ 
Morales, 
Eduardo 
Survey PRODUCE/Vice-
Ministry of Industry 
Special Advisors of 
National Director and 
Vice-Minister of Industry 
30.09.2004 Medina, 
Victor 
Survey MINCETUR/ Regional 
Office Arequipa 
Regional Director of 
Foreign Trade and Tourism 
01.10.2004 Butón, Denise Survey 
 
Arequipa Economic 
Development 
Department  
Head of Department 
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14.02.2005 Franca, Paula NEI MINCETUR Head of Human Resources 
Division 
15.02.2005 Brandes, 
Eduardo 
NEI VICE National Director of 
Regional Integration 
Division 
BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES (BR) 
Date Name Type Entity Position 
29.10.2003 
19.02.2004 
Morante, 
Ramon 
NEI 
Survey 
SNI Head of Foreign Trade 
Department 
31.10.2003 
18.02.2004 
Seperack, 
Silvia 
NEI 
Survey 
Lima Chamber of 
Comerse 
Head of Foreign Trade 
Department; Coordinator 
FTAA Commission-Peru 
16.02.2004 
19.02.2004 
Reaño, Martín  Survey, 
NEI 
SNI-Committee of 
Textiles 
Managing Director 
17.02.2004 Ordoñez, José NEI ADEX Area Manager of 
Agribusiness and Lumber 
19.02.2004 Daly Arbulú, 
Alejandro  
Survey SNI-Committees (4) of 
Vegetable Oils, Wheat, 
Biscuits, Cleansing 
Agents and Cosmetics 
Managing Director 
24.02.2004 Larrea, 
Gilberto 
Survey CONVEAGRO Technical Secretary 
23.02.2004 Vigil Mattos, 
Jorge 
Survey National Fishery Society Chief of Economic Office 
and Fishery Statistics 
25.02.2004 Gamio, Pedro Survey ADEX-Textiles Comité Director Textile Committee 
26.02.2004 Mansur, Pedro NEI National Union of Textile 
Entrepreneurs 
Managing Director 
27.02.2004 Gómez, Raúl Survey National Society of 
Mining, Petroleum & 
Energy 
Head of Administrative 
Department 
06.07.2004 Gálvez, 
Alvaro 
Survey PERUCAMARAS Trade Policy Advisor 
06.07.2004 Tenorio, Luis Survey SNI-Committee of Metal 
Mechanics 
Managing Director 
07.07.2004 Fernández, 
Rómulo 
Survey COMPYMEP President 
07.07.2004 Teullet, 
Patricia 
Survey Foreign Trade Society of 
Peru – COMEXPERU 
Managing Director 
13.07.2004 Villalobos, 
Alvaro 
Survey SNI-ADIFAN Managing Director 
13.07.2004 Piskulich, 
Rolando 
Survey SNI-Committee of Dairy 
Industry (ADIL) 
Managing Director 
13.07.2004 Taipe, Luis Survey SNI-Committees of 
Glass, Ceramics, Lumber 
and Derivates, Alcoholic 
Beverage 
Managing Director 
13.07.2004 La Rosa, 
Carlos 
Survey SNI-COPEI Managing Director 
14.07.2004 Caillaux, Survey FONGAL – Conveagro Trade Policy Advisor, 
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Miguel Agrarian Representative 
16.07.2004 Blondet, 
Alberto 
Survey AGAP Managing Director 
  De Andrea, 
Raúl 
Survey Peruvian Association of 
Assurance Companies 
Managing Director 
29.09.2004 Novoa 
Málaga, Jorge 
Survey Arequipa Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce 
Managing Director 
30.09.2004 Zegarra del 
Carpio, Carlos  
Survey Arequipa Rural Society 
(SADA)  
Board of Directors 
01.10.2004 Cuzzi, Mario Survey Arequipa Association of 
Industrial District 
Companies (ADEPIA) 
President 
05.10.2004 González, 
Carlos 
Alberto 
Survey ADEX Head of Economic Study 
Department 
09.02.2005 Mulanovich, 
Herbert 
NEI SIN Institutional Advisor 
11.02.2005 Bonilla, 
Yolanda 
NEI SNI-Committee of 
Textiles 
Administrative Assistant 
01.07.2004 Villacorta, 
Rosa 
Survey SIN Trade Policy Advisor 
 
 
Selected Interview Partners 
Adolfo López: Jurisprudent. Since the 1970s, Adolfo Lopéz’s profession has been related to the 
Andean Integration process, first as a young functionary inside the Directorate of Integration in 
the scope of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, later as the Peruvian official inside the 
Assembly of the Cartagena Agreement (since 1997 General Secretariat of the Andean 
Community of Nations). In-between, he served as Vice-Ministry of Integration inside the 
Ministry of Industry, Tourism, Domestic Trade and Integration. However, the experience was 
rather short and covered the first eight month of the Alberto Fujimori Administration (July 1990 
– March 1991). Currently, Adolfo Lopéz works as a Consultant of the CAN, heading the 
Informatics Unity inside the General Secretariat. 
Victoria Elmore: Sociologist with a MA in Economic Planning. Together with Eduardo 
Brandes and Elva Rodriguez, Victoria Elmore belongs to the “Dinosaurian” inside MINCETUR. 
She entered the Ministry (by the Ministry of Trade) in 1977 as a policy advisor inside the 
Planning Office. After attending a two year postgraduate degree in France on International 
Economic Relations, in 1983 Elmore again became a trade policy advisor inside the Vice-
Ministry of Trade (belonging first to the Ministry of Economy and later to the Ministry of 
Industry). Then, during the government of Alan García, she worked inside the newly created 
Institute of Foreign Trade as a specialist in export promotion and multilateral affairs. Later in the 
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1990s, she was transferred inside the MITINCI department and began directing the multilateral 
area, first in a rather informal manner in the scope of the Vice-ministry of Integration, and later, 
from 2000, as head of the National Directorate of Multilateral Affairs. Conversely to Eduardo 
Brandes, National Director of Integration, Victoria Elmore was more critical regarding the CAN, 
and hence, adopted the position sustained inside the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
Ramon Morante: In the 1980s, functionary of the Ministry of Industry and Trade; Ramon 
Morante later evolved in the 1990s into the Peruvian industry’s principal trade policy advisor. 
Since the turn of the century, he has headed the SNI Department of Foreign Trade and 
represented the affiliated industrial branches in the most relevant international trade policy 
forums, above all the CAN and ALADI. Due to the close relation maintained with state officials 
inside MITINCI, and from 2002 MINCETUR, Ramon Morante has served in the past as advisor 
of the official negotiations team, i.e. in the scope of FTAA and US-AFTA talks. 
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6 Bolivia 
 
 
Due to its central location within South America, one could be tempted to describe Bolivia as a 
potential engine for regional integration, especially if we consider the fact that the state is named 
after Simon Bolívar, who liberated the majority of the subcontinent at the beginning of the 19th 
century and crusaded for a unified South America. Yet, the integrative force of Bolivia is 
limited. Apart from its extensive area of 1,098,581 sq km2 and its richness in natural resources, 
the country is sparsely populated with only 8.5 million habitants and exhibits a low per capita 
income of US$1,000 per year. This figure makes Bolivia poorer than any other South American 
nation. Furthermore, the scant physical integration inside Bolivia and the marked cultural 
disparities between the Andean highlands in the west and the tropical lowlands in the east have 
influenced the nation’s possibilities to deepen its external economic relations. 
Concerning the conceptual inputs for regional trade policy-making, however, the 
contribution of the poor Bolivian nation have been remarkable. Against the devastating 
hyperinflation in the aftermath of the debt crisis in Bolivia, reaching over 20,000 percent at its 
peak in 1985, the country became one of the earliest reformers in South America. Supported by 
Jeffrey Sachs’ advisory team from Harvard, as of August 1985, Bolivia set forth a severe 
stabilisation program consisting of the application of a unified and market oriented exchange 
rate, the liberalisation of trade and capital accounts and harsh budget cuts. Therefore, inflation 
was brought under control within a few weeks, initiating a thus far unbroken phase of 
macroeconomic stability (see Morales/ Sachs 1990). 
This chapter discusses the implications of this new economic policy on the world market 
integration strategy pursued by Bolivia from 1986 and 2004, and provides explanation for why 
the once visionary economic opening process failed, producing disrepair and social unrest among 
the Bolivian people. Accordingly, this chapter is structured along the following lines. The first 
section outlines the different policy areas making up the world market integration strategy 
(Dependent Variable B), i.e. unilateral trade regime, region and extra-regional integration, sector 
and export promotion. Section two enlightens the organisation of Bolivia’s public sector in the 
trade policy area (Independent Variable A1), showing thus how the local bureaucracies were 
organised with respect to the conduction of international trade policy affairs during the period of 
analysis. Then, section three elucidates the institutional responses of the business sector on the 
same issue (Independent Variable A2). Based on section one to three, section four provides an 
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assessment of the case, and explores the links between independent and dependent variables, and 
controls the possible influences of other variables (C1-4) on the B value. 
 
6.1 The Failed Application of the Multipolar Model 
 
This first section is structured in accordance with the different policy areas that make up the 
world market integration strategy (Dependent Variable B), i.e. unilateral trade regime, region 
and extra-regional integration, sectoral and export promotion policies. The last subsection 
summarises the results and provides an overview of the trade performance from 1985 to 2004. 
 
Unilateral Trade Regime 
The stabilisation plan set forth as of August 1985 by the Supreme Decree No. 21060 represented 
the end of state capitalism born out of the National Revolution of 1952. Instead of the state 
acting as controller of prices, provider and buyer of goods and services, lender of credits and 
subsidies, ruler of labour relations, etc., international market forces became the reference 
scheme. For Carlos Villegas from the State University UMSA, the essential innovation of the 
Decree 21060 was the introduction of a neoliberal economic ruling, even though the ruling 
primarily consisted of macroeconomic stabilisation actions to control inflation (OE 19/03/04). 
Thus, “export or die” were the words used by president Victor Paz Estensoro to persuade 
manufacturers that they should no longer be oriented to the small domestic market dominated by 
a handful of state-led firms, but look outwards for the abundant market opportunities abroad (OE 
Rodriguez 17/01/05). Enhanced capital inflows and cheaper capital goods were expected to 
provide the necessary inputs to accelerate the technical progress, and thus reduce the 
competitivity gaps when compared to foreign competitors (Zambrana 2002). 
In this context, the trade policy measures adopted consisted of a rigorous dismantling of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. By applying a uniform tariff of 20 percent and abolishing nearly all 
quantitative restrictions, new border policies became clear, in stark contrast to the previous 
heterodox and often discretional policies, such as the existence of multiple tariffs levels that 
reached 150 percent, import licenses and quotas (Zambrana 2002). Later, in 1990, tariffs were 
reduced to a uniform level of 10 percent, but excluded about 500 tariff items in the range of 
capital goods that were taxed by only 5 percent. In 2000, a further category for duty free imports 
was introduced in order to continue lowering the costs of capital goods for industrial 
development. By 2005, the arithmetical average rate applied was 8.2 percent, whereas 70 percent 
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of all tariff lines applied the uniform rate of 10 percent (WTO 2005). Despite these modifications 
and exemptions from the flat rate model, tariffs in general were rather stable and enforced 
Bolivia’s image as a transparent and reliable trading partner. 
Against the conceptual turn of 1985, Bolivia soon envisaged the adherence to the world 
trade system as a means to consolidate its unilateral reform steps. Becoming a formal GATT 
member in 1989, the country’s domestic policies were evidently brought in line with the guiding 
principles of the multilateral trading system. Hence, the WTO Secretariat Reports of 1993, 1999 
and 2005 praised Bolivia as a model of autonomous liberalisation, highlighting the benefits of a 
10 percent uniform tariff regime in terms of its predictability, transparency and promotion of an 
efficient allocation of resources. Special emphasis was furthermore placed on the prevention of 
trade distortions due to the removal of any outstanding sector-specific subsidies.1 
In addition to low tariffs, Bolivia accentuated its salient “trade openness” by renouncing 
practically all trade defence measures, except for two interventions during 2002 and 2003 
involving food products from Argentina and Peru.2 Until 2005, domestic legislation had not 
considered any detailed trade defence mechanisms, and thus, made antidumping and safeguard 
actions rely on provisions signed in international agreements within the scope of the WTO or the 
CAN. Beyond the legal sphere, Bolivia has suffered severely from illegal imports, which 
accounted for an estimated 35 percent of total imports in 2002-03; i.e. US$600 million per year 
(Kreidler/ Rocha 2004: 51).3 Therefore, the customs reform implemented in 1999, which cost the 
state US$35 million, failed to combat the structural constraints of contraband activities, such as 
rampant corruption in the customs authorities, extreme poverty in frontier areas and extensive 
and almost uncontrollable frontiers. 
Regarding the market access for Bolivian products, both unilateral reforms and the GATT 
adherence entailed few tangible benefits. Since local exports consisted of a small group of 
primary and low processed goods for which international markets were either liberalised (e.g. 
mining products) or still distorted by subsidies and protectionist border measures (e.g. sugar, 
cotton and soybeans), the advantages provided by the Uruguay Round results were meagre.4 
Moreover, multilateral tariff reductions agreed on caused a general erosion of non reciprocal 
                                               
1 There is a significant gap between tariffs bound in the GATT (40 percent on practically all products) and effective 
applied tariffs; i.e. Bolivia could theoretically revise its open trade regime by raising tariffs up to 40 percent. 
2 Bolivia took countervailing measures against Peru on six elaborate food products because Peru denied the 
importation of Bolivian soy oil. Moreover, the country implemented safeguard measures against Argentina on the 
importation of wheat flour. 
3 Approximately 80 percent of consumer goods, 30 percent of intermediates, and 20 percent of capital goods are 
affected by contraband; see ibid: 44. 
4 For this reason Bolivia joined the Cairns Group in 1999. 
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tariff concessions made by developed countries in the scope of the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP).5 Thus, Bolivia had clear incentives to consider regional preferential 
arrangements as a strategic option for gaining broader market access for its manufacturers. 
 
Regional Integration 
Strikingly, in the course of the 1990s the tiny Bolivian economy, along with Chile, evolved 
among Latin American countries as one of the most connected economies, at least from a legal 
perspective. Between 1990 and 1997, Bolivia was successful in signing comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) with ten of the eleven ALADI states. Thus, in the following section I 
briefly sum up the negotiation pace undertaken by the Bolivian trade diplomacy. 
Andean Community of Nations (CAN): During the period of state capitalism, the closest 
links on an international level were maintained with the Andean Group in which Bolivia was a 
founding member of the Cartagena Agreement of 1969. With the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy in 1985, Bolivia nevertheless neglected the integration scheme due to its strong 
association with the previously pursued ISI approach. Viewing policies such as the Sectoral 
Industrial Development Programs and the strongly selective treatment of foreign capitals, the 
accord signed in 1969 by Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia had been the 
fullest expression of “old regionalism” in Latin America, based on inward-oriented strategies 
(Devlin and Estevadeordal 2001: 24). 
At the onset of 1990s, however, the objectives and modalities of Andean integration 
altered, becoming an interesting development tool for Bolivia’s agriculture exports, particularly 
those originating from the tropical lowlands of eastern Bolivia. At this time, new guidelines were 
set by the Strategic Design in December 1989 when Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela declared in Galapagos, Ecuador, their goal of accelerating intra-zone integration as 
well as becoming open towards extra-regional partners. In the “harmonising” context of 
economic liberalisation in the region, the group finally agreed in December 1991, through the 
Act of Barahona, on the complete removal of border restrictions and the formation of a CET by 
January 1992. 
Although these deadlines were not fully met, the Andean Free Trade Area became a 
reality for Bolivia in February 1993. In the case of the announced CET, member countries 
decided in November 1994 on its implementation by January 1995. Andean Decision 370 
                                               
5 Nonetheless, the GSP conceded from the EU (known as the Andean GSP) and the US (Andean Trade Promotion 
and Drug Eradication Act or “ATPDEA”) has been widened considerably in the last 15 years. 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
THE CASE OF BOLIVIA 
 
241 
specified that the CET would contain four levels, i.e. 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent. To wide extents, 
this escalated tariff concept confirmed the “industry friendly” approach upheld by Colombia and 
Venezuela which was aimed at lowering costs for inputs and capital goods not produced locally, 
and providing higher protection for domestic production according to the degree of a products 
elaboration. Even so, from the outset of negotiations, the Bolivian authorities indicated their 
absent will to sacrifice the modern flat rate. Therefore, and for three main factors, Bolivia was 
granted exemption from applying the higher rates of 15 and 20 percent in order to maintain the 
principal national tariff of 10 percent on third world countries’ imports. 
1) Small and Less Developed Country: In the history of Latin American integration (the 
ALALC in 1960, Andean Pact 1969, ALADI in 1980) small and poor states like Ecuador 
and Bolivia had enjoyed a special status which enabled flexible and privileged treatment 
throughout integration issues; i.e. higher tariff preference, longer phasing-outs, less rigid 
rules of origin, etc. 
2) Landlocked Country: Bolivia, as a landlocked country, and moreover, badly integrated in 
the regional transport system, causes low risks of serious CET perforations by means of 
cheaper imports via Bolivia. 
3) Trade Openness: As described, in 1985 the country adopted a very open trade regime, 
and thus, didn’t resist removing the remaining border restrictions for intra-zone imports. 
At any rate, average tariffs among member states converged considerably due to the previous 
unilateral reforms, leaving Bolivia to stand out with its somewhat lower tariffs, as Table 6.1 
shows. 
 
Table 6.1: Andean Community Nominal Average Tariff 2001 
CET  Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela 
13.6 9.6 11.6 11.2 11.6 11.9 
Source: CAN General Secretariat 
 
Despite this far-reaching convergence, discussions on the CET have so far uncovered 
severe conflicts among members. Accordingly, Peru also aimed for a flat rate model, but 
couldn’t settle on the application of the above enlisted factors. Thus, Peru suspended its CAN 
membership between 1992 and 1997 and has since resisted the adoption of a harmonised CET as 
well as the complete removal of intra-zone trade restrictions; i.e. Bolivia used to suffer from the 
restricted entrance of soy and sugar products. As I outlined in the chapter on Peru, the incessant 
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disagreements upheld between Peru and the CAN did much harm to the Andean integration 
process in general. Even though important institutional reforms were undertaken by the Trujillo 
Protocol in June 1997, by which the Andean Community of Nations was founded, the last years’ 
experiences have shown that efforts aimed at establishing a common market enabling the free 
movement of goods, capital, services and people encounter clear limits in the Andean context.6 
Concerning Bolivia’s participation inside the CAN, the principal focus has traditionally 
been based upon improving and guaranteeing preferential market access for agricultural products 
from Bolivia’s lowlands. The country has further benefited from the Andean Price Band System 
in force since 1995, by which the custom tariffs for up to 400 agricultural products have been 
variably adjusted according to the relation between domestic and world market prices. Bolivia, 
without applying the system, enjoyed higher protection, especially within the buyers’ markets of 
Colombia and Venezuela. 
Mexico: During the first government of Sánchez de Lozada (1993-97), Bolivia tried to 
foster economic integration with the NAFTA. But as the country did not feature on the Clinton 
administration’s priority list, a FTA with ALADI member Mexico seemed to be a pragmatic step 
towards deeper hemispheric integration. Therefore, within the scope of ACE No. 31, in force 
since January 1995, the countries agreed not only on issues affecting the trade of goods, but also 
on commitments concerning new areas of services, state procurement, investment and 
intellectual property.7 Regarding these behind the border measures, Bolivia was virtually overrun 
by Mexico’s team of negotiators, who had accumulated expertise from the adherence to the 
NAFTA, as one negotiator remembered (SO De Rico 15/12/04). Bolivia maintained no offensive 
interests in these new areas, and thus, accepted the impositions with the hope of an expected 
export surge in manufactured goods, above all in tropical woods from the eastern lowlands. The 
total liberalisation of bilateral trade in goods had been planned for the beginning of 2009. 
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR): Since the mid-1980’s, local diplomacy has 
been tempted by integration endeavours between Brazil and Argentina; first by the bilateral 
economic cooperation program, PICE, started in 1986, and later in March 1991, when the major 
economies in the region formed MERCOSUR together with Uruguay and Paraguay. For the 
                                               
6 The Trujillo Protocol introduced the Presidential Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers with decision-
making responsibilities. Furthermore, the Protocol was aimed at reinforcing the internal cohesion of the Andean 
integration process by regrouping all its institutions under a new structure, the Andean Integration System (for 
details see www.comunidadandina.org.) With regards to the Andean Common Market, in May 1999 the member 
states assumed the commitment to create conditions for the free circulation of goods, the unimpeded movement of 
services, capital, and people in the sub region by 2005. 
7 In the case of services, specific commitments were reached in areas such as telecommunications, financial 
services, and professional services. 
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poor, landlocked Andean state, the principal foreign policy concern regarding the states forming 
the Rio Plata Basin was linked to the improvement of transport routes towards the Atlantic 
coast.8 In the 1990s, expectations focussed on a waterway navigable from the tropical zones in 
the east (principally from Puerto Suarez in the Santa Cruz department) to the Atlantic ports of 
Argentina and Uruguay.9 Regarding the regional trade flows, Bolivia was able to control trade 
deficits only due to natural gas exports to Argentina and (since 1999) to Brazil. Particularly, the 
competitive farming sector in the Southern Cone was perceived as a strong threat to local 
producers of wheat, soybean, dairy, meat, sugar and cotton. Conversely, the question of whether 
and to what extent Bolivian manufactures would take advantage of MERCOSUR’s consumer 
markets (e.g. in textiles, leather, lumber and tropical fruits) was more uncertain. 
But trade policy considerations played a minor role as of August 1993 because Bolivia’s 
key officials inside the Foreign Affairs Ministry began working with enthusiasm on the idea that 
Bolivia could become the regional “hinge” between MERCOSUR and the CAN, or “Donna Flor 
and Her Two Husbands” according to the favoured metaphor of President Sánchez de Lozado 
(Sanjinés Avila 2004; Vol. II). As a consequence of intense diplomacy, in 1996 Bolivia became 
an Associate Member of MERCOSUR. Simultaneously, the country signed a comprehensive 
FTA with the trading block that replaced the previous, more limited, bilateral agreements 
maintained with each member state. The so-called ACE No. 36 covered all tariff lines and 
defined a general regime with progressive tariff reductions, starting at 30 percent in 1997 and 
reaching 100 percent by January 2006. Different groups of sensitive products were subject to 
specific schedules that will reach a zero tariff level within 15 to 18 years. In 2011, all exports 
towards MERCOSUR will be duty free, while in the case of Bolivia, tariffs on 28 items in the 
range of vegetable oil, sugar and wheat will be dismantled by 2014. 
Evidentially, neither the members of MERCOSUR or CAN shared Bolivia’s enthusiasm 
about its integrating role inside South America. The deliberations made by the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry evidently proved unrealistic, as former trade diplomats later admitted (OEs Tercero 
18/01/05; Olmos 15/02/05). The CAN membership became displeased with this individual effort, 
given that the group had clear interests in envisaging joint free trade talks with the MERCOSUR 
(OE Larrazabal 08/02/05). For the Southern Cone states, Bolivia was neither a political nor an 
economic priority compared to Chile, who had previously negotiated a FTA with 
                                               
8 Since 1969, the country has been linked to the Rio Plata Basin by a multilateral treaty between Bolivia, Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, aimed at the better use of common aquatic resources. 
9 By the mid-1990’s, the states of the Rio Plata Basin moved into planning stages with the Hidrovía project, 
allowing ocean going vessels to make the 2000 mile trip from Argentinean and Uruguayan ports of the Atlantic to 
currently landlocked areas in Paraguay and Bolivia. 
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MERCOSUR.10 Finally, local business (principally the threatened low-land farmers) sustained a 
strong advocacy against the wide-reaching approach (6.3), thus underlining the lack of 
justification for the perseverance exhibited by Bolivia’s diplomacy. With respect to the content 
agreement signed in December 1996, several aspects have, in hindsight, provided particularly 
disappointing results for Bolivia. 
1) Small and Less Developed Country: Compared to previous regional integration schemes, 
Bolivia renounced its Small and Less Developed Country status; i.e. market access 
concessions and trade disciplines were made on a reciprocal basis. 
2) Market Access: MERCOSUR states showed a reluctance to open up their markets by 
setting long phasing-out chronograms, small import quotas for textiles and relatively 
severe rules of origin for industrial goods.11 Numerous (phyto-) sanitary and customs 
measures later applied constrained the entrance of bananas, pineapples and tomatoes, 
among others. 
3) Powerless Observer: Within the CAN-MERCOSUR negotiations that concluded in 
October 2004, Bolivia merely participated as an “observer”. Thus, it was virtually 
powerless to prevent the erosion of market access preferences for soy products.12 
4) Waterway: Even though the waterway project along the Paraná River received certain 
impulses in the scope of MERCOSUR, ACE No. 36 was limited to the removal of tariffs 
and did not encompass tangible commitments for physical integration towards the 
Atlantic. 
Chile: Despite a preferential agreement agreed on in July 1993, in 2004 Chile was the 
only ALADI member without a FTA signed with Bolivia (disregarding Cuba). Although the 
original ACE No. 22, covering a limited preferential access for 200 Bolivian and 115 Chilean 
products, was gradually extended through several additional protocols, Bolivia refused Chile’s 
request to enter into comprehensive free trade talks until the end of 2002 in light of the huge 
trade deficits registered. In the second government of Sánchez de Lozada, beginning in August 
2002, the neighbours finally launched negotiations aimed at a far-reaching multi-issue 
agreement. 
                                               
10 For example, as the CET entered into force in 1995, MERCOSUR Resolution planned immediate negotiations 
only with Chile. Jorge Campbell (OE 08/06/04), by then Argentina’s Chief Negotiator, confirmed that the talks with 
Bolivia were conducted because of Bolivia’s insistence since initial, common negotiations with CAN were foreseen. 
11 After negotiations were closed in November 1996, Argentina insisted, for example, on a merely symbolic import 
quota of 27,000 t-shirts, one of the few products with market opportunities for Bolivia’s manufacturers. 
12 For the regional perspectives of Bolivia’s oleaginous sector; see Brenes, Madrigal y Montenegro 2001: 40-45. 
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By then, the offensive interests maintained by Bolivia’s government moved away from 
market access issues towards the possibility of obtaining sovereign access to the Pacific coast in 
order to facilitate natural gas exports towards markets in Mexico and the US. However, the 
reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Chile, in combination with the commercial use of 
the huge natural gas reserves, turned out to be politically unviable. The relationship with Chile 
(formally interrupted since 1975) still encountered profound rejection among the Bolivian people 
as a result of the Pacific War, which cost Bolivia its only sovereign access to the coastline in 
1904. Finally, a strong opposition comprised of labour, neighbourhood organisations and 
indigenous movements against the possible natural gas exports via Chilean ports ended, in 
October 2003, in violent struggles with military forces, provoking the necessary exile of Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada. At that same time, the bilateral free trade talks ceased. 
 
Extra-Regional Sphere 
Strong opposition against further foreign trade commitments have hindered the country in the 
past years in its ability to continue the pursuit of a Multipolar Model in the extra-regional sphere. 
In any case, Bolivia’s influence on trade integration outcomes was close to zero at this time as 
the country participated only as minor partner in the “mega negotiations” on the regional, 
hemispheric and multilateral levels started in 1998. As a result, Bolivia contributed very little to 
the bi-regional relations between the CAN and the EU, which had yet to pass pre-negotiation 
stages by 2005, and to the WTO Doha Development Round, which had not yet registered a 
major breakthrough, for example. More revealing from a domestic perspective, however, was 
Bolivia’s recent participation inside the hemispheric sphere, and above all, within the US-AFTA 
talks. 
 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA): With a 0.07 percent share of the hemisphere’s 
GDP, Bolivia’s leverage was insignificant in the FTAA negotiations formally launched in 1998. 
Hence, Bolivia could only adopt an observer’s role in the key negotiations between the US and 
Brazil, those countries being the principal opponents on key issues such as intellectual property, 
agriculture, services and antidumping measures. Bolivia’s offensive concerns focused on trade in 
agriculture and Special Treatment for Small and Less Developed States. According to the latter, 
Bolivia participated actively in the pertinent Declarations of Toronto, Buenos Aires and Quito 
(1999-2002), where related issues had been promoted and specified both in the framework of the 
CAN and FTAA.13 Nevertheless, other potential offensive interests such as the legal protection 
                                               
13 According to Ana Maria Solares, Vice-Minister of International Economic Relations 1998-2002, Bolivia took 
over the leadership within CAN. In the FTAA sphere, Bolivia assumed the presidency of the FTAA Consultative 
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of the huge local biodiversity weren’t pursued with sufficient perseverance, as a trade policy 
advisor from the local pharmaceutical industry observed (BR Dueñas 9/08/04). Finally, the new 
trade issues of services, state procurement, intellectual property, investment, labour and 
environmental standards, were not, or could not be, attended to by the limited Bolivian 
negotiation team (SO’s De Rico 16/03/04; Alvarado 19/03/04; 5.2.2). 
 US-Andean Free Trade Agreement (US-AFTA):  During 2004, the FTAA stalled because 
of a lack of space for the negotiation of key issues such as agriculture, antidumping, services, 
and intellectual property, and as a result, the Bush administration manifested its disposition to 
undergo bilateral trade talks with the Andean countries, after having completed Free Trade 
Agreements with Chile and the Common Market of Central America. Peru, Ecuador and 
Colombia took immediate advantage of this offer and entered into formal negotiations with the 
US in May 2004. At this time, Venezuela abstained due to the ideological quarrels put forth by 
President Hugo Chavez. On several occasions, the Bolivian government likewise declared its 
interest to join the talks, confirming the country’s ambitions for deeper economic relations with 
the US since 1993 (Rodríguez 2003: 113). 
Bolivia’s recent interest in free trade with the US is explained mainly by the fact that 
since 1991 local exporters have enjoyed preferential access to the US market under the Andean 
Trade Preference Act (ATPA). In September 2002, ATPA was superseded by the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), renewing not only the tariff preferences until 
December 31, 2006 but also adding roughly 700 products to the previous list, including clothing, 
leather and wood manufactures, and jewellery. On this ground, the government argued that 
surging exports in these labour-intensive sectors would lose their preferences at the end of 2006, 
or at least, would face investment adverse uncertainty as regards an eventual superseding 
ATPDEA. 
On the domestic level, though, the official free trade plans encountered strong opposition. 
Since 2002, oppositional forces have organised within the scope of the “Bolivian Movement 
against the FTAA Struggle”. Coordinated by the Solon Foundation, a foreign financed NGO, the 
movement was composed of NGOs, labour, indigenous and small peasant groups, 
neighbourhood organisations, and state universities, and raised fundamental objections against 
the disruptive force of globalisation, best exemplified by the US’s southwards expansion. Their 
intellectual leaders put emphasis on the impact of enhanced intellectual property rights, 
investment rules and services, arguing that the “latest generation” FTAs cement the existing 
                                                                                                                                                       
Group for Smaller Economies during 2001. The topic of technical assistance received special attention here in the 
scope of the Hemispheric Cooperation Program; see CADEX 2001, 35. 
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economic regime in favour of US interests (mainly those of installed multinationals, operating in 
services, pharmaceuticals, mining, hydrocarbons, etc.) in working as an intrinsic set of 
instruments to exploit Latin America by imposing US rules on the domestic legal framework.14 
Against this articulated social discontent, the government was hesitant in entering the talks as a 
formal party and attended the process merely as an observer. The US government was concerned 
about the social acceptance of the agreement and likewise opted to wait for more opportune 
moments for direct negotiations. In October 2005, both governments finally decided to handle 
the topic in 2006 (La Razón 13/10/05). The effectiveness by which oppositional forces have 
placed their arguments so far can mainly be explained by three factors: 
1) Organisational Linkages: While “technical support” was provided by NGO’s closely 
connected to the global anti-globalisation movement, the political mobilisations were 
implemented by traditional social actors such as labour, neighbourhood and indigenous 
organisations. 
2) Variety of Activities: The movement made creative use of media, impacting videos, flyers 
and magazines, street protests and blockades, assemblies and workshops, and finally, 
presence in Parliament through the powerful Movement towards Socialism (MAS). 
3) Issue Linkages: The protest against free trade was connected to other, even more polemic 
topics such as the eradication of coca cultivation, public water supply, natural gas 
reserves and the demand to enact a Constitutional Assembly process. 
 
Export and Sector Promotion 
For Gary Rodriguez (2004: 125), the New Economic Policy, in force as of 1985, had four central 
pillars: Planning, Subsidising, Protection and Promotion. Indeed, to enhance domestic 
competitiveness, in which Bolivia was ranked number 101 of 117 states (according to the WEF 
Global Competitiveness Report 2005-06), the governments of the Nationalist Revolution 
Movement party (MNR) paid exclusive attention to structural reforms. While the Victor Paz 
administration (1985-89) placed primary emphasis on deregulating the monetary and trade 
regime, Sánchez de Lozado (1993-97) linked reform power to the modernisation and 
disengagement of the state from its traditional economic activities, through a widespread 
                                               
14 The movement’s intellectual leaders came from the state university UMSA or NGO’s such as the Center for Rural 
Development Studies (CEDLA), Solon Foundation and the Bolivian Center for Information and Documentation 
(CEBID); see for example Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas – UMSA (2003). 
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capitalisation of public assets and autonomous, sector specific regulatory mechanisms, among 
other measures.15  
As economic growth slowed down from 1998 onwards, and popular criticism of the 
“neoliberal achievements” increased, the official economic development approach began to alter 
somewhat. The most noteworthy attempt was embodied in the Bolivian System of Productivity 
and Competitiveness (SBPC) put into practice in November 2001 under the one year presidency 
of Jorge Quiroga, from the centre-right wing party Democratic Nationalist Action. Coordinated 
by the Productivity and Competitiveness Unit (UPC), the SBPC sought to counter the structural 
deficits faced by local industry in the range of a qualified work force, technology, economy of 
scale, and reliable and efficient public institutions, among others. Conceptual emphasis was put 
on the stimulation of supply chains, or vertical clusters, through sector agreements among 
stakeholders from the private, public and academic sectors. This act embraced Bolivia’s potential 
export offer of soy, quinoa foods, textiles and clothing, leather, lumber and furniture, and 
jewellery.16 However, the change of authorities in August 2002, coupled with high budget 
deficits and political and social instability (illustrated by two transitory governments between 
October 2003 and December 2005), strongly modified the institutional structure of the SBPC, 
hindering the effective implementation of the systemic approach to development. 
With regard to export promotion facilities, official support was likewise perceived as 
generally insufficient by local manufacturers (Vaca Calderón/Soliz Salinas 2001: 117-130; 
CONEX 2004a-e). Nevertheless, a set of fiscal measures were envisaged in the Export 
Development and Taxation Law enacted in April 1993 by the Jaime Paz Zamora government 
from the Leftist Revolution Movement (MIR) (1989-93). Although modified on several 
occasions, the following mechanisms were still in force in 2005: 
1) The Tax Refund System: The law introduced the principle of tax neutrality for export 
goods and services; i.e. indirect tax such as the Value Added Tax (VAT) and specific 
consumption tax (ICE) paid along the production process are reimbursed by so called Tax 
Refund Certificates (CEDEIM). However, export subsidies paid on non-traditional 
products were no longer granted from the moment the so-called CERTEX was abolished 
in August 1986. Complaints regarding the CEDEIM mechanism mostly concerned the 
                                               
15 See Larrazabal 2000. The major new regulations during the Sánchez de Lozada government were the Law on 
Banks and Financial Entities (1993), Capitalization Law (1994), Sectoral Regulatory System Law (1994), Electricity 
Law (1994), Telecommunication Law (1995), Central Bank Law (1995), Hydrocarbons Law (1996), Pension Law 
(1996), Mining Law (1997), Council of Judicature Law (1997), Ombudsman Law (1997), Stock Market Law (1998), 
Insurance Law (1998), and the Law on Concessions for Public Works in the Transport sector (1998). 
16 For detailed information, see UPC 2002 and Supreme Decree 26391 enacted on November 8, 2001. 
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arduous presentation of relevant fiscal or commercial invoices, implying several months 
delay on the return of paid taxes.17 
2) The Temporary Import Regime for Export Promotion (RITEX). Under the current RITEX 
provisions, import duties and internal taxes are suspended for a maximum of 360 days for 
imports of raw materials and intermediate goods incorporated into a production process 
that makes products for export; i.e. for their production, processing, or assembly. In 2004, 
RITEX proved quite a popular option, enlisting 118 companies and exporting goods 
worth US$356 million, in comparison with 62 companies in 2001 with exports 
amounting to US$31 million (WTO 2005). 
3) Free and/or Industrial Zones. These areas intended to encourage commercial activities 
and industrial development within a competitive environment by simplifying 
intermediations processes and broad tax exemptions. In 2005, 14 free or industrial zones 
held concessions whereby three of them were for pure commercial use. Nonetheless, their 
contribution to Bolivia’s exports has been limited since they were poorly linked to other 
activities within their geographical zones. 
Furthermore, official market assistance was poorly received by exporters. Since the inaction of 
the National Institute of Export Promotion (INPEX) in 1987, Bolivia’s export promotion agency 
underwent numerous modifications, going through six different ministerial departments. 
Founded in 1997, the Promotion Centre of Bolivia (CEPROBOL), inside the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, was responsible in 2004 for the promotion of exports, foreign investment, and tourism. 
Nevertheless, to attend these broad fields CEPROBOL was designated only a marginal budget. 
According to calculations by the International Trade Centre (ITC), of the yearly budget of 
US$340,000 (2002) salaries accounted for 74% (ITC/BOL/61/80). The report concluded that 
CEPROBOL requires annual resources of approximately US$7 million to carry out its duties in 
an adequate manner.  
                                               
17 The critical voices gathered originated from the leading export entities such as CANEB and IBCE. Furthermore, 
former state officials like Adhemar Guzman, Vice-Minister for Exports 1998-2002, acknowledged ineffectiveness 
inside the system; Interview 21/01/05. 
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A cross-country analysis regarding official trade promotion expenditure in 2003 highlights yet 
further the local disregard for the importance of this area.18 
 
Table 6.2: Official Trade Promotion Expenditure Compared (2003) 
Country Exports (X)  
US$ million 
Promotion 
Expenditure (P) 
% (P/X) Principal Source 
Mexico 166.424 188 0.11 State (Bancomex) 
Spain 111.000 155 0.14 State 
Portugal 23.312 51 0.22 State 
Chile 18.425 25 0.14 State 
Colombia 13.037 19 0.15 State (Fideicomiso) 
Costa Rica 5.898 6 0.10 State (ZOFRI) 
Bolivia 1.200 0,3 0.025 State 
Source: Rodriguez 2004: 132 
 
In the light of this absence of the State, private sector institutions such as the Bolivian Institute of 
Foreign Trade (IBCE), and national and regional export chambers have recently assumed a more 
protagonist role in the promotion of exports.19 As a result, the awareness of the necessity to 
foster national export development has been growing. From the official side, concrete export 
facilitation measures were taken in April 2003, aiming to make better use of the preferential 
market access offered by the APTDEA system.20 On the private sector side, the growing 
dissatisfaction was channelled in November 2001 into formulated guidelines with regard to a 
concerted National Export Strategy (6.2). Nevertheless, the fact that the requested strategy was 
not presented until May 2005 (the so-called ENEX 2005-15) highlights the domestic difficulties 
of following proactive export policies. It is very uncertain, though, whether and to what extent 
the far-reaching promotion policies sustained by the ENEX shall be implemented by the 
forthcoming government. 
 
Summary Dependent Variable B 
Bolivia’s world market integration strategy pursued from 1985 to 2004 turned out to be an 
outright failure. The poor Andean country opened up its economy in 1985, and in the 1990s 
followed strongly outward-oriented regional trade diplomacy in undertaking comprehensive free 
trade commitments with the CAN, MERCOSUR, Mexico, and to a lesser extent, Chile. But as no 
                                               
18 As a matter of fact, Rodriguez made the international comparisons on the basis of countries that were rather 
famous for their efficient and well doted trade promotion facilities. 
19 In any case, most export promotion programs have been financed, at least in parts, by international donor agencies 
such as CAF, IDB, World Bank and bilateral donors. 
20 For example, exporters were permitted to duty free imports of complete industrial plants from abroad and to 
postpone the payment of the value added tax on imported capital goods. Finally, collective manufacturing facilities 
(“maquicentros”) have been established in order to foster cooperation among small scale manufacturers. 
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export and sector-specific measures were adopted to develop potential export champions 
(bearing in mind the structural constraints of the local economy), the blind trade opening caused 
not only a poor trade performance with deep trade deficits, but also a strong domestic movement 
opposed to further trade liberalisation commitments in the extra-regional sphere. Therefore, the 
Multipolar Model could not be implemented effectively, putting into doubt future market access 
conditions for Bolivia’s non-traditional exports, such as derivates of soy and textiles. 
 
Box 6.1: Summary Dependent Variable B 
Unilateral 
Trade Regime 
Regional 
Integration 
Extra-Regional 
Integration 
Export 
Promotion 
Sector 
Promotion 
In 1985 trade 
liberalisation 
covering all 
tariff lines; 
adoption of 
“perforated” 
uniform tariff 
structure of 10 
percent; 5% or 
duty free 
provisions for 
numerous 
capital goods. 
Rampant 
contraband. 
1990-1997; 
Completion of 
FTAs with the 
MERCOSUR, 
CAN and 
Mexico. 
Against domestic 
protest, in 2003 
free trade talks 
with Chile had to 
be cancelled. 
Strong trade 
deficits with 
regional partners.  
Reaching a 
comprehensive 
FTA with the 
United States 
became an 
unviable 
endeavour due to 
discontent 
among social 
movements with 
the liberal 
outward-oriented 
strategy pursued. 
From 1985, 
frequent 
modification of 
export promotion 
schemes and 
modest public 
resources for 
international 
market 
assistance 
avoided spurring 
non-traditional 
exports. 
From 1985, 
Bolivia’s 
economic policy 
was focussed on 
structural 
reforms, and the 
abolishment of 
significant 
sector-specific 
promotion.  
 
 
From 1985 to 2004, Bolivia’s trade performance was negative in quantitative as well as 
qualitative terms. Bearing in mind its share of world exports represented 0.07 percent in the 
1970s (0.05 in 1980), the contribution of 0.025 percent in 2004 appears modest, despite an 
overall export growth from US$ 623 million to US$ 1918 million in the 1985-2004 period 
(DBLA 2005). Moreover, except for the trade surpluses registered in the scope of the CAN, the 
regional trade arrangements signed in the 1990s amplified existing trade deficits. Thus, annual 
trade deficits of about US$200 million on average represented a critical financial drain for the 
chronicle balance-of-payments deficit plagued US$8 billion economy. 
Studying qualitative aspects, the initial dependence on mining exports, accounting for 62 
percent, was lowered against the increased contribution of soy and hydrocarbons. Nonetheless, in 
2004 close to 80 percent of export incomes still originated from mining, agriculture and energy 
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commodities. Furthermore, the most salient non-traditional exports, such as soy products 
destined for the Andean markets, and textiles, jewellery and furniture sold in the United States, 
had an uncertain future. In light of ongoing free trade talks maintained by CAN members with 
MERCOSUR and the US, local soy farmers feared eroding tariff preferences would make soy 
production uncompetitive in Bolivia, given that exporters from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
the US have much cheaper transport costs. With respect to industrial manufacturers, at the end of 
2004, it was unclear whether, and for how long, Bolivia’s textiles and jewellery can further 
benefit from tariff preferences in the US market, as the ATPDEA preference scheme comes to a 
close in December 2006. 
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5.2 State Bureaucracy: The Unpredictable Trade Policy-Making Process 
 
This section is structured along the following lines. The first subsection, responsibilities, exposes 
the division of labour in the conduction of international trade policy affairs, concerning the inter-
ministerial coordination among the different departments involved. Subsection resources 
provides a description of how the trade policy team evolved over the last two decades with 
respect to staff size, technical expertise, and the application of civil service models. Subsection 
openness finally discusses consultation mechanism geared towards the business and civil society. 
 
Responsibilities 
Handling contradictory and fragmentary information was the main challenge when identifying 
the role of the various government departments involved in trade policy-making. Finally, 
however, with information gathered by the frequently modifying Laws of Executive Power 
Organisation (LOPE) and from a handful of open-minded key informants, it was possible to 
elaborate an historic reconstruction of the trade policy-making process inside the Bolivian State. 
Table 6.3 summarises the key features that have defined the institutional set up since the 1970s. 
 
Table 6.3: Trade Policy-Making inside the Bolivian State 1972-2004 
 Economic Policy International 
Trade Policy 
Inter-ministerial 
Coordination 
Outstanding 
Features 
1972 – 1986:  
The Rise and 
Decline of the 
SEGIN 
Ministry of 
Planning and 
Coordination 
General 
Secretariat of 
Integration 
(SEGIN) 
CODEPLAN Presidential 
support of the 
specialised 
SEGIN; Andean 
Group orientation 
1986 – 1997:  
The Omission 
to Strengthen 
the Trade 
Policy Branch 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Super Ministries 
(from 1993) 
From the mid-
1990s, increasing 
involvement by the 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Development 
1997 – 2003: 
Hopes and 
Despair 
with the MCEI 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Ministry of 
Foreign Trade 
and Investment 
(MCEI)/ Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 
CONAPES Erection of a 
specialised trade 
policy branch; 
bureaucratic war 
between Foreign 
Affairs and MCEI 
2003 and 
beyond: 
Towards a 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs/ 
Ministry of 
CONAPES Dissolution of 
MCEI; conflicts 
between 
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Foreign Affairs 
Model? 
Economic 
Development  
Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs 
and Economic 
Development 
 Source: Executive Power (Decree) Laws No. 10460 (1972); No. 1493 (1993); No. 1788 (1997); No. 2446 (2003) 
 
 The Rise and Decline of the SEGIN (1976-1986): Given the prominent regional 
integration attempts in the scope of the Andean Group launched in 1969, international trade 
policy affairs received strong attention during the government of Hugo Banzer (1971-1978), the 
authoritarian leader following a nationalist, state-led development strategy. Herein, the General 
Secretariat of Integration (SEGIN), which until 1976 had been a technical branch inside the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, evolved into an independent agency that enjoyed a ministerial rank.  
The SEGIN sought to bring domestic ISI policies in line with the industrial programming 
pursued inside the Andean Group.21 Due to the conceptual importance of the Andean market, and 
the fact that the agency responded directly to the presidential office, the SEGIN officials held an 
influential voice inside the National Council of Economy and Planning (CODEPLAN) where 
economic policies were coordinated, planned and formulated.22 Simultaneously, the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry lost competencies over international economic affairs, and the Ministry of 
Industry, Trade and Tourism acted as the agency in charge of the state administration of 
domestic and foreign trade. 
Nevertheless, the combination of debt crises, deprived intra-regional trade and 
inflationary pressure caused the SEGIN to become an increasingly obsolete institution in the 
1980s. In 1985, when the New Economic Policy was launched, the trade policy decision-making 
power was concentrated within an inter-ministerial team staffed by a small group of technocrats 
from the Ministries of Planning and Finance, advised by a Harvard team coordinated by Jeffrey 
Sachs.23 Within this first reform stage the institutional leadership was still held inside the 
Planning Ministry led by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (state president 1993-97 and 2002-03). 
                                               
21 According to Manuel Arana (SO 24/01/05), SEGIN obtained strong political backing by Willy Vargas Vacaflor, 
later General Secretary, who acted as Hugo Banzer’s principal advisor in Foreign Affairs. At the end of the 1970s, 
SEGIN was denominated as the Ministry of Integration, even though this title was afterwards altered on several 
occasions. 
22 By the Decree Law of Administrative Structure of the Executive Power No. 10460 of 1972, CODEPLAN was 
ascribed a strategic role in the coordination and formulation of state-led development policies. The Council had first 
been directed by the Finance Minister and was composed of the Ministers of Transport, Communication and Civil 
Aeronautic; Industry, Trade and Tourism, Agriculture and Livestock Farming, Mining and Metal Industry, Energy 
and Hydrocarbons, and the Council’s Secretary. Later on, the CODEPLAN was ruled by the Planning Ministry and 
began to also integrate the social policy area, originally attended by another council. 
23 Regarding the cooperation with the Harvard fellows, the principal nexus of the Bolivian side was Juan Careaga 
Osorio from the Finance Ministry. Thus, the increasing power of the Finance Ministry is closely linked to him, the 
“father of the stabilisation measures”, who served as Minister from 1986 to 1988; see OE Zambrana 5/08/04. 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
THE CASE OF BOLIVIA 
 
255 
This “institutionalised brain” of the Bolivian State disappeared later, however, as the new 
economic ruling no longer focused on 5-year state-led plans defining guidelines for fiscal 
policies and industrial production, but rather on the state’s economic disengagement and fiscal 
discipline.24 These priorities evidently favoured the role of the Finance Ministry as the principal 
economic policy-making institution. 
The Omission to Strengthen the Trade Policy Branch (1987-1997): The SEGIN, at this 
point headed by a politician in his last career steps, became a “takeover candidate”.25 The 
possibility that the Foreign Affairs Ministry would regain the economic branch were thus high, 
especially since the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism had also been plagued by the 
undertaken fiscal adjustments and the State’s withdrawal from trade operations and industry 
planning. And indeed, the personal lobby of Guillermo Bedregal, then foreign affairs minister 
and influential MNR politician, as well as SEGIN staff interested in stable job environments, 
enabled the transfer into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987 (SO’s Arana 24/01/05; De Rico 
15/12/04).  
Afterwards, the trade policy branch subsisted as the downgraded Undersecretary for 
Integration, subordinating its activities to the concerns of the leading political branch inside the 
foreign affairs department. Shortcomings became apparent at the outset of the 1990s when 
regional integration began gaining importance and Bolivia, as a new GATT member, entered 
into multilateral trade negotiations. Increasingly aware of the need to give pertinent institutional 
responses to the outward oriented policies, it was in July 1992 when the government of Jaime 
Paz Zamora sought to build up trade expertise through the creation of the Ministry of Exports 
and Economic Competitiveness (MECE). Under the young MIR deputy, Luis Fernando 
Campero, the enthusiastic MECE staff, which by then was inspired by Michael Porter’s concept 
of competitiveness, aimed at pushing Bolivia’s exports by measures such as the Unified 
Window, facilitating export paperwork, incorporating the National Institute of Export Promotion 
(INPEX), the establishment of free trade zones, and the reimbursement of paid import and 
domestic taxes, among other measures (OE Olmos 15/02/05; SO’s Arana 24/01/05; Miranda 
14/12/04). Though still under the responsibilities of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the new export 
policy branch served, from this point,  as the technical advisory body and provider of export 
development guidelines. 
                                               
24 In 1993, the Planning Ministry was finally relegated as a National Secretariat inside the Ministry of Sustainable 
Development and Environment, losing its influence on core economic issues and focusing instead on topics such as 
decentralisation and environmental policies. 
25 According to Helen de Rico (SO 15/12/04), the office holder in charge was anything but an expert on economic 
integration and stayed at home most of the time. Thus, he delegated all responsibilities to Ana Maria Solares, a 
young functionary who became a crucial official in the trade policy area towards the end of the 1990s. 
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The new drive inside the MECE vanished, though, after just one year, when Sanchez de 
Lozada entered the presidential office in August 1993. The former ministerial structure was 
abolished by the new Ministerial Law of the Executive Power (LOPE) No. 1493. The new 
underlying organisational logic emphasised the idea that economic policy-making was no longer 
based on sector-specific agencies but instead was part of a horizontal development concept. 
Therefore, the executive powers became concentrated in the Super Ministries that embraced the 
areas of Human Development, and Finance and Economic Development. The latter area hosted 
no less than six formal ministerial departments, and covered the National Secretariats of Industry 
and Trade, Finance, Energy and Hydrocarbons, Mining and Metal Industries, Transport, 
Agriculture and Livestock, Tourism, National Pension Funds, Capitalisation and Investment. 
However, the ambitious plans had to be revised in December 1994 when the areas of Economic 
Development and Finance were divided.26 
Export concerns were only poorly attended inside the National Secretariat of Industry and 
Trade. Considering the envisaged structural reforms concerning the capitalisation of state owned 
firms and the implementation of an autonomous sectoral regulatory system, a proactive approach 
to developing exports enjoyed little support inside the Ministry of Economic Development (SO 
Montaña 14/12/04). Moreover, sound trade policy-making was hindered by increasing conflicts 
between the Ministries of Economic Development and Foreign Affairs for greater 
responsibilities in the area of international negotiations and trade promotion. In the latter case, 
office holders of the foreign affairs department requested that the promotion activities become 
part of the global diplomatic network, and hence, set up the Undersecretary of Economic 
Promotion. At the same time, the promotion authority INPEX depended on the Ministry of 
Economic Development in 1993. This superposition ended up in a struggle for scant available 
resources, jeopardising initial plans to expand official market assistance in important export 
markets (BR Fernandez 12/8/04). 
Regarding the area of international trade policy affairs, it was the staff of the National 
Secretariat for Trade and Industry who began to assume a more protagonist role. In 1995, whilst 
in talks with MERCOSUR and Mexico the “singing voice” still belonged to the diplomatic 
cadre,  this primacy was undermined by state secretary Douglas Ascarrunz in the scope of the 
CAN and FTAA.27 This major involvement can be largely explained by the increased business 
                                               
26 Indeed, a senior official concluded that it eventually became impossible to control the political aspirations of the 
sectoral office holders (SO Montaña 14/12/04). 
27 Inside the CAN, one of the country’s two official representations inside the Andean Commission came into the 
hands of the Secretary of Industry and Trade. Before, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the exclusive CAN 
representative. As regards the FTAA meetings, both Secretaries in charge, Douglas Ascarrunz and Mario Reyes, 
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pressure to counter-weigh the integration approach of foreign affairs minister, Antonio Aranibar 
Quiroga, and chief negotiator, Victor Rico; both from the left wing Free Bolivian Movement 
which, for four years, occupied the position of minority partner to the MNR government in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At this time, the farming-oriented Santa Cruz department lamented 
that when Bolivia signed a comprehensive FTA with MERCOSUR in December 1996, trade 
policies responded to the desires of Victor Rico and Antonio Aranibar to strengthen the political 
alliances with the emerging regional bloc in the Southern Cone (BR Rodríguez 27/07/04; OE 
Tercero 18/01/05). “Since the doors of Rico were shut for our concerns, we sought to enter the 
office of the Trade and Industry Secretariat”, concluded IBCE Managing Director, Gary 
Rodriguez (BR 27/07/04). 
 Hopes and Despair with the MCEI (1997 – 2003): Times changed from the moment the 
government of Hugo Banzer – a coalition between the right-wing ADN and the centre-left wing 
MIR – assumed the presidency in August 1997. The demands of national exporters for a better 
representation inside the state executive, lodged during the election campaign, were responded to 
by the new government through the installation of the new LOPE No. 1788. Supported by the 
IDB and other donors, the previous MECE concept (1992-93) was reborn within the newly 
established Ministry of the Foreign Trade and Investment (MCEI), which encompassed the four 
Vice-Ministries of Exports, Foreign Trade, Tourism, and Private Investments. The political 
standing of “export issues” was evidently augmented by the presence of the MCEI inside the 
newly founded National Council of Economic Policy (CONAPE) in charge of inter-ministerial 
coordination in the economic policy area.28 A further up-scaling meant the incorporation of the 
new export promotion authority, CEPROBOL, and the removal of the promotion area inside the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
But initial hopes embodied in the specialised agency soon encountered two major 
obstacles: (1) the lack of resources and (2) the struggles for competencies. Adhemar Guzman 
(OE 21/01/05), Vice-Minister of Exports from 1997-2002, recalled that from the outset, the 
agency did not have the necessary resources to execute its duties. “Every year our budget got 
diminished by both general and sector-specific budget cuts dictated by the Ministry of Finance”, 
concluding that “even though official rhetoric favoured the development of exports, in practical 
terms trade issues were relegated since the political conjuncture, above all since 2000, has 
                                                                                                                                                       
went out without prior coordination to represent the Bolivian State; see OE Larrazabal 8/02/05; SO Miranda 
14/12/04. 
28 Since September 1997, CONAPE has been permanently composed of the Ministers of Foreign Trade and 
Investment, Agriculture, Economic Development, Finance, Presidency, and Sustainable Development and Planning. 
The Social and Economic Policies Analysis Unit (UDAPE) has operated as the advisory body of CONAPE. 
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focused on short-term economic emergency programs” (also OE Jurado 8/03/03, BR Arias 
17/01/05). 
Furthermore, the conflictive coexistence between the new export ministry and the foreign 
affairs department explained the increasing institutional deterioration of the MCEI. As this 
regard, the battle for competencies was apparent from the beginning, considering that the Vice-
Ministry of Foreign Trade focused exclusively on international trade policy affairs and tried to 
bring in a new professional approach to the challenging multilateral and regional trade talks (OE 
Becerra 29/07/04). Consequently, business and state officials reported on the breakout of a 
“bureaucratic war”, initiated between the two departments affecting all negotiation forums, 
ranging from the FTAA, CAN, and the WTO Development Round, to the extension of ATPA 
preferences and the deepening of the ALADI agreement with Chile (OE Guzman 21/01/05; BR’s 
Fernandez 12/08/04; Rodríguez 20/07/04; SO De Rico 15/12/04). Although the Vice-Ministry of 
Foreign Trade was dissolved after eight months and incorporated into the Vice-Ministry for 
Exports, effective inter-ministerial relations were not ensured as MCEI office holders continued 
to argue for the need to handle foreign trade affairs within a specialised agency. 
 Towards a Foreign Affairs Model?(2003-04): The export agency’s future became 
uncertain under the second presidential term of Sánchez de Lozada, beginning in August 2002.29 
By March 2003, the executive power had been reorganised under severe budget constraints, and 
the government decided to sacrifice the MCEI founded by the former administration. Together 
with the areas of industry, investment and domestic trade, LOPE No. 2446 assigned trade policy 
attributions to the wide-reaching Ministry of Economic Development, further comprised of the 
Vice-Ministries of Tourism, Urban Development, Culture, and Small Business. Under this 
regime, the Vice-Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Export (VICE) continued to hold the 
primary responsibilities with regard to the formulation and implementation of trade regimes and 
export promotion. In the area of international negotiations, the VICE was still expected to 
participate by providing technical support, but representation functions belonged exclusively to 
the Vice-Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations from the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
Although the new LOPE was expected to mitigate the inter-ministerial conflicts 
concerning Bolivia’s participation in international forums, the survey carried out among 65 
experts, state officials and business representatives from March to October 2004 still indicated a 
very ambiguous picture. The survey candidates were asked: Inside the executive branch, is there 
                                               
29 By August 2002, the Vice-Ministry of Exports had already been merged with the Vice-Ministry of Private 
Investment in order to save on budget resources. For ministerial reorganisation; see Supreme Decree No. 26772. 
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a clear division of labour in the conduction of international trade policy affairs? If not, in what 
areas can ambiguity be identified? 
 
Table 6.4: Division of Labour in International Trade Policy Affairs 
 Experts (15) State Officials (14) Business (36) Total (65) 
very clear 0 1 1 2   (4%) 
rather clear 2 2 5 9   (17%) 
rather unclear 4 7 21 32 (62%) 
very unclear 4 2 3 9   (17%) 
no response 5 2 6 13 
 
In this regard, 80 percent of respondents perceived the division of labour as rather or very 
unclear. Of particular interest is the fact that the vast majority of state officials had problems in 
clearly identifying responsibilities. Additional statements highlighted the explicit or implicit way 
that the new institutional arrangement began to be questioned in October 2003, when Ana Maria 
Solares entered the VICE office. The accomplished but polemic trade diplomat had, on prior 
occasions, demonstrated her keenness to possess the “main voice”, the latest of which being 
during the period of 1998-2002 when she was Chief Negotiator in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
Albeit on weaker legal grounds, Solares, as head of the VICE, sustained strong personal quarrels 
with Isaac Maidana, Vice-Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, in order to obtain a more 
prominent role inside international trade politics.  
These disputes and the past erratic development inside the policy area also provoked very 
negative survey results in resonse to the following question: Is their close inter-ministerial 
coordination among the departments involved in International trade policy affairs? If not, in 
what areas can coordination gaps be identified? Along the three categories, survey data 
indicated strong coordination deficits, with the relation between the Ministries of Economic 
Development and Foreign Affairs receiving most criticism. Moreover, several diplomats from 
the foreign affairs department, traditionally in charge of domestic consultations before important 
international trade policy events, lamented the weak contributions made by sectoral departments 
from agriculture, industry, transport, communication, and health, etc. 
 
Table 6.5: Inter-ministerial Trade Policy Coordination 
 Experts (15) State Officials (14) Business (36) Total (65) 
very close  0 0 0 0   (0%) 
Rather close 0 3 2 5   (10%) 
Rather sporadic 4 9 19 32 (63%) 
very sporadic 5 1 8 14 (27%) 
no response 6 1 7 14 
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In an act that took all sectors by surprise, in May 2004 Carlos Mesa, transitory president 
between October 2003 and June 2005, took the decision within CONAPE to ascribe the 
responsibility for coordinating the upcoming US-AFTA talks to the Ministry of Economic 
Development, whilst the regional and multilateral forums were maintained inside the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.30 An alleged solution to the confused situation between the two principal trade 
policy areas was found in September 2004, when the staff of the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
“compensated” for their limited influence over the supposedly prestige-laden US-AFTA talks by 
receiving control of the promotion authority, CEPROBOL, embodied in the Supreme Decree 
27732. The greatly desired incorporation of CEPROBOL into the global diplomatic network was 
expected to represent a watershed in the way the Bolivian State promotes local products, and 
thus, put an end to the destructive “back and forth” relationship that had occurred in past 
decades. Moreover, in the same month Ana Maria Solares resigned from her post as Vice-
Ministry of Commerce, Exports and Industry in light of broad criticism against her person. 
It remains uncertain whether the new institutional arrangement proves sustainable or not, 
however. The role of VICE role appeared, by the end of 2004, to be at its weakest point. To date, 
the US-AFTA coordination, in which Bolivia participated as an observer, implied only social 
unrest and the absorption of scant resources. With respect to the agency’s major task, the 
formulation, coordination and implementation of a national export strategy that will lead to the 
creation of jobs in non-traditional, manufacturing branches, the current attributions are 
insufficient. Since the execution of export promotion passed over to the foreign affairs 
department, the VICE is only responsible for the formulation of promotion regimes; i.e. setting 
legal frameworks for export support and technical assistance. Whenever tax concessions are 
involved – and this is nearly always the case – policy formulation is carried out jointly with the 
Finance Minister, giving the latter the primary responsibility. The Finance Ministry is further in 
charge of fiscal policy, and thus embraces competencies regarding the defining of the national 
tariff structure, absorbing another crucial area in the development of local exports.31 
 
Resources 
From the mid-1980s, when the SEGIN staff transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
teams in charge of international trade policy affairs became minority players struggling for 
                                               
30 For example, on July 4, 2004, the influential Santa Cruz Export Chamber (CADEX) published a letter in the 
Sunday Edition of La Razón, Bolivia’s principal newspaper, directed to Carlos Mesa in which the presidential 
decision had been described as without reason, misleading and causing further incoherencies in the trade policy 
formulation.  
31 The Ministry of Finance likewise supervises the National Customs Service. 
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recognition inside the bureaucratic structures. Even so, much of the negotiation skills that 
remained have their roots in the SEGIN created in the 1970s. Though comments provided by 
former SEGIN officials were often vague and influenced by certain nostalgia, the interviewees 
pointed at an autonomous agency composed of 40 to 60 well-trained experts recruited by rather 
meritocratic selection procedures (OE Tercero 18/01/05; SO’s Arana 24/01/05; De Rico 
15/12/04).32 In stark contrast to current trends, the majority of officials had not studied law, but 
were trained as specialists in integration, relevant industrial or rural sectors. The team was 
staffed by young professionals between 30 and 35 years of age, several of which later held 
important public positions in trade related areas.33 
As the SEGIN transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987, the new 
Undersecretariat of Integration failed to adapt to the upcoming regional and multilateral 
challenges.34 While technical requirements ascended due to the proliferation of trade forums and 
topics, the internal structure of the responsible agency altered little, espite its changing 
denomination.35 As previously mentioned, both attempts undertaken to respond to the changed 
international setting (in 1992 and 1997 by establishing the MECE and MCEI, respectively), 
whilst only faint-hearted in nature bearing in mind the modestly disbursed budget resources 
compared to other more traditional ministries, were rejected by the subsequent36.  
Moreover, the founded “export ministries” produced several counter-productive effects.  
Firstly, the competing ministries focused more on the bureaucratic wars on the domestic level 
than on the conquest of external markets. Secondly, as the number of talented, experienced 
experts was small, key negotiators changed their original ministry on different occasions, and 
hence, avoided building up essential institutional memory.37 Thirdly, local business was often 
left confused as to with whom to coordinate wit on certain topics, as I shall elucidate in section 
three. 
                                               
32 Nevertheless, there were no indications that civil service exams had been applied in a strict sense. 
33 Examples are Helen de Rico, Giovanna Miranda, Javier Jiménez, Hugo Ferrufino, Francisco Terceros, Víctor 
Rico and Ana Maria Solares. Most of these people later took on a diplomatic career path. 
34 In the Uruguay Round, for example, Bolivia concluded as an observer since the last two years of negotiations in 
Geneva were assisted by only one young diplomat. Rosa Chavez commented that from 1989-91 the delegation in 
Geneva consisted originally of four diplomats, but that she later remained as the single representative; SO 17/03/04. 
35 Later denominations were the National Secretariat of International Economic Relations (1993-97), the Vice-
Ministry of International Economic Relations (1998-04), and the Vice-Ministry of Economic Relations and Foreign 
Trade in 2004. 
36 According to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (1993; 2001), MECE’s budged in 1993 totaled 
2.6 million Bolivianos (about US$650,000) making it smaller than any other ministry’s budget except the Ministry 
of Hydrocarbons with 2.5 million Bolivianos. In 2002, the MCEI’s financial means were much bigger with roughly 
US$4.5 million but still were the second smallest budget (the Ministry of Justice had the smallest at its disposal). 
37 For example, the first Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade inside MCEI, Vincent Gomés Garcia, previously worked in 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry. By the time Gomés transferred, he hired several key Foreign Affairs diplomats. 
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The survey data collected in 2004 confirmed the difficulties in forming a team soundly 
prepared to face the increased international challenges. The surveyed people were asked: Is the 
official team in charge of international trade policy affairs adequately staffed in order to comply 
with the technical requirements of modern international trade policy affairs (staff size, talent and 
experience)? If not, in what areas/issues can limitations be found?  
 
Table 6.6: Trade Policy Staff 
 Experts (15) State Officials (14) Business (36) Total (65) 
very adequate 0 1 0 1   (2%) 
Rather adequate 1 1 6 8   (15%) 
Rather inadequate 4 7 18 29 (55%) 
very inadequate 6 4 5 15 (28%) 
no response 4 1 7 12 
 
Only 9 out of a total of 53 responses considered the official cadre as rather adequate. 
Strikingly, 11 out of 14 consulted state officials perceived their capacities as insufficient to 
handle the technical requirements of ongoing free trade talks. In asking in what areas/issues can 
limitations be found, the commonly stated answers were, “our negotiators are only generalists, 
not specialists, as regards involved topics”, “the size of the staff is small and only three or four 
negotiators are really accomplished”, “the team composition has been discontinuous and biased 
by party influence”, and “negotiators do not sufficiently consider the realities of the economic 
sectors”. 
According to the ministerial structures upheld in 2004, negotiation expertise was found in 
the following agencies. Inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the weight of the 
Vice-Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations as the “economic branch” has clearly been lesser, 
with just two general directorates, when compared with the eight offices inside the “political 
branch” (Vice-Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship).38 Inside the economic branch, each 
general directorate was integrated by 18 officials, wherein 15-20 diplomats were dedicated to the 
trade negotiation forums of MERCOSUR, Chile, Mexico, CAN, FTAA and the WTO. In March 
2004, the officials involved in these areas served inside the General Directorate of Integration 
made up by the Directorates of South American Integration, Hemispheric Integration, and 
Multilateral Affairs.39 While each area was monitored by three to four professionals, the different 
topics involved were not handled by specialists but required “orchestra negotiators” monitoring 
                                               
38 The total number of career diplomats accounted for about 230 officials in 2004. 
39 The other area had been called “General Direction for Economic Negotiations” and consisted of the Direction for 
Integration and Regional Cooperation, Economic Promotion and Economic Relations, monitoring the Amazon 
Cooperation/ La Plata Basin, Export Promotion, and Technical Assistance. 
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four to five issues simultaneously (SO Invernizzi 18/03/03). Nonetheless, “in order to conduct 
negotiations adequately we should settle on about 36 specialised functionaries, two for each 
topic”, calculated Julio Alvarado, General Director of Integration (SO 19/03/04). 
Compared to other state departments, diplomatic career officials enjoy a stable working 
environment. Together with the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank, the foreign affairs 
department is considered to be the most prestige-laden agency, since t is only in these offices that 
recruitment systems and civil services careers have been implemented properly. Therefore, the 
National Diplomatic Career Scale responds to a special labour regime, ruled by Law No. 1444 
and deriving regulations which set norms as regards entrance, qualifying systems, career paths, 
upgrading regimes, service abroad, and social security. Consequently, all diplomats must 
complete two years of training inside the Diplomatic Academy Rafael Bustillo. Several features 
enlisted below, however, undermined the necessary strength of the trade policy branch. 
Ø Generalist: The academy’s curriculum focussed on the training of “generalists” prepared 
to do all possible tasks within the diplomatic world, while specialists mastering the 
complex technical issues involved in current trade talks have not been trained 
sufficiently. 
Ø Rotations: As in most foreign policy agencies, the stability and expertise of the local staff 
is undermined by the positional career changes that take place, on average, every three to 
four years. 
Ø Low Salaries: While the salaries paid domestically normally bare few economic 
incentives, most functionaries are enthusiastic to serve in foreign embassies or to be 
contracted by international donor agencies for special consulting services in order to gain 
salaries in excess of US$1,500 per month. 
To face these deficits, the Vice-Ministry for Foreign Economic Affairs promoted the creation of 
the International Trade Negotiation Unit (UNCI), financed by an IDB loan of US$5 million (BO-
0212). The UNCI is aimed at coordinating negotiation policies and strategies and participating in 
trade talks, directing the technical aspects of negotiations to the various international forums. 
The project, first rejected in June 2003 inside CONAPE, was finally approved in December 2004 
and enabled a pre-selection of 32 area experts via a public invitation procedure. However, by the 
end of 2005, the UNCI had yet to be put into force. 
 Ministry of Economic Development (MDE): In May 2004, the MDE holding the Vice-
Ministries of Industry, Commerce and Exports (VICE), Tourism, Urban Development, Culture 
and Small Scale Business was comprised of 340 functionaries. The VICE employed 34 persons, 
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including senior, technical and administrative staff. If the areas of Industrial Development, 
Domestic Trade and Private Investment are discounted, the number of foreign trade related 
officials shrank down to one dozen and consisted of the vice-minister, three special advisors, the 
General Director of Commerce and Exports, the Director of Exports, and six officials inside the 
Directorate of Exports (MDE 2004a). Hence, the limited staff seriously questioned the capacity 
to provide technical negotiation support. 
Likewise, since its creation the former MCEI suffered from regular budget cuts (OE 
Guzman 21/01/05). In 2002, of an approved budget of 48 million Bolivianos (approx. US$6 
million), merely 33 million were disbursed, lowering the “trade area” resources inside the Vice-
Ministry of Exports from 4.9 to 3.8 million Bolivianos. Later, in August 2002, means had to be 
shared with the “private investment area” inside the newly established Vice-Ministry of Export 
and Private Investment. As the MCEI disappeared in March 2003, the new VICE was compelled 
to operate with scant resources of 3.5 million Bolivianos from the former industry office, 
reducing the trade policy staff by about 50 percent compared to 2002.40  
Beyond financial constraints, officials faced uncertainty due to the continuous 
replacement of office holders. Since the creation of the MCEI in August 1997, the foreign policy 
area outside the Foreign Affairs Ministry underwent the following personal changes. 
 
Table 6.7: Office Holders from 1997 to 2005 
Period Office Holders Presidency 
08/1997 – 06/1999 Jorge Crespo (MCEI) Hugo Banzer, AND 
06/1999 – 10/2000 Carlos Saavedra Bruno (MCEI) Hugo Banzer, AND 
10/2000 – 07/2002 Claudio Mansilla (MCEI) Banzer (- 07/2001); Jorge Quiroga 
07/2002 – 03/2003 Juan Carlos Virreira (MCEI) Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, MNR 
03/2003 – 10/2003  Luis Fernando Peredo (VICE) Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, MNR 
10/2003 – 08/2004 Ana María Solares Gaite (VICE) Carlos Mesa Quisbert, independent 
10/2004 Juan Carlos Iturri (VICE) Carlos Mesa Quisbert, independent 
10/2004 – 02/2005 Carlos Tadic (VICE) Carlos Mesa Quisbert, independent 
Since 02/2005 Gonzalo Molina Sardan (VICE) Carlos Mesa Quisbert, independent 
 
                                               
40 In 2004 and 2005, the VICE budget was reduced again, ending up at 2.5 million Bolivianos (US$300,000) in 
2005. Therefore, several functionaries such as Helen Rico, Giovanna Miranda and Gustavo Invernizzi transferred to 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry in 2003; see Sigma-Ministry of Finance 2001-05; SO Invernizzi 18/03/04. 
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The political and financial instability maintained since 1997 hindered the strengthening of 
civil service provisions embodied in the Civil Servant Statute of 1999.41 Requirements regarding 
the transparent recruitment and upgrading regimes became almost obsolete; i.e. both the 
designation and the ascendance of functionaries relied mostly on informal allies.42 Therefore, 
stable bureaucratic careers were almost entirely absent, being limited to lower-ranked 
administrative staff.43 Moreover, the upper reaches covering General Directors and Vice-
Ministers weren’t covered by the Civil Servant Statute, and thus, remained politically appointed. 
In this volatile environment, the MCEI/VICE personnel likewise suffered frequent changes, i.e. 
positions were occupied for less than one year on average. Finally, the most experienced 
professionals hold little interest in occupying senior positions since these are perceived merely as 
useful career steps towards a consultant position financed by international donor agencies or 
private sector entities.44 
 Ministry of Finance: Inside the Finance Ministry, responsible for defining the national 
tariff structure, the “tariffs and integration area” inside the Vice-Ministry of Tax Policy was 
noticeably downsized in the past years, and consisted of only four officials by August 2004. 
What stands out, however, is that the remaining functionaries passed meritocratic civil service 
exams and were part of the administrative career (SO; K. Rico 13/08/04). The Finance Ministry 
is further in charge of negotiation issues related to sate procurement. In this respect, since 2004 
Bolivia pursued the policy to favour small domestic suppliers of goods and services by 
implementing the Buy Bolivian Act. But during 2004, the team inside the General Directorate of 
Administrative System – financed by the World Bank – likewise suffered significant reductions, 
and consequently, just one single functionary was monitoring the ongoing trade talks in 2004 
(BR De Los Angeles 9/08/04). 
 Ministry of Agriculture and Small Farming Affairs: The participation of the Agriculture 
Ministry in international negotiations has traditionally been insufficient, considering that local 
farming is responsible for approximately 15 percent of the GDP. Thus, an institutional reform 
launched during 2001 sought to streamline the ministry which was traditionally dominated by 
party politics. Accordingly, the office holder then in charge commented that the personnel were 
                                               
41 By Law No. 2027 the Hugo Banzer administration sought to perfect the initial steps towards more transparent 
public administration embodied in the Law of Integrated System of Financial Administration and Governmental 
Control (SAFCO) from 1991. 
42 According to the Ministry’s Director of Human Resources, about 90 percent of the selected personnel is related to 
personal recommendation; see Interviews 10/08/04 and 24/01/05. 
43 Out of 340 employees inside the Ministry, only 19 had a permanent career status. Furthermore, administrative 
careers in chief areas are largely unattractive for top officials since salaries do not surpass the US$1,100 ceiling. 
44 According to the Supreme Decree No. 27327 of January 31, 2004, salaries of Special Advisors cannot exceed the 
salaries received by a General Director (18,900 Bolivianos or US$2400). However, short-term consulting, specific 
projects, or studies weren’t covered by this provision (Art. 9/ II). For salary data; see MDE 2004b. 
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reduced from 300 to 108, but of these, 85 had been selected through a transparent and 
meritocratic recruitment mechanism (OE Nuñez 10/08/04). In the trade policy area, the Walter 
Nuñez administration created a “Unit for International Negotiations” integrated by well trained 
economists, whereas previously only one official attended international agriculture talks (SO 
Jimenez 9/08/04). Nonetheless, under later office holders, the department was downgraded anew 
and left with only one professional monitoring ongoing trade talks during the period of 2003-
04.45 
 The Analysing Unit for Economic and Social Policy (UDAPE): The think-tank 
established in 1983, and initially financed by the USAID agency, became a prestigious advisory 
board monitoring the implementation of the economic liberalisation efforts. The team used to be 
composed of selected, well-trained collaborators who minimally held a MA degree. Towards the 
end of the 1990s, however, the agency’s excellence began to deteriorate as party politics 
increasingly came into view and the think-tank transferred from the Finance Ministry to the 
presidential office, ending up inside the Ministry of Economic Development as the Technical 
Secretariat of CONAPE. The fact that out of roughly 30 area experts only one had been devoted 
to the “External Sector” certainly underlines the agency’s priority on macroeconomic policy (SO 
Zambrana 5/08/04). 
 Other Agencies: The number of institutions involved since the trade agenda in both the 
multilateral and regional sphere was established became broader. In the scope of the Inter-
Institutional Working Group where affected governmental areas have been regularly convened 
by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the following state agencies were invited in February 2004 to 
collaborate in the FTAA, CAN, MERCOSUR, and the WTO: Vice-Ministries of Justice; Tax 
Policy; Natural Resources and Environmental Policy; Health; Agriculture and Livestock 
Farming; Science and Technology; National Customs Authority, SENASA responsible for 
(phyto-) sanitary regulation, SENAPI in charge of intellectual property rights and sectoral 
regulatory bodies for telecommunications, banking, and the standard organisation IBNORCA 
and OBA.  
In May 2004, as the AFTA Bureau inside the Ministry of Economic Development began 
coordinating Bolivia’s observation within these trade talks, 29 public agencies monitored the 
area of market access, textiles, agriculture, rules of origin, safeguards, (phyto-) sanitary 
measures, technical obstacles, services, financial services, telecommunications, electronic 
commerce, state procurement, intellectual property rights, competition policy, labour and 
                                               
45 In August 2004, the Ministry was about to hire four trade experts according to the chief of area; see SO Jimenez 
9/08/04. 
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environment regulation, institutional affairs, and dispute settlement and cooperation (MDE 
2004c). However, most of the agencies that specialised in these topics did not possess explicit 
negotiation expertise and were often poorly informed of the potential impacts of ongoing talks, 
as a confidential key official report commented (Ministry of Foreign Affairs; April 2004) 
 
Openness 
The erratic institutional development which took place inside the executive branch also marked 
the modes of interaction towards business. In simplified terms, three different governance-styles 
could be observed in the last two decades: 
1) Insulated Technocratic Style: When the New Economic Policy was designed in 1985, 
the group of involved actors were limited to a handful of policy makers inside the 
Ministries of Planning and Finance. As several officials originated from private sector 
organisations, the incorporation of business views occurred inside the government. 
On the contrary, formal business associations were practically excluded from 
important trade policy decisions such as the GATT adherence (BR Gastelu 20/01/05). 
2) Informative Reunions: Since the late 1980s, the Foreign Affairs Ministry has been 
convening state and business entities in the scope of the Inter-Institutional Working 
Group, inviting them to learn about situations presented within the framework of the 
regional and multilateral trade regimes (SO’s De Rico 16/03/04; Chavez 17/03/04). 
Usually, the entities considered are: the Bolivian Confederation of Private 
Entrepreneurship, the Departmental Federations of Private Entrepreneurship, and the 
national entities of industry, commerce, exports, banking, mining, farming, assurance, 
pharmaceutical, oleaginous, forestry, and construction sectors. 
3) State-Business Collaboration: The conviction that the making of trade policy should 
be an endeavour shared by state and business developed relatively late in Bolivia. The 
most ambitious attempt to date in this regard has been the National Export Council 
(CONEX), which was launched as an integral part of the Export Development and 
Taxation Law No. 148 enacted by the Jaime Paz Zamora administration in April 
1993. According to article 24, the public-private advisory body is in charge of 
proposing and evaluating policies, programs, and strategies to promote the country’s 
export development. 
From the outset, however, the implementation of CONEX became arduous and struggled to 
achieve recognition among involved actors. Table 6.8 sums up both attempts undertaken by the 
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governments of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1994) and Hugo Banzer (1998) to revive the 
CONEX by regulating its activities. 
 
Table 6.8: CONEX Regulations 1994 and 1998 
Legal Base Supreme Decree 23822, July 1994 Supreme Decree 25023, April 1998 
Focus Development of non-traditional 
exports, excluding mining and 
hydrocarbons by trade promotion 
facilities, market assistance, trade 
defence, export incentive 
mechanisms, international trade 
negotiations, and industrial policies. 
Development of value added exports 
by trade promotion facilities, export 
incentive mechanisms, international 
trade negotiations. 
 
Functions 
 
Recommend, suggest, propose and 
assess policies, strategies, guidelines 
and programs. 
Recommend, suggest, propose and 
assess policies, strategies, guidelines 
and programs. 
Presidency National Secretary for Industry and 
Trade (MDE) 
Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Investment (MCEI) 
Internal 
Commissions 
1. Foreign Economic Promotions 
(coordinated by Foreign Affairs) 
2. Integration (Foreign Affairs) 
3. Foreign Trade Development 
(MDE) 
4. Productive Development (MDE) 
On ad-hoc basis 
Permanent 
Governmental 
Members 
National Secretaries of Foreign 
Economic Relations, Agriculture and 
Livestock, and Finance 
Vice-Ministers of Exports, Foreign 
Trade; Agriculture, Foreign 
Economic Relations, and Fiscal 
Policy 
Permanent 
Business 
Members 
CANEB, CNI, CNC; CEPB only in 
extraordinary cases; Presidents 
participate in plenary reunions; 
Managing Directors in internal 
commissions 
CANEB; Associations of Mining 
and Hydrocarbon if considered 
necessary by permanent members 
No. Reunions  Regular monthly meetings and more 
frequent if considered necessary   
Regular monthly meetings and more 
frequent if considered necessary   
 
In general, the 1994 decree contained more detailed provisions, such as the exclusive focus on 
non-traditional exports and the establishment of internal commissions with designated 
responsibilities. Therein, export development was conceptualised not only as an exclusive mix of 
trade policies, but it also involved accompanying industrial policies in which the Ministry of 
Economic Development took over the leadership. Compared to the second CONEX version, this 
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distinction is best explained by the fact that, between 1993 and 1997, the trade and industry areas 
were paired together inside the Ministry of Economic Development, while the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry occupied the major responsibilities in the areas of international negotiations and export 
promotion. Conversely, in 1998, CONEX primarily concerned the preferences of the MCEI 
officials and National Chamber of Exporters (CANEB), the latter being the private organisation 
that most pushed for the creation of the MCEI. From 1998, the Vice-Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Affairs became one of only five invited vice-ministries which did not hold any 
specific competencies. Regarding the incorporation of business, the CANEB was assigned a 
representative monopoly without exhibiting the features of a valid interlocutor (6.3).46 
In the end, both CONEX versions were poorly implemented.47 As a permanent 
coordination channel, CONEX only operated from October 2000 to July 2002 when Claudio 
Mansilla directed the MCEI. Mansilla, as former CANEB president and soy exporter from Santa 
Cruz, enjoyed a “natural” closeness to business. Therefore, CONEX convened on a monthly 
basis during 2001, and followed a clear working agenda ending with a set of “Guidelines for a 
National Export Development Strategy” handed over to the State President Jorge Quiroga at the 
First National Export Convention in November 2001 (Guidelines 2001; BR Cabrera 13/12/04). 
Afterwards, CONEX entered an impasse of two years and was first revived in May 2004, then 
sustained by the idea to complete the National Export Strategy (ENEX). 
But despite this revival which enabled six plenary reunions in 2004 and the formulation 
of “ENEX 2005-2015”, the prospective for an efficient coordination pattern remained adverse. 
The council’s destiny has depended thus far on the frequently alternating office holders who 
each maintained different approaches of communicating with the private sector. Furthermore, the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, as the responsible agency for export promotion and trade negotiations, 
generally participated only faint-heartedly, since other governmental areas presided over the 
institution. Finally, the limitation of having only CANEB at the round table reduced the scope of 
policy deliberation, often being considered as a mechanism to enhance particular company 
interests instead of coordinating enlightened policies that favour Bolivia’s insertion into the 
world market. Therefore, CONEX could not offer adequate space for consultations in 
international trade policy affairs, but instead had to delegate this coordination activity to the 
umbrella organisation, CEPB, where most economic sectors have traditionally assisted (6.3). 
                                               
46 The formal consideration of the mining and hydrocarbon sector did not concern CANEB because those entities 
are exclusively focused on traditional export products.  
47 According to key informants, CONEX did not launch reunions before 1998, when the second regulating Supreme 
Decree was signed (SO Chavez 17/03/04; BR Arias 17/01/05). Adhemar Guzman (OE 21/01/05) specified however, 
that between 1993 and 1998, CONEX operated only in a sporadic manner. 
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Studying the survey data, the responses gathered in 2004 indicated that the consultation 
channels offered by the government were deficient. The survey candidates were asked: Does the 
government closely coordinate with business associations in trade policy affairs, involving the 
conduction of international trade negotiations and the implementation of trade agreements? If 
not, in what sectors/issues can coordination gaps be identified? As can be seen below, two thirds 
of the consulted entities considered the relations to be rather sporadic concerning trade policy 
affairs. Even though principal export sectors acknowledged the openness exhibited by most 
officials as of 1997, the ongoing inter-ministerial conflicts and the instability inside the state 
executive hindered the establishment of solid working relations.48 Contrary to business, experts 
and state officials perceived the coordination between state-business as very or rather close. In 
the case of experts though, most views referred to privileged informal channels offered to large 
scale mining and farming elites in the lowlands, and thus, insinuated forms of business capture. 
 
Table 6.9: State-Business Coordination 
 Experts (15) State Officials (14) Business (36) Total (65) 
very close 1 3 1 5     (9%) 
rather close 6 5 7 18   (34%) 
only sporadic 3 4 22 29   (55%) 
very sporadic 0 0 1 1     (2%) 
no response 5 2 5 12 
 
Concerning transparency measures put forward to inform on international trade policy affairs, 
business responses replicated the prior results to wide extents. Even though consulted chambers 
recognised the official communication efforts, most of them saw information as insufficient or 
inopportune, as it was either “too late” or “imprecise.” Expert views provided a different picture. 
While a majority perceived state-business channels as close, seven of nine responding experts 
qualified the governmental efforts to lighten up trade policy affairs as insufficient. The apparent 
contradiction can be explained by fact that several experts associated with civil society 
organisations like CEDLA, UMSA and the Solon Foundation made critical objections regarding 
the lack of transparency towards society in a broad sense. 
 
                                               
48 Officials like Ana Maria Solares, Hugo Mansilla and Isaac Maidana maintained very close relations with CANEB, 
CAMEX, CADEX and IBCE. An IBCE representative reported that after having suffered from sporadic relations in 
1993-97, since 1997, MCEI and Foreign Affairs started to compete for privileged channels with the private actors. 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
THE CASE OF BOLIVIA 
 
271 
Table 6.10: Transparency in International Trade Policy Affairs 
 Experts (15) Business (36) Total (51) 
very transparent 0 1 1   (2%) 
rather transparent 2 10 12 (29%) 
rather non-transparent 5 21 26 (62%) 
very non-transparent 2 1 3   (7%) 
No response 6 3 9 
 
These critical assessments contrasted with the increasing attempts to explain and 
legitimise the daily work inside the public sector. Above all, in the final years of the study the 
local diplomacy tried to counter common views such as “our diplomats negotiate for their own 
purpose” or “they like to appear in the diplomatic world without caring for domestic need”, thus 
giving the impression of an insulated, self-preserving diplomacy. Against this, the Vice-Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Affairs organised numerous public events during 2003-04, often in 
coordination with private entities such as the IBCE, in order to outline the official position with 
regard to ongoing FTAA talks, the deepening of relations with Chile and Peru, and the (possible) 
impacts of the WTO Development Round and the US preference scheme, APTDEA.  
Previously unseen efforts were made during the US-AFTA negotiations launched in May 
2004. The US-AFTA Bureau sought direct contact with organisations of small business, 
peasants, mining workers, indigenous groups, and thus, incorporated some of the sectors 
previously excluded from trade policy-making (SO Alvarado 16/12/04). Furthermore, the Bureau 
published a range of documents (such as impact studies, brochures, and newsletters) which 
sought to make society aware of the pros and cons of an eventual US-AFTA agreement. 
To some extent, this new openness was confirmed by the survey data, as 29 out of the 35 
responses indicated that transparency was enhanced compared with the 1990s, when Bolivia 
negotiated various regional trade agreements. Only four business representatives and two experts 
openly denied any improvement. An annalist from CEDLA objected that the information 
channels opened by the government were only due to the increased pressure originating from the 
“Bolivian Movement against the FTAA Struggle,” arguing that the official sector remained 
uninterested in establishing true relations, but instead aimed to establish better public relations. 
Alberto Zelada, a diplomat and expert in international economic law, responded (OE 10/08/04), 
“It remains our task, indeed, to better incorporate civil society into the decision-making, but we 
don’t know them and have little idea who they are representing; in contrast, we have identified 
the business sectors very well.” 
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Summary Independent Variable A1 
In general, the institutional strength of Bolivia’s state bureaucracy in the area of international 
trade policy affairs has been very low during the whole period of analysis, as resumed in Box 
6.2. In particular, the creation of “export ministries” on two occasions caused only struggles for 
responsibilities and left unmet hopes and consternation among exporters. Regarding the variable 
dimension resources, the trade policy staff in charge of international trade policy affairs has been 
inadequate to deal with the technical requirements involved in regional and multilateral trade 
policy. In the variable dimension “openness”, I showed that interaction patterns with business 
and civil society have been unstable, therein negatively affected by the erratic institutional 
development inside the state bureaucracy. 
 
Box 6.2: Summary Independent Variable A1 
Responsibilities Resources  Openness 
The creation of “export 
ministries” in 1992 and 1997 
put into question the 
prevailing Foreign Affairs 
Model. However, 
forthcoming governments 
held other priorities and 
hindered the consolidation of 
a specialised agency that 
deals with export concerns, 
embracing promotion, 
regulation and market access 
negotiations. 
Despite far-reaching 
commitments undertaken in the 
regional and multi-lateral 
sphere, until 2004 the official 
negotiation team had been 
inadequately staff  (small 
number, lack of specialists) in 
order to comply with the 
international requirements 
involved in international trade 
policy affairs. 
 
Although trade policy 
officials sought close ties 
with business, above all since 
1997, unclear responsibilities 
hindered close business-state 
collaboration. Furthermore, 
recent attempts to initiate a 
stable dialogue with civil 
society failed as a result of 
the fundamental critics 
regarding the ongoing free 
trade talks with the US. 
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6.3 The Regional Division of Business Advocacy 
 
This section is structured in accordance with the variable dimensions of the Independent 
Variable A2. The first subsection, Institutional Leadership, analyses the domestic attempts to 
establish a widely recognised peak or “umbrella” association, capable of coordinating economic 
policies between the leading sectoral and regional representatives. It further describes the 
institutional mechanism aimed at the intermediation of trade interests among leading sectoral and 
regional representatives. The second subsection, Organisation Strength, makes an assessment of 
the professionalism involved in business advocacy, stressing the domestic pattern of financing, 
participatory behaviour, and in-house trade policy expertise. The last subsection summarises the 
results and provides an overview of the business representation pattern from 1985 to 2004. 
 
Institutional Leadership 
In Bolivia, the process of forming business entities is still fairly young compared to other 
countries in the region, where the leading institutions were created in the 19th century 
(Conaghan/Malloy 1994; Mansilla 1994; Sanjinés Avila 2004). On the domestic level, the only 
chamber founded in this century was the La Paz Chamber of Commerce, erected in 1890 
(becoming later the National Chamber of Commerce). A few decades later, traders from Santa 
Cruz (1913) and Cochabamba (1922) likewise decided on common representative structures. The 
industry associations did not emerge before the 1930s, with the National Industry Chamber 
(CNI) in 1931 and the Departmental Chambers of Cochabamba (1938) and Santa Cruz (1947). 
Regarding branch organisations, the majority of the entities from forestry, agriculture, and 
manufacturing began the organisational process in the period between 1960 and 1980, with the 
exception of the previously created mining, pharmaceutical and banking associations.  
Given this relatively delayed institutional building process, the establishment of the 
multisectoral Confederation of Private Entrepreneurship of Bolivia (CEPB) in 1962 can be seen 
as athe first timid trial to raise and coordinate the private sector’s voice in the context of a 
distinct state-led development model maintained from 1952 to 1985, wherein the leading 
companies in the mining, hydrocarbons, banking, and manufacturing sectors were state owned.49 
Therefore, the New Economic Policy enacted in August 1985 converted the CEPB into the 
privileged civilian partner of the government of Victor Paz Estenssoro. Several functionaries 
                                               
49 The Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) accounted for 60 percent of exports and the oil company YPFB 
80 percent of the domestic production of oil and natural gas. Furthermore, most of the banking system was state 
owned by the Rural, Mining and State Banks. Through the Bolivian Development Corporation (CBF), the state also 
controlled the manufacture of glass, textiles, cement, dairy products, oils, and sugar. 
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associated with the CEPB took over strategic state executive positions, with Fernando Illanes 
assuming the role of Ambassador in Washington, and Fernando Romero and Roland MacLean 
becoming top policy makers inside the Ministries of Planning and Finance. Hence, the peak 
entity assumed a key role inside the private sector and society in general, setting forth a proactive 
liberal agenda covering mainly fiscal, investment and labour policies. Moreover, in promoting 
the acceleration of structural reforms by claiming the privatisation of state owned companies, the 
ambitious business agenda even began to contrast with the slower reform pace upheld by the 
public sector until 1993.  
Within the private sector, the leadership was increased by a fast institutional expansion 
during the presidency of Carlos Calvo (1989-1992), augmenting the affiliates from 20 to 32 
associated organisations. For example, the Eastern Chamber of Agriculture and the Chamber of 
Hydrocarbons - two influential entities from the eastern lowlands – joined the peak association 
(Sanjinés Ávila 2004, vol. II: 167-210). 
From an institutional perspective, the fast growth of the peak association nevertheless 
proved to be unsustainable, since the national business representation structures have been 
marked by the phenomena of “overrepresentation”. Indeed, considering a GDP of US$8 million 
and the informal economy reaching up to 60-70 percent, Bolivia would appear to have more 
chambers than large-scale companies. This institutional disorder can best be exemplified by the 
CEPB’s internal structure in which four, often overlapping, member categories can be identified. 
 
Box 6.3: The Four Overlapping Member Categories inside the CEPB 
Departmental Peak 
Associations 
Departmental Federations of Private Entrepreneurship 
which are composed of regional sector chambers from 
industry and commerce, among others. 
 
National Chambers composed 
of Firms, and Regional and 
Sectoral Entities 
The National Chambers of Industry and Commerce are 
characterised by a membership of regional chambers from 
industry and commerce, national branch organisations and 
firms located in La Paz. Although individual firms are 
formally associated inside the La Paz Chambers of Industry 
and Commerce, their financial contributions sustain the 
national chambers since their premises and staff are 
identical to their regional organisations. 
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National Chambers 
Representing Departmental 
Entities 
The National Chambers of Exporters (CANEB), 
Construction (CBC), and Banking (ASOBAN) contain 
special arrangements. While CANEB and CPC represent 
only their regional chambers and not firms, ASOBAN 
represents private banks and used to likewise hold regional 
subsidiaries. 
 
National Chambers 
Representing Firms 
The national branch organisations integrated entirely by 
individual firms are the chambers of hydrocarbons, 
pharmaceuticals, assurances, mining, etc. 
 
The varying logics of medium and large company representation (disregarding the marked 
institutional fragmentation among small and micro business associations) caused business 
organisations to permanently struggle for internal (among firms) and external (among state 
authorities) recognition. A clear example can be found in the situation of the brewery sector 
where three companies represent close to 100 percent of the domestic market. These firms are 
associated in the National Brewery Chamber (CABOFACE), created in 1996. CABOFACE, in 
turn, holds an affiliation inside the CEPB and the National and Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce. The breweries are further individually associated inside the Departmental Chambers 
of Industry and Commerce, and hence, supported the operation of the National Chambers as the 
contributions of sectoral and regional chambers are marginal. 
Beyond the overlapping memberships, the CEPB’s role as leader of the national 
bourgeoisie received a serious setback as a consequence of the privatisation of state owned firms 
and the creation of the private pension funds system under the government of Sánchez de Lozado 
(1993-97). The fact that Bolivia’s capitalists, coordinated by the peak association, followed these 
reforms as mere observers – considering that all companies came under Bolivian ownership – 
was clear evidence for many of the persistent risk adversity among national entrepreneurs.50 
Even though the CEPB complained to state authorities that local companies were mainly shut out 
of the bidding procedures, the transnationalisation of domestic assets hindered the CEPB in the 
aftermath in its ability to spread the powerful properties of private business. Moreover, in the 
context of a stagnating economy and a growingly tense political climate from 1998, the 
institutional fragmentation inside the national private sector came increasingly into view.  
Nevertheless, the principal dividing forces had regional grounds. With increasing 
potency, the business entities from the department of Santa Cruz began to openly question the 
legitimacy of the national organisations located in the capital city La Paz. Regarding the CEPB’s 
                                               
50 Even the former CEPB General Secretary, Augusto Estívariz (1993-1996), admitted that local entrepreneurs 
lacked sufficient aggressiveness; see Sanjinés Ávila 2004, vol. II: 289 and personal interview BR 12/12/04. 
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decision-making structure, for example, the factions from Santa Cruz argued that the economic 
importance of their agro-industrial, service and hydrocarbon sectors were by no means 
considered and pointed to their under representation inside the Directing Council.51 To underline 
this distortion, the powerful Santa Cruz Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Services and Tourism 
evidenced its regional contribution to the nation’s welfare in 2002 by measures of its in-house 
Centre for Bolivian Economy (CAINCO 2003). 
Ø GDP Share: The Santa Cruz GDP share increased from 26.8 in 1990 to 30.6 percent, 
whereas the La Paz contribution decreased from 25.9 to 23.1 percent. 
Ø Exports: While Santa Cruz provided 50.7 percent of exports (from 35.2 in 1999), La Paz 
was only responsible for 13.8 percent of exports. Furthermore, 67.1 percent of Santa Cruz 
exports were classed as non-traditional. 
Ø FDI: Seventy-five percent of FDIs went to Santa Cruz or their southern neighbour Tarija, 
with the latter accounting for more than 80 percent of all natural gas and oil reserves. 
Until 2000, initiating regional rivalries had been covered by the unremitting “Santa Cruz 
Presidencies” of Carlos Rechezal (1994-1996) and Jose Luis Camacho (1996-2000). The picture 
changed under the new presidency of Ernest Calvo (2001-2003) when the breakout of the 
regional conflict became inevitable. To analyse the clash, which came to a climax at the end of 
2003 through the disaffiliation of the Santa Cruz and Tarija related chambers, at least four 
conflictive features ought to be taken into account:52 
1) Tax Policy: By the end of 2003, the natural gas and oil exporting Departments of Santa 
Cruz and Tarija had rejected governmental plans to increase taxes on hydrocarbon 
production and banking transactions, whereas CEPB authorities supported the project of 
State President Carlos Mesa. 
2) Regional Autonomy: The Santa Cruz business elites assumed a leading force in the force-
ful struggle for greater regional autonomy witnessed in the final years of the study. 
Therein, it is an open secret that regional entities, such as CAINCO in particular, strongly 
backed the Department’s Civic Committee in charge of the political battle. 
3) Idiosyncrasy: The cambas, i.e. people of Santa Cruz decent, consider themselves to be 
dynamic, risk-loving entrepreneurs, always ready to do business, whereas they describe 
                                               
51 Since each member had been represented by two members inside the governing body and the Santa Cruz region 
enjoyed only a direct representation by 4 out of 30 chambers, the nominal representation of Santa Cruz used to be 
rather weak compared to its economic contribution.  
52 The pertinent chambers were the Federations of Private Entrepreneurship from Santa Cruz and Tarija, the 
National Chambers of Forestry and Hydrocarbon and the Eastern Chamber of Agriculture. Besides, departmental 
sector chambers withdrew their national associations, such as CAINCO from the National Chamber of Commerce 
and the Santa Cruz Chamber of Construction from the National Chamber of Construction. 
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the collas from La Paz as conservative and risk adverse. For the collas, however, the 
cambas are just lucky as they rarely face protesting labour, neighbourhood and 
indigenous groups. Moreover, they qualified them as unserious since cambas’ companies 
keep double-entry accounts, and therefore, are rarely registered in the local stock market.  
4) Economic Structure: While the lowland producers have been interested in preserving the 
domestic market for their agriculture and forestry products, La Paz has sought cheaper 
prime materials for its food processing and furniture industry. Such conflicts were 
increasingly difficult to handle in the trade policy scope, as I demonstrate in the next 
subsection. 
 
The Intermediation of Trade Interests 
The business advocacy in the area of trade policy not only replicates the fragmented pattern 
identified preciously, but builds a paradigmatic case for the dilemma faced by national business. 
To identify internal divisions, manifold regional, sectoral, and institutional aspects need to be 
considered. The principal weakness, however, concerns the lack of reliable national institutions 
capable of articulating either offensive or defensive interests concerning Bolivia’s insertion into 
world markets. Box 6.4 sums up the major shortcomings of the main national chambers involved 
in trade policy affairs. 
 
Box 6.4: The Shortcomings of National Trade Policy Advocates  
National Chamber of  
Commerce CNC 
(Foundation 1890) 
· Heterogeneous, overlapping membership (sectors, regions, firms) 
· Representation of importers’ interests mainly 
· La Paz oriented (local firms sustains CNC) 
 
National Chamber of 
Industry CNI (1931) 
· Heterogeneous, overlapping membership 
· La Paz oriented (local firms sustains CNI) 
· Weak trade policy branch 
 
CEPB (1962) · Heterogeneous, overlapping membership 
· Internal division between La Paz and Santa Cruz 
· Weak trade policy branch 
 
National Chamber of 
Exporters CANEB 
(1983) 
· Dependence on Santa Cruz Chamber of Exporters (CADEX) 
· Individual advocacy of La Paz Chamber of Exporters (CAMEX) 
· Weak trade policy branch 
 
Bolivian Institute of  
Foreign Trade IBCE 
(1986) 
· Representation in La Paz only since 2004 
· Considered as a representative from the Santa Cruz Department 
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A common feature to all the national chambers is the regional division between La Paz and Santa 
Cruz, which has increased in the recent times of social unrest and distinctive articulations of 
regional autonomy movements. Subsequently, I will present the adverse grounds for national 
trade policy intermediation and the accentuating misbalance as regards regional advocacy power. 
 The Failed National Coordination: Noteworthy efforts for national consensus building 
were set forth inside the CEPB in 1992 when the Commission of Integration and Foreign Trade 
was put into force. Key informant reports described the commission as a technical advisory body 
in which meetings took place twice per month and which enjoyed wide recognition among 
members’ delegates (SO Arana 24/01/05; BR’s Gastelu 20/01/05 and Rodríguez 20/07/04; 
17/01/05). The Commission benefited at the beginning from the prestige-laden presidencies of 
Carlos Iturralde and Adalberto Violand, both former CEPB presidents and high-ranked 
diplomats, and the fact that Manuel Arana, as secretary, provided sound expertise due to his 
career inside the SEGIN, Andean Group and CAF.53 Moreover, between 1994 and 2000, the 
CEPB was presided over for the first time by entrepreneurs from Santa Cruz, and thus, raised the 
entity’s acceptance in the economically boosting lowland region. 
Over the years, however, the business factions from La Paz perceived an increasing 
misbalance in the internal decision-making. While, for the Santa Cruz entities, the Commission 
of Integration and Foreign Trade provided a useful forum to place their sectoral concerns, the La 
Paz chambers behaved rather passively in ongoing talks with the CAN, MERCOSUR, Chile and 
Mexico. As a consequence, on countless occasions the lowland region was able to demonstrate 
its superior business advocacy, and hence, managed to make use of the limited negotiation 
capacities of state authorities. Accordingly, a Bolivian official serving for the CAN General 
Secretariat in Lima stated that, in the past, his government pursued a single issue agenda inside 
the CAN and pointed at efforts undertaken to guarantee and preserve the Andean markets for soy 
products (OE Larrazabal 08/02/05). As local exports regularly faced safeguard or discriminatory 
measures applied by Colombia, Venezuela and Peru, intensive diplomacy in the CAN scope 
became necessary to obtain and control preferential market access conditions.54 Furthermore, 
Bolivia had to repeatedly insist on their Andean partners’ prompt application of the Common 
                                               
53 Carlos Iturralde was formally Foreign Affairs Minister and Violand served as Ambassador to Chile in the 1970s. 
54 In 2002, for example, Colombia imposed safeguard measures of 29 percent tariffs on vegetable oils from the 
Andean partners; see CAN Resolution 671. Other measures applied by Colombia were related to a differential VAT 
treatment according the value added on imported products. For recent restrictions taken by Venezuela during 2005, 
the principal buyer’s market, see El Nuevo Día 18/08/2005 or IBCE publication Comercio Exterior; March 2005. 
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External Tariff for soy products (15-20 percent) and the Andean Price Band System, which in 
combination guaranteed higher tariff preferences in the case of low world market prices.55 
While chambers from La Paz did not oppose the search for market access for soy and 
other lowland products like sugar, cotton and lumber, discussions became more conflictive when 
Santa Cruz sought to protect its local production. For example, the food processing industry in 
La Paz showed little comprehension to the idea that commodities such as wheat, sugar, and milk 
should enjoy a more protectionist treatment by means of non-tariff barriers or longer phasing-out 
schemes than value added products like wheat flour or dairy products (BR’s Fernandez 12/08/04; 
Gastelu 20/01/05). One case that provoked particular debate concerned the lumber imports from 
Chile, where the domestic forestry located in Santa Cruz was able to convince authorities to 
avoid preferential access in the ACE No. 22 scope at the expense of the export oriented furniture 
companies in La Paz. Manuel Arana reported (SO 24/01/05) that arduous internal work was 
required towards the end of the 1990s to find a solution accepted by both the Bolivian Forestry 
Chamber and furniture factories represented by George Satt, the then President of the La Paz 
Chamber of Exporters and owner of the leading export company directed towards the US market. 
Nevertheless, the adaptation of the domestic lumber sector to the requirements of furniture 
production seemed unviable and the Bolivian Forestry Chamber located in Santa Cruz continued 
to insist on the existing protection margin. 
For the CEPB, the failure to coordinate in such occasions meant a serious setback in its 
pretension to intermediate among regional positions. Consequently, between 2000 and 2003, the 
Foreign Trade Commission held no regular meetings, and it was only during 2004, when Bolivia 
entered the US-AFTA talks as an observer, that these were revived. These discrepancies were 
reflected inside the CANEB, as the national representative of non-traditional exports. Against the 
rising internal leverage of the Santa Cruz Export Chamber (CADEX), which was owed to the 
strong growth of soy exports in the 1990s, the weakened La Paz Export Chamber (CAMEX) 
headed by George Satt demonstrated, in the internal election of 1998, its unwillingness to accept 
the decision power assigned to CADEX.56 Thus, the CAMEX disaffiliated from the CANEB and 
                                               
55 The purpose of this system, in force since February 1995, is to stabilise domestic prices for palm oil, soybean oil, 
rice, sugar, barley, milk, corn, soybeans, wheat, chicken, and pork, among others. Thus, when the international 
bench mark price falls below a predetermined minimum level, member countries will apply a variable-rate surcharge 
on imports of such products, over and above the CET. Likewise, when the international bench mark price rises 
above a certain ceiling, the member countries will lower the normal tariff rate to reduce the import cost of the staple. 
56 According to the articles of the associations from 1991, when La Paz was the principal exporter, a 60 percent 
share of exports implied the assignment of a 42 percent of votes by the elections of the chamber’s Directorate. 
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individually pursued its regional interests for six years, although the entity continued to share the 
same two-floor building with the CANEB.57 
 The Rise of Santa Cruz: The bargaining power of Santa Cruz inside national chambers 
and before state agencies has been closely linked to the institutional responses given concerning 
the regional and multilateral challenges on the horizon from the outset of the 1990s. By this 
point, Santa Cruz, more than any other department, began to define its trade policy interests and 
to achieve a high degree of inter-institutional coordination. In order to explain the coherence of 
Santa Cruz’s lobbying it is pertinent to point out the distinctive social cohesion among local 
elites, enrooted in four centuries of insularity and disconnection from the country’s economic 
and political centres (Waldmann 2001). Yet, another crucial explanation concerns the state-led 
development strategies implemented in the second half of the 20th century which produced a 
significant awakening of the tropical lowlands. Inspired by the so-called Bohan Report carried 
out by US diplomat Merwin L. Bohan in the 1940s, it was public agencies such as the Bolivian 
Development Corporation that used the vast majority of public investments for the development 
of the isolated eastern parts of the country, through the construction of roads and railways from 
La Paz and Cochabamba, and the preparation of large scale agriculture soils. 
The creation of the Santa Cruz oriented Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade (IBCE) in 
March 1986 represented a perfect match between local social cohesion and state support.58 
Francisco Tercero (OE 18/01/05), IBCE’s first Managing Director, recalled that the idea of 
creating an institution specialising in export issues emerged during the Convention “Santa Cruz 
in 2000” organised in 1985 by the state-ruled regional Development Corporation, 
CORDECRUZ. Later, in 1986, CORDECRUZ facilitated a start-up capital of US$20,000, half of 
the initial investment, and further made available a group of experts that designed the 
organisational setting together with the leading entities from industry, trade, agriculture and 
forestry. During the first years of its existence, IBCE focused, together with the also recently 
created CADEX, on working streams related to (1) the analysis and capacity building of 
exporters in the range of customs and tax procedures, (2) trade promotion by providing technical 
assistance and participating in trade fairs in neighbouring countries, and last but not least (3),  
improved physical access to the Paraguay-Paraná waterway through the Tamengo Channel, so as 
                                               
57 Finally, in 2004, CANEB succeeded in incorporating CAMEX. But its involvement has been hesitant so far 
because the La Paz chamber still resists paying its monthly affiliation rate of US$500. 
58 Obviously, the national denomination was questioned by the La Paz entities, and thus, required first a Minister of 
Trade, Industry and Tourism from the Santa Cruz Department, Freddy Teodovich Ortiz, until the name was accepted 
in 1988 by the Supreme Resolution No. 204442. 
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to carry local products towards the Atlantic ports in Uruguay and Argentina (OE Tercero 
18/01/05; IBCE 1997). 
Analytical skills in trade integration have mainly been built up since 1990. Under the 
coordination of Gary Rodriguez, Technical Manager from 1986 to 1996 and Managing Director 
from 1996, the IBCE assumed a regional “gate keeping” role before, during, and after trade 
negotiation rounds. Furthermore, the five associated chambers from industry and trade 
(CAINCO), forestry (CFB), customs agents, agriculture (CAO), exports (CADEX), and the 
invited Federation of Private Entrepreneurship, created in 1993 the Santa Cruz Monitoring 
Committee for International Trade Negotiations. From this point on, the IBCE coordinated 
monitoring committee evolved into a technical body where regional entities defined common 
positions and brought together relevant sector information (BR Cirbián 25/03/04). Rodriguez 
reported (BR 27/07/04) that, initially, the chambers’ officials would meet twice a month on 
average, yet later the meetings were organised on a more and more informal, ad-hoc basis. As 
mutual trust grew among the members, Rodriguez stated, “I started to carry out consultation 
through e-mail, and if nobody objected to my propositions, I presented my technical points of 
view in the framework of the CEPB and before the state authorities.” Due to this institutional 
mechanism, the participating of Santa Cruz inside the CEPB was permanent and unified, despite 
the breath-taking trip from the tropical lowlands to the capital city at 3600 metres. In 1994, 
IBCE, as a non-CEPB member, became an “invited institution” inside the Commission of 
Foreign Trade and Integration, and hence, was able to set the meetings’ rhythm and the contents 
as regards ongoing regional integration.59 
 Uncoordinated Voices from La Paz: By the time Bolivia entered free trade talks with 
Mexico and MERCOSUR, the national chambers CNI, CNC, and CANEB also recognised the 
necessity for better inter-institutional coordination. Therefore, in 1993, the three entities formed 
a National Council of Industry and Trade, denominated COINCI, to submit “national” business 
proposals to the authorities on solid technical grounds, according to Julio Olmos, at that time 
COINCI Executive Secretary (OE 15/02/05). In hindsight, however, to delimit the council’s 
purpose as the one taken over by the CEPB’s Commission of Foreign Trade and Integration is 
puzzling as the secretaries of both institutions claimed “the unification of national business 
interests” (Arana 24/01/05; Olmos 15/02/2005). 
                                               
59 Important guidelines were defined in the study “Bolivia in the Context of Latin American Integration: The Vision 
of the Exporting Sector from Santa Cruz,” carried out in 1993 by IBCE and CADEX. The 140-page document 
handed over to Antonio Araníbar (Foreign Affair Minister from 1993-97) made recommendations for giving priority 
to CAN and not MERCOSUR, to lessen the time-costing bureaucracy by implementing trade agreements, and to 
insist on the Special and Differential Treatment foreseen in the ALADI scope. 
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Instead, the creation of COINCI was considered an attempt by the chambers of La Paz to 
counter-weigh the concerted positions attained by Santa Cruz. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of 
MERCOSUR talks, the involved chambers could no longer agree on the body’s modus operandi. 
Simultaneously, the regional asymmetries regarding the trade policy advocacy widened as Santa 
Cruz was the only department that permanently sent representatives to negotiation rounds 
overseas. Therefore, in 2000, the La Paz chambers undertook a new effort to better local 
coordination by creating the Foreign Trade Unit, this time in the ambit of the La Paz Federation 
of Private Entrepreneurship.60 After several meetings among delegates of the CNI, CNC, 
CAMEX and the Departmental Chamber of Custom Agents, however, the project was once again 
abandoned. The new failure was in part related to the appointment of CAMEX leader, Bruno 
Guissani, as President of the National Customs Authorities, who took over the initiative in this 
enterprise. Nonetheless, at least two more factors must be highlighted to shed enlightenment on 
the lack of collective action. 
1) Rivalry: In particular, the National Chambers of Industry and Commerce, as the 
country’s most traditional entities, have maintained a relationship marked by envy and 
suspicion concerning the internal and external recognition among La Paz’s major 
companies and state authorities. In the event of COINCI, in which the Executive 
Secretariat was hosted within the CNC, the industrialists saw the shared institution 
captured by the importing sectors grouped in the CNC.61 
2) Financial Commitment: The associated members have proved unwilling to pay costs 
related to technical staff and travels necessary for accompanying the official negotiation 
team.62 
Given the failed attempts in La Paz, it was the IBCE from Santa Cruz that sought from 2004 to 
convert its Bolivian denomination into a program full of content. Therefore, the IBCE 
established a regional office in the capital city that aimed at improving technical support inside 
the CEPB Commission of Foreign Trade and Integration, recovering the sound intermediation of 
national exporters’ interests. Nonetheless, the project supported by the Swiss State Secretariat of 
Economic Affairs (SECO) has to be considered as a long-term investment in the still contending 
                                               
60 Cochabamba, the third important Department economically (mainly dedicated to the export of fruits), managed, 
prior to La Paz, to establish a Foreign Trade Unit under the Federation of Private Entrepreneurship, yet without 
having permanent presence in trade talks. Though loosely organised, the Unit was still operating in 2004. 
61 With regard to MERCOSUR negotiations, importers tended to be more in favour of a fast opening up of the 
economy, while the industrialists sustained (albeit timid and partial) Santa Cruz’s critical standpoints regarding the 
official attempts to sign a complete FTA; see Diario Hoy 27/02/97; OE Olmos 15/02/05; BR Fernandez 12/08/2004. 
62 IBCE was mostly present with Gary Rodriguez and Carlos Roca.  Further representatives came from the farming 
entity CAO, and especially from the “National” Association of Oleaginous and Wheat Producers (ANAPO). 
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regional antagonism. Even though Soraya Fernandez, as Managing Director of the La Paz office, 
has showd a clear willingness to better articulate exportation views from the highlands (for 
example by the analysis of regional offers in the range of textiles, jewellery, alpaca clothing, 
leather wear, etc.), IBCE’s physical presence is likely to arouse certain suspicion, at least 
initially, with the La Paz dominated organisations.63 
 
Organisational Strength 
Based on a survey with 36 business associations (see Appendix) his subsection I will shed light 
on aspects related to the organisational strength of private sector representatives, stressing the 
importance of diversified revenues, reliable payment of membership dues, active member 
participation, the existence of permanent staff and in-house trade policy expertise. 
 Diversification of Association Revenues: Bolivian business chambers tend to diversify 
their revenues, and consequently, reduce their dependency on affiliation dues. Fifty percent of 
given answers indicated that, in 2004, more than 40 percent of entities’ incomes were generated 
by mechanisms such as the provision of services, rent of office spaces, the management of 
collective funds, or donor agency contributions. On the contrary, less than one third of entities 
reported that revenues relied entirely on the payment of affiliation dues (e.g. national 
associations representing mining, pharmaceuticals, banking, telecommunications and breweries).  
 
Table 6.11: What share of revenues originates from other than affiliation dues? 
More than 40% 10-40% 0-10% 0% No Response 
17 (50%) 4 (12%) 3 (9%) 10 (29%) 2 
 
The sustainability of additional funding wasn’t always clarified in the survey, however. 
Mainly among small scale business chambers like the FEBOPI, departmental CADEPIA’s and 
the CIOEC, an almost complete dependence on contributions made by donor agencies seemed to 
be rather common. Conversely, interesting examples of diversified revenues were identified 
inside the CEPB and its Departmental Federations. In this example, incomes depended between 
60-70 percent on means provided by INFOCAL, an associated foundation dedicated to the 
industrial and vocational training of workers and financed by firms’ voluntary contributions of 
one percent of salary volume. Even though the peak entity suffered from a painful shrinking of 
these incomes in recent years, INFOCAL funds remained essential, considering that member 
                                               
63 Therefore, IBCE has regularly participated within the scope of the CEPB Commission of Foreign Trade and 
Integration and has therein assumed the role of Technical Secretariat. In formal terms, however, IBCE staff was 
compelled to attend using the name of CANEB due to the ongoing division between Santa Cruz and La Paz. 
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quotas of the 30 members, ranging from US$250 to $1500, appeared too modest to sustain a 
professional lobby organisation.  
Nearly without exception, chambers from Santa Cruz enjoyed strongly diversified 
incomes. Carlos Rojas (BR 23/07/04), President of the National Association of Oleaginous and 
Wheat Producers (ANAPO), proudly explained that US$250,000 of annual incomes, representing 
roughly 30 percent, was related to a buyer’s arrangement between ANAPO and GRAVETAL, 
one of the leading companies dedicated to the transformation and exportation of soy. As 
GRAVETAL is closely located to the Brazilian border, and thus, interested in soy imports from 
Brazil by means of the Temporary Admission Regime, the company offered guaranteed prices 
and volumes to local producers as long as ANAPO used its advocacy power for the maintenance 
of this regime. This deal allowed ANAPO not only to charge 50 cents per sold tonne, but also to 
oblige the remaining exporting companies to pay a similar value.64  
Although affected by recent income losses due to mismanagement and a general decline 
suffered by the farming sector, during the 1990s the influential Oriental Chamber of Agriculture 
(CAO) was able to base its revenues on similar incomes generated by the affiliated membership 
(US$200,000), the organisation of Bolivia’s biggest Trade Fair “EXPOCRUZ” (US$200,000), 
and the administration of the Central Storehouse of Farming Equipments (ACAP) (US$150,000), 
according to CAO’s former Managing Director, Walter Nuñez 1989-98 (OE 10/08/04; also BR 
Arano 24/03/04). With regard to the Santa Cruz Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Services and 
Tourism (CAINCO), Operating Manager Mario Cirbián (BR 25/03/04) indicated that due to 
serious efforts to capture more external funds made in the 1990s, nowadays the chamber offers 
business an impressive array of services, in which SICOMEX stands out by providing permanent 
information to importers from the customs areas. According to Cirbián, the incomes generated 
by external funds were responsible, therefore, for 60 percent of total revenues. 
 Predictability of Association Revenues: Local associations clearly face problems in 
persuading their members to comply with their financial duties. Even though consulted 
functionaries were reluctant to make accurate information available, the survey data from 2004 
highlighted that the prompt payment of members’ dues was rather unusual, since 50 percent of 
memberships did not meet payment deadlines regularly. In general terms, large scale entities 
from banks, insurances, breweries, mining, forestry and leading trade organisations like the 
IBCE and CAINCO had fewer problems in this respect than entities of small scale farmers or 
manufacturers. Nonetheless, several “big company advocates” such as the CEPB, CANEB, CNI 
                                               
64 Further revenues in the amount of US$100,000 originated from the utilities of the entity’s seeds plant, created in 
1985. Finally, ANAPO ran several projects of technical assistance financed by international donor organisations 
such as PROTRIGO from USAID and Food Safety-PASA sponsored by the European Union. 
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and ANAPO also encountered uncertainties as regards the capture of dues. The widespread local 
efforts to maintain external funding are thus comprehensive.  
 
Table 6.12: What share of membership regularly meets the payment deadline? 
80-100% 50-79% 20-49% less than 20% No response 
12 (35%) 5 (15%) 11 (39%) 6 (21%) 2 
 
Participatory Behaviour of Members/Business: When consulting on the properties of internal 
trade decision-making, two thirds of the entities qualified their members’ participation as rather 
or very active, pointing at the frequent presence in meetings and, to a lesser extent, the 
submission of proposals. Yet, the validity of data seemed rather modest since the responses were 
often aimed at casting a positive light on their own members. Moreover, in only 7 out of 23 
chambers which indicated an active participation, did the organisation hold a commission related 
to foreign trade and/or integration affairs: IBCE, CIFABOL (pharmaceuticals), ASOBAN 
(banks), ABA (insurance), CNC and the Cochabamba Chambers of Industry and Exports. In 
total, twelve entities maintained an issue related commission in 2004. 
 
Table 6.13: Business/ member participation in trade policy affairs 
 Experts State Officials Total Experts +  
State Officials (29) 
Business*(36) 
very active 0 2 2   (9%) 12 (36%) 
rather active 2 3 5   (22%) 12 (36%) 
rather passive 4 6 10 (43%) 6   (19%) 
very passive 4 2 6   (26%) 3   (9%) 
no response 5 1 6 3 
* Responses are referred to the behaviour of members inside the internal bodies of each chamber. 
 
Furthermore, the data provided by business contrasted with the observations collected from 
experts and state officials concerning the behaviour of business entities in international trade 
policy affairs. Sixteen out of the 23 responses suggested a very or rather passive behaviour. The 
most positive remarks concerned the agro-industrial lobbies from Santa Cruz. On eight 
occasions, five state officials and three experts made explicit reference to the eye-catching 
presence of the IBCE and the five associated members. With respect to the negative quotes, 
many answers highlighted the business participation in general. Several specific comments 
considered the segment of small scale business, yet, leading organisations like the National 
Chamber of Industry received official criticism for barely taking part in ongoing trade negotia-
tions (SO’s R. Chavez 17/03/04; Velázquez 9/08/04; Zambrana 5/08/04). 
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 Staff Size and Trade Expertise: Many private sector organisations in Bolivia maintain a 
large staff base compared with corresponding entities in Argentina and Peru. By 2004, in 44 
percent of the chambers the number of employees was higher than ten, compared to 18 percent in 
Argentina and Peru. Evidently, the staff size was closely associated to activities going beyond 
lobbying and concerned the chambers search for strengthening its institutional position by 
offering a broad range of selective goods, i.e. customs services, (phyto-) sanitary controls, 
technical assistance, data, trade missions and fairs, collective seller, or buyers arrangements, etc. 
 
Table 6.14: What is the size of permanent staff? 
more than 20 11-20 5-10 1-5 no response 
 7 (22%) 9 (22%) 6 (17%) 14 (39%) 0 
 
Given this service providing approach, the number of employees is not necessarily linked to the 
extent of trade policy advocacy. Table 6.15 gives a brief overview. 
 
Table 6.15: Bolivia Top Ten Business’ Entity Administrations  
Rank Name Staff Location Outstanding Properties 
1 FEGASACRUZ (Santa 
Cruz livestock 
federation)  
86 Santa Cruz Technical assistance, slaughterhouse, 
banking and trade facilities, etc.  
2 CNC 60 La Paz Unit of Custom Services 
3 CNI 50 La Paz Centre of Sustainable Technology 
Promotion (CPTS) 
3 CAINCO 50 Santa Cruz Wide range of business services, 
impressive CAINCO Tower with 
Convention Center 
5 ANAPO 32 Santa Cruz Technical assistance provisions 
6 CIOEC (Coordinator 
for Small peasant 
Units) 
30 La Paz and 
regions 
Technical assistance for small 
peasants; 90 percent financed by 
international donors  
7 CADECO 
(Cochabamba Chamber 
of Commerce) 
21 Cochabamba Wide range of business services 
8 IBCE 18 Santa Cruz Trade promotion and analysis  
9 CAMEX   17 La Paz Trade data and promotion 
10 CADEX 15 Santa Cruz Trade data and promotion 
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Even though the ranking notified several modifications, the leadership of Santa Cruz’s entities 
was repeated when asking how many employees monitor trade policy affairs. Export promotion 
facilities excluded, one third of the consulted chambers had experts observing the outcomes of 
trade talks in 2004. In general, most of these entities, such as the CADEX, CAINCO, ANAPO, 
the Cochabamba Chambers of Industry, Exports and Commerce, CIFABOL (pharmaceutical 
industry), CAMEX, CEPB and CIOEC, had at their disposal one trade policy specialist and one 
assistant. The single organisation holding a technical department with three ore more employees 
was the IBCE. Altogether, the trade policy branch at that time consisted of seven persons from 
General Management (one), the Technical Division (four), and the La Paz quarter (two). 
Furthermore, most Santa Cruz chambers, such as CAINCO, the Forestry Chamber, CAO, and 
FEGASACRUZ, indicated that they often relied on IBCE’s expertise, commonly calling it their 
“technical branch”. 
 
Table 6.16: Who within the staff is monitoring and analysing trade policy affairs? 
think thank  
(3 officials) 
Trade Department  
(1-2) 
Managing 
Director 
none no response 
1 (3%) 11 (31%) 12 (34%) 11 (31%) 0 
 
Conversely, the trade policy advisory units of the national chambers were rather modest 
or absent. For budget reasons, the CEPB maintains a modest technical staff that only 
encompasses the Directors of the Economic, Institutional and Legal Divisions. Only temporarily, 
from March 2003 to September 2004, did the peak association count on a Foreign Trade Director 
who supported the technical work inside the Foreign Trade Commission. Later, the position 
remained vacant due to a lack of financial resources. A similar situation was faced by the CNI at 
the end of 2003, when the person responsible for foreign trade was no longer replaced. In any 
case, taking into account the fact that the national industry representative decided, in 1997, to 
establish an area of foreign trade (financed by means of an IDB trade promotion project), 
highlights the modest importance ascribed to this policy field. Finally, CANEB, an allegedly 
responsible national entity for export concerns, was also forced to reduce technical staff for 
budget reasons. Excluding the trade promotion area which runs externally financed projects, the 
administrative structure only contained the positions of an Executive Director and an 
Administrative Assistant in 2004. 
The modest in-house expertise upheld by most entities was confirmed by the impressions 
gathered among experts and state officials. Eighteen out of 21 given answers considered the 
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technical level of business policy proposals submitted by business entities in the area of 
international trade policy as very or rather low. 
 
Table 6.17: How do you assess the technical level of business proposals submitted in the 
area of international trade policy? 
 Experts (15) State Officials (14) Total (29) 
very high 0 1  1   (5%) 
rather high 2 0 2   (10%) 
rather low 4 8 12 (57%) 
very low 4 2 6   (28%) 
no response 5 3 8 
 
The quotes either indicated that entities where short of accomplished experts and/or that 
contributions normally did not go beyond the particular interests of a small group of companies 
dominating the chambers. Closely interrelated with the observations made regarding the 
participative behaviour, nine comments (five state officials and four experts) excluded technical 
work undertaken by the IBCE staff from the general criticism. 
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Summary Independent Variable A2 
This section indicates a low institutional strength of business associations, especially of those 
representing national business concerns. Regarding the variable dimension leadership, the lack 
of multi-sectoral coordination capacity stands out, negatively affecting the intermediation of 
economy and trade related policies before the government. The organisation strength of national 
business associations is largely deficient, although regional differences needs to be considered, 
as Box 6.5 point out. 
 
Box 6.5: Summary Independent Variable A2 
Peak 
Association 
The leadership that the peak entity CEPB enjoyed at the 
beginning of the New Economic Policy decreased in light of 
the growing regional division between business factions from 
La Paz, the capital city located in the highlands, and the private 
sector from Santa Cruz, the most important economic centre in 
Bolivia’s lowlands. By the end of 2003, the Santa Cruz related 
organisations decided to disaffiliate from the CEPB. 
Leadership 
Trade Policy 
Coordination 
The trade policy advocacy has been marked by the lack of 
reliable national intermediating institutions and the regional 
discrepancies regarding the high degree of inter-institutional 
coordination among Santa Cruz entities and the largely 
disorganised entities in La Paz. 
Organisational Strength  
 
Based on the provision of services and other funding activities, 
Bolivia’s business administrations are relatively big. The 
organisational strength of the Santa Cruz entities was eye-
catching, which through the solid trade policy branch of IBCE 
maintained a clear advantage over the inadequately staffed 
national and departmental organisations in La Paz. 
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6.4 Assessment 
 
After examining separately the evolution of the dependent and independent variables over the 
period of analysis, in this final section, I assess how, and to what extent, Bolivia’s failed world 
market integration strategy was effectively caused by the explanatory variables A1+2, or whether 
third variable influences became responsible for the observed policy failure. 
Before stressing the posed hypothesis, however, I point out the main aspects of Bolivia’s 
pursuit of world market integration. In 1985, in light of a scenario of hyperinflation, the country 
embarked on a strategy based on liberal structural adjustment policies. In the ongoing decade, 
this market-led model that characterised Bolivia’s approach to world market integration came 
under increasing pressure. As well as a radical opposition from social movements against free 
trade, fiscal constraints and political crisis strongly hampered the concerted search among 
domestic actors for sound trade policy-making. Therefore, when analysing Bolivia’s world 
market integration strategy in the last two decades, these macroeconomic and political 
turbulences need to be considered. Conversely, several empirical puzzles cannot simply be 
linked to Control Variable C3+4, but require the examination of the selected independent 
variables. 
First, from 1985 to 1997, why did Bolivia undertake, on the regional and multilateral 
sphere, more trade policy commitments than any other country in South America (except Chile)? 
Generally, these free trade arrangements neither entailed positive effects on the development of 
exports nor caused a significant surge of foreign investments. Instead, the agreements signed in 
the regional sphere, above all, caused strong trade deficits, and hence, negatively affected the 
balance of payment and the domestic market access of local products. 
Second, why did Bolivia choose not to implement coherent export promotion schemes in 
order to foster non-traditional exports in the range of industrial and agricultural manufactures, 
thus spurring sales in markets where preferential access had been negotiated? With meagre 
results, the National Council of Exports (CONEX) established in 1993 was in charge of 
concerting policy guidelines and instruments aimed at strengthening the national export 
development. 
Third, why did Bolivia participate in the US-AFTA negotiations only as an observer, 
considering the necessity to consolidate preferential market access conditions for Bolivia’s non-
traditional exports, for which the US market represents the main destination? In fact, by the end 
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of this study, it was highly uncertain whether, and for what duration, the US preference scheme 
for Andean countries, ATPDEA, will be extended. 
Forth, how can the successful consolidation of the Andean markets for Bolivia’s 
oleaginous products be explained? While in general Bolivia suffered from huge trade deficits, 
since the 1990s, increasing soy exports to Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru became 
responsible for regular trade surpluses in the scope of the CAN.  
In the light of these empirical puzzles, Table 6.18 sums up the value of the observed 
variables and the explanatory power each one possesses. Therefore, I will next outline when and 
how the values of variables changed over time and how they influenced on the value of B. 
 
Table 6.18: Explaining Bolivia’s Failed World Market Integration Strategy 
Variable Variable 
Dimension 
Value (Variance 1985-
2004) 
Explaining Power for 
Policy Success/Failure 
Responsibilities 1985-2004: very low 1985-2004: very high 
Resources 1985-2004: very low 1985-2004: rather high 
A1: Institutional 
Strength of State  
Bureaucracy Openness 1985-1992: rather low 
1993-1997: very low 
1998-2004: rather high 
1985-1992: rather low 
1993-1997: very high 
1998-2004: rather low 
Leadership 1985-1997: rather high 
1998-2004: very low 
1985-1997: rather low 
1998-2004: very high 
A2: Institutional 
Strength of Business 
Associations Organisational 
Strength 
1985-2004: rather low* 
 
1985-2004: rather high 
 
C1: Heterogeneity Sectoral Preferences  1985-2004: rather low 1985-2004: very low 
C2: Heterogeneity Foreign Preferences 1985-2004: rather low 1985-2004: rather low 
C3: Political Instability 2000-2004: very high 2003-2004: rather high 
C4: Macroeconomic Instability 1997-2003: rather high 1997-2003: rather high 
* High in the case of exporters from Santa Cruz, having strong influence on B. 
 
Institutional Strength of State Bureaucracy (A1) 
According to Table 6.18, strong explanatory power can mainly be ascribed to Variable A1. 
Between 1985 and 2004, no clear organisational model for the international trade policy area 
could be consolidated. In particular, the Foreign Affairs Model was broadly questioned by the 
private sector because the limited economic branch inside the foreign affairs department could 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
THE CASE OF BOLIVIA 
 
292 
not adequately respond to their concerns and the technical requirements involved in ongoing 
regional and multilateral challenges (resources).  
Moreover, the trade policy drawn up inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
developed at a distance from domestic business (openness). Especially, from 1993 to 1997, when 
Bolivia undertook far-reaching commitments of reciprocal liberalisation with the MERCOSUR 
and Mexico, the private sector organisations felt shut out of trade policy-making. Hence, 
Bolivia’s international trade policy did not reflect the preferences and possibilities of economic 
sectors, but relied, above all in the case of the MERCOSUR agreement, on the keenness of the 
leading diplomats to strengthen the political alliances with the emerging regional bloc in the 
Southern Cone, who suggested that Bolivia could become a regional hinge between the CAN and 
MERCOSUR. 
Given the widespread distrust of the local trade diplomacy, the business sector sought to 
empower the trade policy staff outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the stronger 
involvement of the staff from the Secretariat of Industry and Trade (1993-97), and the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade (established in 1997 and dissolved in 2003), primarily caused inter-ministerial 
struggles for responsibilities in the areas of international trade policy and export promotion. 
Above all, the personal quarrels between key trade policy officials hampered the development of 
export development strategies, as the emphasis was placed more on inter-ministerial disputes 
than on improving market access conditions abroad. 
For example, together with the Export Development and Taxation Law, in April 1993 the 
Bolivian government launched the National Export Council (CONEX), which was aimed at 
building an institutionalised public-private mechanism for concerting proactive policies that 
foster national exports. But in the aftermath, effective work inside the CONEX was not viable 
due to the unclear responsibilities within the executive branch. In this regard, the reluctance of 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry to acknowledge the legitimacy of the institution (which was headed 
by the Ministry of Economic Development and later by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Investment) stood out. 
In the period 2003-2004, as political instability increased and free trade talks with the 
United States became a concrete option for Bolivia, the institutional deficits of the trade policy 
branch were abundant considering the ongoing inter-ministerial conflicts and the deteriorating 
budget resources. As a result, the Bolivian government lacked the necessary authority to 
convince the population, principally the growing opposition to free trade maintained by social 
movements, of the benefits of furthering trade liberalisation commitments with the United States. 
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To a certain extent, previous trade policy failures committed by the government, i.e. opening up 
the economy without prior consultation and strengthening of economic sectors, influenced 
negatively on the credibility of governmental attempts to outline the positive impacts anticipated 
from freer trade with the US. 
 
Institutional Strength of Business Associations (A2) 
The failure to open up the economy without undertaking complementary measures aimed at 
increasing the competitiveness of domestic sectors can hardly be associated with the behaviour 
of local business associations. Therefore, the unilateral opening of the economy of the mid-1980s 
was designed by a small inter-ministerial staff inside the Ministries of Planning and Finance, 
without noteworthy participation of the leading peak and sectoral organisations. Moreover, in the 
1990s, it was the private sector organisations, above all the business entities from Santa Cruz, 
which broadly rejected the wide-reaching liberalisation commitments undertaken by the 
MERCOSUR agreement in December 1996.  
On the other hand, the absence of strong national coordination mechanism in the trade 
policy area entailed strong counter-productive effects on the development of coherent export 
promotion schemes. For example, the inter-ministerial conflicts in the scope of CONEX were 
largely confirmed by the lack of recognised business interlocutors. The National Chamber of 
Exporters (CANEB), which at one point claimed a monopoly for the private sector 
representation, had not only been characterised by a precarious administrative structure without 
holding significant in-house trade policy expertise (organisational strength) but increasingly 
suffered from the internal division between the regional chambers from Santa Cruz and La Paz, 
respectively (institutional strength). In fact, the chamber from La Paz disaffiliated in 1998, 
before returning in 2004. Similar conflict patterns were also observable in other national entities, 
such as the peak association CEPB and the national chamber of industry CNI. 
In general, the institutional strength of trade policy advocacy exhibited by the private 
sector in Santa Cruz was notably higher than in the capital city La Paz. The presence of the 
business think thank IBCE, which facilitated a high degree of inter-institutional coordination 
among Santa Cruz entities and a permanent monitoring of international trade policy affairs, 
largely accounts for the rather successful consolidation of the Andean markets for agricultural 
products from the lowlands, above all soy exports, which represented 25% of national exports in 
2004. In close coordination with Bolivia’s official negotiation team, the IBCE staff undertook 
permanent efforts to guarantee and preserve the Andean markets for soy products. As local 
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exports regularly faced safeguard or discriminatory measures applied by Colombia, Venezuela 
and Peru, intensive diplomacy in the CAN scope became necessary to obtain and control 
preferential market access conditions.65 Furthermore, Bolivia had to repeatedly insist on their 
Andean partners’ prompt application of the Common External Tariff for soy products (15-20 
percent) and the Andean Price Band System, which in combination guaranteed higher tariff 
preferences in the case of low world market prices.66 
 
Control Variables C1-C4 
Assessing the influence of selected control variables C1-C4, certain disturbing effects on the 
value of B were observed regarding C3 and C4.  
Political Instability (C3): After numerous alternating military regimes and the return to 
democracy (1982-85) accompanied by economic and social turmoil, from 1985 Bolivia entered a 
longer phase of political stability that enabled five democratic governments to conclude their 
terms properly (1985-2002). Increasing political instability began to appear towards the end of 
the 1990s, nonetheless. Several polemic topics, such as the eradication of coca plants, the 
engagement of multinational companies in public water supply, possible natural gas exports 
towards the US via Chilean ports, and the US-AFTA talks, led to a series of social protest and 
street blockades from workers, indigenous and neighbourhood organisations. Massive riots 
finally provoked the compulsory retreat of State President Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003. 
In the aftermath, the transitory presidency of Carlos Mesa (until June 2005) likewise operated on 
highly unstable grounds, making the political agenda dependent on popular demands such as the 
referendums which concerned the use of natural gas resources and the convocation of the 
Constitution Assembly. 
Studying the effects on B, the governance crisis experienced, above all, from 2003, 
subordinated concerns on long-term oriented trade policies. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that the strong opposition by civil society movements did not primarily jeopardise the ongoing 
world market integration strategy, for example in struggling against the free trade talks with the 
                                               
65 In 2002, for example, Colombia imposed safeguard measures of 29 percent tariffs on vegetable oils from the 
Andean partners; see CAN Resolution 671. Other measures applied by Colombia were related to a differential VAT 
treatment according the value added on imported products. For recent restrictions taken by Venezuela during 2005, 
the principal buyer’s market, see El Nuevo Día 18/08/2005 or IBCE publication Comercio Exterior; March 2005. 
66 The purpose of this system, in force since February 1995, is to stabilise domestic prices for palm oil, soybean oil, 
rice, sugar, barley, milk, corn, soybeans, wheat, chicken, and pork, among others. Thus, when the international 
bench mark price falls below a predetermined minimum level, member countries will apply a variable-rate surcharge 
on imports of such products, over and above the CET. Likewise, when the international bench mark price rises 
above a certain ceiling, the member countries will lower the normal tariff rate to reduce the import cost of the staple. 
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US, but has to be seen as a reaction to the failed process of economic opening, in which domestic 
constraints had not been adequately considered. 
Regarding the macroeconomic instability (C4), after experiencing rampant hyperinflation 
in the mid-1980s, Bolivia was able to control inflationary pressure during the whole period of 
analysis. From 1997 to 2004, however, the Bolivian State suffered under high budget deficits of 
3 percent and beyond. Between 2001 and 2004, the corresponding rate even moved between 6 
and 9 percent, and thus, offered a deprived panorama for the expansion of sector-specific and 
export promotion facilities, an indispensable element of the Multipolar Model (B). 
Studying the sectoral preferences (C1), heterogeneous interests were mostly observed 
along the regional lines, i.e. while the lowland producers from Santa Cruz have been interested 
in preserving the domestic market for their agriculture and forestry products, La Paz has sought 
cheaper prime materials for its food processing and furniture industry. Nevertheless, since the 
highest tariff rate applied by the Bolivian government does not exceed 10%, the presence of 
strong multisectoral business organisations should have allowed for the reconciliation of these 
opposing sectoral views. 
Preferences of others countries (C2): Bolivia’s trade policy has been virtually unaffected 
by other countries, disregarding specific market access restrictions for various agricultural goods 
and industrial manufactures. In general, the country has been widely granted with a special and 
differentiated treatment. For example, Bolivia recieved, in contrast to Peru, exemption from the 
Andean CET (not applying the higher tariff levels of 15 and 20%). Although rather opposed to 
by the CAN membership, moreover, Bolivia pursued a Multipolar strategy in negotiating a 
bilateral FTA with the MERCOSUR. 
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Interviews 
OUTSIDE EXPERTS (OE) 
Date Name Type Organization Function 
08.03.2003 Jurado, 
Wilfredo 
NEI International Trade Center  
(UNCTAD/WTO) 
International Consultant; 
Export Development 
16.03.2004 Pérez, 
Abraham 
Survey UMSA/ Institute for 
Economic Studies 
Professor of Economics 
18.03.2004 Chavez, 
Gonzalo 
Survey Catholic University/ Master 
Program for Development 
Professor of Economics and 
Development Studies 
18.03.2004 Mercado, 
Alejandro 
Survey Catholic University/ Institute 
of Socio-Economic Research 
(IISEC) 
Economists; Director IISEC 
18.03.2004 Peredo, Luis 
Fernando 
Survey British Department of Inter-
national Cooperation (DIFID) 
Consultant; Ex-Vice-
Minister of Exports 
19.03.2004 Villegas, 
Carlos 
Survey, 
NEI 
UMSA-CIDES/ Master 
Program on Development 
Science  
Economist; Director CIDES 
23.03.2004 Gutiérez, 
Osvaldo 
Survey National Council of 
Economists of Bolivia 
President; Policy Advisor of 
State and Business Entities 
19.03.2004 Castillo 
Simbrón, Max 
Survey Bolivian Association of 
International Political 
Economy 
President; Ex-UMSA 
Professor in International 
Law 
20.07.2004 Garcia, Luis 
Fernando 
Survey Private University of Bolivia,  
Santa Cruz 
Professor of Economics 
22.03.2004 
20.07.2004 
27.07.2004 
17.01.2005 
Rodríguez, 
Gary (Selected 
Interview 
Partner) 
Survey, 
NEI 
IBCE; University NUR/ 
Master on International 
Trade 
IBCE Managing Director; 
Professor of International 
Trade 
08.06.2004 Campbell, 
Jorge 
NEI IMCG Consulting Consultant; Argentinean 
Chief Negotiator 1994-1999 
22.07.2004 Serrate, 
Guillermo 
Survey Autonomous University 
„Gabriel Rene Moreno“/ 
Department of Economics 
Director; Rural 
Development Studies 
24.07.2004 Escobar, 
Emilio Javier 
Survey Autonomous University 
„Gabriel Rene Moreno“/ 
Department of Economy 
Professor of Economics; 
Expert in International 
Economy 
29.07.2004 Becerra, Marco NEI Cochabamba Chamber of 
Customs Agents  
Managing Director; Ex-
MCEI Official 
04.08.2004 Vaca Calderón, 
Patricia 
Survey Study Center of Labor and 
Rural Development 
(CEDLA) 
Economist, Expert in 
Foreign Trade and 
Economic Policy 
10.08.2004 Zelada, 
Alberto 
Survey, 
NEI 
Andean University Simón 
Bolívar/ Master on 
International Economic Law  
Legal Expert in Foreign 
Economic Relations; Ex-
Director UDAPEX  
10.08.2004 Nuñez, Walter Survey Bolivian Competitiveness in 
Commerce and Business 
(BCCN) 
USAID Contractor; Ex-
Minister of Agriculture and 
CAO Managing Director 
10.08.2004 Rojas Ulo, 
Edwin 
Survey UMSA-CIDES/ Master 
Program on Development 
Professor of Economics; 
Expert in Industrial Policy 
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Science and Public Investment 
13.08.2004 Kruse, Thomas Survey Study Centre of Labour and 
Rural Development 
(CEDLA) 
Expert in International 
Economy 
18.01.2005 Tercero, 
Francisco 
NEI Santa Cruz Department 
Authorities  
Director Productive 
Development; EX-Trade 
Diplomat and Managing 
Director of IBCE and 
CADEX 
21.01.2005 Guzman, 
Adhemar 
NEI PCAB-Andean Community 
of Nations 
International Consultant; 
Ex-Vice-Minister of 
Exports  
08.02.2005 Larrazabal, 
Juan 
NEI Andean Community of 
Nations 
International Functionary; 
Ex-Bolivian Trade 
Diplomat 
15.02.2005 Olmos, Julio NEI Andean Community of 
Nations 
International Functionary, 
Ex- Business Trade Policy 
Advisor 
STATE OFFICIALS (SO) 
Date Name Type Agency Function 
16.03.2004 
11.08.2004 
Otálora, 
Carmen 
Survey, 
NEI 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ 
Vice-Ministry of 
International Economic 
Relations (VREI) 
Trade Diplomat; ALADI 
and Market Access Affairs 
16.03.2004 
15.12.2004 
De Rico, Helen 
(Selected 
Interview 
Partner) 
Survey,  
NEI 
VREI   Director of Hemispheric 
Affairs; Ex-SEGIN and 
MCEI Official 
17.03.2004 
02.08.2004 
Chavez, Rosa Survey, 
NEI 
MDE/Vice-Ministry of 
Industry, Commerce and 
Exports (VICE) 
General Secretary CONEX; 
Trade Diplomat 
18.03.2004 Invernizzi, 
Gustavo 
Survey VREI Trade Diplomat; Advisor in 
the Vice-Ministerial Office 
19.03.2004 
14.12.2004 
Montaña, José Survey, 
NEI 
VICE Trade Policy Advisor in the 
Vice-Ministerial Office 
19.03.2004 
16.12.2004 
Alvagardo, 
Julio 
Survey VREI   General Director of 
Integration; Coordinator of 
the US-AFTA talks 
05.08.2004 Chambi, Irina Survey MDE/Vice-Ministry of Micro 
and Small Scale Producers 
Policy Advisor; SME Trade 
Promotion 
05.08.2004 Peñaranda, 
Marco 
Survey MDE/Vice-Ministry of Micro 
and Small Scale Producers 
Advisor in the Vice-
Ministerial Office 
05.08.2004 Zambrana, 
Humberto 
Survey, 
NEI 
MDE/UDAPE UDAPE Annalist; Area 
“External Sector” 
09.08.2004 Velázquez, 
Paola 
Survey VICE Policy Advisor; Foreign 
Trade and Statistics Affairs 
09.08.2004 Jimenez, 
Andrés 
Survey Ministry of Agriculture Director of Agriculture 
Markets 
10.08.2004 
24.01.2005 
Cortez, Juan 
Carlos 
NEI MDE Director of Human 
Resources 
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12.08.2004 Torres, William Survey Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs/UDAPEX 
Director UDAPEX 
13.08.2004 De Rico, 
Katerine 
Survey Ministry of Finance/ 
Vice-Ministry of Tax Policy  
Chief of Area “Tariffs and 
Integration” 
14.12.2004 Miranda, 
Giovanna 
NEI VREI   Trade Diplomat since the 
1980s 
17.12.2004 Rodriguez, 
Zandra 
NEI VREI  Director of South American 
Integration 
24.01.2005 Arana, Manuel 
(Selected 
Interview 
Partner) 
NEI VICE General Director of 
Industry 
BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES (BR) 
Date Name Type Entity Function 
15.03.2004 
05.08.2004 
12.08.2004 
Fernandez, 
Soraya 
(Selected 
Interview 
Partner) 
Survey 
NEI 
IBCE-La Paz Representation Managing Director 
16.03.2004 Pardo, Luis Survey CNI Sub-Managing Director 
17.03.2004 Quiroga Patiño, 
José  
Survey La Paz Federation of Private 
Entrepreneurship  
Sub-Managing Director 
23.03.2004 Menacho, 
Carlos 
Survey CADEX Sub-Managing Director 
23.03.2004 Bowles, Arturo Survey Bolivian Forestry Chamber 
(CFB) 
Managing Director 
24.03.2004 Arano, Lorgio Survey IBCE Head of Trade Policy 
Advisory Unit 
24.03.2004 Nogales, Walter Survey Santa Cruz Chamber of Small 
Scale Industry (CADEPIA) 
President 
25.03.2004 Cirbián, Mario Survey CAINCO Sub-Managing Director 
26.03.2004 Antelo, Juan 
Armando 
Survey Eastern Chamber of 
Agriculture 
President 
26.03.2004 Kempff, Julio Survey Santa Cruz Federation of 
Private Entrepreneurship 
Managing Director 
23.07.2004 Zabala, Rolando/
Rojas, Carlos 
Survey, 
NEI 
ANAPO 
 
Managing 
Director/President 
26.07.2004 Cirbián, Luis 
Alfredo 
Survey Santa Cruz Federation of 
Livestock Farming 
(FEGASACRUZ) 
Annalist Planning 
Department 
26.07.2004 Cardona, 
Gregorio 
Survey Association of Vegetable and 
Fruit Producers 
(ASOHFRUT) 
Vice-President 
28.07.2004 Barrios, Juan 
Carlos 
Survey Association of Beans 
Producers (ASOPROF) 
Managing Director 
28.07.2004 Cortéz, 
Mamerto 
Survey National Association of 
Maize, Sorghum, Beans and 
sunflower (PROMASOR) 
Managing Director 
29.07.2004 Loayza, Jimena Survey Cochabamba Chamber of 
Exporters (CADEXCO) 
Managing Director 
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29.07.2004 Grájeda, 
Nathalie 
Survey Cochabamba Chamber of 
Industry 
Trade Policy Advisor 
29.07.2004 Avila, Richard 
Alvarez 
Survey Cochabamba Chamber of 
Commerce and Services 
Managing Director  
30.07.2004 Candia, Ramiro Survey Cochabamba Chamber of 
Small Scale Industry 
(CADEPIA) 
General Coordinator 
30.07.2004 Lujan, Ronny Survey Bolivian Federation of Small 
Scale Industry (FEBOPI) 
President 
02.08.2004 Endara, José Survey CNC Head of Foreign Trade 
Department 
02.08.2004 Mendoza, José Survey Bolivian Chamber of 
Automobiles 
Assistant 
03.08.2004 Uriona, Hugo Survey National Association of 
Medium Sized Mining 
General Secretary 
03.08.2004 Collao, Katya Survey Association of Micro Finance 
Entities (ASOFIN) 
Economic Policy Advisor 
03.08.2004 
12.12.2004 
Estivariz, 
Augusto 
Survey, 
NEI 
Bolivian Chamber of 
Brewery (CABOFACE ) 
Legal Advisor; former 
CEPB General Secretary  
03.08.2004 Abvanad, Ana Survey Bolivian Chamber of 
Telecommunication 
(CATELBO)  
Assistant 
03.08.2004 Arduz, 
Fernando 
Survey Bolivian Chamber of 
Electricity (CBE) 
Managing Director 
03.08.2004 Ramos, Maria 
Luisa 
Survey Coordinator of Small Scale 
Farming Unit Organizations 
of Bolivia (CIOEC) 
Annalist of Agrarian Policy 
05.08.2004 Rojas, Ronald Survey CEPB Director of Foreign Trade 
05.08.2004 Kuhn, José Survey CAMEX Managing Director 
05.08.2004 Balcazar, Ana 
Carola 
Survey CANEB Managing Director 
09.08.2004 Dueñas, Erika Survey Chamber of the Bolivian 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
(CIFABOL) 
Managing Director 
09.08.2004 De los Angeles, 
María 
NEI CIFABOL Legal Advisor 
09.08.2004 Carpio Díaz, 
Gonzalo 
Survey CADEPIA – La Paz Managing Director 
11.08.2004 Baudoin, Carlos Survey Bolivian Association of 
Assurances (ABA) 
Managing Director 
09.08.2004 Custer, 
Elisabeth 
Survey 
 
Bolivian Association of 
Private Banks (ASOBAN) 
Economic Policy Advisor 
11.08.2004 Hinojosa, Javier Survey 
 
Chamber of Construction 
(CADECO) 
Managing Director 
13.12.2004 Glover Paz NEI CANEB President 
13.12.2004 Cabrera, Cecilia NEI IBCE – La Paz Trade Policy Advisor; Ex-
MCEI Official 
20.01.2005 Gastelu, Max NEI CEPB Director of Institutional 
Affairs; Ex-Trade Diplomat 
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Selected Interview Partners 
Arana, Manuel: Economic Professor at the Catholic University. Manuel Arana started his career 
as a trade diplomat in the 1970s as a Bolivian functionary inside the Andean Group. Between 
1976 and 1982, Arana worked inside the General Secretariat of Integration (SEGIN) as one of 
the country’s principal negotiators within the ongoing regional integration, ALALC, ALADI and 
Andean Group. Later he worked for the Andean Development Corporation CAF until 1986. In 
the last 20 years, Manuel Arana was occupied as a university professor in economics and an 
economic policy advisor for several business and state institutions, standing out in his position as 
Chief of the Economic Department inside the peak association CEPB during the 1990s and as 
General Director of Industry within the 2003-04 period. 
De Rico, Helen: Economist. In 1983, Helen De Rico became a trade policy advisor inside 
SEGIN. In 1987, the SEGIN staff was incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During 
the government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97), she worked inside the Secretariat of 
Industry and Trade in charge of international trade policy affairs. Within the following 
administration of Hugo Banzer (1997-2002), Helen De Rico became part of the erected Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and Investment, again attending the area of international negotiations. By 2003, 
she returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has been heading the Hemispheric Division 
inside the General Directorate of Integration, thus, becoming Bolivia’s principal negotiator 
within the FTAA talks. 
Fernandez, Soraya: Trade Policy Advisor. Soraya Fernandez worked between 1986 and 
1988 first as a junior official inside the Foreign Trade Division of the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade. In the following nine years, she became part of the established Export Promotion 
Authority, INPEX. From 1997 to 2003, Soraya Fernandez headed the Foreign Trade Department 
in the National Chamber of Industry. Finally, as of April 2004, she started to establish a business 
trade policy branch in La Paz within the scope of the Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade. 
Therefore, Fernandez assumed the Technical Secretariat position inside the Foreign Trade 
Commission of the peak association CEPB. 
Rodríguez, Gary: Economist with an MA in International Commerce from the 
Autonomous University “Gabriel René Moreno,” and author of the book, Economic Opening 
and Exports in Bolivia: The Role of State (1980-2003). Gary Rodríguez has worked for the 
Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade since its creation in 1986, first as of Head of the Technical 
Division, and as of 1996 as its Managing Director. In the last 15 years, he has therefore evolved 
as the principal trade policy advisor of Bolivia’s private sector, and particularly of the Santa 
Cruz Department. 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
 PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
7 Conclusions 
 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the patterns of world market integration have transformed significantly, and 
therein, have particularly challenged the capabilities of development nations. Given a general 
tendency towards trade liberalisation, and the inclusion of developing nations into multilateral 
and regional trade regulatory frameworks, the essence of trade policy-making no longer refers to 
the level of national tariffs, but to the need for permanent coordination among a broad set of 
policy areas, covering both border and behind-the-border measures, parallel negotiations on 
different international levels, and the complex incorporation of trade agreements into national 
laws. For the purpose of this study, therefore, a successful world market integration strategy has 
been conceptualised as a “high degree of coherence reached by implementing a particular set of 
trade related policies that developing countries adopt within a context of gradual liberalisation 
of the global economy and a shift of trade policy-making towards regional and multilateral 
levels, considering to what extent essential principals, policies, and objectives of the selected 
strategy have been put into practice and maintained over the period of analysis (1985 to 2004).” 
However, existing theories on trade policy mainly focus on the preferences of domestic 
actors, and refer to the redistributive character of trade policies that are manifested at given 
moments. In this respect, International Political Economy literature conceives trade decisions as 
conflict management among economic sectors that face dramatic changes in the rules that govern 
their markets (Milner 1988; Hillman 1989; Frieden 1991; Rodrik 1995; Hiscox 2002). Based on 
sectoral approaches, the outcomes of such processes are explained by analysing the political 
behaviour of export-oriented industries that favour liberalisation, and respectively, the import-
competing sector that is affected by reform steps. 
But this traditional view on the “politics of trade reforms” needs to be complemented in 
light of the current challenges of world market integration. Particularly, in this thesis I examined 
the effects of institutions involved in the domestic policy-making process, that is, formal and 
informal rules which shape the behaviour of collective actors, analysing to what extent these 
factors favour, or hinder, the success of world market integration strategies. In this regard, the 
study focused on the state bureaucracy and business associations. The analysis of the complex 
internal structures of the state bureaucracy, defined as the executive branch in charge of trade 
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policy, proved particularly revealing due to its central position in the conduction of international 
trade policy affairs, considering that in developing countries the involvement of the legislative 
branch is often very limited. Conversely, business associations, i.e. trade and industrial chambers, 
and peak and sectoral organisations, are not only expected to assume the task of intermediating 
among the economic sectors affected by trade policy rules, but should also have key trade data at 
their disposal, such as growth perspectives, consumer trends, technological innovation, fiscal and 
labour regulations, sanitary rules and technical obstacles. In light of these institutional 
imperatives, this book has sought to find answers to the following research question: How, and to 
what extent, does the success of world market integration strategies in developing countries 
depend on the institutional strength of state bureaucracies and business associations? 
In analysing institutional factors of state bureaucracies and business associations, I draw 
mostly on existing theoretical Neo-Institutionalism insights, such as Schmitter and Streeck (1999) 
and Peter Evans (1995). Accordingly, the institutional strength of collective actors (parties, 
interest groups, etc.) relies on stable and predictable rules and norms which govern interactions 
among actors. But unlike individuals acting in particular social contexts, the behaviour of 
collective actors is determined by the internal structural constraints of involved organisations. 
Hence, the outcome of collective action cannot be seen as the simple aggregate of individual 
preferences, but as a result of several factors influencing, or filtering, collective actors’ interests, 
such as internal decision-making procedures, the number of actors involved, common resources 
and principals. 
Regarding the collective action of entrepreneurs, the institutional strength of business 
associations is related to the complicated, intermediary position between two independent and 
resourceful actors – firms on one side, and state authorities on the other. So as not to be over-
looked, a business association is obliged to insert itself into the direct exchange of market actors 
and state authorities, by offering a service at a beneficial price or quality, according to the 
neocorporatist logic sustained by Schmitter and Streeck (1999: 19). Therefore, the institutional 
strength of business associations is defined as the capacity of organisations that represent private 
sector interests – i.e. trade and industrial chambers, business councils, peak entities, farmers 
organisations, entities representing specific sectors or branches – to effectively intermediate the 
often opposing preferences within the private sector, and simultaneously, to maintain close 
relations with state authorities. 
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In the case of state bureaucracies, institutional strength concerns the structures and norms 
that determine the work inside the executive branch and the way other non-state actors, especially 
business agents, are incorporated into the trade policy-policy making process. With this, it is 
indicated that the behaviour of bureaucrats is not simply guided by an obvious, clearly defined 
“public interest”, but by the outcome of multifaceted interaction patterns with other state and 
non-state actors.  
Bearing in mind the rampant corruption and rent-seeking behaviour commonly found in 
developing countries, Peter Evans’ concept of Embedded Autonomy (1995) combines the 
strength of bureaucratic structures with two seemingly opposing features: First, a high degree of 
autonomy, or insulation, of policy makers from societal pressure, in order to reduce rent-seeking 
opportunities. Second, bureaucrats require the capacity to maintain fluent relations with the 
business sector through channels that allow the permanent negotiation and monitoring of 
economic goals and policies, in order to fine-tune and adapt public policies to the possibilities of 
economic sectors responsible for efficient strategy/policy implementation. In this study, the 
notion of Embedded Autonomy was adapted to the underlying context and objectives. Hence, the 
institutional strength of state bureaucracy was conceptualised as an executive branch, wherein 
the responsibilities, as regards the conduction of international trade policy affairs, are clearly 
perceived, the trade policy staff are adequately doted, and finally, a degree of openness is 
sustained towards business and non-business regarding their incorporation into the trade policy-
making process. 
Regarding the effects of the institutional strength of state and business organisations on 
the outcome of trade policy-making, the analytical framework developed in this book was built 
upon the following test hypothesis: The success of world market integration strategies in 
developing countries (Dependent Variable B) depends on the institutional strength of state 
bureaucracies (Independent Variable A1) and business associations (Independent Variable A2). 
As mentioned, a successful world market integration strategy is conceptualised as a “high 
degree of coherence reached by implementing a particular set of trade related policies that 
developing countries adopt within a context of gradual liberalisation of the global economy and a 
shift of trade policy making towards regional and multilateral levels, considering to what extent 
essential principals, policies, and objectives of the selected strategy have been put into practice 
and maintained over the period of analysis (1985 to 2004).” The measurement of the degree of 
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coherence took as reference two idealistic modes of world market integration, which were both 
pursued in South America in the given time period: the Multipolar Model, based on the creation 
of a dense network of bilateral free trade agreements in- and outside the region, and the 
Springboard Model, which focuses on deeper forms of regional integration so as to establish a 
common regional market and a customs union (see Table 2). It was further assumed – but not 
analysed in this study – that a coherently implemented world market integration strategy 
contributes to improve the trade performance of a country, and finally, to achieve the goal of 
economic growth and, simultaneously, poverty reduction. 
To mitigate such disturbing influences as economy, culture, geography and politics, the 
focus of this study was narrowed down to South American countries, thus ensuring similar 
background conditions between the cases. Moreover, the countries selected – Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile and Peru – held in common their traditional dependence on commodity exports (and thus 
had clear incentives to foster diversification), as well as the implementation of far-reaching 
market reforms coupled with the transition from authoritarian to democratic rules, which both 
took place during the last two decades. Other case selection criteria were extreme values on the 
study variable and variance both in-case and between cases, and the access to data. Despite this, 
to ensure that the value of B was not caused by a factor other than A1+2, I controlled the 
influence of another four variables; Heterogeneity of Sectoral Preferences (C1), Heterogeneity of 
Foreign Preferences (C2), Political Instability (C3), Macroeconomic Instability (C4). 
The propositions of the analytical framework were investigated by means of case studies 
derived from one developing region: Since the 1980s, South America has become a paradigmatic 
case in order to understand the modern challenges of world market integration. South American 
States not only embarked upon wide-reaching market reforms (mainly as a consequence of the 
debt crisis of the 1980s) and adhered to the WTO system, but made intensive use of reciprocal 
forms of liberalisation. Regarding this latter point, countries’ involvement in regional 
liberalisation schemes became especially widespread. In this respect, both the customs union 
agreements of the Common Market of the South, or “MERCOSUR” (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay) and the Andean Group (Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) stand 
out, as do numerous bilateral preferential trade agreements, both between Latin American 
countries, and with trading partners in Europe, North America, and Asia. But despite this general 
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tendency towards economic liberalisation, and a major integration into regional and multilateral 
regulatory schemes, there is significant variance regarding the policy success of each country. 
Case Study 1: Chile went through several different stages during the process of adopting 
an exemplary Multipolar Model. Military leaders (Chile maintained an authoritarian regime from 
1973 to 1989) can take credit for putting in practice the so-called “flat rate” regime and the wide-
reaching export promotion schemes that were implemented as of 1985. But the cornerstone of the 
current trade policy was launched under democratic ruling, i.e. it was in the 1990s when the 
Southern Cone State evolved into a world wide pioneer of New Regionalism. Inside Latin 
America, Chile’s trade integration advanced more than in any other country, through the signing 
of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with practically every Latin American State. Later, 
from 1996, emphasis was placed on strengthening extra-regional ties. Through so-called “latest 
generation” FTAs, involving a broad range of new trade topics, with North American, European 
and Asian countries, the small emerging economy became an attractive partner in trade and 
investments for the big players of the world economy. As a result of these combined efforts, 
Chile registered impressive export growth rates as well as a significant export diversification 
based on non-traditional export champions, such as lumber, cellulose products, fruits, vegetables, 
salmon, wines and various manufactured goods. 
Case Study 2: Argentina’s strategy for world market integration was far less successful 
than that of its neighbour country. Although responsible for an innovative, proactive Integration 
Programme for Economic Cooperation (PICE) with Brazil (1986-1989), this approach, which 
aimed to gradually search for industrial complementarities in specific sectors, received major 
revision from 1990 onwards. Aside from far-reaching unilateral trade reforms, the MERCOSUR, 
founded in March 1991, took on a universal and automatic liberalisation approach (rather than a 
gradual, sector-specific one), by setting a four year timeframe for full liberalisation, and thus 
favouring the fast expansion of intra-zone trade in sectors where Argentina enjoyed comparative 
advantages, such as petrochemicals and food processing.  
In the aftermath, however, a coherent implementation of this world market integration 
strategy based on the MERCOSUR became undermined by several factors. First, the goal of 
establishing a common regional market and a customs union (in line with the Springboard 
Model), which demanded common external trade policies and the harmonisation of behind-the-
border measures, stood in contradiction to Argentina’s economic policy. Hence, the 
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implementation of the regional integration objectives stagnated, as Argentina and the other 
member states failed to assume the MERCOSUR as a reference scheme for unilateral policy-
making. In general, the observable lack of intra-MERCOSUR cohesion, and a loss of 
international credibility, hindered the group’s ability to act as a powerful trading block, both 
inside and outside Latin America. For example, virtually all external negotiations launched 
became deadlocked. Second, several permanent and temporary exceptions from the liberal trade 
regime persisted. Furthermore, the fact that such protectionist measures were applied in an 
uncoordinated, ad-hoc manner underlined the high unpredictability of domestic trade policies and 
the lack of clarity related to the strategy for each sectors’ world market integration. Third, while 
sector-specific policies were absent (except for the automotive regime), official export promotion 
facilities suffered from the combination of frequent modifications, modest resources and a high 
degree of institutional fragmentation. 
Case Study 3: In 1991, Peru implemented far-reaching market reforms, in which trade 
liberalisation was a cornerstone. In a strategy strongly influenced by the Chilean experience, the 
country sought to adopt a “modern” flat rate tariff, and to define individual forms of trade 
integration by leaving the Andean Group (later Andean Community of Nations - CAN) where 
members pursued a Common External Tariff (CET) based on a four-tier structure. Nevertheless, 
the desired policy goals failed to materialise. Rather than setting forth vigorous bilateral trade 
diplomacy, in 1997 Peru returned to the CAN without making any clear commitment to comply 
with the ongoing Andean integration process. In fact, the controversies on the Common External 
Tariff (CET) had yet to be resolved by the end of the period of analysis. Furthermore, the flat rate 
model pursued by Peru has not been reached thus far, and indeed, as of 2002 Peru has been 
applying seven different tariff lines. 
By the beginning of the new millennium Peru had attained certain policy success, 
nonetheless, discerning significant progress in assuming a Multipolar Model. The country set 
forth a rather active trade policy, combining the strengthening of trade relations with the US, the 
Pacific Area, and MERCOSUR, with the implementation of the National Export Strategy 2003-
2013. Though the pursued model had not been consolidated at the time of writing, the trade 
policy applied in the final years of th study period differed notably from the passive and 
incoherent trade policy sustained in the 1990s. 
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Case Study 4: The Bolivian experience can be considered an outright failure. The 
impoverished, landlocked Andean country opened up its economy in 1985, abandoning such 
policies as tariff ceilings, price regulations and subsidies, and became one of the earliest 
reformers in Latin America. Later, during the 1990s Bolivia signed several far-reaching trade 
arrangements in the multilateral, and above all, regional spheres. The FTAs signed with the CAN 
(itself being a CAN member), MERCOSUR, and Mexico were of particular importance. 
But since no significant support schemes for exporters were put into practice, such as 
market assistance, fiscal incentives or sector-specific measures, the enhanced market access 
opportunities remained largely unexploited. In light of the massive structural shortcomings faced 
by the local entrepreneurship (market size, infrastructure, technology, etc.), the distinctive liberal 
trade regime primarily caused large trade deficits. In recent years, the market-led, outward-
looking strategy became drastically opposed to by civil society actors, such as indigenous groups, 
workers, NGOs and state universities. Above all, the government’s intention to strengthen trade 
relations with the US caused major domestic social unrest. Furthermore, the blind search for 
“trade openness” was responsible, along with other factors, for the increasing destabilisation of 
the political system, which began to materialise as of the year 2000. 
In this final chapter of the book I summarise and compare the results of the empirical case 
studies, proceeding as follows. In the first part, I show how, when and to what extent the policy 
failure/success observed in the four countries from 1985 to 2004 was caused by the Institutional 
Strength of State Bureaucracy (the Independent Variable A1). In the second part, the explanatory 
power of the Independent Variable A2, the Institutional Strength of Business Associations, will 
be discussed. In the third part, I discuss whether, and to what extent, third variable influences, 
represented by C1-C4, became responsible for the values of B. In the final part, all the variable 
influences are presented for comparative purposes. 
Studying Table 7.1, the empirical results suggest that A1 exhibits a high explanatory 
power throughout all of the cases and periods of analysis, becoming in several occasion the key 
factor that accounts for the observed intra-case variances. In general, the relevance of the variable 
dimensions Responsibilities (division of labour and inter-ministerial coordination) and Openness 
(state-business coordination and transparency) seem slightly higher than Resources (trade policy 
staff). 
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Table 7.1: The Institutional Strength of State Bureaucracy (A1) 
  Chile Argentina Peru Bolivia 
Responsi-
bilities 
85-94: rather low  
95-04: very high  
85-87: rather high 
88-04: rather low 
85-01: rather low 
02-04: rather high 
85-04: very low 
Resources 85-94: rather low  
95-04: rather high  
85-04: rather high 85-90: rather high 
91-01: very low 
02-04: rather high 
85-04: very low 
Value of 
A1 
Openness 85-04: very high  85-89: rather high 
90-95: very low 
96-04: rather high 
85-98: rather high 
99-04: very high 
85-92: rather low 
93-97: very low 
98-04: rather high 
Responsi-
bilities 
85-94: rather high 
95-04: very high 
85-04: very high 85-04: very high 85-04: very high 
Resources 85-04: rather high 85-88: rather high 85-04: rather high 85-04: rather high 
Effect 
on B 
(Policy 
Failure/ 
Success) 
Openness 85-04: very high 85-89: rather low 
90-95: rather high 
96-04: rather low 
85-98: rather low 
99-04: very high 
85-92: rather low 
93-97: very high 
98-04: rather low 
 
In Chile, the emergence of a broadly accepted Foreign Affairs Model (responsibilities) as 
of 1995, embodied in the institutional strengthening of the General Directorate of International 
Economic Affairs (DIRECON), proved to be decisive for the successful Multipolar approach to 
world market integration. Prior to this, international trade policy affairs policies had generally 
lacked coherence. During the military regime, the DIRECON – created in 1979 – was only 
theoretically in charge of international trade policy affairs. In practice, the export-oriented 
strategy launched in 1985 was based on unilateral tariff reductions and far-reaching export 
promotion schemes, as the Chicago Boys inside the Ministry of Finance conceived trade policy to 
be merely a unilateral tool, that is, something that must be liberalised regardless of what may 
occur in country A, B or C.  
Thus, putting an end to this orthodox, “ivory-tower” attitude was the real achievement of 
democratic policy-makers. They understood that successful world market integration goes 
beyond coherent, predictable, business-friendly domestic policies, by demanding an accurate 
analysis of what is needed domestically, and what can be obtained externally. In this regard, the 
democratic government that took office in 1990 did not only aim to preserve the trade policy of 
its authoritarian predecessor (e.g. by maintaining the “flat rate regime”) but also to complement 
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efforts in extending market access opportunities through preferential trade agreements with a 
wide array of global economies, thereby attaining a paradigmatic Multipolar Model.  
In the first democratic government (1990-94), however, the Ministries of Finance, 
Economy, and Foreign Affairs sustained different trade integration goals, and thus, created a 
struggle for competencies. While the department of economy pursued the development of value-
added exports by strengthening relations with Latin American markets (above all with the 
emerging MERCOSUR), the finance department paid greater attention to a possible adherence 
with the NAFTA, as this option was seen as an opportunity to “cement” previous unilateral 
liberalisation. Finally, the foreign affairs department, at this time still rather weak, considered 
deepening trade relations with the Andean and Southern Cone states as an appropriate way to 
restore good neighbourhood in the region. 
During the second government of the centre-left coalition Concertación (1995-2000), the 
different state departments involved decided to strengthen the DIRECON office, converting it 
into the leading international trade policy branch (a process which included a strong up-scaling of 
trade policy officials; resources), in order to encounter the rising challenges of regional and 
multilateral forces. As a result, inter-ministerial coordination improved, as the division of labour 
was clearly set, i.e. the Ministry of Finance remained in charge of tariff policy, investment 
measures, and financial services; the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for negotiations on 
agricultural trade; and the Ministry of Economy served as an advisory unit on intellectual 
property rights, sector-oriented regulatory issues and technical trade obstacles. 
Inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the DIRECON enjoyed a distinct autonomous 
status, especially with regards budget spending and the appointment of officials. Thus, without 
significant interference from the political branch, the engagement of this economic policy agency 
could be exclusively focussed on improving market access conditions for export industries, both 
by means of negotiating preferential trade agreements in- and outside the region, and through the 
market assistance activities in the scope of the export promotion authority Prochile, which itself 
forms part of the DIRECON office. In fact, from 1995 the DIRECON office began to spur 
international trade talks across the globe, becoming a pioneer in South America by signing 
comprehensive FTAs with Canada, the United States, the European Union, Korea, Singapore, and 
China. 
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Another crucial factor of A1 that strongly influenced the Dependent Variable B was the 
high degree of openness to business. Indeed, the establishment of close working relations with 
business entities, above all with the Society of Manufacturing Promotion (SOFOFA), is one of 
the essential factors that helps us to understand appropriately why, and how, Chile pursued the 
Multipolar approach to world market integration. In keeping with the tradition of the military 
regime, which in the aftermath of the debt crisis in 1982-83 opened steady participation channels 
with organised business sectors, the systematic incorporation of business views has been a key 
element, particularly for the DIRECON. There are two main reasons for this: First, the ambitious 
trade agenda set forth required the private sector to contribute with its “decentralised 
intelligence” from markets, through the provision of information on trade obstacles, investment 
perspectives, and market trends. Second, the SOFOFA became a strategic partner for the 
DIRECON inside the business sector, as it strongly shared the principals and objective of the 
Multipolar Model, thus providing firm domestic coalitions and disseminating the properties of 
trade policy among local sectors. 
Regarding the influence of A1 in the case of Argentina, the explanatory power was 
mostly concentrated in the variable dimension responsibilities. In fact, the local “partnership 
model” in which the Ministry of Economy defines “what” has to be negotiated in trade policy 
affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decides “how” to implement those inputs on the 
international level, remained unclear during practically the entire period of analysis, negatively 
affecting the development of international trade policies.  
In 1986-87, the Secretariat of Industry and Foreign Trade (SICE), part of the Ministry of 
Economy, took over the clear responsibility of designing the innovative PICE approach, whilst 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry launched the initial talks and assumed the overall coordination of 
this first substantial integration step with Brazil since the return to democracy in 1983. The 
previous merger of the areas of “trade” and “industry” inside a single state secretariat (a 
precondition set by Roberto Lavagna when taking office) was moreover crucial to explain the 
sectoral approach to integration that combined export promotion with industrial policies. By then, 
the technical work inside the SICE was strongly supported by the Foreign Trade Service, a 
specialised cadre of career trade diplomats inside the Ministry of Economy (resources). 
Furthermore, the staff in charge of the different sectoral negotiations maintained close working 
relations with the private sector (openness). Hence, the state bureaucracy exhibited apparently 
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adequate institutional structures for successful trade integration initiatives. On the side of the 
private sector, however, such conditions were lacking, as I later expose. 
 In the aftermath, however, the institutional strength of the executive branch declined, 
helping explain, to a wide extent, the subsequent failures in the country’s world market 
integration strategy. In particular, effective inter-ministerial coordination could no longer be 
ensured in the light of an unclear division of labour for the conduction of international trade 
policy affairs. Instead, the course of action became strongly dependent on personalised decisions 
and undermined the institutional role of state bureaucracy as a whole (responsibilities, resources, 
and openness). 
Specifically, Domingo Cavallo, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1989-90) and Minister of 
Economy (1991-1996), defined – being advised by a group of personal advisors from the 
orthodox-liberal think tank Mediterranean Foundation – the scope of economic reforms and trade 
liberalisations. The integration scheme embodied in the MERCOSUR treaty of 1991 can also be 
seen as a reflection of the policy style sustained by Cavallo’s economic advisory team, which 
aimed at a fast expansion of intra-regional trade and the attraction of foreign investment. These 
new rules favoured the steel, petrochemicals, foods, and automobiles industries, where large 
companies dominated, whilst small scale manufacturers, especially in the range of capital goods, 
suffered due to the lack of industrial policies, increased import competition and overvaluation of 
the local currency. 
Contrary to the PICE process, private sector organisations were almost entirely excluded 
from the key decisions regarding the institutional set-up of MERCOSUR (openness). The 
adoption of the Customs Union by December 1994, which contradicted both current and, indeed, 
future national policies, came to be seen as a concession to Brazil, in order to avoid deteriorating 
bilateral relations (the goal of reaching the CET was yet to be defined in 1991). Evidently, the 
concession made by Carlos Menem was opposed by the economy minister (who favoured a free 
trade zone), although Mr. Cavallo (then as foreign affairs minister) supported the decision in 
March 1991, when the Asunción Treaty was signed and the goal of reaching a CET by 1995 was 
set, as Jorge Campbell, chief negotiator within the Ministry of Affairs (1994-99) explained.1 
                                                 
1 Anecdotically, Campbell reported that Cavallo called, only ten days prior to the Ouro Preto Protocol, for a meeting 
with Menem and Di Tella in order to put arguments on the table in favour of a simple FTA, which was too late to 
retract. Later on, Cavallo remained the Customs Union’s major adversary. By March 2001, when he was again 
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From 1995, the ambitious goals set in the scope of MERCOSUR – which required the 
harmonisation of trade, macroeconomic, sectoral, and fiscal policies – overstrained the 
institutional capacities of the local bureaucracy. In particular, the trade policy staff within the 
Ministry of Economy experienced a steady decline after the Foreign Trade Service transferred to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, with continued budget cuts taking place as of 1996 
(resources). 
Given the decline in the capacity of the Ministry of Economy to monitor, and technically 
support, the international trade policy, the trade policy branch inside the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
increasingly assumed the role of defining both policy guidelines, and the implementation of 
negotiation strategies on the MERCOSUR and extra-regional level. Effectively, however, these 
far-reaching responsibilities weren’t fully assumed before 2002 because of a range of internal 
constraints, such as the difficulties of incorporating the Foreign Trade Service into the traditional 
diplomatic career scale, and the weak leadership of the office holders in charge between 1999 and 
2001 (resources). 
It was not until the period of 2002-04, under chief negotiator Martin Redrado, that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed almost full responsibility – although opposed in parts by the 
Ministry of Economy – and was able to put forward an ambitious Multipolar Model, initiating 
and planning numerous negotiations in the regional and extra-regional sphere. Moreover, Mr. 
Redrado insisted on a marked involvement of the private sector, and revived the Centre of 
International Economy (CEI) in order to convince a broad public, with technical arguments, of 
the pursued Multipolar strategy (openness).  
By the end of 2004, however, it was still unclear whether the proactive Multipolar 
strategy could be successfully implemented, for two main reasons: First, a lack of intra-
MERCOSUR cohesion persisted by 2004, and thus, the conclusion of initiated and planned free 
trade talks was highly uncertain. Between 1995 and 2004, when Chile and Mexico rapidly 
expanded trade relations towards (extra-) regional areas, the negotiations launched by 
MERCOSUR mostly deadlocked. Second, although state-business coordination was much more 
intense in 2004 than in the first half of the 1990s, the business sector still faced similar 
institutional deficits. 
                                                                                                                                                              
appointed Minister of Economy, the dynamic but unpredictable technocrat openly threatened to downgrade 
MERCOSUR to a FTA. 
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In Peru, the empirical results suggest a high explanatory power for Variable A1 regarding 
the key aspects of the country’s world market integration. Above all, the Peruvian government’s 
incoherent attitude towards the Andean integration process is strongly associated with the 
modifications inside the state bureaucracy that took place in the 1990s. Due to the public sector 
reforms implemented in 1990-91, specialised trade policy entities such as the Foreign Trade 
Institute (ICE) and the Ministry of Industry, Domestic Trade and Integration (MICITI) were 
dissolved (ICE) or drastically downsized (MICITI) in light of severe budget cuts affecting the 
central government. On the other hand, some key agencies such as the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (MEF) were greatly up-scaled. But the MEF staff, which became responsible for the 
structural adjustment reforms involving trade liberalisation, did not rely on traditional career 
bureaucrats, recruiting instead from a group of special advisors close to the Peruvian Institute of 
Economy (IPE), a private think-tank based on orthodox-liberal standpoints. As a result, the 
pattern of policy-making strongly resembled market reforms implemented in Argentina under the 
guidance of Mr. Cavallo’s advisory team.  
The team, headed by economy minister Roberto Boloña, considered trade policy in 
essence as an instrument for the unilateral liberalisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers, as did the 
Chicago Boys in Chile’s authoritarian regime. Herewith, the application of uniform tariffs was 
perceived as modern, since discretional policy-making could be avoided, and the predictability of 
fiscal revenues increased. The aim of reaching a flat rate by the end of 1994, however, stood in 
contradiction with the intention of the Andean Group, of which Peru was a member, to establish a 
Common External Tariff (CET) that assumed an escalated structure with four tariff levels. 
Moreover, the intra-regional exchange of goods was traditionally unfavourable for Peru, as less 
than 10% of exports went to the Andean markets, whilst imports from Andean Group members 
were noticeably higher, causing permanent trade deficits from a Peruvian perspective. 
As economy minister Boloña directly interfered in negotiations on the Andean level, in 
July 1992, Peru’s suspension of the Andean Group membership was a coherent decision in mind 
of the ongoing unilateral trade policy. In the aftermath, however, the coherence of the country’s 
world market integration strategy could not be attained. Instead of pursuing a Multipolar Model, 
as had been planned by Mr. Boloña’s advisory team, from 1992 Peru failed to establish a flat rate, 
nor did it set forth an active bilateral negotiation strategy, and neither promoted non-traditional 
exports.  
CONCLUSIONS 318
In the 1990s, the special advisory staff inside the MEF (resources) focussed on unilateral 
trade reforms, whilst reciprocal forms of liberalisation played only a secondary role. Moreover, 
the responsibilities in the area of international trade policy were not clearly defined. Between 
1991 and 1992, there was, incredibly, no state department in charge of international negotiations 
in the scope of ALADI and the WTO. From October 1992, when the Ministry of Industry, 
Tourism, Integration and International Trade Negotiations (MITINCI) was created, the Peruvian 
government disposed again of an international trade policy branch. But the MITINCI was not 
sufficiently staffed to implement active trade policies in the regional, extra-regional, and 
multilateral spheres (resources). Moreover, the few trade policy officials inside the MITINCI 
were divided into a group that supported the policy guidelines of the MEF (and thus the 
separation from the Andean Group), and another that favoured the return to the Andean 
integration scheme. 
The intra-governmental work became further complicated by the diplomatic staff inside 
the Ministry of External Affairs who sought, from the mid-1990s, a more protagonist role in 
international economic affairs (responsibilities). At this point, the Peruvian diplomacy attempted, 
together with parts of the MITINCI staff and local manufacturers, to facilitate Peru’s return to the 
Andean Group, and thus, began stressing numerous inconveniences of a definitive departure from 
the CAN, such as the displacement of its headquarters located in Lima, the impossibility to 
conduct common foreign affairs, the loss of privileged market access in the Andean markets, and 
the mandatory withdrawal from numerous shared institutions, such as the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF), Latin American Reserve Fund (FAR), and technical assistance programs. 
Therefore, it was due to “one of the rare occasions of coordination between the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and the MITINCI, that the hardliners inside the MEF could be displaced”, 
according to Luis Tello (2004: 118), who analysed the domestic power shift that took place in 
May-June 1997, when Peru returned to the Andean Group. 
In the ongoing decade, the institutional strength of the trade policy branch was 
significantly enhanced, thus explaining, to a large degree, the shifting approach to trade 
integration. Increasingly, the MITINCI staff focused on integration options in the Western 
Hemisphere and the APEC area. Above all, it was Alfredo Ferrero – Vice-Minister of 
International Negotiations and later Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism – who managed to 
create domestic consensus to strengthen the development of national exports, especially to the US 
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markets. Therefore, export-specific concerns gained increasing recognition among the public and 
private sector, making possible, in May 2002, the creation of a well-doted trade policy staff 
within the new Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism, MINCETUR (responsibilities and 
resources). As a result,, MINCETUR became the leading agency in the new proactive multipolar 
approach put forward from 2003, i.e. involvement in free trade talks with the US, comprehensive 
FTA with MERCOSUR, the launching of bilateral negotiations with Thailand, and the start of the 
first National Export Strategy, based on 10-year objectives. 
Similarly to Argentina, the question of whether this new trade policy approach, strongly 
based on the Multipolar Model, will prove to be sustainable or not, largely depends on the 
question of whether the mostly personalised style of governance will lead to a greater degree of 
institutionalisation of the trade policy-making. This is especially the case with respect to the high 
degree of openness that was maintained by Alfredo Ferrero. Under his direction, the government 
undertook multiple actions to make trade policy not only more transparent, but also more popular 
within business, parliament and civil society. In particular, the close relations with local business 
factions became crucial to legitimise more active trade policies, mostly aimed at the US market. 
The key officials from MINCETUR, therefore, built up strategic alliances with the National 
Industry Society (SNI) and the Exporters Associations (ADEX). 
In Bolivia, the empirical results suggest that the state bureaucracy variable (A1) is the 
principal cause for the outright failure of its world market integration strategy. To a greater extent 
than in any other country observed, Bolivia’s world market integration was negatively affected 
by the fact that no clear organisational model for the international trade policy area could be 
consolidated between 1985 and 2004. In particular, the Foreign Affairs Model was broadly 
questioned by the private sector because the limited economic branch inside the foreign affairs 
department failed to adequately respond to their concerns and the technical requirements 
involved in ongoing regional and multilateral challenges (resources).  
Moreover, the trade policy drawn up inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was handled 
in isolation from domestic businesses (openness). Particularly, from 1993 to 1997, when Bolivia 
undertook far-reaching commitments of reciprocal liberalisation with the MERCOSUR and 
Mexico, the private sector organisations felt shut out of trade policy-making. Hence, Bolivia’s 
international trade policy did not reflect the preferences and possibilities of economic sectors, but 
relied, above all in the case of the MERCOSUR agreement, on the keenness of the leading 
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diplomats to strengthen the political alliances with the emerging regional bloc in the Southern 
Cone, pretending that Bolivia could become a regional hinge between the CAN and 
MERCOSUR. 
Given the widespread distrust of the local trade diplomacy, the business sector sought to 
“empower” the trade policy staff outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But unlike the 
successful creation of the MINCETUR in Peru (“Foreign Affairs Model”), in Bolivia the stronger 
involvement of the staff from the Secretariat of Industry and Trade (1993-97), and the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade (established in 1997 and dissolved in 2003), primarily caused inter-ministerial 
struggles for responsibilities in the areas of international trade policy and export promotion. 
Above all, the personal quarrels between key trade policy officials hampered the development of 
export development strategies, as the emphasis was placed more on inter-ministerial disputes than 
on improving market access conditions abroad. 
For example, coupled with the Export Development and Taxation Law, in April 1993 the 
Bolivian government launched the National Export Council (CONEX), which aimed to build an 
institutionalised public-private mechanism to concert proactive policies that would foster national 
exports. But in the aftermath, effective work inside the CONEX never became viable due to the 
unclear responsibilities within the executive branch. In this regard, the reluctance of the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry to acknowledge the legitimacy of the institution (which was headed by the 
Ministry of Economic Development and later by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment) 
is particularly prominent. 
In the period 2003-2004, as political instability increased and free trade talks with the 
United States became a concrete option for Bolivia, the institutional deficits of the trade policy 
branch became very apparent, considering the ongoing inter-ministerial conflicts and the 
deteriorating budget resources. As a result, the Bolivian government lacked the capacity to 
convince the population (principally the growing opposition to free trade maintained by social 
movements) of the benefits of furthering trade liberalisation commitments with the United States. 
To a certain extent, previous trade policy failures committed by the public sector, i.e. opening up 
the economy without prior consultation and strengthening of economic sectors, influenced 
negatively on the credibility of governmental attempts to outline the expected positive impacts 
from freer trade with the US. 
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Regarding the influence of the second explanatory variable, the Institutional Strength of 
Business Associations (A2), the empirical results suggest a mostly high influence on the success 
of world market integration strategies, often strengthening the effects of the state bureaucracy 
variable on the value of B. 
 
Table 7.2: The Institutional Strength of Business Associations (A2) 
  Chile Argentina Peru Bolivia 
Leadership 85-04: very high  1985-2004: very 
low 
85-04: rather low 85-97: rather high 
98-04: very low 
Value of 
A2 
Organi-
sational 
Strength 
85-94: rather high 
95-04: very high 
1985-2004: very 
low 
85-04: very low 85-04: rather low*
 
Leadership 85-04: very high 85-04: very high 85-04: rather high 85-97: rather low 
98-04: very high 
Effect 
on B 
(Policy 
Failure/ 
Success) 
Organi-
sational 
Strength 
85-94: rather high 
95-04: very high 
85-04: very high 85-04: rather high 85-04: rather high 
 
 
Above all, in Chile the explanatory power of A1 is strongly linked to the effects of A2. In 
fact, the effective incorporation of entrepreneurs into the development of the Multipolar Model 
required strong interlocutors inside the private sector. Specifically, the leadership of the 
multisectoral organisation CPC, a business-wide recognised entity in coordinating sectoral 
positions was crucial for Chile’s international trade policy until the mid-1990s. By this point, the 
CPC had become responsible for organising the private sector in preparation for the possible 
adherence to the NAFTA treaty. For instance, by carrying out exhaustive impact assessments 
regarding such an integration step, the CPC managed to channel and articulate the strong interest 
among the local entrepreneurship, and herewith, signaled to the Chilean and US government the 
marked preposition to face this challenge. Thus, the CPC played a similar role to that adopted by 
the Mexican business council CCE, which Schneider (1997) qualified as decisive in explaining 
Mexico’s entrance into the NAFTA.2  
From 1994 to 1996, moreover, the leadership of CPC was crucial for the harmonisation of 
opposing sectoral views during the controversial negotiations with the MERCOSUR. While the 
                                                 
2 But contrary to Mexico, the US government however decided later to leave Chile and other Latin American 
countries out of the NAFTA, and to launch the FTAA initiative embracing the whole Western Hemisphere. 
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industrial and service related sectors favoured far-reaching economic integration (albeit a full 
membership was rejected due to the customs unions concept), the CPC authorities placed special 
emphasis on the defensive concerns of local farmers, in order to balance the inter-sectoral 
interests. Supporting the free trade agreement in general terms, the umbrella organisation stressed 
the potential liberalisation costs for farmers, and thus, supported the claims of the National 
Society of Agriculture (SNA) for far-reaching compensation measures and long phasing-out 
schemes. As a result, the agreement with MERCOSUR became viable despite strong 
heterogeneous interests among domestic sectors.   
In the second, and more dynamic, stage from the mid-1990s, the schemes of business 
intermediation underwent significant changes. The variable dimension organisation strength 
attained more relevance because sectoral associations increased their protagonism. As previously 
pointed out, the SOFOFA became the privileged interlocutor of the DIRECON office, not only 
because of its leadership among export-oriented branches, but especially due to its collaborative 
behaviour in supporting trade policy officials through the permanent monitoring of foreign 
markets and accomplished technical proposals. For this purpose, the SOFOFA hired two former 
trade diplomats to build up an Area of Foreign Trade and International Economic Relations as of 
1995, when negotiations with MERCOSUR and Canada where underway, attaining herewith 
state-of-the-art trade policy advisory skills. Aside from the SOFOFA, other sectoral entities from 
agriculture (SNA) and services (Santiago Chamber of Commerce) likewise increased their trade 
policy skills in order to facilitate an efficient exchange with state authorities. 
In sum, the manner in which Chile pursued its integration into world markets assumed a 
neocorporatistic flavour, considering the close state-business collaboration pattern. Aimed at 
improving its capacity to coordinate public policies – in this case international trade policies – the 
Chilean government was interested in establishing close and stable relations with particular 
business associations, wherein strong leadership and organisation strength were the most 
important selection criteria. In general, such policy-making patterns are criticised for their lack of 
inclusiveness, because they imply “representation monopoly”, leaving little room for minority 
actors or groups facing collective action problems.  
In Chile’s trade policy, indeed, several actors’ preferences have been reflected scarcely. In 
this respect, prominent examples include the segment of import-competing small scale 
manufacturers, workers and other members of the civil society, all of which suffer from a 
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widespread fragmentation of their interests. In parts, the centre-left coalition Concertación, in 
power since the transition to democracy in 1990, sought to compensate such asymmetries, for 
instance by providing technical assistance and subsidised loans to small manufacturers to 
enhance their competitiveness.3 Regarding the participation of civil society, the government made 
widespread efforts to foster dialogue with a broad range of society actors on international trade 
policy affairs. To date, however, free trade critical civil society organisations have largely felt 
excluded from the world market integration strategy in force. 
Contrary to the Chilean example, in Argentina close state-business interactions were 
absent during the period of analysis, mostly due to the institutional deficits of organised business, 
which hampered the coherent implementation of trade policies. Differing from the key sectoral 
associations in Chile, such as the SOFOFA, SNA, or the Santiago Chamber of Commerce, in 
Argentina, stable working relations between state and business entities has been negatively 
affected by the organisational weakness of the key business entities, generally as a result of 
unreliable revenues, the passive behaviour of entrepreneurs and weak trade policy advisory units, 
as chapter four exposed in detail. 
With respect to the particular sequences of world market integration, organisational 
weakness usually appeared in combination with a lack of leadership within the key associations. 
In 1986-87, significant progress in the sectoral negotiations with Brazil in the PICE scope was 
avoided by the lack of intermediation capacity of the national manufacturers association UIA. 
Rather than coordinating between export-oriented and import-competing sectors, defining 
effective compensation measures for threatened sectors (as Chile’s CPC did in the negotiations 
with MERCOSUR), the UIA authorities were an unreliable interlocutor for the government. 
Therefore, sectors and individual companies pursued their mostly protectionist interests outside 
the UIA institutions, and in so doing, limited the state officials’ room for negotiations. 
In the 1990s, the UIA and seven other leading sectoral associations were organised in the 
scope of the G-8 alliance. Contrary to previous decades, the private sector demonstrated unity 
and supported the ongoing economic reforms launched by Mr. Cavallo. But beyond a general 
business consensus, which was largely based on the conviction that liberalisation was needed to 
control inflationary pressure, the leading business organisations did not develop detailed and 
                                                 
3 Chile strengthened its framework dedicated to improving the competitiveness of SMEs, increasing expenditures 
from 0.34 to 0.93 percent of the GDP between 1990 and 1999 (Ministry of Economy 2000). 
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concerted policy proposals regarding the MERCOSUR. Instead, the attitude towards this regional 
integration schemes depended on short-term interests affecting the particular sectors. 
For example, the behaviour of local business on the CET issue has been described as 
passive in comparison with Brazil, where the private sector provided permanent advice to its 
diplomacy during negotiations; indeed before Ouro Preto, no domestic policy debate really took 
into account the long-term impacts of a common trade policy regime (Botto 2004; Bouzas and 
Pagnotta 2003; Da Motta Veiga 2002). Initial criticism expressed against the CET,  principally by 
powerful industries such as food processing, steel, and chemicals, disappeared in the light of the 
impressive Brazilian import growth that took place from the beginning of 1994 (a consequence of 
Brazil’s macroeconomic stabilisation plan “Real”). 
From 2002 to 2004, when the Argentinean government began to pursue an ambitious 
external trade agenda, a strategy denominated “Multipolar” by chief negotiator Martin Redrado, 
the participation of business associations was generally faint-hearted or disperse. Contrary to the 
1990s, a multisectoral coordination mechanism no longer existed. Moreover, the UIA, the leading 
industrial entity, suffered from internal divisions, since several sectors, such as steel, 
metalworking, and textiles, built up their own “Industrialist Group”, undermining the leadership 
of the “official UIA”. Moreover, trade policies set forth by the UIA were focussed almost 
exclusively on the claim for an institutionalised safeguard mechanism inside the MERCOSUR, in 
order to protect local industries from the threatening import surges originating in Brazil. 
The business support for Mr. Redrado’s (chief negotiator) Multipolar strategy was limited 
almost exclusively to the branches related to booming agriculture commodities. From an 
institutional perspective, the creation of the Institute for International Agriculture Negotiations 
(INAI), in 1999, can be seen as the first timid attempt by local farmers to overcome the 
fragmentation among rural representatives, and the lack of professional advocacy structures. 
After the failed WTO Ministerial in Seattle, and backed by chambers representing cereals and 
oleaginous crops, INAI began to serve as a steady technical counterpart for the Secretariat of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the agriculture talks on the regional and 
multilateral sphere. Although market access conditions could not be improved fundamentally 
within the period of 1999-2004, the enhanced public-private coordination efforts gave lead to a 
stronger international presence of the Argentinean government in this crucial policy area. 
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In Peru, the firm support of the leading industrial and export chambers, in this case 
strongly encouraged by export-oriented textiles, clothing and agriculture (asparagus, mangoes, 
and grapes) was decisive to the trade policy strategy embarked upon inside the MINCETUR 
department as of 2002. Indeed, the Peruvian private sector behaved rather pro-actively, as 
business coordination mechanisms were established in the scope of the FTAA-Peru Commission 
(1998-2003) and the Entrepreneurial Council of International Trade Negotiations (CENI), which 
joined business proposals during the free trade talks with the US launched in May 2004. These 
institutional efforts had the effect of raising awareness among local business regarding the 
upcoming challenges of the international trade agenda, and facilitating the dialog with 
government authorities. 
On the other hand, the institutional deficits of those initiatives have been widespread, and 
hence, put into question the sustainability of the pursued Multipolar approach that required, 
among other tasks, the effective implementation of the undertaken free trade agreements. By 
2004, as in Argentina, Peruvian private sector organisations generally did not count on any 
professional structures (organisational strength), i.e. most entities showed no signs of 
diversifying their revenues, held small staff bases and did not permanently monitor international 
trade policy affairs. Hence, the participation inside the CENI working groups was intermittent, 
and focussed on traditional market access issues, while complex behind-the-border topics were 
largely neglected. Moreover, 76 percent of surveyed experts and state officials qualified the 
technical level of trade policy proposals submitted by business entities as rather or very low. 
With reference to previous periods, the institutional deficits of the local business 
associations negatively affected the coherent pursuit of the international trade policy. In 
particular, the lack of concerted trade policy proposals (leadership) underscored Peru’s difficulty 
to pursue coherent positions in the scope of the Andean Group. The peak entity CONFIEP, a 
strong business interlocutor of the structural adjustment reforms at the outset of the 1990s, lost its 
multisectoral coordination capacities towards the end of the decade, as opposing groups emerged 
from within the organisation. On the one hand, the services (mainly finance and public utilities) 
and commodity oriented sectors (mining and fishery) had been favoured by the economic model 
in force, and hence, sustained the rationale of the Ministry of Economy and Finance that pursued 
a flat rate model and individual forms of integration. On the other hand, the “productive group” 
who favoured an escalated tariff structure and a return to the CAN, were represented by the three 
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leading industry and trading chambers; SNI (manufacturers), ADEX (exporters), and CCL 
(Chamber of Commerce). 
It is important to consider, nevertheless, that difficulties in coordinating trade policy 
interests went beyond the internal division of the CONFIEP, by also encompassing institutional 
fragmentation and the lack of solid trade policy proposals within the two groups, especially 
among manufacturers’ and exporters’ associations. Although the “productive group” vied for an 
escalated tariff and the return to the CAN, there was not a comprehensive approach to world 
market integration either among the chambers composing the “productive group”, or inside each 
of the teams. Instead of deeper commitments to pursue a Springboard Model, based on 
completing a common regional market, manufacturers were mainly concerned with uncertain 
market access conditions in the Andean markets, and higher taxes on raw material and 
intermediate goods. Therefore, in the aftermath, the “productive group” no longer acted as a firm 
advocate of the Andean integration process, for example by insisting on the convergence of 
external tariffs or the harmonisation of economic policies on the regional level. 
In light of the extremely negative effects of the state bureaucracy variable (A1), in Bolivia 
the explanatory power of the business association variable is rather limited. Particularly, the 
failure to open up the economy without undertaking complementary measures aimed at 
increasing the competitiveness of domestic sectors can hardly be associated with the behavior of 
local business entities. Therefore, the unilateral opening of the economy in the mid-1980s was 
designed by a small, inter-ministerial, staff inside the Ministries of Planning and Finance, without 
noteworthy participation of the leading peak and sectoral organisations.  Moreover, in the 1990s, 
it was the private sector organisations, especially the business entities from Santa Cruz, which 
broadly rejected the wide-reaching liberalisation commitments undertaken by the MERCOSUR 
agreement in December 1996.  
On the other hand, the absence of strong national coordination mechanisms in the trade 
policy area entailed strong counter-productive effects on the development of coherent export 
promotion schemes. For example, the inter-ministerial conflicts in the scope of CONEX were 
largely confirmed by the lack of recognised business interlocutors. The National Chamber of 
Exporters (CANEB), which at one time claimed a monopoly for the private sector representation, 
not only had been characterised by a precarious administrative structure, without holding 
significant in-house trade policy expertise (organisational strength), but increasingly suffered 
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from the internal division between the regional chambers from Santa Cruz and La Paz, 
respectively (institutional strength). In fact, the chamber from La Paz disaffiliated in 1998, before 
returning again in 2004. Similar conflict patterns were observable also in other national entities, 
such as the peak association CEPB and the National Chamber of Industry CNI. 
In general, the institutional strength of trade policy advocacy exhibited by the private 
sector in Santa Cruz was notably higher than in the capital city La Paz. The presence of the 
business think-tank IBCE, which facilitated a high degree of inter-institutional coordination 
among entities in Santa Cruz, and a permanent monitoring of international trade policy affairs, 
largely explains the rather successful consolidation of the Andean markets for agricultural 
products from the lowlands, above all soy exports which represented 25% of national exports in 
2004. In close coordination with Bolivia’s official negotiation team, the IBCE staff undertook 
permanent efforts to guarantee and preserve the Andean markets for soy products. As local 
exports regularly encountered safeguard, or discriminatory, measures applied by Colombia, 
Venezuela and Peru, intensive diplomacy in the CAN scope became necessary to obtain and 
control preferential market access conditions.4 Furthermore, Bolivia had to repeatedly insist on 
their Andean partners’ prompt application of the Common External Tariff for soy products (15-
20 percent) and the Andean Price Band System, which in combination guaranteed higher tariff 
preferences in the case of low world market prices.5 
                                                 
4 In 2002, for example, Colombia imposed safeguard measures of 29 percent tariffs on vegetable oils from the 
Andean partners; see CAN Resolution 671. Other measures applied by Colombia were related to a differential VAT 
treatment according the value added on imported products. For recent restrictions taken by Venezuela during 2005, 
the principal buyer’s market, see El Nuevo Día 18/08/2005 or IBCE publication Comercio Exterior; March 2005. 
5 The purpose of this system, in force since February 1995, is to stabilise domestic prices for palm oil, soybean oil, 
rice, sugar, barley, milk, corn, soybeans, wheat, chicken, and pork, among others. Thus, when the international bench 
mark price falls below a predetermined minimum level, member countries will apply a variable-rate surcharge on 
imports of such products, over and above the CET. Likewise, when the international bench mark price rises above a 
certain ceiling, the member countries will lower the normal tariff rate to reduce the import cost of the staple. 
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Regarding disturbing influences on the value of B, Table 7.3 indicates the existence of several 
factors which at times entailed effects on the pursuit of world market integration strategies, often 
in negative terms. 
 
Table 7.3: Control Variable C1-C4 
  Chile Peru Argentina Bolivia 
Heterogeneity 
Sectoral 
Preferences (C1) 
85-04: rather high 85-04: rather high 85-04: rather high 85-04: rather low 
Heterogeneity 
Foreign 
Preferences (C2) 
 85-04: rather high 85-04: rather high 85-04: rather high 85-04: rather low 
Political 
Instability (C3) 
85-04: very low 00-01: very high 01-02: very high 00-04: very high 
Value of  
C1-C4 
Macroeconomic 
Instability (C4) 
85-04: very low 89-91: very high 88-90: very high 
00-02: very high 
97-03: rather high
Heterogeneity 
Sectoral 
Preferences (C1) 
85-04: rather low 85-04: rather low 85-04: rather low 85-04: very low 
Heterogeneity 
Foreign 
Preferences (C2) 
85-04: rather low 85-04: rather low 95-04: rather low 85-04: rather low 
Political 
Instability (C3) 
85-04: rather low 00-01: rather low 01-02: rather high 03-04: rather high
Effect on 
B (Policy 
Failure/ 
Success) 
Macroeconomic 
Instability (C4) 
85-04: rather low 89-91: very high 88-90: very high 
00-02: very high 
97-03: rather high
 
The influences of the selected control variables C1-C4 were mostly kept under control in 
the case of Chile. Studying the sectoral preferences (C1) involved, however, one is tempted to 
argue that the successful development of the export-oriented strategy was made possible by the 
small and homogenous private sector that survived the drastic reforms undertaken from the 1970s 
(see Bartell 1995; Montero 1990). But this argument appears to loose validity when the large 
number of signed free trade agreements is brought in line with the marked protectionist attitude 
of the influential farming elites organised inside the National Society of Agriculture (SNA). 
Hence, the coherent implementation of particular trade policies might be favoured by the rather 
homogenous, export-oriented preferences of local manufacturers (e.g. compared to the more 
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heterogeneous industry in Argentina), but strongly opposed to by farming sectors vulnerable to 
free trade (e.g. compared to the homogenous, export-oriented preferences of Argentinean 
farmers). 
Regarding the heterogeneity of foreign preferences (C2), only once was Chile seriously 
restricted in its pursuit of a Multipolar Model. In the 1990s, Chile appeared to be ready to 
undertake a comprehensive NAFTA-style agreement with the United States. But for reasons not 
related to Chile, this step could not be accomplished before 2003. Thus, the course of action was 
influenced, but not the essence of Chile’s approach to world market integration. On the regional 
level, Chile circumvented heterogeneous preferences by opting for a Multipolar Model rather 
than a Springboard approach, where strong economic policy coordination among neighbour 
countries would have been needed. 
 Finally, Chile did not suffer from any political (C3) or macroeconomic (C4) instability 
during the period of analysis, in stark contrast to most other South American countries. As 
mentioned, during the period of analysis, Chile passed from authoritarian to democratic rule. But 
the concerted method of administering this process avoided the emergence of political crisis or 
drastic changes in the making of economic policy. On the contrary, the stable environment was 
strongly conducive to coherent trade policy making, and explains, to some extent, the successful 
implementation of the world market integration strategy. Compared to the strong influences of 
A1 and A2, the positive effects of C3 and C4 were rather low. 
In the Argentinean case, however, the control of influences on the B-value derived from 
C1-C4 was more difficult than in Chile, especially regarding C2, C3 and C4. With respect to the 
former (heterogeneity of foreign preferences), the sensitive agricultural issue caused notable 
difficulties in the free trade talks with the US, EU, CAN, and Mexico, considering that Argentina, 
together with Brazil, is one of the world’s largest foodstuff producers. On the other hand, 
problems linked to heterogeneous agriculture interests became, in parts, compensated by the 
attractive consumer markets offered by the emerging trading block; indeed, from 1995 North 
American, European and Asian countries demonstrated clear interests in deepening trade 
relations with MERCOSUR states. Moreover, other FTAs such as between Chile-Canada, Chile-
EU and Australia-US, indicated the possibility of excluding certain tariff items from reciprocal 
liberalisation, or defining special phasing-out schemes for sensitive products. 
Therefore, the main factor for the deadlocked talks was the poor implementation of the 
internal agenda of MERCOSUR, especially the harmonisation of economic policies, and 
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opposing interests between Argentina and Brazil. For example, Brazil’s defensive concerns in 
new behind the border issues contrasted with the far-reaching liberalisation commitment of 
Argentina (key issues in the FTAA and MERCOSUR-EU negotiations). 
Within the MERCOSUR, integration progress depended strongly on Brazil assuming a 
clear agenda-setting role. Therefore, failures in regional integration can be largely explained by 
Brazil’s reluctance to limit its national policy-making autonomy, widespread protectionist 
measures against intra-zone imports, and its unwillingness to provide necessary funds to face 
structural asymmetries among members. It is important to note, however, that Argentina 
confirmed the absent commitment among members for deeper regional integration, considering 
the lack of incorporation of communitarian norms into national law, and the repeated entry 
barriers for intra-zone imports. As indicated, Chile, on the other hand, mistrusted from the onset 
the possibility of coordinated liberalisation efforts on the regional level, and hence, decided to set 
forth independent forms of trade integration, thus rejecting the MERCOSUR’s Customs Union. 
Regarding the effects of control variable C4 (macroeconomic instability), throughout the 
1980s, Argentina suffered from strong inflationary pressure, a shortage of foreign capital, and 
high fiscal deficits, explaining in parts the decline of the sectoral PICE approach in 1988-89. 
Later, the introduction of the Currency Board in 1991, and the economic stabilisation in Brazil by 
1994, provided favorable grounds for the expansion of intra-regional trade and the consolidation 
of MEROCOSUR. This integration friendly context was again interrupted by Brazil’s abrupt 
currency devaluation in January 1999, and Argentina’s breakdown of the Currency Board in 
January 2002. During this period, Argentina faced macroeconomic turbulences due to its growing 
foreign debt, and fiscal deficits of between 3.4 and 5.4 percent of GDP. The period from 2003 to 
2004 was again encouraging for regional integration in the context of low inflation and a 
comparable evolution of exchange rates between Argentina and Brazil.  
In conclusion, in the last 20 years trade relations in the Southern Cone were largely 
influenced by macroeconomic factors. On the other hand, it can be argued that successful 
regional integration policies were not hindered primarily by macroeconomic variables, but by the 
scant advances made during the “golden times” of MERCOSUR (particularly 1994-98 and 2003-
04) in which no solid base was built to encounter more unstable circumstances. In these periods, 
practically no progress was noticeable regarding the harmonisation of trade and economic 
policies, such as the convergence of the CET, (phyto-) sanitary measures, and the liberalisation of 
services. Furthermore, in times of macroeconomic stability, it was largely the development of 
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coherent unilateral policies on export promotion and sectoral development, which supported the 
ongoing world market integration process. 
In accordance with macroeconomic turmoil, political instability (C3) was registered in 
1989-1990 and 2001-02. In the latter occasion, the combination of an unemployment rate beyond 
20 percent, the four-year recession and the rampant fiscal and debt crises, caused the compulsory 
resignation of State President Fernando de la Rúa. Strikingly, the stabilisation of the economy 
and political system took place within 2002. As indicated under macroeconomic instability, the 
instability registered in 1989-90 and 2001-02 both resulted in a backlash, principally for the 
ongoing trade integration endeavors with Brazil. Conversely, the country’s behaviour in the times 
in between didn’t provide significant evidence that coherent trade policies had been implemented. 
With respect to the heterogeneity of sectoral preferences (C1), in the past the private 
sector was often divided into export-oriented agriculture and inward-looking industry. This 
heterogeneity appears to explain the failed attempt to create a business-wide coordination pattern, 
such as the establishment of a strong peak association. But as of 1990, when economic reforms 
were implemented, this explanation appears to become increasingly invalid. First, many 
manufacturing sectors became export-oriented and peak tariffs came down to 22 percent, 
disregarding the automotive regime maintained in the MERCOSUR. Second, intra-sectoral 
division became as widespread as inter-sectoral differences. While the rather homogenous rural 
interests are represented by no less than four peak entities, and several branch organisations 
lobbying outside these institutions, the manufacturers’ association UIA was unable to coordinate 
a wide range of existing common interests among local manufacturers, a fact that became 
particularly evident with the economic opening in the 1990s. Therefore, the main problem of 
domestic business advocacy has institutional roots, and is not the result of extremely 
heterogeneous preferences. 
In the case of Peru, disturbing influences from C1-C4 were mostly kept under control. 
However, some specific comments must be made on the heterogeneity of sectoral preferences 
(C1). In general, trade policy interests among the Peruvian private sector are relatively 
homogenous, especially since the structural adjustment reforms implemented in 1990-91, when 
maximum tariff rates came down to 25%. While the commodity sectors (mainly mining and 
fishery) have traditionally been outward-looking, Peruvian manufacturing has strongly increased 
its export orientation, focussing principally on consumer goods (textiles, clothing, and foodstuffs) 
and intermediates (plastic, chemicals, and various metals). Contrary to other South American 
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countries such as Colombia, Brazil and Argentina, the fabrication of capital goods, normally 
inward-looking, is largely absent. 
The main challenge for trade policy coordination was represented by the agricultural 
sector, thus far dominated by the largely uncompetitive, small scale, production of, for instance, 
maize, wheat, rice and sugarcane. Strikingly, however, the principal trade policy conflicts 
observed, above all in the scope of the CAN, where identified among manufacturers, affecting the 
coherence of Peru’s world market integration. Hampered by collective action problems, the 
coordination of defensive rural concerns first came into view in the build up to the free trade talks 
with the United States. Nonetheless, the opposition that organised within CONVEAGRO, the 
main sectoral representative, lacked the sufficient power to avoid the conclusion of the free trade 
agreement, which had been approved by the end of 2005. 
Regarding control variable C2, Peru’s decisions on trade policy matters had to take into 
account heterogeneous foreign preferences in the scope of the CAN, particularly. The goal of 
reaching a Customs Union on the Andean level reflected the interests of Colombia, and to a lesser 
extent, Venezuela. The multi-level, or “escalated”, tariff structure reflected their industrial policy 
preferences, enabling their manufacturers to expand the modest home market in a familiar and 
less competitive environment. Therefore, Peru, which preferred a flat rate model, had two 
options. Whilst the first considered the definitive withdrawal from the CAN, and the 
implementation of individual integration modes, the second alternative required negotiating the 
Peruvian position within the Andean scope with perseverance and coherent technical arguments. 
Nonetheless, by the end of the study period, neither policy option had been followed with the 
necessary determination. 
Regarding the control variable C3 (political instability), the most noteworthy events were 
linked to the government of Alberto Fujimori (disregarding the social unrest caused by the 
hyperinflation of the 1980s). The auto-coup initiated by Alberto Fujimori in April 1992 stands 
out, with the subsequent implementation of a semi-authoritarian regime by circumventing 
essential democratic checks of balances, and finally, the compulsory resignation of Fujimori in 
November 2000. Afterwards, Valentín Paniagua became transitory Head of State until July 2001, 
when Alejandro Toledo assumed the Presidency for the period of 2001-06. 
Nevertheless, the impact of these abrupt political shifts on Peru’s trade policy was  
modest, for two main reasons. Firstly, the way in which trade policies were designed under the 
Fujimori regime differed very little from the methods used in the full democratic regimes of the 
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region, insofar as key players were found both inside the executive power and the business sector. 
Secondly, the shift towards a more active trade policy approach was initiated at the end of the 
Fujimori regime. In 1999, Alfredo Ferrero (as of November 2003 Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Tourism) assumed the position of Vice-Minister of Integration and International Trade 
Negotiations, and began to pursue a dynamic Multipolar approach. Later on, Mr. Ferrero 
persisted in office under various ministers and state presidents, while at the same time, the new 
trade policy approach gained rising recognition among state and business actors. 
Finally, with respect to C4 (macroeconomic instability), the effects on B were modest 
after macroeconomic turmoil was left behind from 1991. Compared with fiscal deficits of 9.4 and 
7.5 percent of GDP in 1989 and 1990, and annual inflation rates of 2,775 and 7,650 percent in the 
same years, the figures registered in the aftermath were very favourable indeed. Although annual 
budget deficits reached roughly 2 percent on average, and until 1994 certain inflationary pressure 
remained at an annual variation rate of 139, 57, 39 and 31 percent, the Peruvian government was 
able to set stable grounds for economic prosperity, involving the development of local exports. 
As was the case in Argentina, the Bolivian study implied a relatively difficult control of 
disturbing influences on B, especially taking into account the rather strong effects of C3 (political 
instability) and C4 (macroeconomic instability). After numerous alternating military regimes and 
the return to democracy (1982-85), accompanied by economic and social turmoil, from 1985 
Bolivia entered a longer phase of political stability that enabled five democratic governments to 
properly conclude their terms (1985-2002). Increasing political instability came into view 
towards the end of the 1990s, nonetheless. Several controversial topics, such as the eradication of 
coca plants, the engagement of the multinational companies in public water supply, possible 
natural gas exports towards the US via Chilean ports, and the US-AFTA talks, led to a series of 
social protests and street blockades by workers, and indigenous and neighbourhood organisations. 
Massive riots finally provoked the compulsory retreat of State President Sánchez de Lozada in 
October 2003. In the aftermath, the transitory presidency of Carlos Mesa (until June 2005) like-
wise operated on highly unstable grounds, whereby the political agenda became dependent on 
popular demands such as the referendums concerning the use of natural gas resources and the 
convocation of the Constitutional Assembly.  
Studying the effects on B, the governance crisis experienced, above all from 2003, 
subordinated concerns on long-term oriented trade policies. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that the strong opposition by civil society movements did not primarily jeopardise the ongoing 
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world market integration strategy, for example in struggling against the free trade talks with the 
US, but has to be seen as a reaction to the failed process of economic opening, in which domestic 
constraints had not been adequately considered. 
Regarding the macroeconomic development (C4), after experiencing rampant 
hyperinflation in mid-1980s, Bolivia was able to control inflationary pressure during the whole 
period of analysis. From 1997 to 2004, however, the Bolivian State suffered from high budget 
deficits of 3 percent and beyond. Between 2001 and 2004, the corresponding rate even moved 
between 6 and 9 percent, and thus, offered a deprived panorama for the expansion of sector-
specific and export promotion facilities, an indispensable element of the Multipolar Model (B). 
Studying the sectoral preferences (C1), heterogeneous interests were mostly observed 
along the regional lines. While the lowland producers from Santa Cruz were interested in 
preserving the domestic market for their agriculture and forestry products, La Paz sought cheaper 
prime materials for its food processing and furniture industries. At any rate, given that the highest 
tariff rate applied by the Bolivian government does not exceed 10%, the presence of strong 
multisectoral business organisations should have allowed for the reconciliation of these opposing 
sectoral views. Finally, with regard to the heterogeneous foreign preferences (C2), Bolivia’s 
trade policy was only minimally affected by other countries, disregarding specific market access 
restrictions for various agricultural goods and industrial manufactures. In general, the country had 
been widely granted with a special and differentiated treatment. For example, Bolivia was 
allowed, in contrast to Peru, to be exempted from the Andean CET (not applying the two higher 
tariff levels of 15 and 20%). Moreover, although the CAN membership generally opposed such a 
policy, Bolivia pursued a Multipolar Model in negotiating a bilateral FTA with the MERCOSUR. 
The following Table 7.4 summarises the results of the empirical analysis, and depicts the 
factors that had the strongest influence on the outcomes to be explained, in each of the five year 
periods of the study. 
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In conclusion, the study of institutional factors involved in the domestic trade policy-making 
process has proved to be extremely enlightening. It has aided in the understanding of the 
problems faced by developing countries when taking on the modern challenges of world market 
integration processes, even though in some cases, above all in Bolivia and Argentina, it was at 
times rather difficult to isolate the assumed cause-effects links. The analytical focus on executive 
branches and business organisations was warranted, given the abundant observations already 
made on the deficient involvement of legislators and civil society actors in trade policy-making, 
herein often causing the general lack of democratic legitimacy of world market integration 
processes. 
Concentrating on the degree of coherence reached in pursuing world market integration 
strategies, I was able to demonstrate, by means of the four country studies carried out in South 
America, that trade policy success depends, to a large extent, on the institutional strength of state 
bureaucracy and business associations. With respect to the independent variable A1, I proved 
that a clear division of labour in the conduction of international trade policy affairs, which was 
achieved in Chile from 1995 (and to some extent in Peru from 2002), became crucial to 
successfully encounter ongoing trade policy challenges, considering the permanent linkages 
among a broad set of policy areas that cover both border and behind-the-border measures, 
parallel negotiations on different international levels, and the complex incorporation of trade 
agreements into national laws. On the other hand, it was also shown that the failure to 
consolidate a particular organisational model in Bolivia and Argentina hindered the 
implementation of successful trade policies during the period of analysis. 
Disregarding whether there was a single (or “pilot”) agency in charge of international 
trade policy affairs (such as the DIRECON in Chile) or not, the empirical results suggest the 
importance of relying on an effective inter-ministerial coordination pattern involving broad parts 
of the executive branch. Although the official negotiation team can provide valuable input, or 
even guidelines, for development strategies, it should act primarily as an “implementing 
agency”, converting policy proposals originated from domestic policy agencies into feasible 
responses on the international level. This close involvement, for example, of the Ministries of 
Industry, Agriculture, or Labour, becomes decisive for the effective application of trade 
agreements on the national level, i.e. when the official negotiation team is no longer the 
responsible actor. However, the existence of burdensome coordination mechanism inside the 
state bureaucracy, the lack of awareness regarding the implications of international trade 
arrangements on the side of domestic policy oriented state agencies, and in particular, inter-
ministerial struggles, often limited the effective compliance with the corresponding tasks. 
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Furthermore, the openness to business, in combination with clear-cut responsibilities, was 
highlighted as an essential component for successful world market integration strategies. In Chile 
and, to a lesser extent, in Peru, the establishment of close working relations with business entities 
is essential when understanding appropriately why, and how, these countries succeeded in 
pursuing a particular approach to world market integration. In line with corporatist views, trade 
policy-makers had clear incentives for a systematic incorporation of business views, for two 
main reasons: First, the ambitious trade agenda set forth required the private sector to contribute 
with its “decentralised intelligence” from markets, through the provision of information on trade 
obstacles, investment perspectives, and market trends. Second, policy-makers needed strategic 
partners inside the business sector which shared the principals and objectives of a particular trade 
policy approach, thus providing firm domestic coalitions and disseminating the properties of 
trade policy among local sectors. 
With regard to the variable dimension resources, the effects on B were less obvious, 
considering that variances between the cases (especially between Chile, Argentina and Peru) 
were smaller than with respect to responsibilities and openness. Even though the Chilean State 
had an internationally recognised negotiation team at its disposal, the principal distinction was 
related to the vast negotiations experiences in the extra-regional sphere (e.g. with US, Canada 
and EU), which helped the mainly young negotiators become familiar with state-of-the-art 
international trade policy affairs. Conversely, the implementation of a stable and well trained 
bureaucratic staff, in line with Max Weber’s writings, was absent in all observed countries 
(contrary to the development states in East Asia; Evans 1995).6 
Given the shift towards market-led development strategies that took place in every one of 
the four examined South American States in the last two decades, conversely, the organisational 
features of the private sector were more decisive than in the export-led growth strategies in East 
Asia, where the State assumed the role of planning the modes of industrial and trade 
development. Regarding the effects of the independent variable A2, therefore, the empirical 
results indicated that the (in-) effective organisation of business interests was in most cases a key 
factor in explaining the observed policy success/failure. 
                                                 
6 Thus far, in South America two mechanisms permitted the circumventing of generally limited career perspectives 
inside the public administration: (1) well doted temporary contracts for trade policy advisor, often sustained by 
international donors, or (2) the diplomatic career status. The former modus (predominately applied in Peru and 
Chile) inhibited the formation of a coherently organised bureaucratic body, which is supposed to enable an effective 
implementation and administration of undertaken foreign trade commitments in a long term perspective. On the 
other hand, the diplomatic career (prevailing in Argentina and Bolivia) offered a high degree of stability and 
institutional commitment by state officials, but has been accompanied by diplomatic training favouring the 
“generalist type” instead of required area experts, and absent incentives to serve for longer periods inside domestic 
trade policy offices. 
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Specifically, the existence of broadly recognised business entities (leadership) with the 
capacity to reconcile opposing business interests, and to develop concerted private sector 
proposals, became crucial for the coherent implementation of world market integration 
strategies. Most strikingly, in the cases of Argentina and Chile, I was able to demonstrate that the 
absence and existence, respectively, of broadly recognised peak and sectoral associations largely 
explains the policy failure (in Argentina and to a slightly lesser extent in Peru and Bolivia) and 
success (in Chile). While Chile’s business entities provided firm coalitions in favour of particular 
integration steps, Argentina’s business entities generally failed to create consensus around 
common goals. As a consequence, Chile’s policy-makers could work upon clear mandates both 
within domestic and international policy-making processes, enabling the pursuit of coherent 
trade policies. Conversely, Argentina’s key officials suffered from wobbly business proposals 
that were based on heterodox sector- and company-specific demands, mostly responding to 
short-term needs rather than long-term oriented sector strategies. 
Often combined with the amount of leadership, the degree of organisational strength of 
the business associations, in the sense of professional administrative structures, became another 
important element when understanding whether, and how, the countries were (un) able to 
manage the modern requirements of international trade policy affairs. Although effects were 
mostly inferred in general terms by interviewed key actors, the existence of trade policy advisors 
in charge of monitoring and analysing negotiations and foreign market developments, the active 
involvement of associated companies, and stable and diversified revenues, can be considered as 
essential so as to detect, and adequately assess, market opportunities, and to put forward the 
sound technical arguments required in international trade negotiations. 
In general, this study has contributed to the understanding of whether, and how, 
institutional factors on the domestic level determine the success of world market integration 
strategies pursued by developing countries, and hence, provided practical insights on attempts 
aimed at the effective institutional strengthening of trade policy-making. On the other hand, 
further research is required regarding the question of how the institutional strength of state 
bureaucracy and business associations is acquired. In this regard, the empirical observations 
clearly indicated noteworthy explanatory power related to the ongoing multilateral and regional 
integration forces. Specifically, in Chile and Peru, a clear tendency for institutional strengthening 
could be observed in the context of wide-reaching free trade agreements with industrialised 
countries, especially with the United States. Nevertheless, more systematised work is needed to 
confirm such effects of international trade policy affairs on the institutional development at the 
domestic policy-making level. 
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Table 9.1: Profile of Business Entities Surveyed 
 Total 
Entities 
Geographical 
Focus 
Sectoral  Focus Key Features 
Argentina 58 Buenos Aires 
(capital city) 
50% Industry 
25% Agriculture 
25% Trade and Services 
Strongly diversified business 
representation structure, i.e. firms 
channel interests via branch 
organisations 
Bolivia 36 La Paz 
(capital city)/ 
Santa Cruz 
30% Industry 
20% Agriculture 
50% Trade and Services 
Division of economic power 
between La Paz and Santa Cruz; 
Importance of peak entities 
Peru 29 Lima (capital 
city) 
50% Industry 
25% Agriculture 
25% Trade and Services 
Importance of peak entities 
located in Lima 
Chile 5 Santiago de 
Chile (capital 
city) 
Multisectoral (1), 
Industry (2), Agriculture 
(1), Trade (1). 
Importance of peak entities 
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Table 9.2: Questionnaire Business Associations (February – October 2004) 
Objective Analysis of Business Associations in Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and 
Chile, placing emphasis on business entities’ participation in 
international trade policy affairs. Additionally, the survey 
evaluates the perceptions of business actors regarding the 
organisation of the state executive branch and the coordination 
mechanism between public and private sectors in the conduction 
of current international trade negotiations on the bilateral, 
regional and multilateral level. 
Organisation Name  
Sector  
Year of foundation  
Name of surveyed 
person 
 
Position and length of 
time in that position 
 
Telephone/E-Mail  
Date  
1) What is the profile of your associates? 
  □ mainly businesses □ only businesses 
 
  □ mainly chambers
  
□ only chambers 
2) How representative is the entity? (with regards the sectors revenue) 
  □ 80-100%  □ 50-79% □ 20-49% □ 0-19% 
3) Are there any other entities that represent the sector, or a part of the sector? 
□ We are the only 
representative of the 
sector. 
 
□ We are the 
main 
representative. 
 
□ There is a certain 
institutional 
fragmentation within 
the sector. 
□ The sector suffers 
from elevated 
institutional 
fragmentation. 
4) How diversified are the organisations revenues?  
□ The revenues 
originate exclusively 
from its members. 
 
□ The members’ 
contributions 
constitute more 
than 90% of 
revenues. 
 
□ Between 10 and 
40% of revenues are 
obtained through 
activities and 
services.  
□ More than 40% of 
revenues are 
obtained through 
activities and 
services. 
5) What share of membership regularly meets the deadline for membership fees? 
□  80 -100%  □  50-79% □ 20-49%  □ less than 20% 
6) Which internal body is responsible for international trade policy affairs? 
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□ There are specific 
commissions for 
international trade 
negotiations and for 
foreign trade. 
□ There is a 
foreign trade 
commission that 
also handles 
international trade 
negotiations. 
□ The commission or 
executive board 
places great 
importance on 
international trade 
policy affairs. 
□ International trade 
policy affairs are not 
a priority within the 
entity.  
 
7) How do you evaluate members’ participation in the scope of internal bodies 
responsible for international trade policy affairs? 
  □  very active 
 
□  rather active □ rather passive  □ very passive 
 
8) Is there any permanent staff in charge of international trade policy affairs? 
□ There is a Centre of 
Economic Studies with 
three or more 
technicians. 
□ There is a 
foreign affairs 
department or 
management with 
1-2 technicians. 
□ The executive 
Director is an expert 
in this issue and/or 
we have external 
assessors specifically 
for this issue. 
□ International trade 
policy affairs are not 
a priority issue for 
the permanent staff. 
9) Has the organisation carried out impact studies regarding concluded or ongoing 
international trade negotiations? 
□ Technical studies 
were carried out for 
particular trade 
negotiations/integration 
processes (ALCA, 
WTO, MERCOSUR, 
etc.) 
□ A general 
technical study on 
the trade 
negotiations has 
been elaborated. 
□ Studies were 
carried out in 
conjunction with 
other entities on a 
wider sector. 
□ No such studies 
were carried out. 
10) Hoy many employees work permanently (minimum 50% dedication) for the 
organisation? 
Size of the administrative 
body: 
 
Size of the technical body: 
 
Total number of employees: 
 
11) In your opinion, does the government take adequate measures to ensure 
transparency concerning advances and possible impacts of ongoing international trade 
negotiations? 
□ Yes, absolutely 
 
□ On the whole, 
yes 
□ On the whole, no 
 
□ Absolutely not 
12) Bearing this in mind, can improvements be noted in the last ten years? 
□ Yes, there has been a 
great improvement.         
□ Yes, there has 
been a slight 
□ No, it has 
worsened slightly. 
□  No, it has clearly 
worsened. 
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 improvement. 
13) Does the government closely coordinate with business associations in trade policy 
affairs, involving the conduction of trade negotiations and the implementation of trade 
agreements? If not, in what sectors/issues can coordination gaps be identified?  
□ Yes, very closely. 
  
□ Yes, rather 
closely. 
 
□ No, coordination is 
only sporadic. 
   
□ No, there is 
practically no 
coordination. 
Comments: 
 
14) Inside the executive branch, is there a clear division of labour in the conduction of 
international trade policy affairs? If not, in what areas can ambiguity be identified? 
□ Yes, it’s very clear. □ Yes, it’s quite 
clear.  
□ No, it’s quite 
unclear.  
□ No, it’s very 
unclear. 
Comments: 
 
15) Is their close inter-ministerial coordination among the departments involved in 
international trade policy affairs? If not, in what areas can coordination gaps be 
identified?  
□ Yes, it’s very close.  □ Yes, it’s rather 
close. 
□ No, it’s quite 
sporadic. 
□ No, it’s very 
sporadic. 
Comments: 
 
16) Is the official team in charge of international trade policy affairs adequately staffed 
in order to comply with the technical requirements of modern trade negotiations (staff 
size, talent and experience)? If not, in what areas/issues can limitations be found?  
□ very adequate □ rather adequate □ rather inadequate □ very inadequate 
Comments: 
 
17) In your opinion, does the government carry out adequate impact assessment 
regarding the benefits and costs of international trade agreements? If not, in what 
areas/issues can limitations be found? 
□ Yes, definitely □ It’s generally 
appropriate 
  □  It’s generally 
inappropriate  
□ No, definitely not 
 
Comments: 
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Table 9.3: Questionnaire Outside Experts (February – October 2004) 
Objective Survey of the perceptions of outside experts in the areas of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Integration regarding the institutional features of 
trade policy-making processes in four Latin American countries. 
Particular importance is given to the organisation of the state executive 
branch and business sector in the conduction of current international 
trade negotiations on the bilateral, regional and multilateral level. 
Name of 
surveyed Expert 
 
 
Institution  
Area of 
Investigation/ 
Work 
 
Telephone/E-
Mail 
 
Date  
1) Inside the executive branch, is there a clear division of labour in the conduction of 
international trade policy affairs? If not, in what areas can ambiguity be identified? 
□ Yes, it’s very clear. □ Yes, it’s quite 
clear. 
□ No, it’s quite 
unclear.  
□ No, it’s very 
unclear. 
Comments: 
 
2) Is their close inter-ministerial coordination among the departments involved in 
international trade policy affairs? If not, in what areas can coordination gaps be 
identified? 
□ Yes, it’s very 
close.  
□ Yes, it’s rather 
close. 
□ No, it’s rather 
sporadic. 
□ No, it’s very 
sporadic. 
Comments: 
 
3) Is there a shared vision between the foreign affairs and economic agencies regarding 
the country’s world market integration strategy? 
□ Yes, absolutely.
  
□ It is generally 
shared. 
□ There are many 
divergences. 
□ No, absolutely not. 
Comments: 
4) In your opinion, does the government carry out adequate impact assessment 
regarding the benefits and costs of international trade agreements? If not, in what 
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areas/issues can limitations be found? 
□ Yes, definitely. □ It’s generally 
appropriate. 
□ It’s generally 
inappropriate.  
□ No, definitely not. 
 
Comments: 
 
5) In your opinion, does the government take adequate measures to ensure 
transparency concerning advances and possible impacts of ongoing international trade 
negotiations? 
□ Yes, absolutely 
 
□ On the whole, 
yes. 
 
□ On the whole, 
No. 
 
□ Absolutely not. 
Comments: 
 
6) Bearing this in mind, can improvements be noted in the last ten years? 
□ Yes, there has been 
a great 
improvement.         
 
□ Yes, there has been 
a slight 
improvement. 
   
□ No, it has 
worsened slightly. 
□ No, it has clearly 
worsened. 
Comments: 
 
7) Does the government closely coordinate with business associations in trade policy 
affairs, involving the conduction of international trade negotiations and the 
implementation of trade agreements? If not, in what sectors/issues can coordination 
gaps be identified? (Comments) 
□ Yes, very closely. 
  
□ Yes, rather closely. 
 
□ No, coordination is 
only sporadic. 
   
□ No, there is 
practically no 
coordination. 
Comments: 
 
8) Is the official team in charge of international trade policy affairs adequately staffed 
in order to comply with the technical requirements of modern trade negotiations (staff 
size, talent and experience)? If not, in what areas/issues can limitations be found?  
□ Yes, very 
adequate. 
□ Yes, rather 
adequate. 
□ No, rather 
inadequate. 
□ No, very 
inadequate. 
Comments: 
 
9) How do you qualify the business behaviour in international trade policy affairs? 
□ very  active 
  
□ rather active □ rather passive □ very passive 
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Comments: 
 
10) In light of the ongoing international trade negotiations, does the government 
implement policy measures to prepare local sectors for the challenges ahead, so as to 
take advantage of the future trade agreements?  
□ Yes, absolutely.
  
□ Yes, measures are 
generally adequate. 
□ No, there is little 
activity in this 
regard. 
□ No, absolutely not. 
 
Comments: 
 
11) How do you assess the technical level of business proposals submitted in the area of 
international trade policy? 
□ very high 
 
□  rather high □ rather low  □ very low 
 
Comments: 
 
12) How would you consider the role played by NGOs within the process of world 
market integration? 
□ Very efficient, the 
NGOs nourish the 
public debate in an 
influential way. 
□ Rather efficient, 
NGO contributions 
are rather influential. 
□ Rather inefficient, 
their contributions 
are not very relevant. 
 
□ Very inefficient, 
NGOs have very 
little influence in this 
debate 
Comments: 
 
13) How would you qualify the contribution of the academic sector within the process 
of world market integration?  
□ Excellent, the 
universities nourish 
the public debate 
with the necessary 
inputs. 
□ Rather good, the 
universities generally 
assume the 
importance of this 
process.  
□ Rather poor, the 
academic sector 
generally doesn’t 
comply with its 
corresponding role.  
□ Very poor, the 
universities are 
absent from the 
debate.  
Comments: 
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Table 9.4: Questionnaire State Officials (February – October 2004) 
Objective Survey of the perceptions of civil service employees from the 
international trade policy related areas (economic integration, trade 
negotiations, and foreign trade) regarding the institutional features of 
trade policy-making processes in four Latin American countries. 
Particular importance is given to the organisation of the state executive 
branch and business sector in the conduction of current international 
trade negotiations on the bilateral, regional and multilateral level. 
Name of 
surveyed State 
Official 
 
 
Department/ 
agency  
 
Position  
 
 
Telephone/E-
Mail 
 
Date  
1) Description of competencies of the state department/agency 
 
 
2) Institutional record (since servant entered the agency) 
 
 
3) Staff size 
Size of the permanent technical body: 
Total number of staff: 
Special advisors (external staff): 
 
4) Labour (salary structure, social security, recruitment system, staff rotation, etc.)  
 
 
 
 
5) Inside the state executive branch, is there a clear division of labour in the conduction 
of international trade policy affairs? If not, in what areas can ambiguity be identified? 
□ Yes, it’s very clear. □ Yes, it’s quite 
clear. 
□ No, it’s quite 
unclear.  
□ No, it’s very 
unclear. 
Comments: 
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6) Is their close inter-ministerial coordination among the departments involved in 
international trade policy affairs? If not, in what areas can coordination gaps be 
identified? 
□ Yes, it’s very 
close.  
□ Yes, it’s rather 
close. 
□ No, it’s rather 
sporadic. 
□ No, it’s very 
sporadic. 
Comments: 
 
7) Is there a shared vision between the foreign affairs and economic agencies regarding 
the country’s world market integration strategy? 
□ Yes, absolutely.
  
□ It is generally 
shared. 
□ There are many 
divergences. 
□ No, absolutely not. 
Comments: 
8) In your opinion, does the government carry out adequate impact assessment 
regarding the benefits and costs of international trade agreements? If not, in what 
areas/issues can limitations be found? 
□ Yes, definitely. □ It’s generally 
appropriate. 
□ It’s generally 
inappropriate.  
□ No, definitely not. 
 
Comments: 
 
9) Is there close coordination between state and business actors in trade policy affairs, 
involving the conduction of international trade negotiations and the implementation of 
trade agreements? If not, in what sectors/issues can coordination gaps be identified? 
□ Yes, very closely. 
  
□ Yes, rather closely. 
 
□ No, coordination is 
only sporadic. 
   
□ No, there is 
practically no 
coordination. 
Comments: 
 
10) Is the official team in charge of international trade policy affairs adequately staffed 
in order to comply with the technical requirements of modern trade negotiations (staff 
size, talent and experience)? If not, in what areas/issues can limitations be found?  
□ Yes, very 
adequate. 
□ Yes, rather 
adequate. 
□ No, rather 
inadequate. 
□ No, rather very 
inadequate. 
Comments: 
 
11)  How do you qualify the business behaviour in international trade policy affairs? 
□ very  active 
  
□ rather active □ rather passive □ very passive 
 
Comments: 
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12) In light of the ongoing international trade negotiations, does the government 
implement policy measures to prepare local sectors for the challenges ahead, so as to 
take advantage of the future trade agreements? 
□ Yes, absolutely.
  
□ Yes, measures are 
generally adequate. 
□ No, there is little 
activity in this 
regard. 
□ No, absolutely not. 
 
Comments: 
 
13) How do you assess the technical level of business proposals submitted in the area of 
international trade policy? 
□ very high 
 
□  rather high □ rather low  □ very low 
 
Comments: 
 
14) How would you consider the role played by NGOs within the process of world 
market integration? 
□ Very efficient, the 
NGOs nourish the 
public debate in an 
influential way. 
□ Rather efficient, 
NGO contributions 
are rather influential. 
□ Rather inefficient, 
their contributions 
are not very relevant. 
 
□ Very inefficient, 
NGOs have very 
little influence in this 
debate 
Comments: 
 
15) How would you qualify the contribution of the academic sector within the process 
of world market integration?  
□ Excellent, the 
universities nourish 
the public debate 
with the necessary 
inputs. 
□ Rather good, the 
universities generally 
assume the 
importance of this 
process.  
□ Rather poor, the 
academic sector 
generally doesn’t 
comply with its 
corresponding role.  
□ Very poor, the 
universities are 
absent from the 
debate.  
Comments: 
 
       
Curriculum Vitae  
 
Christian Robin was born on 7 November 1975 in Uznach, Canton St. Gallen. He went to 
elementary and secondary school in Rapperswil-Jona and graduated from High School in 
Wattwil (Maturität Typus E – Wirtschaft, Kantonsschule Wattwil) in 1996.  
 
In the fall of 1996 Christian Robin enrolled at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Zürich 
in Political Sciences, Social and Economic History, and Media and received a Masters Degree 
(Lizentiat) in June 2002. Between 2003 and 2006 he carried out field research in Latin 
America as doctoral candidate of the Centre for International and Comparative Studies (CIS) 
Zurich and worked for the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) in the scope 
of the Trade Cooperation Programmes in Bolivia and Peru. 
 
Christian Robin submitted his doctoral thesis in International Political Economy in February 
2006. He is currently working and living in Berne. 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com
